Gervais, Will M., van Elk, Michiel, Xygalatas, Dimitris, McKay, Ryan T., Aveyard, Mark, Buchtel, Emma T., Dar-Nimrod, Ilan, Kundtová Klocová, Eva, Ramsay, Jonathan, Riekki, Tapani, Svedholm-Häkkinen, Annika M., and Bulbulia, Joseph (2018) Analytic atheism: a cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? Judgment and Decision Making, 13 (3). pp. 268-274.

Preview

PDF (Published Version) - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (266kB) | Preview

 

45

897

Abstract

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.

Actions (Repository Staff Only)

Item Control Page