A

Apergis, Nicholas, Cooray, Arusha, and Rehman, Mobeen Ur (2023) US partisan conflict uncertainty and households' access to bank credit: Evidence from UK survey data. Global Finance Journal, 56. 100744.

C

Cooray, Arusha, Jha, Chandan, and Panda, Bibhudutta (2023) Corruption and assortative matching of partners in international trade. European Journal of Political Economy, 77. 102273.

Cooray, Arusha (2023) Corruption and the Financial Sector: An examination of the literature. In: Jha, Chandan Kumar, Mishra, Ajit, and Sarangi, Sudipta, (eds.) The Political Economy of Corruption. Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy . Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, UK, pp. 87-99.

Cooray, Arusha, and Schneider, Friedrich (2018) Does corruption throw sand into or grease the wheels of financial sector development? Public Choice, 177. pp. 111-133.

Cooray, Arusha, Dzhumashev, Ratbek, and Schneider, Friedrich (2017) How does corruption affect public debt? An empirical analysis. World Development, 90. pp. 115-127.

G

Grainger, Daniel, Watkin-Lui, Felecia, and Cheer, Karen (2021) The value of informed agency for Torres Strait climate change. Ecological Economics, 180. 106880.

Grainger, Daniel, and Stoeckl, Natalie (2019) The importance of social learning for non-market valuation. Ecological Economics, 164. 106339.

M

Mushaya, Christina Rutendo, Chaiechi, Taha, and Pryce, Josephine (2022) Integrated risk management, a conduit to building resilient and sustainable local government communities: a scoping review. In: Community Empowerment, Sustainable Cities, and Transformative Economies. pp. 515-533. From: BEMAS: 1st International Conference in Business, Economics, Management, and Sustainability, 2-3 July 2021, Cairns, QLD, Australia.

V

Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, Cooray, Arusha, and Brazys, Samuel (2018) Nothing to hide: commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard. Economics and Politics, 30 (1). pp. 55-77.

Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, and Cooray, Arusha (2016) Do freedom of information laws improve bureaucratic efficiency? An empirical investigation. Oxford Economic Papers, 68 (4). pp. 968-993.