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IT'S MORE THAN TOURISM: INVESTIGATING INTEGRATED CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY IN TOURIST RELIANT DESTINATIONS

~ Case Studies of Bali and Phuket ~

Thesis submitted by

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James Cook University

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At the beginning of my research a colleague flippantly remarked that beyond academic credentialing, what a PhD truly represented was an award for **P**erseverance, **H**ard work and **D**etermination. Reflecting on what has been a very long and challenging journey, I now truly appreciate how prophetic those words were.

I have been fortunate that this adventure to completion has been both shared and sustained by a vast array of people. In review, such individuals are far too numerous to afford each a formal personalised acknowledgement, so my overwhelming gratitude extends to anyone that has ever helped, supported, accompanied, and believed in my efforts to complete this research endeavor.

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Above all I would like to dedicate this thesis to my informants, the friends, families and survivors of each of these tragic disaster events. While many continue to strive for holistic recovery post-event, your stories, experiences and resilience are the true embodiment of perseverance, hard work and determination.

~ STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS ~

Nature of Assistance	Contribution	Names, Titles and Affiliations of Co-Contributors
Intellectual support	*Supervision*	Associate Professor David King Director Centre for Disaster Studies James Cook University Associate Professor Alison Cottrell Centre for Disaster Studies James Cook University
	Cartography	Adella Edwards Cartographer School of Earth and Environmental Sciences
	Peer review	Journal article blind reviewers (anonymous) Conference abstract, presentation and workshop feedback
	Research Collaborations	Sustainable Tourism Co-operative Research Centre (STCRC) Dr Damian Morgan Senior Lecturer Monash University Dr Scott Cunliff Research Fellow James Cook University
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~ ABSTRACT ~

Since the turn of the century the global tourism industry has been impacted by an increasing and diverse range of external shocks including, terrorism, pandemics, earthquakes, civil unrest, tsunami, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and a global financial and economic downturn. As an industry that generates hundreds of billions of dollars annually through income revenues, employment, investment and infrastructure, there has been a growing interest in trying to develop more effective management strategies to prevent and/or mitigate the adverse effects of such events, particularly at the localised region or destination level. Central to this endeavour is appreciating the direct relationship between tourism, risk, and hazards, and recognising that the tourism industry is inherently susceptible to crises and disasters.

As a relatively recent area of research, existing literature on tourism crisis and disaster risk management reflects numerous definitions and academic approaches. Advocating the ideal of sustainable tourism development, discourse in development studies examines the broader historical, social, political, economic and environmental context of tourism development to better understand the dynamics of destination vulnerability and capacity. While disaster risk management is similarly premised in understanding the context, it elaborates on the functional phases of a disaster, promoting proactive hazard prevention and mitigation. Utilising this functional strategic management approach, scholars such as Faulkner (2001) and Ritchie (2004) have developed prescriptive crisis and disaster management frameworks specifically for the tourism industry.

Despite the incidence of crises and disasters continuing to affect entire tourist destinations and host communities, there have been limited attempts to synthesise key measures of destination vulnerability and sustainable development within the existing tourism disaster risk management modelling. Similarly, as disasters and crisis events are frequently detailed in autonomous linear models of specific duration, occurring in an identifiable time and space, it remains difficult to realise the complex diversity of additional factors and longer term issues that influence the outcome of management and recovery efforts. The advent of the Bali Bombings (October 2002, 2005) and South

Asia Tsunami (26 December 2004) within communities characteristic of tourism dependency provided an opportunity to directly assess the value of a more holistic integrated approach to understanding tourism disaster management strategies and destination recovery.

Consistent with contemporary disaster management and tourism research, case studies are utilised as "a holistic empirical inquiry … to gain an in-depth understanding of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, using multiple sources of evidence" (Beeton 2005:42). The longitudinal case studies in this treatise have been established in intensive fieldwork periods reviewing the full continuum of disaster management from response and recovery to prevention and preparedness. Fieldwork methods involved observation, participant observation and informal and semi-structured interviews with a diversity of individuals from key stakeholder groups. Supplementary and secondary data included photographs, official reports, print media, web material, journal articles and continued email correspondence with key informants. The significant data set collected was organised temporally to correspond and compare with the progressive linear phases or anatomy of a crisis/disaster as characterised in Faulkner's (2001) and Ritchie's (2004) tourism disaster management frameworks.

The synthesis of case study results demonstrates that linear tourism disaster management models focused specifically on the tourism industry are unable to appreciate or address the broader context of destination vulnerability and capacity for sustainable recovery. In the absence of integrated, proactive, participatory planning, recovery management efforts supported a return to the pre-crisis "normalcy" of tourism dependency rather than sustainable transformation aimed at disaster risk reduction. While conventional tourism statistics suggest gradual industry and destination recovery, conditions for many host community stakeholders including individuals, families, small and medium enterprises (SME) and members of the informal sector, remain tenuous.

Recommendations for comprehensive disaster risk management and greater sustainability for tourist destinations are premised in a more holistic, integrated approach to crisis and disaster management encompassing: all hazards, all phases, all resources and all stakeholders. Additionally, in recognising the unique and dynamic

nature of each destination and potential hazard, practical disaster management needs to be continuous, flexible, adaptable, and self-appreciating.

As an industry that is heavily reliant on public perceptions of safety, security and reputation, tourism will always be susceptible to crises and disaster. While impacts are experienced most significantly at the localised region or destination level, understanding the broader context of vulnerability and capacity is integral to the planning and implementation of more effective and sustainable tourism disaster risk management strategies. Although crises and disasters are inevitable, case studies of afflicted destinations facilitate industry and organisational learning to build better management capacity and mitigate adversity.

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~ ACRONYMS ~

ACHR - Asian Coalition of Housing Rights

ADPC - Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre

ADRC – Asian Disaster Reduction Centre

AEMI – Australian Emergency Management Institute

AFP – Australian Federal Police

AICST - APEC International Centre for Sustainable Tourism

APEC - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ATTA - Association of Thai Travel Agents

ASITA - Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agents

BCBTA - Bali Community Based Tourism Organisation

BHA - Bali Hotel Association

BPS – Badan Pusat Statistik – Bali Statistics Office

BPBD - Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah – Area Office

BNPD - Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – National Disaster Mitigation Agency

BTB - Bali Tourism Board

CGI - Consultative Group of Indonesia

DDPM - Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

DRC – Disaster Research Centre

EHA – World Health Organization - Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action

EMA – Emergency Management Australia

EOC – Emergency Operations Centre

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HFA – Hyogo Framework for Action

ICTB - Indonesia Culture and Tourism Board

IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

KSBA - Kuta Small Business Association

MICE – Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Exhibitions

NHC – Natural Hazards Centre

NHRAIC - Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Centre

NSO – National Statistics Office of Thailand

NTO – National Tourism Organisations

OEF – Oxford Economic Forecasting

PATA - Pacific Asia Travel Association

PEDRR - Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction

PHRI - Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association

PTA – Phuket Tourism Association

RTG - Royal Thai Government

SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

STCRC – Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre

TAT - Tourism Association of Thailand

TCMI – Tourism Crisis Management Institute

THA - Thai Hotel Association

TSA – Tourism Satellite Accounting

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNDRO – United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation

UNEP – United Nations Environment Program

UNESCAP - United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

UNISDR - United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

UNWTO – United Nations World Tourism Organisation

USAID - United States Agency International Development

UTS – University of Technology - Sydney

WCDR – World Conference on Disaster Reduction

WCED - World Commission on Environment and Development

WHO - World Health Organisation

WTO - World Tourism Organisation

WTTC - World Travel and Trade Council

~ Crisis: Danger and Opportunity ~

For decades charismatic leaders, motivational speakers and self-help books have extolled the meaningful life lesson and ancient wisdom behind the Chinese depiction of crisis:

"The Chinese word for crisis is written by joining two ideograms together. These two ideograms, when joined together, make up the Chinese word crisis. When these ideograms, are presented separately they stand for two different ideas or concepts. The first ideogram stands for danger and the second ideogram stands for opportunity" (Russell 1980)

危机

While authoritative Sinologists have fervently tried to correct this common mistranslation of *wei-ji,* the profound optimism behind this dialectic synthesis remains appealing. To approach crisis as a synergy between precariousness and unrealised potential is not to debase any adversity, rather it encapsulates the fundamental intent of effective crisis management – to mitigate hazard impacts through the realisation of maximum capacity and capability.

Chapter 1

~ INTRODUCTION ~

"Crisis management strategies are needed to help retain the confidence of travellers and the travel industry, and to minimise the impact of a crisis on the destination"
World Tourism Organisation (2003a) *Crisis Guidelines for the Tourism Industry*

Background

With improved transportation options, greater accessibility, and new emerging markets, tourism continues to be one of the world's largest and fastest growing industries (United Nations World Tourism Organisation 2013a). Generating hundreds of billions of dollars annually through income revenues, employment, investment and infrastructure, it has been widely endorsed as a practical and lucrative economic development opportunity, especially in developing nations. Although such positive benefits are widely evident, tourism development also generates a number of challenges. Of particular relevance to destinations which are reliant on tourism revenues is the industry's inherent sensitivity to disasters and crises.

Since the turn of the century, the global tourism industry has been exposed to an increasing and diverse range of high profile shocks including; terrorism (September 11 2001 airline-hijacking, Bali Bombings 2002 and 2005, Madrid train bombing 2004, London public transport bombings 2005, Mumbai shooting and bombings 2008, Boston Bombing 2013, Kenya mall attack 2013), disease pandemics (Foot and Mouth 2001, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS] 2002-3, Avian influenza [H5N1] 2003-6), ongoing civil unrest (Israel, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Egypt), earthquakes and tsunamis (South Asia 2004, Japan 2011, Christchurch 2011), hurricanes and cyclones (Hurricane Katrina 2005, Hurricane Sandy 2012), wildfires/bushfires, volcanic eruptions (ash cloud from Eyjafjallajokull eruption in Iceland 2011), and a global financial and economic downturn (2008 – 2010). As each incident has triggered tourism industry instability and/or

uncertainty, impacts are felt most significantly at the localised region or tourism destination level.

Reflecting the relative frequency and consequences of such events there has been a growing industry emphasis on reducing hazard risks for tourist destination. While the resultant strategic management models and guides consistently advocate proactive planning and preparation, many destinations continue to remain highly vulnerable to hazards, and have experienced substantial disaster losses and crisis. Resolution of this problem recommends further understanding of the complex and dynamic relationship between tourism, risk, and hazards, and the development of more holistic strategies to facilitate comprehensive destination resilience and sustainability.

Context of analysis

In an article published in 2001, tourism academic Bill Faulkner observed that

> Relatively little systematic research has been carried out on disaster phenomena in tourism, the impacts of such events on the tourism industry and the responses of industry and relevant government agencies to cope with these impacts. Such research is an essential foundation for assisting the tourism industry and relevant government agencies to learn from past experiences, and develop strategies for avoiding and coping with similar events in the future (2001:136)

With the increasing incidence and prevalence of disaster events at popular tourism destinations there has been a parallel growth in relevant literature from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Discourse in development studies, disaster risk reduction, and strategic tourism disaster management remain prominent in this sphere of research. As each theoretical paradigm provides a different context to vulnerability and hazard reduction, the synthesis of these ideas provides a broader scope to understand the issues and challenges associated with effective crisis prevention, impact mitigation, and destination recovery.

Based in anthropological or sociological research, development theory examines the processes and consequence of change in society. In terms of tourism development it examines the transition or reorientation of existing social and economic activities in relation to processes of modernisation, economic growth, dependency and sustainable development – particularly stressing the diversity of short term, intermediate and longer term impacts. Increased sustainability and livelihood security in development initiatives is envisaged to minimise the vulnerabilities associated with tourism dependency and reliance.

As any destination's social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental conditions are variably influenced by development processes, such changes alter both the level and types of risks. Disaster studies employ relative concepts such as hazard, vulnerability, resilience, capacity, and adaptation, to measure and assess this risk context. Rather than relying on purely reactive emergency response and disaster recovery strategies, disaster risk management emphasises a more systematic, proactive planning approach for every phase of a potential disaster. Informed by comprehensive risk identification, such strategies are intended to reduce the risks, mitigate potential impacts, and facilitate more sustainable disaster recovery.

Given the apparent benefits of making tourist destinations more risk averse, a number of researchers such as Drabek (1995), Gee (Drabek and Gee 2000), Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) modified disaster and risk management initiatives to develop industry relevant approaches. With the significance and value of positive image and reputation to prosperous tourism, appropriate crisis management strategies were similarly integrated to address issues of consumer confidence and risk perceptions (Fink 1986, Gee & Gain 1986). As one of the earliest published models, Faulkner's *Tourism Disaster Management Framework* (2001) is perhaps the most cited and well-known approach to managing significant tourism disaster or crisis.

In further appreciating the dynamic and chaotic nature of each event Ritchie (2004) modified Faulkner's model to present a more holistic, *Strategic Management Framework* accommodating greater flexibility, adaptation, learning and feedback mechanisms. While

Ritchie (2009) has expanded on a number of issues related to destination vulnerability and the idea of crises/disasters as positive transformative agents, current frameworks still remain principally focused on the interests of the tourism sector and notions of industry resolution and "pre-crisis" restoration.

Although it is widely recognised that hazard risks, vulnerability, and the impacts of significant disaster are not limited to the tourism industry, there have been few attempts to integrate key understandings of destination vulnerability and sustainable redevelopment within current tourism disaster management modelling. Similarly, there appears to be little consideration of the unique complexity of social, economic, and environmental dynamics within each destination.

As historical processes of development, hazard risk context, and the extent of disaster and crisis management planning can each influence destination vulnerability and recovery capacity, a more holistic, integrated approach is recommended to appreciate the practical relevance and consequence of such intrinsic destination characteristics. While it is evident that there has been an increase in systematic research relating to the disaster phenomena in tourism, the knowledge and lessons acquired from the experience of disaster and destination recovery can extend beyond the tourism industry and government agencies.

