Insights from experimental economics on local cooperation in a small-scale fishery management system
Aswani, Shankar, Gurney, Georgina G., Mulville, Sara, Matera, Jaime, and Gurven, Michael (2013) Insights from experimental economics on local cooperation in a small-scale fishery management system. Global Environmental Change, 23 (6). pp. 1402-1409.
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Abstract
Cooperation is central to collective management of small-scale fisheries management, including marine protected areas. Thus an understanding of the factors influencing stakeholders' propensity to cooperate to achieve shared benefits is essential to accomplishing successful collective fisheries management. In this paper we study stakeholders' cooperative behavioral disposition and elucidate the role of various socio-economic factors in influencing it in the Roviana Lagoon, Western Solomon Islands. We employed a Public Goods Game from experimental economics tailored to mimic the problem of common pool fisheries management to elucidate peoples' cooperative behavior. Using Ostrom's framework for analyzing social-ecological systems to guide our analysis, we examined how individual-scale variables (e.g., age, education, family size, ethnicity, occupational status, personal norms), in the context of village-scale variables (e.g., village, governance institutions, group coercive action), influence cooperative behavior, as indexed by game contribution. Ostrom's framework provides an effective window for conceptually peeling back the various socio-economic and governance layers which influence cooperation within these communities. The results of our research show that the most important resource user characteristics influencing cooperative behavior were age, occupation and beliefs about giving access to others to fish for commercial gain. Through elucidating the factors affecting stakeholders' propensity to cooperate to achieve shared benefits, our analysis provides guidance in understanding cooperation in relation to collective management of marine resources.
| Item ID: | 31604 |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Article (Research - C1) |
| ISSN: | 1872-9495 |
| Keywords: | cooperation; collective action; fisheries management; marine protected areas (MPAs); public good games (PGG); Solomon islands |
| Funders: | David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Conservation International-GCF, Pew Charitable Trust, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF) |
| Projects and Grants: | David and Lucile Packard Foundation Grant 2011-17407, David and Lucile Packard Foundation Grant 2005-447628-58080, Conservation International-GCF Grant 447628-59102, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Grant 60243, NSF-CAREERBCS-0238539, NSF-HSD-BCS-0826947 |
| Date Deposited: | 06 May 2014 23:36 |
| FoR Codes: | 16 STUDIES IN HUMAN SOCIETY > 1608 Sociology > 160802 Environmental Sociology @ 34% 05 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES > 0502 Environmental Science and Management > 050205 Environmental Management @ 33% 05 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES > 0502 Environmental Science and Management > 050209 Natural Resource Management @ 33% |
| SEO Codes: | 96 ENVIRONMENT > 9606 Environmental and Natural Resource Evaluation > 960601 Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection @ 33% 96 ENVIRONMENT > 9606 Environmental and Natural Resource Evaluation > 960604 Environmental Management Systems @ 33% 96 ENVIRONMENT > 9613 Remnant Vegetation and Protected Conservation Areas > 961303 Protected Conservation Areas in Marine Environments @ 34% |
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