In accentuating the variable relationship between tourism, development, destination vulnerability, and sustainable disaster recovery, this thesis employs authentic case studies of significant tourism crisis to directly examine practical, operative disaster management strategies. Beyond the rhetoric of strategic tourism crisis management models or frameworks, it integrates a more holistic approach to explore the question: *"How do tourist-reliant destinations mitigate and recover from significant crisis?"*

Research design

Realised as an iterative continuum, tourism disaster and crisis management reflects a constant, ongoing system of prevention, preparation, mitigation, adaptation, and recovery strategies. As the uncertainty, demands, and diverse impacts of any significant event

cannot be reproduced, the capacity and limitations of the management strategies applied are most precisely assessed through hazard exposure and the experience of disaster conditions. Consequently, case studies of genuine disaster in tourist destinations can assist in understanding and providing transferable lessons for effective crisis recovery and improved destination resilience.

Consistent with current disaster management and tourism research, case studies are utilised as "a holistic empirical inquiry … to gain an in-depth understanding of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, using multiple sources of evidence" (Beeton 2005:42). While the high profile disasters experienced on the tropical islands of Bali and Phuket were "triggered" by separate and distinctive events, the common qualities of tourism reliance and significant crisis provided an invaluable opportunity to explore the influence of different hazards, stakeholders, and contexts, on response and recovery strategies.

As few tourism studies have attempted to follow the disaster continuum from hazard impact through to long term recovery and proactive disaster risk reduction, the case study research was designed to be longitudinal in nature. Intensive fieldwork periods were arranged in each destination to observe, document and describe key behaviours and activities, corresponding with the recognised disaster phases. Fieldwork methods involved observation, participant observation, informal and semi-structured interviews with informants from the host communities and key stakeholder groups. Secondary data collection remained an ongoing endeavour. Systematic coding and qualitative thematic analysis enabled the identification of key impacts, behaviours, issues and transferable knowledge.

In addition to the outputs of this thesis, key lessons and recommendations derived from the research have been used to assist and inform collaborative research endeavours including the Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre (STCRC) Online Tourism Training *Risk Management for Small Tourism Enterprises* (STCRC, Gurtner, Morgan and Cunliffe 2007) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) publication *Tourism Risk Management. An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism* (Robertson, Kean,

and Moore, 2006). Authored publications have also been provided to key informants within the case study communities to assist with ongoing disaster management efforts.

Scope and limitations

Although no destination is immune to potential tourism crisis, case studies of disaster in tourist-reliant destinations were specifically chosen to emphasise the multifaceted relationship between tourism, risk and vulnerability. As these destinations are located within developing nations outside the dominant Euro-American context, governance structures and the level of available human, financial and material resources may vary significantly from other case studies of tourism crisis.

The research process for the thesis was intentionally longitudinal to demonstrate the extent and scope of recovery issues. However, with the gradual decline in urgency for response and recovery strategies, related stakeholder behaviours and activities became less discernable. The content of this text reflects this apparent disparity. Similarly, as community based interviews guided the identification of key stakeholder groups, local views and experiences are more prevalent than formal tourism authorities or government insights.

Despite such limitations the value of this research is to provide a more comprehensive, holistic appreciation of tourism disaster recovery and management, and help identify tangible, transferable lessons for other vulnerable tourist destinations.

Structure of the Thesis

Following the terrorist bombings at Kuta Beach, Bali, and the impacts of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Phuket, Thailand, this research aims to document the vulnerability and capacity of social, political and economic systems, and investigate the nature of change and recovery consequent to significant crisis in these tourist reliant destinations. This will be realised through the following objectives:

1. Document the social and economic impacts of significant disaster (direct/indirect/ripple effect) and investigate aspects of permanence within host communities, particularly for the marginal and informal sector not enumerated in statistics eg. the private transport operators, guides and street vendors.

2. Explore key concepts of vulnerability, crisis, resilience, capacity, and recovery for destination stakeholders ie. investigating key stakeholder understandings, perceptions and behaviours.

3. Assess the value and appropriateness of crisis management strategies developed to mitigate and recover from tourism crisis.

Each of the objectives is broadly addressed within the chapters detailed below.

The thesis commences with a brief introduction to the contemporary tourism crisis discourse, highlighting the vulnerability of tourist destinations and the potential utility of more comprehensive management strategies to effectively mitigate significant crisis impacts and adversity. Empirical case studies of recent crises in tourist-reliant destinations are presented as an opportunity to investigate existing management strategies and review lessons towards developing more resilient, sustainable destinations.

Chapter 2 utilises a multidisciplinary approach to examine the prevailing definitions and characteristics of both tourism and disaster, synthesising literature in development studies, disaster risk management, and tourism crisis management, to articulate a holistic integrated crisis management framework for sustainable risk reduction at the localised destination level.

In reviewing relevant established practice, Chapter 3 provides the foundation for conducting effective case study research in the post-disaster context. From the selection of appropriate research sites to the adoption of a longitudinal perspective, this section explains the fieldwork methodology, informant recruitment, data collection and further development of the case studies. Data analysis and issues of validity, rigour, ethical implications and apparent limitations are also addressed.

While there is significant literature and evidence to support the assertion that tourism crises are complex, multidimensional, and often concurrent (Hall 2010, Armstrong 2008, Ritchie 2004, 2009), the case studies of Bali and Phuket chronicle the events surrounding specific disaster events. Consistent with a conventional disaster anatomy, successive chapters describe a pre-event period, a disaster impact (trigger) with emergency response efforts, the transition from response to recovery, and a longer term post-event recovery synopsis. Each phase is broadly paralleled with Faulkner's (2001) and Ritchie's (2004) disaster management frameworks. As it remains a central tenet of this treatise that disasters and crises cannot be understood in isolation from a broader holistic context, this structural style has been adopted for analytical clarity rather than suggestive of any mutually exclusive phases, strategies or experiences.

In providing a summary of the environment (natural and built), society, culture, economic conditions, organisational structures, and the process of tourism development in pre-crisis Bali and Phuket, Chapter 4 facilitates a greater understanding of the complex, multidimensional context of risk and vulnerability within these tourist reliant destinations. Many of the socio-economic stresses and pre-conditions to adversity are shown to be symptomatic of prevailing structures, systems, and processes.

Chapter 5 depicts the circumstances and specific hazard agents which triggered disaster and significant crisis conditions for each of the case study destinations. From immediate impact demands (agent generated needs) and emergency response and relief, the strategic emphasis transitions from the protection of life and property to various stakeholder reactions, including issues of media portrayal, convergence, emergent organisations and behaviour, resource identification, and destination rebuilding.

Chapter 6 describes the direct escalation of crisis conditions and more apparent intermediate impacts (consequence generated needs), elaborating on host community adaptation and resilience, industry, government and organisational response, and the challenges of both formal and informal recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The medium to longer term perspectives provided in Chapter 7 primarily addresses notions of destination and host community recovery. Stakeholder experiences of coping, innovation, capacity building, and instability, are correlated with tourism industry restoration, and government redevelopment policies, initiatives and planning. With the crisis events substantially resolved, potential destination growth and issues of future sustainability are considered.

The final chapter systematically reviews the experience of tourism crisis presented in the case studies to assess the effectiveness of destination recovery efforts. In appreciating that destinations encompass more than just the tourism sector, the evaluation employs indicators of holistic disaster recovery and sustainable redevelopment. Key lessons highlight recognised barriers and enablers from both the literature and case studies to inform the development of more holistic integrated crisis management strategies for tourist destinations. As an exploratory research endeavour, limitations and further studies are discussed.

This dissertation provides an opportunity to realise that comprehensive destination recovery and disaster management extends well beyond the tourism sector, requiring extensive integration of social, economic and environmental dynamics. While the tourism industry remains vulnerable and susceptible to crisis, it is apparent more holistic, integrated strategies are required to assist the development of safer more sustainable destinations and host communities.

As many popular tourist destinations still appear to lack adequate planning and preparation for significant disaster or crisis, a further challenge is to identify practical, relevant, and effective strategies to support (and sustain) comprehensive disaster management efforts. As the following literature review presents a number of analogous approaches to this endeavour, key concepts have been synthesised and subsequently tested in the proceeding case studies of tourism and disaster recovery in Bali and Phuket.

Figure 1.1: Thesis structure

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
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Research design
Scope and limitations
Structure of the Thesis

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Crisis Management – a flexible, adaptable approach
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Research Paradigm
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Research Framework
Fieldwork Methods
Data
Data Analysis
Limitations and Bias
Ethical Considerations
Investigating Tourism Crisis Management

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Bali – "Island of the Gods"
Phuket "The Pearl of the South"
Exploring Vulnerability and Capacity
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CHAPTER 5 - HAZARD AGENTS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND EMERGENT PHENONENA
Bali – a deliberate attack on tourists
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CHAPTER 6 - INTEGRATING RESILIENCE AND DESTINATION RECOVERY
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Southern Thailand – humanitarian issues and the "second wave"
Implementing destination response and recovery strategies

CHAPTER 7 - ADAPTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
Bali – adaptation, trail and change
Southern Thailand – peaks and troughs
Recovery evaluation and lessons learnt

CHAPTER 8 – IT'S MORE THAN TOURISM
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Organisational Learning – review and feedbacks
Lessons towards holistic integrated crisis management
Case studies of crisis recovery and lessons for other tourist reliant destinations

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Chapter 2

~ TOURISM: DEVELOPMENT, DISASTERS & RECOVERY ~

As the scale and prominence of tourism has increased it has been variably cited as the world's "most remarkable", largest and/or fastest growing industry (United Nations World Tourism Organisation [WTO] 2013a, Pender & Sharpley 2005, Drabek & Gee 2000, Chawla 2004). While global economic indicators suggest sustained tourism development and prosperity, repeated high profile disasters and incidents reveal an industry inherently vulnerable to shocks and threats. Declines in consumer confidence and associated spending following events such as the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in America, and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) have been well documented (see World Tourism Organsiation [WTO] 2003[1], Prideaux 1999, Prideaux 2003, Blake & Sinclair 2003, Beirman 2003). With a growing awareness of the sensitivity of tourism markets, there has been a concurrent increase in the level of industry and academic literature devoted to mitigation and recovery from adverse events (Ritchie 2009, Pforr & Hosie 2009, WTO 2003a, Pacific Asia Travel Association [PATA] 2003, Wilks & Moore 2004, Faulkner 2001, Bierman 2003, Glaesser 2003, Hall, Timothy & Duval 2003, Santana 2003, Ritchie 2004, Henderson 2007a, Xu & Grunewald 2009, Hall 2010, Laws & Prideaux 2005).

Despite the apparent proliferation of dedicated research and authoritative tourism "crisis management guides", tourist destinations continue to experience significant and prolonged disruption to commerce, services and reputation following any credible damage to destination image (Tarlow 2005, Santana 2003, Sausmarez 2004, Scott & Laws 2005). In considering the infinite variability of contexts and risk events Faulkner (2001) observed that the effects of any threat to tourism can be highly unpredictable and highly differential. As any tourism-related crisis is intrinsically unique and inimitable, the development of comprehensive destination management strategies recommends greater appreciation of factors that may exist beyond the scope of conventional tourism industry containment and

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[1] The WTO is now referred to as the UNWTO

resolution (Ritchie 2004, Pforr 2006, Nankveris 2009, Calgaro & Lloyd 2008). A more interdisciplinary research approach demonstrates that the volatile relationship between tourism and destination vulnerability may be further understood within the theoretical paradigms of development, disaster management and integrated tourism crisis management.[2]

Defining Tourism

In 1993 the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO 2013b) defined tourism as, "comprising the activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited". Further elucidations that define tourism as travelling for pleasure, recreation leisure and/or holidays (Hall 1998, Merriam Webster 2013), consistently feature the temporal movement and intended purpose of the purported tourist. While such definitions seem popular with academics, consultants, governments and industry professionals, a more conventional understanding of tourism is also likely to encompass the businesses, organisations, people, and services that enable the activities of the tourist (Nankervis 2000, Pender & Sharpley 2005, UNWTO 2013b). Appreciated as an industry of both *supply* and *demand*, tourism actually reflects a complex and multifaceted dynamic. Attempts to expound the wider scope and scale of tourism enterprise variably deliberate economic value, structural facets, key stakeholders, and direct marketing potential.

One of the most common international standards for measuring travel and tourism is Tourism Satellite Accounting (TSA). Advanced by the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) and Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF) TSA is a statistical instrument that measures the total direct impact of tourism on the economy at a global, national and/or

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[2]A recurrent issue in the reviewed literature is the lack of consensus regarding central definitions and terminology. Key concepts including tourism, development, disasters and crisis are used variably in a range of contexts and disciplines. While language adaptability and flexibility reflect a capacity for emergent knowledge management, such a high level of ambiguity restricts learning transference and functional application. As the value of any analysis can only be premised on a consistent understanding of terminology, key concepts for this treatise have been elaborated in the text.

regional level (WTTC/OEF 2006). Principal indicators quantify the relative size and importance of the industry, along with its contribution to gross domestic product (GDP). Such figures are consequently utilised by many governments and industry to gauge continued investment, expenditure and development.

Although TSA integrates significant data on consumer demand, consumption, employment, capital investment, and government expenditure, the variable role of other industries within this system of supply and demand suggests that it would be difficult to clearly differentiate direct tourism inputs and outputs. Similarly, as TSA is premised on the systematic and standardised use of classification and measures, the credibility of any statistical information remains contingent on the quality and accuracy of data available at every level of application. While Tourist Satellite Accounting may have value as a general indictor of industry trends, tourism can also have significant *indirect* economic impacts within destinations. Indirect employment, expenditure, skills and the informal sector can represent a significant and vital contribution to tourism related economies, particularly at the local and regional level (Hall 1998, Sofield 2003, United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] 2012). Without the availability of clear, consistent and comprehensive data it is difficult to propose any authoritative economic quantification of the tourism industry.

Rather than relying on statistical parameters Drabek & Gee (2000) and UNTWO (2013b) characterise tourism through common structural elements (products and services) including:

- Transportation Services: e.g. airlines, rail service, water passenger transport, and ground transportation (taxis, buses, vans, limousines, cars etc.), rental services;

- Accommodation and Hospitality Services: e.g. hotels, motels, and other types of visitor accommodation (bed and breakfast), and food and beverage establishments;

- Travel Distribution Systems: e.g. tour wholesalers, tour operators, and travel agencies, reservation services; and,

- Providers of other amenities: e.g. theme parks and other types of attractions, specialized retail outlets, sports and reaction, and entertainment complexes.

Nankervis (2000:10) utilises a similar service-based typology of tourism consisting of hospitality, travel, and visitor service sectors. While such categories may appear practical, analogous with Tourism Satellite Accounting, it is often difficult to determine the exact scope of tourism when many of the key services, amenities and facilities are also patronised by local businesses, government, and the general public. Other elements of the economic sector such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, utilities, health, administration, education, finance and public infrastructure can also contribute at different levels within a system of tourism supply and demand. In a broader interpretation of tourism enterprise, Pender & Sharpley (2005:7) proposed that "conceptually, the industry is made up of all firms, organisations and facilities designed to meet the needs and wants of tourists."

Rather than elaborate on infrastructure or supply and demand, an alternative perspective of tourism may focus on the concept of hospitality, concerning the principal people, organisations and networks that operate within tourism enterprises (see Timur 2003, Xu & Grunewald 2009). With tourism "stakeholders" broadly defined as "those people and organisations who may affect, be affected by or perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision, activity or issue" (Standards Association of Australia 2004) assignment of key actors and participants again becomes a complex and highly subjective issue. At the most fundamental level of any form of tourism enterprise, there is the apparent tourist and host relationship. Dependant on the degree of development, this may be extended to a network of support industries and governance systems.

As the scope and scale of the industry increases, so does the variety of apparent stakeholders. In an empirical investigation of the major players and their relative salience for a "typical" tourism destination, Sheehan & Ritchie (2005:721) identified thirty-three stakeholder categories, including a nonspecific "other". While conventional groups such as hotels, government, attractions, host-community and industry associations rated highly in

this particular study, other less evident groups included the media, advertising and volunteers.

Adding to the multitude of variable definitions, meanings and distinguishing parameters, tourism is frequently defined in market segmentations or correlated with an important yet intangible "milieu" (Hall 1998:7). Common terms such as backpacking, adventure tourism, health/medical tourism and dark (thana[3]) tourism, each describe a particular niche or type of tourism with specialised clientele, yet add very little to a universal understanding of the tourism industry. Similarly, the relative value of cultural, heritage and environmental tourism remains as indeterminate as a prevailing ethos of fun, relaxation, ambience and escapism.

Rather than a static measure or industry, McIntosh & Goeldner (1986) propose that tourism is an interactive process, "it is the sum of the phenomena and relationships arising from the interaction of tourists, business suppliers, host governments, and host communities in the process of attracting and hosting these tourists and other visitors (p.ix)". While such a reference does not quantify or elucidate the relative scale of tourism, it does provide a more open and dynamic framework to appreciate the scope of its development and influence.

Tourism and Development – the context of vulnerability

Irrespective of the definition or measure employed, most accounts of contemporary tourism development indicate progressive worldwide economic growth, expansion and new emerging markets (UNWTO 2013a, WTTC 2013). Belying such global trends however, local and regional analysis demonstrates that industry development has not always been positive, equitable or entirely self-determined (Sofield 2003, Meheux & Parker 2004, UNEP 2012). Although many locations and communities exhibit attractive qualities and amenities, the foundation of viable tourism activity requires consumer demand and a direct investment of resources – whether human, material, capital and/or financial. Influenced by a multiplicity of socio-cultural, political, economic and environmental factors, the degree of

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[3] Dark tourism, black tourism, grief tourism or thana tourism is tourism involving travel to sites associated with death (often violent) and tragedy (Stone 2013)

any stakeholder investment and commitment towards local tourism development is highly variable (Sofield 2003, Calgaro 2005, UNEP 2012). An appreciation of this broader context and the historical processes of tourism development in many countries can assist to understand why some destinations appear consistently more vulnerable and sensitive to the threat of tourism crisis.

While vulnerability and destination crisis are now well established issues within contemporary tourism, extensive reviews of existing research by Nankervis (2000), Sofield (2003) and Calgaro (2005, Calgaro & Lloyd 2008) have ascertained minimal literature that associates destination vulnerability with past practices of economic development. Yet, as formal tourism planning strategies and policy first gained prominence in a post-World War II era of reconstruction and redevelopment (Broham 1996), innumerable adverse consequences have been identified and detailed in other social science literature (Milne & Ateljevic 2001, UNEP 2012). Milne & Ateljevic (2001:370) maintain that it wasn't until the 1970s and 1980s, that tourism researchers genuinely began to consider tourism development in any terms other than quantitative economic growth. Epitomised in mass tourism and popular tourist locus in many "developing nations", dependency and modernisation perspectives demonstrate the substantive role tourism development may have played in exacerbating socio-economic, systemic and institutional vulnerabilities.

Dependency and International Development Theory
Recognised as neo-Marxist theory, dependency, or a core-periphery relationship, is premised on an operational environment of global capitalism (McEntire 2004). Proponents of dependency theory allege hegemonic governments and western capitalism directly sustain and exploit an economic power, production, and trade imbalance over poorer populations. Such an approach to development discourse suggests that disparate relationships established during eras of colonialism and imperialism were explicitly advanced through early 1950's initiatives of "universal development". Founded on policies of industrialisation, foreign investment, international intervention and aid, macroeconomic development programs were engendered in the depressed economies of the "third world" to enhance social and economic conditions (Keogh 1990, Broham 1996:49, Meheux & Parker

2004). As a labour intensive industry, with a demonstrated capacity for employment generation, income, investment, trade, and revenues, tourism was advanced as a viable and lucrative development opportunity (Broham 1996, Meheux & Parker 2004, Calgaro & Lloyd 2008, UNEP 2012).

Supported in various scales of international and national government development strategies, tourism subsequently proliferated throughout many developing countries (Sofield 2003, Meheux & Parker 2004). While successful industry establishment generated apparent increases in levels of direct capital production within such destinations, early exponents of dependency such as Britton (1982, 1989, 1991) began to question broader issues of equity and the distribution of benefits. As social researchers subsequently highlighted a growing number of issues including, high rates of foreign ownership, overseas leakage of tourism earnings (via foreign-owned tour operators, airlines, multinational hotels, imported drinks and food) and a low economic multiplier and spread effect outside of tourist enclaves, related tourism development indicated a continuing manifestation of the capitalist domination over production and consumption (Brohman 1996, UNEP 2012).

The concurrent change from traditional market-driven to state-led directives was similarly linked to a loss of articulation over domestic resources and increasing socio-economic, sectoral and spatial polarisation (Sofield 2003, UNEP 2012). As many regions developed into ad hoc enclaves or mass tourist destinations, emergent issues for residents revealed inflated prices, alienation, marginalisation, and a developing dependence on tourism as a sole livelihood option. With clear seasonal fluctuations in earnings, and a growing reliance on the marketing strategies and product preferences of large international tour operators, many local economies became less autonomous (Calgaro 2005:10).

As affluent "western/capitalists" still continue to represent the largest investors and consumers in such destinations, it has been contended that modern processes of tourism development maintain these networks and processes of relative power (Scott & Laws 2005:153). Within such a hegemonic and biased system, peripheral destinations and

stakeholders affect limited control over local development and management issues. Instead of the imagined "universal" amelioration of socio-economic conditions, such dependency discourse reveals how foreign capital and international strategies of tourism development may have actually increased the vulnerability of many host communities.

Modernisation theory and tourism development

Rather than an emphasis on the economic, political and spatial distribution of tourism development, modernisation theory has been more concerned with the processes of social and economic change. Based on institutions and collective patterns of behaviour a Weberian "lifecycle" or "modernist perspective" positions all societies on a linear span between traditional and modern (Butler 1993, Sofield 2003, McEntire 2004, Bankoff 2001:22). With traditional society viewed as backward and primitive (at the beginning or far left of a linear span), development represents the reorganisation and evolution of social and cultural institutions towards a 'modernised society' and the ideal of 'modernisation'. Modernist perspectives grew in popularity during the 1950's, with the economic benefits of active tourism development (particularly in 'least developed' or developing countries) anticipated to provide a stimulus or catalyst towards greater socio-cultural evolution (Sofield 2003).

With targeted modernisation programmes including foreign investment and intervention, tourism progressively supplanted the traditional subsistence lifestyles of many recipient communities (Calgaro 2005). As the accompanying acculturalisation of modern/"western" ideas, policies and values fostered greater urbanisation and labour redistribution, qualitative research in the 1970s revealed a variety of adverse impacts that were associated with this systemic change (Milne & Ateljevic 2001).

 The UNEP (2012) and Sofield (2003) detail numerous socio-cultural issues including the generation of seasonable/unskilled jobs, loss of local skills, environmental destruction, commodification of people and culture, loss of social control and identity, and a general disruption of the structure of the host society. Many of the problems of tourism

development identified by dependency theorists have been similarly cited as characteristic of imposed changes to economic and social processes.

Criticised as western ethnocentric doctrine, the central evolutionary and functionalist principles of modernisation theory were gradually dismissed by later theorists (Sautter & Leisen 1999:313), there is general acknowledgement that tourism development produced significant adjustments to traditional institutions and standards. Many documented changes reflect a considerable transformation in collective behaviours and established coping capacities (Oliver-Smith 1996:314). For host-communities that reorientated traditional industries and livelihoods around tourism revenues, this vision of "modern" society served to create significant sensitivity to fluctuations in tourism demand. Similarly, increasing reliance on relationships of external development aid, investment, and foreign consumption, has been correlated to a decline in community self-sufficiency and determination. Tourism development policies rationalised by modernisation did effect change for traditional communities, yet, have also created new vulnerabilities.

Sustainable Development

Although useful in explaining different facets of international tourism development and vulnerability, more recent discourse has criticised dependency and modernisation perspectives as overly pessimistic, reductionist and generalised (Sofield 2003:7). While such views emphasised common adverse impacts of tourism, Milne and Ateljevic (2001) contend that more 'balanced' social research reveals that the economic and social significance of tourism can vary dramatically between individuals, households, communities and regions. Furthermore, as increasing literature recognised that host communities and stakeholders are not merely passive recipients in most development initiatives, a more inclusive theoretical approach was demanded (Berke, Kartez & Wenger 1993:98, McEntire 2004:197). A contemporary sustainable development paradigm extends beyond such narrow conceptions of dependency and modernisation to understand the broader issues of development (Sofield 2003:5).

The global emphasis on sustainable development and livelihood security was first formally established in the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Brundtland Report. Based on a notion of intergenerational equity, the central tenet of sustainability was determined to be "economic and social development that meets the needs of the current generation without undermining the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987:43).   Premised in principles of ecological sustainability, economic sustainability, social sustainability, and cultural sustainability, related theory advocates a more holistic, integrated, understanding of development practices (World Health Organisation [WHO] 2002: 71; McEntire 2004:197). Already associated with significant ecological, economic, social and cultural implications, the issue of sustainability within the context of tourism development was similarly open to scrutiny.   When appreciated as an outcome of exogenous forces *and* endogenous powers, tourism embodies a dynamic, interconnected, and complex transaction of production, consumption, circulation and exchange (Milne & Ateljevic 2001).

Although a "sustainable tourism" approach appears to have become the ideological objective of most contemporary practice and theory, prominent tourism literature still reveals limited scope of broader biophysical and socio-cultural contexts. Additionally, while the concept of sustainability advances the long-term viability of services and resources, sustainable tourism research rarely considers practical measures of risk and hazard reduction (Nankervis 2000:36, BEST Education Network [BESTEN] 2005, Calgaro and Lloyd 2008, Nankervis 2009). As earlier development discourse clearly demonstrates that historical and social dimensions may influence levels of vulnerability (Bankoff 2001:24), any consideration of destination "sustainability" should involve a concomitant awareness of significant environments, threats and stakeholders. Although not specifically focused on tourism and destinations, literature within the field of disaster management integrates interdisciplinary knowledge of context variables, hazard agents, multiple actors, and functional capacities, towards a more encompassing understanding of development and sustainability (Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Centre [NHRAIC] 2001, McEntire, Fuller, Johnston & Weber 2002:272).

Comprehensive Disaster Management – advancing "sustainable" development

With natural, geophysical and climatic hazards an inherent danger in any human existence, there has been a long tradition of recording and relating disaster knowledge. Significant reviews suggest that as the interaction between human systems and the environment has progressively expanded, the quantity and type of hazard risks has also risen (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC] 2004, Pelling, Ozerdem, Barakat 2002:283). Decades of empirical research conducted by establishments such as the Disaster Research Centre (DRC) corroborate the apparent interface between disasters and social and economic development. Most contemporary disaster professionals accede that "while the development of urbanised and industrialised systems becomes increasingly more complex and interconnected, the quantity, scale and adverse effects of disasters are only likely to continue to grow" (Quarantelli 1984, 1994, McEntire 1999:351). As the destruction and adversity associated with each disaster event may threaten long-term livelihood security, environment and resources, development issues have a direct consequence in sustainability imperatives. In assessing the relationship between disasters, development and sustainability McEntire et al (2002:271) contend, "development often promotes disasters, disasters inhibit development, and better development practices are needed to prevent disasters".

Defining disasters

While disasters are not new phenomena, there has been extensive intellectual debate in establishing a precise concept or definition (Quarantelli 1998a). Disasters are variably depicted by hazard agent ('trigger'), geographical space, chronological time or even social construction. Traditionally dominated by literature concerning impacts, emergency response, relief and donor organisations, a common element in most disaster definitions is a need for significant aid or assistance. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2009:4) glossary defines a disaster as "a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources." Although the media and public profile of disasters perpetuate issues of post-event destruction and adversity, current disaster management

research establishes this phenomenon within a more proactive and dynamic continuum advocating systematic vulnerability reduction and mitigation.

Vulnerability and capacity in the disaster context

In a comprehensive review of risks, hazards and disasters, Blaikie, Cannon, Davis & Wisner (1994:9) describe vulnerability as "the degree to which a population, individual or organization is unable to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of disasters". Extensive data has been collated on a specific hazard type/agents and events, yet prescriptive manuals by humanitarian organisations including the UNDP/United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation ([UNDRO] 1992), IFRC, (2004) and WHO (2002), advocate greater understanding of the influences and processes which determine general hazard exposure and susceptibility (ie. the broader context of vulnerability). An integral feature of modern development and aid programmes is an understanding of key variables such as; physical, social, cultural, economic, institutional, political, environmental, and even intangible psychological and psycho-social conditions to evaluate the propensity of things to be damaged by a hazard.

Although restricted scope may limit disaster vulnerability to a specific area or social group such as the marginalised, poor, sick and/or disabled (Keys 1991:13) comprehension of a wider context demonstrates that "vulnerability is a dynamic rather than simple, linear or static condition and may affect all types of people (Buckle 1999:11)". Anderson–Berry (2002:260) similarly found that "a review of the evolving natural disaster and hazard vulnerability literature indicates that vulnerability is increasingly conceptualised as being a process that is dynamic, multi-layered, multi-dimensional and both spatially and temporally specific." As Table 2.1 illustrates the breadth and diversity of indicators of vulnerability, comprehensive vulnerability assessment must also appreciate the complexity of interactions between these factors. Conditions of vulnerability are not viewed as homogenous or inherent rather they suggest the context in which to develop mechanisms to manage risks.

Table 2.1: Facets of vulnerability and capacity

KEY VARIABLE	POTENTIAL INDICATORS
Physical	geography/geology, environment, climate, critical infrastructure and facilities, utilities plant, technology, hazardous industries, cultural, environmental and historically significant assets, transport, buildings resource base
Demography	population (numbers, growth), density, age/structure, gender distribution, minorities, isolated/marginalised, special needs, mobility
Health	medical/emergency services and facilities, health status, disabilities/mobility, nutrition, air/water quality, sanitation, disease
Economy	income, production and productivity, trade, employment, livelihoods, insurance, individual assets/savings, capital, investments, opportunity, agriculture, livestock, sectoral diversification, social safety net, financial support, economic status
Communications	public education, awareness, information and warning systems, patterns and transference, media, equipment, credibility, censorship, partnerships
Emergency Management	plans, resources and equipment, access, trained personnel, knowledge, values, experience, services/agencies, response and recovery capability
Psychological	disaster experience, awareness/knowledge, disaster subculture, stress, acceptance, risk aversion, bravado, attitude, motivation, preparation, independence, flexibility, resilience, adaptive capacity
Organised community structure/ Social aggregation	government, NGO services and social institutions, politics, logistics, policies, planning processes, management, law, authority structure, mitigation, social infrastructure, extra family/community ties and networks, safety and security, external networks
Societal/Cultural	coping strategies/mechanisms, cohesion, language, leaders, beliefs, resilience, lifelines, adaptation, innovation, skills, traditions, improvisation, values, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, integration/membership/participation, social activism, transition

Adapted from WHO/EHA (2002), Weller & Krepps (1970:10), Zamecka & Buchanan (1999:39)

Although underlying causes, pressures and unsafe conditions (Blaikie et al 1994, World Health Organisation. Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action [WHO/EHA] 2002) can provide relative measures of "high risk", the term capacity has emerged as a concept to recognise "the many capacities, resources and assets people possess to resist, cope, and recover from the disaster shocks they may experience" (Handmer 2003:55). From this perspective an appraisal of the many facets of vulnerability may also be used to identify capacity. Integration of capacity indicators within conventional vulnerability assessments appreciates that communities, organisations and stakeholders may be

constructive determinants rather than fatalists or passive victims in the disaster phenomenon. Current practice within international aid agencies recommends effective vulnerability reduction through maximising local resources and community capacity building.

Disaster Risk Management

Referring to "the body of policy, administrative decisions and operational activities which pertain to the various stages of a disaster at all levels" (UNDP/UNDRO 1992, Zamecka & Buchanan 1999) disaster management has typically been a reactive response to a significant emergency or disaster situation (Quarantelli 1998a). Formally governed by professional organisations, government agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs) and donors, decisions are frequently made with limited public consultation or collaboration (variously characterised as "command and control", hierarchical, authoritarian and/or "top down" approaches). Yet consistent with a growing emphasis on holism, sustainability and an inclusive community-based understanding, current disaster management discourse advocates a proactive, participatory approach towards continuous hazard prevention and mitigation (Wisner et al 2004, UNISDR 2013).

Thoroughly detailed in Zamecka & Buchannan (1999), disaster risk management represents a systematic process that produces a range of measures which contribute to the well-being of communities and the environment. The process considers the likely effects of hazardous events and the measures by which they can be minimised. Adapted from generic business risk management frameworks (e.g. AS/NZS4630:2004[4]), such comprehensive disaster risk management requires multi-sector, multi-level, stakeholders and collaborative relationships. Within a community this is likely to involve local public services, the private sector, volunteers, residents, and extra community organisations (Weller and Kreps 1970:19). Less obvious risk management partners may include national coordination bodies, scientific and engineering research, regional planning, social infrastructure,

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[4] This standard has been superseded by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) document Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines AS/NZS ISO31000:2009

agriculture and forestry, environment health and sanitation, civil protection and relief, NGOs, media and the insurance industry (ADRC 2003).

Based on planning and preparedness measures to reduce risk and susceptibility, this approach also endeavours to raise general hazard resistance and resilience. McEntire et al (2002:272) encourage such initiatives as "comprehensive vulnerability management." Table 2.2 reflects the persuasion of holism and sustainability philosophies on traditional disaster management methodologies.

Table 2.2: The shift in disaster management strategies

FROM	TO
Hazard	Vulnerability
Reactive	Proactive
Single Agency	Partnership
Science Driven	Multidisciplinary Approach
Response Management	Risk Management
Planning for Communities	Planning with Communities
Communicating to Communities	Communicating with Communities

Source: Pearce (2003:213)

Functional phases - a disaster management analytical framework

Although contemporary disaster management aims to proactively prevent and minimise potential harm to the community and environment, the development of effective mitigation strategies remains contingent on accurately understanding the entire disaster phenomenon. As an analytical framework, disasters are often represented in functional phases (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] 1996, Emergency Management Australia [EMA] 2003, UNISDR 2013). While the terminology, constituents and practical steps may vary, such models reflect a chronological arrangement of a generic hazard event, with a pre-event period, a trigger, and a response phase. In American disaster management literature these phases are often illustrated using the 4R's: Reduction, Readiness, Response,

and Recovery (FEMA 1996). Alternatively, this has been frequently represented in the acronym PPRR; Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (EMA 2003).

Reduction/Prevention Phase

In any conventional disaster management framework, the pre-event phase describes the measures taken in advance of a disaster. Consistent with comprehensive disaster risk management, the ideal is to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of impact and any adverse consequences. Practical hazard prevention or risk reduction strategies are generally characterised as structural or non-structural. Structural measures such as protective barriers, public safety facilities, hazard resistant buildings, and population resettlement, are typically capital intensive (Zameka & Buchannan 1999). Common non-structural options include; land use planning/zoning, regulations, economic diversification, local hazard education and establishing warning systems. Significantly, the ISDR (2004) indicates less tangible elements such as community attitude, motivation and behaviour in promoting a "culture of prevention".

Hazard Readiness/Preparedness

Hazard readiness generally refers to proactive measures and actions towards effective hazard-impact response. Such strategies are intended to diminish residual, latent and unanticipated hazard risks. Although not applicable to all contexts, conventional preparedness approaches include contingency planning, training exercises, public awareness, warnings and evacuations (Zameka & Buchanan 1999). Extensive evidence clearly demonstrates that significant disasters may be averted through early identification and treatment arrangements (NHRAIC 2001). Similarly, appropriate planning and communication can limit the level of damage to lives, property and the environment. As disaster events challenge the capacity and resources of a community, functional readiness encourages a collaborative effort, often evidenced in established memoranda of understanding, mutual aid agreements and community response networks. Beyond administrative protocol and policies, such community-based approaches remain intentionally inclusive of informal institutions, groups and relationships.

E.L. Quarantelli (1998b), noted that while preparatory arrangements for significant emergency and disaster situations are often formalised in written (paper based) disaster plans, it is the actual *process* of planning for disaster that determines subsequent capabilities (see also Auf der Heide 1989 Chapter 3). This includes public awareness, understanding, participation, coordination and sharing of resources and information. As the contexts, stakeholders and hazards may change over time, systematic disaster management plans are further anticipated to be "living documents" reflecting a demand for constant monitoring, review and redevelopment.

Disaster response and initial assessment

Disaster response actions normally commence with the detection of an oncoming "threat event", or if there is no warning, with a hazard impact. Consistent with an aim of ensuring maximum protection of life, property and environment, early warnings are anticipated to disseminate appropriate information to government officials, institutions and at-risk populations (UNDP/UNDRO 1992). Depending on the hazard agent, such warnings can offer a situation report and advice on appropriate actions and behaviour, including avoidance and/or evacuation measures. If sufficient time is available, recommended practice includes the activation of an emergency coordination centre and the organisation of potential resources (EMA 2003).

When there is a significant hazard impact, precipitating a disaster, the majority of immediate management decisions are aimed at responding to the emergency situation and keeping losses to a minimum (Comfort 1988:217). Synonymous with danger, confusion and a sense of urgency, direct response efforts are often characterised by survival and altruism. Emergency responders, whether represented by trained personnel such as paramedics, the fire department, military and police, or comprised of survivors, bystanders and volunteers, traditionally attempt to locate any victims and bring them to safety and/or medical attention (Quarantelli 1997).

Although not always formalised in the disaster management process, post-impact assessment refers to an evaluation of the specific situation and impacts to identify relief

needs, local capacity and priorities for recovery (UNDP/UNDRO 1992, Pelling et al 2002, UNISDR 2013). Similar to a triage concept, disaster assessment is conducted as soon as practical, and essentially governs a system of tactical coordination and cooperation (Auf der Heide 1989). Where feasible, authorities may establish a recognised emergency operations and communications centre (EOC). While supporting search and rescue efforts, and the continued provision of medical assistance (as required), precedence is generally given to sustaining basic human needs (food, water, shelter and security).

Dependant on the quality of accessible communication and information systems, common disaster response measures include the direction and mobilisation of humanitarian assistance/emergency relief, resource allocation, logistics and supplies (IFRCS 2004). In a typical post-event environment, survivors, affected populations, and the wider public generally want information and relevant details regarding official efforts and available support. As any danger associated with direct or secondary impacts diminishes, priorities often address the restoration of critical infrastructure, temporary housing, re-establishing self-sufficiency and facilitating the return of essential services (Comfort 1988:219-220). Further strategies may extend to social welfare involving the provision of short term social, financial and trauma assistance for survivors, and the implementation of additional safety and security measures (ISDRC 2013).

In recent times, post-disaster response environments have represented a mass convergence of heterogeneous people, agencies and organisations (Quarantelli 1985:18). Empirical analysis conducted by Weller & Kreps (1970:19) recognised the interface of numerous emergency response organisations, extra community organisations and non-emergency organisations with emergency relevant resources. Additionally, high profile disasters have become synonymous with an inundation of spontaneous volunteers and unsolicited aid and donations (Auf der Heider1989:70). Common issues associated with poor emergency management and response capacity include jurisdiction, responsibilities, duplication of effort, impediment, resource allocation and domain gaps (Quarantelli 1985:18). With the need for external assistance a defining characteristic of any disaster situation, there has also

been considerable debate regarding the ethics involved in disaster-aid provision (IFCRS 2004, Citraningtyas, MacDonald, Herrman 2010)

Disaster Recovery

Influenced by the scope and impacts of the initial disaster event (ie. predictability, nature, frequency, location, severity/intensity, scale, duration) (Weller and Kreps 1970, UNDP/UNDRO 1992) most emergency relief operations and programs are progressively reoriented towards recovery assistance. Correlated with terms such as restoration, rehabilitation, reconstruction and restitution (Quarantelli 1999), recovery strategies generally focus on the repair/replacement of damaged infrastructure and the regeneration of viable social and economic activities. Often envisaged as normalisation or as a return to pre-crisis operational conditions (NHRAIC 2001), the UNISDR (2009:10) defines recovery as, "decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk."

Although many initial response initiatives such as clearing, relocation and financial support are consistent with recovery objectives, Zameka & Buchannan (1999) describe the recovery phase as the measures taken after urgent community needs have been met. Yet as the demands of direct physical damage and short term impacts are moderated, there appears to be limited appreciation of intermediate to longer term disaster recovery issues (McEntire 1999:351, UNDP/UNRO1992:33, Norman 2006). Experience suggests that many less perceptible secondary/indirect impacts and flow-on/ripple effects may manifest weeks, months or even years after a disaster. Additionally, local post-disaster contexts are often indicative of new and emergent social arrangements, relationships and activities (Quarantelli & Kreps 1981). Australia's primary disaster response coordination agency, Emergency Management Australia (EMA 2003), stresses that disaster recovery is most effective when management arrangements recognise that "recovery from a disaster is a complex, dynamic and protracted process". Similarly, Mileti (1999) described disaster recovery as a dynamic, interactive decision –making process.

As disasters can have variable impacts on established physical, psychosocial, and economic conditions, recent approaches to community recovery have come to reflect a synthesis of generic disaster management and sustainable development principles (Pearce 2003, McEntire 1999, NHRAIC 2001). Authors such as Passerini (2000) Weller & Kreps (1970: 31-35) and Bankoff (2003) propose that beyond any associated loss and adversity, disasters may actually represent a catalyst or opportunity to encourage sustainable hazard mitigation practices. Premised in understanding and arrangements to assist affected communities to manage their own recovery, such initiatives support continuous community engagement, integration of resources, services and coordination (EMA 2003). Consistently, related development strategies are expected to maintain and enhance environmental quality, quality of life, responsibility, vibrant local economies and inter-intra generational equity (Pearce 2003:213). As key recovery actions may (or may not) include improved building structures, public warning arrangements and local hazard education, the disaster recovery environment can be seen to directly influence future hazard mitigation, risk reduction and prevention capabilities.

While the functional phases of PPRR are widely employed in emergency management planning to structure tasks and organisational roles Crondstedt (2002) and King (2007) explain that this is actually an artificial delineation. A disaster event is not necessarily preceded by formal prevention and preparedness measures, just as response and recovery actions can occur simultaneously. There is no official expiration or point where disaster management activities are no longer relevant. Extensive experience shows that the disaster process is not structured in independent sequential steps rather it demonstrates dynamic complexity where activities are inextricably linked, ongoing, reinforcing, iterative and complimentary. Such spatial and temporal diffusion may be better understood in an integrated disaster management framework.

Integrated Disaster Management

Beyond a static linear-chronological disaster anatomy, integrated disaster management conceptualises disaster events within a continuous cycle, or self-appreciating continuum (refer Figure 2.1). Respectively, the accrual of transferable lessons, experiences and

knowledge from past disaster events are anticipated to direct and/or inform further disaster management mechanisms. While based in conventional disaster principles, such an approach recognises that it is artificial to isolate any disaster experience from a broader contextual environment. An "ideal type" model, this integrated disaster management continuum recommends the appreciation of all hazards, all phases, all resources and all stakeholders, within the disaster management process.

Figure 2.1: An Integrated Disaster Management Continuum

Adapted from EMA (2003) and Standards Association of Australia (2004)

As a framework for contemporary practice the value of this model is primarily founded in improved awareness and understanding. Applied disaster management reflects dynamic and diverse roles, risks, relationships, behaviours and decisions that are not limited to formal policies and plans. As a continuous and collective social process, responsible community disaster management should similarly reflect a culture and operational environment of open communication, consultation, review, and monitoring. Irrespective of specific planning or disaster recovery activities, the primary objective in integrated disaster

management is to maximise viable capabilities, capacities and resources in the protection of life, property, environment and livelihoods.

Tourism, Sustainability and Disaster Management – an interdisciplinary approach

In 2001 an electronic newsletter produced by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (APDC) observed:

> Once an industry oriented to tourists, service and hospitality, tourism has evolved through sustainable tourism development approaches to consider not only tourists, but more importantly the physical, cultural, social and economic sustainability of host communities and tourism resources … To sustain tourism development and community livelihood, it is necessary to plan for the prevention, preparedness and mitigation of disasters at the destination. To develop sustainable tourism destinations and increase a community's physical, economic and social resilience to disasters, it is important to integrate disaster management into tourism planning and development … Despite common elements in their approaches and obvious benefits, disaster management has not been consciously integrated into tourism planning and development" (Mandke in Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre [ADPC] 2001)

While numerous high profile events in subsequent years have affected significant theoretical advances, disaster management within tourism is still poorly implemented or understood (Drabek 1995, Drabek & Gee 2000, Faulkner 2001, Beirman 2011, Robertson et al 2006, Ritchie 2008, 2009).

In the article "Tourism and Disaster Planning" Murphy & Bayley (1989) remarked that disaster management within tourism research is most commonly associated with natural phenomena. Alpine ski lodges, beach bungalows, forest retreats and thermal spring resorts are each directly exposed to recognised natural hazards risks. Similarly, entire destinations are located within, or proximate to, established hazard zones including: flood, avalanche, fire, drought, severe tropical storms and seismic activity (Faulkner 2001). In examining the geological congruence of natural hazards and tourism, Murphy & Bayley (1989:36) noted

that it is often the exotic, isolated or physically distinctive features of such locations that have made them popular tourist destinations.

Even where inclusive of other types of hazard agents, conventional destination disaster management plans are normally grounded in the needs and problems of permanent residents. As a service oriented industry however, responsible tourism management implies a moral obligation or "a duty of care" to incorporate visitor requirements (Scott & Laws 2005:151). Established research shows that when removed from their typical environment, travellers and tourists may actually be at greater risk, due to their assumed behaviour, attitude, lack of local familiarity, and the various barriers to effective communication (Faulkner 2001, Pottorff & Neal 1992, Wilks & Moore 2003). The WTO (2003a) identifies the diversity of risks to tourists, host communities and tourism employees as originating from four main source areas (although this is not an exhaustive or mutually exclusive typology - refer PATA 2003a; Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said 2003, Faulkner 2001, Gurtner & Morgan 2007):

- *the human and institutional environment* (visitor as a victim)
eg. delinquency, violence, organised crime, terrorism, civil unrest

- *tourism and related sectors* (defective operations)
eg. poor safety standards, poor sanitation, insufficient provision of security, fraud, strikes

- *individual travellers* (self-exposure)
eg. engaging in unsafe activities, travelling in poor health, creating social conflict, criminal activities, visiting dangerous areas, carelessness

- *physical and environmental risks* (physical and environmental damage)
eg. lack of awareness of natural characteristics, insufficient medical preparation, disregard of health precautions, exposure to dangerous situations

Despite the extensive range of risks and associated management issues, the tourism industry has traditionally remained hesitant to dwell on hazards and risk factors. Situations associated with danger, distress, fear, anxiety, and trauma are considered the antithesis of the enjoyment, pleasure, relaxation and stability often sought in the tourist experience (Santana, 2003). Yet as initiatives within the airline and adventure tourism industry clearly demonstrate that business can remain both profitable and viable in an atmosphere of "informed choice", there has been increased professional interest in developing proactive risk management planning for tourism destinations (PATA 2003a, WTO 2003, Wilkes & Moore 2003, Robertson et al 2006, UNWTO 2013b).

Tourism risk management - prevention and mitigation

Heavily influenced by innovations within the insurance industry, the purpose of risk management is essentially about minimising loss. It represents "the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk" (EMA 2003). Based on maximum knowledge and understanding of the contextual environment, it requires measured judgments regarding the likelihood and consequences of identified risks. Such risks can be internal and localised in origin, or may be secondary to external events and decisions (Standards Association of Australia 2004). Utilising any number of variables, matrices, permutations, equations and/or qualitative data, comprehensive risk management is proposed as a proactive and judicious approach to directly address issues of vulnerability, susceptibility and exposure. With the relative frequency, severity and socio-economic cost of recent events affecting the tourism industry, it has become widely promoted as an efficient method of reducing the potential and actual detriment of any significant hazard (Tarlow 2005; Wilkes & Moore 2003, Robertson et al 2006, UNWTO 2013b).

While the concept of tourism-associated risk management appears to have achieved substantial uptake in many medium scale and larger tourism businesses such as; international transport carriers, recognised hospitality establishments and multinational hotel/retail chains, effective development and commitment to the process requires a significant investment of time, resources and money. Formal risk prevention and preparation, when addressed at the more encompassing and complex destination/host

community level, is generally considered the jurisdiction of local tourism associations or government agencies. Yet consistent with Quarantelli's (1997) research on proactive disaster risk management, not all destinations have the resources, capacity, political determination or even knowledge to undertake such comprehensive risk planning.

As many hazard impact events also appear to be unprecedented, unexpected or provide limited warning (rapid onset), the experience of significantly affected destinations suggests that proactive risk management should be integrated with comprehensive response, recovery and mitigation strategies (Mileti 1999, PATAa 2003).

An integrated tourism disaster management framework

In spite of significant research and theoretical development in the area of disasters and tourism management, Faulkner (2001) is widely acknowledged as the first to formally conceptualise a tourism-specific disaster management framework (Miller & Ritchie 2003, Ritchie 2004, Sharpley 2004, Laws & Prideaux 2005, Speakman & Sharpley 2012). Utilising Fink & Roberts (1986) 'lifecycle' model of the disaster process, Faulkner synthesised conventional disaster management principles with recognised tourism-disaster strategies. Beyond "visitor friendly" disaster plans and proactive industry-based risk assessment and planning, Faulkner produced "a generic model for analysing and developing tourism disaster management strategies" (Faulkner 2001:135 refer Figure 2.2). Consistent with an integrative approach he additionally identified a number of "prerequisites and ingredients" for effective tourism disaster management planning which included: coordination, commitment, consultation, flexibility, involvement, education and review (Faulkner in ADPC 2001).

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Figure 2.2: Faulkner's Tourism Disaster Management Framework

Phase in disaster process	Elements of the disaster management responses	Principal ingredients of the

Precursors

1.Pre-event

When action can be taken to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disaster

- Appoint a Disaster Management Team (DMT) Leader and establish DMT
- Identify relevant public/private sector agencies/organisations
- Establish coordination/consultative framework and communication systems
- Develop, document and communicate Disaster Management Strategy
- Education of industry stakeholders, employees, customers and community
- Agreement on, and commitment to, activation protocols

Risk Assessment

- Assessment of potential disasters and their probability of occurrence
- Development of scenarios on the genesis and impacts of potential disasters
- Develop disaster contingency plans

2. Prodromal

When it is apparent that a disaster is imminent

Mobilisation

- Warning systems (including general mass media);
- Establish disaster management command centre;
- *Activate communication tree;*
- Secure facilities and office files;
- *Switch communication systems;*
- *Relocate mobile resources*
- *Relocate perishable food stocks*

Disaster Contingency Plans

- Identify likely impacts and groups at risk
- Assess community and visitor capabilities to cope with impacts
- Articulate the objectives of individual (disaster specific) contingency plans
- Identify actions necessary to avoid or minimise impacts at each stage
- Devise strategic priority (action) profiles for each phase:

  - Prodromal

3. Emergency

The effect of the disaster is felt and action is necessary to protect people and property

Action

- Rescue/evacuation procedures;
- Emergency accommodation and food supplies;
- Medical/health services
- Monitoring and communication systems

  - Emergency;

4. Intermediate

A point where the short-term needs of people have been addressed and the main focus of the activity is to restore services and the community to normal

Recovery

- Damage audit/monitoring system;
- Clean-up restoration
- *Office facilities and communication support; "Buddy System"/task force for operator counselling/support*
- Media communication strategy

  - Intermediate;

  - Long-term recovery;

5. Long-term (Recovery)

Continuation of previous phase, but items that could not be attended to quickly are attended to at this stage. Post-mortem, self-analysis, healing

Reconstruction and Reassessment

- Repair of damaged infrastructure
- Rehabilitation of environmentally damaged areas
- Counselling victims
- Restoration of business/consumer confidence and development of investment plans
- Debriefing to promote input to revisions of disaster

- On-going review and revision in the light of:

6. Resolution

Routine restored or new improved state establishment

Review

Reappraisal of marketing; planning and policy regime

36

Source: Faulkner (2001: 144)

To test the utility and validity of this tourism disaster management framework Faulkner & Vikulov (2001) conducted a retrospective examination of the Katherine, Northern Territory "Australia Day Flood" of 1998. While able to evaluate each functional disaster phase and establish significant insights, the authors acknowledged multiple complexities associated with disasters, and a need for further testing, modifications, and review (Faulkner & Vikulov 2001:343). In scrutinising the impact of Foot and Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom, Miller & Ritchie (2003) concluded that while Faulkner's model may be a helpful analytical tool, it had limited utility in tourism management planning due to the significantly variable nature of disasters and crises. While each hazard event varies in nature, intensity, duration, impact, scope and scale, Santana (2003:299) reinforces the fact that disasters are not confined by geographical vicinity, time or political and cultural boundaries.

Other researchers have additionally noted that while certain elements and principles may appear consistent, threats and disasters are not necessarily predictable, singular, linear, orderly or sequential (see Ritchie 2004:671, Prideaux 2003, Laws and Prideaux 2005, Speakman and Sharpley 2012). Reflecting a more holistic systems approach of modern interdependencies, interconnection, interacting social networks and high tourist mobility, the implications and effects of tourism disasters are rarely considered discrete or independent (Scott & Laws 2005: 156)

The importance of perception in mitigating tourism disasters
Intended as a general tool to assist tourism disaster management, the vast majority of strategic responses developed in Faulkner's framework appear to focus specifically on physical-impact risks and hazards. Yet as an industry heavily reliant on positive reputation and image, tourism remains highly sensitive to any declines in consumer confidence. As a voluntary activity, tourists and travellers retain the discretion to cancel plans, postpone trips or opt for alternative destinations. Similarly, as an extremely competitive industry, tourism markets and promotes the capacity to easily accommodate such changes in consumer desires through destination substitution.

While specific incidents such as natural phenomenon, disease outbreak and civil war, can represent a direct threat to proximate individuals, extensive industry experience demonstrates that the risk perceptions and actions of travellers are not necessarily premised in reality or objective logic (Pizam & Mansfield 1996, Speakman and Sharpley 2012). Evidenced in rumour, misinformation, prejudicial advice, and media sensationalism, tourism dependant enterprises are particularly vulnerable to a range of less tangible risks which affect negative association (Santana 2003:200). As "safety, tranquillity and peace are a necessary prerequisite for prosperous tourism" (Pizam & Mansfield 1996:1) the more a destination is publicly linked with potential risk and adversity, the greater the likelihood that consumers will make alternative arrangements.

Numerous case studies demonstrate that significant and prolonged declines in local visitor arrivals can precipitate disastrous economic conditions for dependant destinations, businesses and host communities (Mansfield 1999, Fallon 2003, Beirman 2003, Chawla 2004, Laws & Prideaux 2005, Glaesser 2006, Pforr & Hosie 2009). As perception represents a significant issue in destination vulnerability and sustainability, it is apparent that more encompassing management mechanisms are required to mitigate the impacts of both real and perceived hazards (Santana 2003:306).

Crisis Management – a flexible, adaptable approach
The term crisis management first gained prominence in the 1960's political environment of international relations and conflict resolution (Sausmarez 2004). Premised in the belief that the actions of others cannot always be accurately predicted or planned for, it refers to a process of effectively confronting and resolving crises as they arise. Corresponding with elements of disaster management, prescriptive methodologies involve identifying the precursors of crisis situations, proactively implementing contingency plans to mitigate the severity and duration of adverse impacts, and appropriate management after a crisis has occurred (Laws & Prideaux 2005, Shaluf et al 2003:30-31, Glaesser 2006) Related operational competencies include: policy planning, strategic thinking, effective decision-making, adjustment and organisational skills (Ritchie 2009). Progressively adapted into business and marketing management doctrine, traditional conceptions of crisis management

have expanded to emphasise communications, public relations and reputation management (Beirman 2003, Henderson 2007a).

While increasingly evident in a variety of disciplines including health care, finance/economics, geography, engineering and more recently, information technology security, as a science or applied approach, crisis management is still considered a "juvenile" field of investigation (Laws & Prideaux 2005:2, Robert & Lajtha 2002:190). There is no universally accepted definition or model of crisis management, yet in the business context it has been described as:

> an ongoing integrated and comprehensive effort that organisations effectively put into place in an attempt to first and foremost understand and prevent crisis, and to effectively manage those that occur, taking into account in each and every step of their planning and training activities, the interest of their stakeholders" (Santana, 1999 *cited* in Santana, 2003, p.308).

Robert and Lajtha (2002:181) contend that the key to effective crisis management is a "structured and continuous learning process designed to equip key managers with the capabilities, flexibility and confidence to deal with sudden and unexpected problems/events - or shifts in public perception of any such problems/events."   Such proficiencies are similarly aligned with research in contingency studies, organisational strategy and continuity management (Ritchie 2004, Ritchie 2009). While there is obvious value in appreciating that operational measures and capabilities may mitigate adversity, one of the challenges in developing systematic crisis management strategies has been establishing an unambiguous meaning for the term crisis.

Defining crisis
Keown-McMullan's (1997) review of almost three decades of pervasive crisis management literature clearly demonstrates the repeated effort of researchers to definitively identify what constitutes a crisis. Significant propositions suggest criteria such as: threat, urgency, potential damage, perception, context, and the level of media attention. Shaluf et al (2003)

similarly documented a plethora of definitions, typologies, characteristics, criteria and models, dedicated to an understanding of crisis. While the merits and constraints of each definition may be heavily debated, there has been a general consensus that crisis is endemic to change (Scott & Laws 2005:153). Analogous to an abnormal or disruptive event, numerous authors argue that crisis represents a critical moment or turning point that may be directly influenced by management actions and decisions (Faulkner 2001, Glaesser 2006, Ritchie 2009). Accordingly, effective crisis management represents the ability to capitalise on any positive prospects or opportunities created, while minimising adversity.

As such ideas of organisational capacity, response, control, and management remain central to mainstream crisis management approaches, Richardson (1994:74) proposes the development of a new strategic paradigm which equally considers changing the environmental context of crisis. Described as a "crisis avoiding paradigm" towards a "safer society", he advocates the development of management strategies which include ecological-utilitarian ethics, holism, participation, collaboration, community-based understanding and long-term sustainability (Richardson 1994:77). While Richardson's concept is comparable to integrated disaster management, intrinsic crisis strategies also appreciate indirect threats, perception management and the substantial role of media.

Yet, despite the increasing interest in crisis management theories, scientific rigor and application remain limited by difficulties in defining, measuring, standardising, and comparing one crisis with another (Robert & Lajtha 2002:190, Speakman & Sharpley 2012). As each crisis context is unique, specific events cannot be reliably replicated, reproduced or simulated for experimentation. Similarly, substantive information and details regarding crisis phenomena are often obscured by issues of accessibility, disclosure, transparency and accountability. Santana (2003:318) suggested that for effective crisis management processes to develop "beyond the rhetoric", further research, understanding, implementation, and subsequent evaluation, is required.

Tourism and crisis

In realising the relevance and potential for crisis management approaches in tourism, the subject was first raised in the literature of Arbel & Bargur (1980), Lehrman (1986), Gee & Gain (1986), Cassedy (1991) and Drabek (1995). Yet despite the prospective value of related strategies, Santana (2003:304) observed that the idea continues to be largely overlooked by the industry and tourism scholars. Consistently, Faulkner (2001) admonished the general lack of research on crisis and disaster phenomena in the tourism industry, on impacts of such events on both industry and specific organisations, and regarding the responses of the tourism industry to such incidents. With limited systematic development, the available literature continues to struggle to develop standardised concepts and definitions (Faulkner 2001, Bierman 2003, Ritchie 2004, Laws and Prideaux 2005, Glaesser 2006, Robertson et al 2006, Henderson 2007a, Pforr and Hosie 2009, Ritchie 2009, UNTWO 2013b).

Generally indicative of adversity, the term crisis in tourism literature is often used synonymously with risk, threat, hazard, vulnerability, emergency and/or disaster. In conferring with a panel of eight 'expert' tourism academics and practitioners, Eclipse (Moonshine Marketing 2006), found that crisis was variously described as "unusual", "sudden", "bad news", "abnormal", and "a negative event". In distinguishing crisis from a disaster Faulkner proposed that crisis represents "a situation where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt to change" (2001:136). Faulkner (2001) and Santana (2004) each ventured to summarise common characteristics of a crisis situation (refer Table 2.3)

Table: 2.3 Characteristics of a Crisis

FAULKNER	SANTANA
· a triggering event · a high threat environment with short response times · a perception of an inability to cope by those directly affected, at least in the short term · a turning point where the situation is responded to · characterised by "fluid, unstable, dynamic" situations	· unexpected · unstructured · uncertain · outside typical operational framework · requires non programmed (non-routine) responses · excessive amount of incomplete and conflicting information · highly emotional · sense of urgency/action

Adapted from Faulkner (2001) and Santana (2003)

While most apparent crises may transpire as a critical event with a limited warning period, Ritchie (2004:671) qualified that crisis situations can also be emergent (developing gradually), sustained (lasting weeks, months or even years) sequential, multiple in manifestation, or even combined in origin and effects. The WTO (2003a) generically defines tourism crisis as "any unexpected event that affects a traveller's confidence in a destination and interferes with the ability to continue operating normally." Research by Sonmez, Backman and Allen (cited in Sonmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999) resulted in the more empirical description of "tourism crisis" as:

> … any occurrence which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism related businesses: damage a tourist destination's overall reputation for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively affecting visitor's perceptions of that destination; and, in turn, cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism economy and interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel and tourism industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures.

What causes or "triggers" crisis?

As a growing body of literature continues to discuss and redefine operational definitions for tourism crisis (Glaessner 2006, Beirman 2003, PATA 2003a, Scott & Laws 2005, Laws & Prideaux 2005, Cohen 2010, Ritchie 2009, UNWTO 2013), there appears to be a similar

preoccupation towards developing a classification system or typology of potential threats to the tourism industry. Wilkes & Moore (2004:22) illustrate that tourism risks have been variably organised by source areas (WTO 2003, Sharpley 2004), hazard/agent type (human, natural, technological (PATA 2003a:23-24, Robertson et al 2006) and direct and indirect event consequences (EMA 2003:25). Despite numerous attempts to develop prescriptive lists and guides towards effective crisis identification, the risks to tourism remain infinite in both quantity and diversity. Santana (2003:318) proposes that "[a] crisis is not an event. It is a process that develops in its own logic." Consequently, he counsels that the ability to deal with a crisis is reliant on an understanding of the phases in which a crisis evolves, and the implications each phase poses to management.

Tourism Crisis Management

In response to the increasing frequency and severity of events affecting the tourism industry, the WTO (2003) published an instructive online information sheet *Crisis Guidelines for the Tourism Industry,* advocating "crisis management strategies are needed to help retain the confidence of travellers and the travel industry, and to minimise the impact of a crisis on a destination". Based on a conviction that the techniques for effectively dealing with any type of crisis are "quite similar", the WTO (2003) asserts that tourism management strategies must expressly incorporate: communications; promotion; safety and security; and, market research. These key themes have been consistently reiterated throughout the available tourism crisis management literature. Reflecting a systematic and planned approach, specific actions are recommended for the pre-crisis period, during the actual problem, and immediately after a crisis (WTO 2003). As crisis events have become more substantial the UNWTO launched their Risk and Crisis Management Programme initiative in 2009 (UNWTO 2013). The Pacific Asia Travel Association (2011) similarly produced a comprehensive resource for effectively managing tourism crisis entitled "Bounce Back: Tourism Risk, Crisis and Recovery Management Guide."

Crisis management strategies for tourism – communication, promotion/marketing, safety and security

At the most rudimentary level, communication strategies refer to the exchange of information within and between stakeholder groups. Consistent with the importance of perception management and consumer confidence in successful tourism enterprise, extensive literature has been dedicated to the development of effective communication, media and public relation strategies (WTO 2001, PATA 2003a, Henderson 2003, Beirman 2003, Henderson 2007a, Beirman 2009, Tourism Crisis Management Institute [TCMI] 2012). Yet as crisis situations are considered outside of typical operational frameworks they can necessitate the development of new communication approaches. Crisis communication strategies are intended to facilitate operational capacity and decision making under conditions of stress and duress, while maintaining honesty and integrity.

Premised in proactive planning, specific tactical and strategic procedures vary, but recommended elements include the identification of key contacts, roles, responsibilities, structures and resources. The WTO (2003:6) suggests that "the first 24 hours of a crisis are crucial. An unprofessional response could wreak further havoc on the destination, while responsible management of the crisis can actually enhance relations with the travel and trade industry and help the destination recuperate faster".

While tangible hazards may necessitate appropriate warnings, evacuations and emergency response information, constructive crisis communications establish coordination and control. This may be facilitated by the designation of an operations/media communications centre. Faulkner (2001) identified that the media can be particularly influential in the exacerbation or amelioration of crisis impacts. Recommended tourism crisis communication strategies involve establishing any physical/geographical context, full disclosure of the known facts, active engagement with the media, balanced reporting and general consideration of the public, tourists and victims (WTO 2003, PATA, 2003 Somnez et al 1999, Beirman 2003, TCMI 2012). As the threat and urgency of a crisis decreases, such strategies often become indistinguishable from promotion, marketing, safety and security initiatives.

Recognised as a highly competitive consumer-driven enterprise, the tourism industry is sustained by a well-established system of promotion and market research. Strategic approaches to development and expansion are generally supported by investment, advertising, incentives and visitor endorsements. While appropriate to normal circumstances, disaster and destination crisis situations can require the rapid development of new processes. Accordingly, crisis management strategies have been highly recommended to assist the restoration of consumer confidence when the destination becomes associated with negative images and perceptions (Mansfield 1999, Santana 2003, TCMI 2012, UNWTO 2013).

Industry professionals including Bierman (2003, 2009), Glaessner (2003) and Henderson (2007a) have devoted comprehensive publications to the awareness and understanding of strategic marketing approaches for crisis afflicted destinations. Based on business marketing principles and relevant case studies, established strategies include the expansion of domestic and regional marketing campaigns, familiarisation trips, expanding the profile and potential of the MICE (meetings, incentives, conference and exhibition) sector, incentive adding, re-branding and developing niche markets. In circumstances where travel advisories may have been implemented, and/or visitor safety has become an issue, it is suggested that promotional efforts should be complimented with tangible security initiatives, measures and comprehensive information (Ryan 1993, Somnez 1999, Beirman 2003, 2011, UNWTO 2013).

Complimentary research and case studies collated by Pizam & Mansfield (1996), Hall (2010), Timothy and Duval (2003) clearly indicate that destination risk perception has become conversely correlated with tourist arrival numbers. Irrespective of whether a threat is real or perceived, concern and apprehension regarding the safety and security of a destination may be sufficient to trigger tourism crisis. With protection of life and property recognised as a fundamental imperative, tourism crisis management proponents suggest proactive networking and collaboration with relevant government departments and emergency response services (eg police, military customs/immigration, fire, medical etc) (TCMI 2012). Such constructive relationships are enhanced through local awareness,

training, monitoring, evaluation and improved security facilities and measures. Relevant to all stakeholders, such safety and security initiatives should aim to effectively mitigate risks and moderate any associated visitor concerns or uncertainty.

Integrated Tourism Crisis Management

While is it apparent that disasters and crises can indiscriminately impact on tourists, tourism plant, institutions, communities, exposed structures and ecosystems, the majority of tourism crisis management literature appears to be oriented in organisations, industry associations, government and/or formal operational capacities. Although vulnerability and adversity is not restricted to these areas, there has been limited consideration of broader stakeholders and environmental contexts. In reviewing contemporary tourism research Pforr (2006:2) asserts "crisis management strategies have to be positioned in the context of the respective environment, including socio-cultural, economic, political, historic but also physical characteristics" Consistent with an integrated disaster management approach tourism crisis management should appreciate all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders and all resources.

Following Faulkner's model, Ritchie (2004) does present a more holistic and strategic management framework that counters the dynamic and chaotic nature of crisis events through flexibility, evaluation and modification capacities (see Figure 2.3). Presented as a continuously adaptive process of proactive planning, strategic implementation, review, and preparation for future contingencies, Ritchie maintains the need for further research and development (Ritchie 2004:681). With direct reference to business management, communication/public relations, disaster management, environment, planning, political science and stakeholder collaboration, he recommends the investigation of "different paradigmatic positions" to improve our understanding of crisis and disaster management in tourism. Consistently in 2011 and 2012 the UNWTO, Australian Institute of Emergency Management (AEMI) and University of Technology-Sydney (UTS) convened an International Forum on the Integration of Tourism and Emergency Management to "follow on and an advance on the theme of cooperative policy, strategy and practice between the public and private sectors of the tourism industry and government and private sector emergency management agencies" (UNWTO 2013c)

Figure 2.3: Ritchies's Strategic Management Framework

Strategic Management Framework	Anatomy of a Crisis/Disaster

CRISIS/DISASTER PREVENTION AND PLANNING

- *Proactive planning and strategy formulation:* environmental scanning issues analysis; scenario planning; strategic forecasting; risk analysis
- *Scanning to Planning:* developing plans from scanning and issues analysis; contingency and emergency planning

1. *Pre-Event Stage*

- Action taken to prevent disasters

2. *Prodromal*

- Apparent a crisis/disaster is about to hit

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION

- *Strategy evaluation and strategic control:* formulation of strategic alternatives; evaluation of alternatives; selection of appropriate strategies; making effective decisions quickly; influence or control over crises/disasters
- *Crisis communication and control:* control over crisis communication strategy including use of a public relations plan; appointment of spokesperson; use of crisis communication to recover from incidents; short versus long term crisis communication strategies
- *Resource management:* responsive organisational structures; redeployment or generation of financial resources; leadership styles and employee empowerment
- *Understanding and collaborating with stakeholders:* internal (employees, managers, stakeholders) and external (tourist, industry sectors, government agencies, general public, media) stakeholders, need for collaboration between stakeholders at different levels to resolve crises or disasters

3. *Emergency*

- Incident hits; damage limitation and action needed

4. *Intermediate*

- Short term needs dealt with; restoring services

5. *Long term (recovery)*

- Longer term clean up; repair; reinvestment;

RESOLUTION, EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK

- *Resolution and normality:* resolution and restoration of destination or organisation to pre-crisis situation; reinvestment strategies and resourcing; crises/disasters as agents of change
- *Organisational learning and feedback: organisations or destinations may reassess and take 'stock' of themselves; evaluating effectiveness of strategies and responses; feedback to pre-event planning; levels of learning depend on single or double loop*

6. *Resolution*

- Normal or improved state created

(Left vertical label:) FLEXIBILITY, EVALUATION AND MODIFICATION OF CRISES AND DISASTERS

(Right vertical label:) CLASSIFYING/UNDERSTANDING CRISES AND DISASTERS

Source: Ritchie (2004:674)

Although the term has yet to be applied within popular tourism/destination literature, this type of comprehensive interdisciplinary perspective is consistent with an "Integrated Crisis Management" approach as described in Crisis Management International (2004). Integrating facets of crisis management, emergency response, business continuity, disaster recovery, crisis communications, humanitarian assistance and crisis planning, it encompasses all activities relative to an organisations preparation and response to any significant critical incident. Extended to a holistic destination context, this concept of integrated crisis management would facilitate the development of comprehensive and collaborative crisis mitigation.

Beyond the rhetoric…

While it is apparent that destination vulnerably and tourism crises are neither new nor disassociated phenomena, there still appears to be limited systematic development of coherent and practical crisis management strategies (Pforr 2006, Ritchie 2009, Speakman & Sharpley 2012). With no consensus or consistent application of integral terms such as disaster, crisis, crisis management or even tourism development, it is difficult to consider the quintessence of a more effective and sustainable "integrated crisis management framework" for tourism. In the past decade there has been a rapid proliferation of theoretical and industry-based literature related to this paradigm, yet relatively modest application of tangible research and analysis. (Faulkner 2001, Santana 2003, Ritchie 2004, Laws & Prideaux 2005, Pforr & Hosie 2009, Xu & Grunwald 2009, Cohen 2010, Speakman and Sharpley 2012, TCMI 2012).

The majority of tourism crisis management case studies and investigations that have been developed remain exclusive to a hospitality and tourism industry context (Robertson et al 2006, Pforr 2006, Henderson 2007, TCMI 2012, WTO 2003a, WTO 2003b , UNWTO 2013b). Alternative methodologies outline key issues of finance/economics (Hall 2010) communication, information management and mass media/perception, promotion and marketing, or safety and security (Somnez 1998, Ryan 1992, Richter & Waugh 1986). While Fallon (2003), Calago (2005, Calago & Lloyd 2008) and Nankervis (2009) have each examined less formalised elements of destination management and development

subsequent to crisis, such investigations appear uncommon. Brohman (1996) contends that enhanced destination sustainability would be facilitated through "multifaceted realistic tourism strategies to proactively meet the changing conditions and diverse interests of the operational environment"

Although such ideas of systematic crisis management appear to be gaining increased industry attention, recent experiences of terrorism, natural disasters and disease outbreaks indicate that the vast majority of tourist destinations continue to lack adequate planning awareness, resources and/or political determination (McEntire 2004:196, Ritchie 2009, Speakman and Sharpley 2012). While larger developed countries with sizeable foreign currency reserves, high proportions of insured assets, comprehensive social services and diversified production, are more able to absorb and spread the burden of impacts over space and time (Pelling, Ozerdem & Barakat 2002 :286); tourist reliant destinations continue to remain particularly susceptible to any threat or incident that may adversely affect destination image.

As contemporary discourse within the fields of development, disaster management and crisis management each advocate greater holism and integration to effectively mitigate vulnerabilities and adversity, the validity and utility of such approaches need to be better explored in real world regional contexts. Consistent with a recurrent process of review and learning through the experiences, lessons and knowledge of related phenomena, the development of more effective methodologies for integrated crisis management suggests further examination of the question: "How do tourist-reliant destinations mitigate and recover from significant tourism crisis?" One of the most apparent and cogent means to investigate this matter is through relevant case study research.

Chapter 3
~ **METHODOLOGY** ~

As a nascent approach to understanding tourism crises, the functional value of a holistic integrated tourism crisis management framework has yet to be adequately investigated within the context of a real event. Consistent with Santana's (2003) review of the relevant literature, the development of tangible and practical frameworks for destinations need to go "beyond the rhetoric" of theory and conceptual modelling. The majority of existing research and case studies within this field of enquiry commonly represent a description of a specific disaster or crisis event and associated impacts for the tourism industry (refer Faulkner 2001, Prideaux 1999, 2003, Law and Prideaux 2005, Beirman 2003, Pforr and Hosie 2009, Cohen 2010). Some researchers such as Armstrong (2008), Calgaro (2005), Henderson (2007) and Xu and Grunewald (2009), have pursued a broader, more inclusive approach to investigating crises in affected destinations, however, most of the resultant analyses and recommendations still remain directed at the tourism sector.

While such credible research aids in the development of applied tourism recovery and marketing strategies, the highly integrated and multifarious nature of pervasive community tourism reliance necessitates a better understanding of individual, organisational and community response and behaviour in the post-disaster context. In the absence of a singular proven and accepted methodology, practical scientific enquiry recommends the adaptation of existing techniques to the specific research topic and needs (Bernard 2002, Yin 2003). Reflecting a constructivist epistemology, exploring the way principal stakeholders *construct*, engage and adapt to their experiences is foremost within post disaster and interpretive social science research.

Post-disaster research methodologies
Systematic, purposive, social and behavioural research in the post-impact disaster environment has an extensive and well established foundation. Predominant in the academic endeavour, the Natural Hazard Centre (NHC) in Boulder, Colorado, reflects a

fieldwork tradition of over 60 years while the Disaster Research Centre (DRC) at the University of Delaware has a dedicated resource collection exceeding 55000 items (DRC 2012). Investigative post-disaster literature is also well represented within analogous disciplines including anthropology, economics, medicine, health, psychology, development sociology, human geography, public policy, political science and humanitarian aid (Quarantelli 1994:3).

Reflecting a significance that extends beyond academic endeavour, comprehensive post-disaster impact investigation and analysis is widely employed in both the public and private sphere. Discernment of institutional and organisational disaster recovery demands helps to inform aspects of public policy, administrative decision-making, service delivery and agency responsibility. Governments, the military, development aid agencies, and international organisations routinely promulgate policy and manuals dedicated to the effective conduct of post-disaster survey and assessment (EMA 2001, UNDP 1993, USAID 2005, IFRC 2008). As a financial imperative, a significant component of the business and insurance industry is similarly committed to administering thorough post-disaster appraisals (i.e. Swiss Re). Given such variability in research approaches and agendas, there is no apparent singular, universal methodology applicable to post-disaster data collection and analysis.

Renowned disaster management scholar Thomas Drabek (*cited* in Britton 1989:14) contends, "there is neither a special set of strategies which might be referred to as disaster methodology, nor a separate set of techniques which might be labelled disaster research methods". Dynes (1994:1) proposed that numerous field-oriented data-collection practices and research techniques are "adaptable and relevant to the subject matter relating to disasters". Rather than employing a specific investigative technique, the majority of research reflects the application of various methodologies developed in the context of the specific disaster impact environment (Britton 1989, Quarantelli 1994, 1997, 2001, Tierney 1998). While an adaptive exploratory approach to disaster research is advocated, systematic analysis of post-impact crisis recovery in a tourist-reliant destination compels synthesis with appropriate tourism analytical frameworks.

A research design for investigating tourism crisis and network linkages

Although the connection between significant disaster and a subsequent tourism crisis is well documented in recent tourism literature, few of these commentaries detail applied research methodologies and analysis. A review of relevant web-based data generated by peak industry bodies such as UNWTO, WTTC, PATA and various NTOs suggests a focus on traditional disaster statistics (eg. fatalities, injuries, estimates of direct physical and economic damage) and conventional industry/sector based measures (eg. visitor arrivals, occupancy rates, duration of visit, expenditure). These figures are similarly replicated within media, government, recovery marketing, and promotional assessment reports. In reviewing the pervasive tourism literature, Decrop (1999) highlighted the dominance of a positivist paradigm and the associated importance of 'objective' quantitative research/data, principally economic figures and statistical generalisation. While such data may provide a broad insight to pre- and post-crisis conditions, it is widely acknowledged that disaster statistics can vary significantly in both quality and integrity depending on the source (Quarantelli 2001, Dynes 1994:2, Pelling et al 2002:283, Mileti 1999:96-100) and that disaster impacts are rarely homogenous across individuals, communities and destinations.

A more comprehensive and inclusive approach to understanding tourism crisis has been through the presentation of case studies (Law, Prideaux and Chon 2007, Pforr 2006, Pforr and Hosie 2009). Beeton (2005:42) characterises the case study in tourism as 'a holistic empirical inquiry used to gain an in-depth understanding of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, using multiple sources of evidence'. Primarily descriptive, recognised research procedures reflect a diversity of social science methodologies including; investigative fieldwork (refer Armstrong 2008), interviews (refer Ritchie, Dorrell, Miller, Miller 2003, Hystad and Keller 2008), questionnaires/surveys (refer Calgaro 2003, Armstrong 2008, Měheux and Parker 2004) and secondary data analysis (refer Ritchie et al 2003). Rich qualitative data is frequently supported with statistics and quantitative analysis. As each crisis situation is unique, dynamic, subjective, and often ephemeral, accepted practice supports the triangulation of multiple methods, interdisciplinary variables and/or data sources to study the same phenomenon (Decrop 1999, Yin 2003).

While existing case studies and assessments have persuaded the development of numerous functional guides and frameworks for understanding tourism crisis, Nankervis (2000:8) and Scott and Laws (2005:158) observe there is still limited analysis beyond a direct, functional industry context. Authors including Santana (2003), Fallon (2003), Cushnanhan (2003), Calgaro (2005) and Armstrong (2008) have extended the scope of research enquiry; yet still fail to effectively address key spatial/temporal dynamics and apparent stakeholder diversity. Issues of community vulnerability, adaptation, coping capacity, resilience, recovery and mitigation, clearly have realities that span beyond the tourism sector, industry and government policy. As both the tourism industry and contemporary disaster management processes reflect a significant intersection of global, national, regional and local systems, a more pervasive "linkages" approach as described by Kottack (1999), supports the analysis of "the outcomes of the interaction of multiple levels and multiple factors" (p.23).

Corresponding with identified frameworks of post-disaster and tourism crisis research, linkage methodologies serve to further understandings of the roles and influences of agents, agencies, forces, and time, in any local ecosystem (Kottack 1999:25-26, Bankoff 2003:15). Not limited to a constructed static reality or single social system/cluster (Dynes 1994:3), this approach promotes an extended investigation of inter- and intra-organisational dynamics, emergent groups and/or behaviours. With a basis in fieldwork, such research practice incorporates multilevel analysis, systematic comparison and longitudinal study (Kottack 1999:26). Documented data such as archives, official records, statistics and policy development help contextualise prescribed strategies and relationships within a less tangible ethos of stakeholder associations, meanings, behaviour and actions. Less formal material including photos, illustrations, memos/emails, websites, local media and personal accounts (written and verbal) can provide supplementary insight and perspective.

Informed by established practice and a 'linkages' approach, this research presents a synthesis of multiple validated and inclusive data collection techniques, executed through fieldwork/quick ethnographies, iterative documentary analysis and statistical inference. To compensate for the limitations or weaknesses in any singular investigative technique, the

convergence of multiple sources of evidence is designed to "corroborate, elaborate or illuminate the research question" (Decrop 1999:158), facilitating a more rigorous, holistic, representation of the phenomenon of crisis in a tourist-reliant destination.

Research Paradigm

Understanding (epistemology) and the meaning (ontology) of existing linkages, social relationships, organisations, actors, agents, and stakeholder experiences, within a complex and holistic post-disaster context is founded in an interpretivist/constructivist research paradigm. Naturalistic social science data collection methods such as interviewing, observation and analysis of existing texts make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them – accepting that meaning is socially constructed (subjective) and realities are multiple and dynamic (Wahyuni 2012). This study will focus on the social construction and interpretation of meaning about disaster recovery by participants and the researcher. This is sometimes referred to as 'meaning making' (Crotty 1998)

Research Case Studies – Destinations in Crisis

Recognising that no two tourism crises are identical, a systematic analysis of destination impacts and recovery recommends a degree of exploratory research. To effectively investigate this phenomenon in a tourist-reliant destination, the selected research case study must conform to two primary criteria:

1. Exhibit substantive destination/community reliance on tourism (a circumstance that should be well documented and recognised)
2. Experience an event causing significant adversity to the local tourism industry (i.e. an event such as a "disaster" which exceeds the ability of the affected community or destination to cope using its own resources)

Secondary considerations include the currency and scale of "trigger" event, the level of media attention generated, destination familiarity and awareness, proximity, accessibility of informants and information, financial and logistical research constraints, and opportunity.

Attracting worldwide media headlines, both the Bali Bombings and South Asia/Indian Ocean Tsunami represented tangible, contemporary examples of substantial disaster and crisis within regional tourism destinations. While the physical, social and economic impacts of these events were diverse and wide-ranging, the resultant damage to tourism was perhaps most evident in the prominent tourist centres of Kuta (Bali, Indonesia refer Figure 3.1) and Patong (Phuket, Thailand refer Figure 3.3)

As popular international destinations, the mass tourism locales of Kuta and Patong epitomised tourism reliance. In recent decades, employment, income, and infrastructure for local residents was significantly transformed and sustained through tourism investment and revenues. Representing relative affordability for foreign visitors, both island locations provide a warm tropical climate, proximity to the ocean and a rich vibrant culture. From traditional fishing and agrarian lifestyles, they also experienced analogous patterns of rapid tourism expansion and poorly regulated development. Despite such parallels, each of these destinations reflects a unique and complex inter-relationship of social, economic, environmental and political variables which influence their vulnerability and susceptibility to different crisis events.

Figure 3.1: The Island of Bali

Source: Lonely Planet (2005a)

**Figure 3.2: The Sari Club, Kuta Beach Bali**

Source: Bali SOS (2004)

Figure 3.3: Provinces of Phangnga, Phuket and Krabi, Southern Thailand

Source: Kontogeorgopoulos, N (2004:3)

Figure 3.4: Areas of Southern Thailand Directly Affected by the tsunami December 2004


Source: PATA (2004)

Research Site – Kuta

From its traditional origins as a small Indonesian fishing and trading village on the south-west coast of Bali, over the course of fifty years Kuta progressively developed into an internationally renowned tourist destination. Located on the beachfront, proximate to the international airport and provincial capital city of Denpasar, it supports a diversity of hotels, restaurants, and amenities, which cater for any class and budget of tourist (refer to Figure 3.5). With abundant attractions, extensive shopping opportunities, a vibrant cultural and entertainment scene and a reputation for relative tolerance, affordability and hedonism, it grew into a perennial favourite for the young adult demographic (18-35), backpackers, surfers, and "package deal tourists" (particularly from Australia) (Lonely Planet 2005a)

With the pressures and demands associated with increasing visitor popularity, the core tourist area of Kuta encroached north into the traditional community areas of Legian and Seminyak, and south towards Tuban. Consequently, the official *kelurahan* (local government administrative area) of "Kuta" has expanded to nearly 8km along the beach, and amalgamates the four original local communities (Lonely Planet 2005, Parum Samigita 2012). In 2000, the official population (permanent residents and registered migrants) for the area was estimated at 124,000 (BITD 2005), but it typically experiences a high degree of seasonal variability.

Despite the prevailing sense of Balinese (Hindu) culture and tradition, the host community of Kuta reflects significant ethnic diversity. While the majority of residents are Indonesian nationals, many have migrated from Java, Sumatra and other smaller surrounding islands, frequently lured by the prospects of tourism related employment and opportunity. Similarly, the lifestyle, climate and apparent promise of Bali have attracted a substantive 'western' expatriate population. Challenging formidable traditional conventions on property rights and land title, the majority of tourism infrastructure in Kuta is alleged to be financed, leased and/or owned by external international investment interests (*personal communication* 2004). As such infrastructure, development and support industries appear to dominate the beachside and every major street in Kuta, tourism has seemingly permeated most local livelihoods.

Figure 3.5: Kuta-Legian (Bali)


Source: Lonely Planet Bali (2005a)

Research Site- Patong

Located on the west coast of Phuket Island, the 3km beach stretch known as Patong, is the busiest and most 'popular' tourist destination of this prosperous Thai province (refer to Figure 3.6). With an official population of 15,000 (2001) (National Statistics Office of Thailand [NSO] 2013), during a typical peak tourist season (November to April) the resort area of Patong is estimated to accommodate as many as 60,000 residents. Amidst the density of accommodation, seafood restaurants, travel bureaus, language schools, tailors, souvenir and vogue shops, the area is also infamous for its "hostess" bars and candid sex industry. While daytime tourist activities often focus on the beach, diving, water sports and tours, the majority of local business and trade is active during the evening and night hours.

Consistent with its highly transient population, the community of Patong exhibits clear cultural, social and economic heterogeneity. The abundance of multi-storey international hotel chains and franchises is seemingly paralleled by locally owned guesthouses, bungalows and open-air eateries (Lonely Planet 2005b). Predominantly Buddhist, a posture of tolerance, openness and freedom has manifested in wide-ranging religious syncretism and acceptance. Although many entertainment venues "tout" sex shows and bar girls, gay and transsexual activities are similarly conspicuous. As a destination patronised largely by single male "westerners", many visitors have subsequently migrated to the area to establish businesses and personal relationships.

Demonstrating relative modernity and prosperity, Patong has become widely known as a tourist mecca and "party" destination. Despite being approximately 25km from the airport, it is generally considered the central point for most day tours and travel around the island. Over the past two decades growing popularity of the region has also stimulated additional tourism growth in proximate coastal and island locations including Phi Phi Island, Krabi, Khao Lak and Phang Nga (refer to Figure 3.3). Redolent of rapid development and significant investment, tourism revenues openly provide the main source of income for this community.

Figure 3.6: Patong (Phuket)

Source: Lonely Planet (2005b)

Research Framework

When originally proposed, this thesis was based around a case study of Kuta and community recovery from the October 12, 2002, terrorist bombings. As similar experiences suggested that the duration of any disaster recovery process can be variable, it was planned as a longitudinal study spanning a minimum research period of three years. Following a comprehensive review of the available tourism and disaster literature, a rough field guide of questions and issues was generated for augmentation during the preliminary fieldwork period. The fieldwork questions and guide were subsequently reviewed and edited by research peers with extensive familiarity and experience with post-disaster surveys and fieldwork. Scheduled to be conducted less than four months after the terrorist attacks (January and February 2003), the initial trip was planned to coincide roughly with a transition in efforts towards the reconstruction phase of disaster recovery (refer Comfort 1988). Two further comparative studies were arranged to document and explore any changes that were related to impacts of the bombings. The second fieldwork component was completed (as anticipated), during May 2004.

Although tragic, the advent of the tsunami on December 26, 2004 represented a distinct opportunity to directly investigate the emergency response efforts and the initial stages of recovery in another tourist reliant destination. Given the level of media attention focused on Patong in Southern Thailand, this was selected as a secondary case study research site. Preliminary in-situ fieldwork began within four days of the tsunami impact (December 30, 2004), and continued until late January 2005. A subsequent trip was conducted to the area in April 2005 (4 months after the tsunami), again coinciding with the traditional transition towards the reconstruction phase. This fieldwork in Thailand was directly followed by a consolidation trip to Bali in May 2005. While the advent of a second series of bombings in Kuta on October 1, 2005 was anticipated to provide significant insight into the efficacy of modified local recovery and disaster management arrangements, travel to the destination was not viable at the time. Characteristic of a longitudinal approach and effective analysis of longer term recovery strategies a final fieldtrip to Thailand was conducted in 2010 (following the 5 year commemorative anniversary) to observe the degree of pervasive change and adaptation.

Data collection and review of the relevant literature remained an iterative and ongoing process.

Fieldwork Methods

Disaster researcher Kathryn Tierney (1998:1) asserts that irrespective of individual approach or disaster agent, "fieldwork is still considered the most important data collection strategy". Beyond retrospective informant recall and content analysis of secondary sources, "effective field investigation can provide a base line of empirically validated material on which to develop a systematic and objective assessment" (Tierney 1998:1)

Observation and participant-observation

Having previously conducted ethnographic research in the Kuta community, and possessing a general knowledge of spoken Indonesian, there were minimal concerns regarding the conduct of strategic fieldwork in this region. As an unaccompanied, Caucasian, female, within the common youth-traveller demographic, the role of direct observer was readily accessible (Bernard 2002:327). In establishing the role of both volunteer and academic researcher (as distinct from a disaster tourist/voyeur, journalist or government representative), it became possible to engage and collect detailed information and documents from a broad range of local stakeholders, groups and community organisations. Such participant observation assisted to generate rapport and an enhanced understanding of the meaning of observations (Bernard 2002:334). Despite an apparent reduction in overt response/recovery activities over subsequent visits, most stakeholders and informants remained amenable to continued research enquiries.

Although lacking a similar level of local familiarity and language capabilities for initial fieldwork in Patong, data gathering in the immediate post-disaster period presented comparable operational advantages. Consistent with observations made by Dynes (1994:4) "the conditions in the emergency period are such that social barriers are reduced and the expressive behaviour is enhanced. This provides optimum conditions for gathering information." In such an environment, there were minimal problems regarding access and the open conduct of research activities. Contacts established during this emergency

response period also facilitated connections and enquiries during the following fieldtrip. While in Southern Thailand, travel and an *emic* understanding of the afflicted region was facilitated by a local Thai guide/driver conversant in English. A qualified translator was later employed to clarify and assist more specific follow-up interviews with informants (elaborated further in the section entitled Interview Methods).

Given the variance in routines of different stakeholder groups, late evenings were generally used as an opportunity for withdrawal from cultural immersion and to intellectualise both observations and experiences (Bernard 2002:366). The unpredictable and informal nature of many activities and conduct however, necessitated a degree of flexibility. While a field note book recorded specific details as they occurred, all relevant information was consolidated daily in a running logbook (via laptop computer) with careful measures to note subjective factors such as personal judgments and emotions. Recall of specific locations, observations and facts were assisted through digital photography.

Sampling

In the case of Bali, the time delay between the initial crisis event and preliminary fieldwork component allowed for the solicitation of local contacts in the community prior to arrival. These contacts were mainly established through responses to a generic email sent to all internet addresses listed on the "Bali Recovery Group" (2002) website. As a self-proclaimed co-ordinating body of predominantly non-government organisations (representing over 25 groups), this consortium offered the unique opportunity to directly document many of the early recovery strategies pursued by regional, emergent and external agencies. In addition to the list of potential contacts provided in personal interviews with each informants (purposive organisational/"snowball" sampling), direct involvement in local meetings and activities facilitated an opportunistic sampling approach (Bernard 2002:185, Dynes 1994:2, Quarantelli 1997:8). With the urgency and chaotic nature of the immediate post-tsunami environment of Patong, the sampling procedure was more random.

Based on the information and insight gained through the preliminary fieldwork it was possible to identify a diversity of key stakeholder groups and organisations in each community (refer to Table 3.1). Subsequent field investigation capitalised on the network of existing informants to gauge changes in the social dynamics while progressively expanding the number of respondents. As the populations of both destinations are transient, respondents were chosen and retained on the basis of availability, approachability, and cooperation. With an average of 45 respondents each field trip, the research was designed to establish/maintain at least one key informant (Bernard 2002:188) within every major stakeholder group identified. In Thailand, an experienced interpreter was employed to facilitate direct access and communication with informants who were not conversant in English. Given the personal, emotional and sometimes disparaging nature of information provided, all informants were assured that their identities would remain confidential.

Interview Techniques

In the post-impact environments, an accurate assessment of conditions and the fostering of reliable key informants was facilitated by a sound knowledge of the relevant literature and previous fieldwork experience (Britton 1989:7). Consistent with the exploratory nature of the research, initial interviews with most respondents were highly informal and indiscriminate (Quarantelli 1997:9). Open oral testimony established a respondent's personal experience and understanding of the specific disaster event. Through lead questions and probing it was possible to identify the stakeholder groups that were considered the most influential and active in the local community response and recovery processes. Such clusters included unofficial organisations and members of the informal sector, who are not often considered or enumerated in official documents. As informant groups became more apparent, a field guide of relevant topics/information was used to conduct a succession of unstructured interviews.

Given prevailing concerns regarding the ethics and appropriateness of questionnaires for people under stress (refer Oliver-Smith 1996:318-319), each interview was conducted within a participants natural everyday environment, employing a more dialogic, open-

ended approach. As the primary subject matter (ie the terrorist bombing or tsunami) had the potential to elicit psychological distress, all participants' maintained control over the interview duration, depth of their responses, privacy and emotional concerns. Participants were further provided the opportunity to edit or censor their recorded personal data. While there were no apparent instances of overt or serious distress, established local counselling services were advised of the nature and conduct of research project, accepting referrals and visits as required. These procedures and the proposed resolution are consistent with Experimental Category 3 in established Ethical Guidelines (ethics approval elaborated in the *Ethical Considerations* section p.71)

Subsequent field investigations allowed for an evaluation of the key issues as well as identification of any new ones. Where informant retention was possible, the core questions were repeated to ensure the accuracy of existing data and to test the informant's historical recall of events. This process provided consistency and a direct foundation from which to judge the information provided by any new respondents. Questions and issues initially designed for the Kuta community were tested and adapted for use in the context of post-tsunami Patong.

Detailed notes were produced from each interview and collated daily with the impressions gathered through direct and participant observation. By reviewing data at regular intervals the researcher was able to retain a set focus, a technique sometimes referred to as debriefing (Bernard 1988:149). Constant filtering of unsubstantiated and unnecessary material, with an examination of factual reliability, allowed clarification and the solicitation of further information from on-site informants (Britton 1989:7). The composition and execution of weekly goals ensured that the objective of each fieldwork component was completed within the available time frame.

Table 3.1: Source of Fieldwork Respondents/Informants

Stakeholder Group	Respondent/Informant Source	
	Kuta/Bali	**Patong/Southern Thailand**
Hospitality staff/employee	Hotel, *losmen* (guest house), restaurant, *warung* (local eatery), bar, nightclub, health/spas, tour staff	Hotel, guest house, restaurant, local eatery, bar, nightclub, health/spas, tour staff
Hospitality management/administration	Hotel, bar, *losmen*	Hotel, bar, guest house
Transport	Taxi, driver/guide, bus, ferry	Taxi, driver/guide, bus, ferry
Travel Agent/Operator	Regional, domestic, international	Regional, domestic, international
Retail	Clothing, audio/visual, furniture, jewellery, souvenirs, textile	Clothing, audio/visual, jewellery, souvenirs, tailor
Arts/Crafts	Woodcarving, painting, batik, silver, stone carving	Leather carving, glass work
Informal Sector	Sex worker, beach/street vendors, massage, gamblers, tattoo artist	Sex worker, beach/street vendors, massage, tout, tattoo artist
Private enterprise (other)	Money changer, architect/developer, telecommunications (internet/telephone service)	Real estate investor, telecommunications (internet/telephone service)
Local government	Police, military, sanitation, security, tourist police	DDPM, construction, security, tourist police
Local NGO	Parum Samigita, BaliSOS, BaliHati	Raks Thai, Rotary Patong
External NGO	Zero-to-One, Ausaid, Red Cross	Care, World Vision, Israeli DVI
Tourism Association	Bali Hotel Association	Phuket Tourism Association
Resident	Children – Adult	Children – Adult
Medical	Psychologist, Nurse, Pharmacy	Hospital staff, Surgeon
Direct victim/friends/family	Local, Tourist, National, International	Local, Tourist, National, International
Volunteer	Local, Tourist, Ex-patriot	Local, Regional/Domestic, Ex-patriot, Tourist
Media	Bali Post, Bali Discovery (Update), Sydney Morning Herald	Phuket Gazette, Andaman Coastal, News Limited, Toronto Star
Domestic tourist	Indonesia (Bali, Java, Sumatra etc)	Thailand (Bangkok, Chaing Mai etc)
Foreign tourist (country of origin)	Australia, Singapore, Canada, Japan, France, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, New Zealand, Germany, Holland , America	Australia, Norway, Denmark, England, Belgium, Kuwait, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Canada, South Africa, America

Informal Documents

During the fieldwork process, a conscientious effort was made to collect any available formal/informal documents and non-technical data, to supplement interviews and field observations (Quarantelli 1997:7, 14). Such information included; papers, newspapers, local records, status reports, group minutes, manuals, and non-reactive items such as informal graffiti and bulletin board notes. While capturing images of both the physical impacts and specific stages of community reconstruction, digital photographs assist to substantiate descriptions and observations regarding the social/sociological aspects of these crises (refer Quarantelli 1997:13).

Data

Primary Data

On return from each field visit, the raw data sets were expanded and reviewed to develop researcher familiarity. In the process of organising and indexing this information for easy retrieval, it also became possible to identify provisional categories for further investigation and analysis. Research from the preliminary fieldwork was used to identify, clarify and direct the focus of subsequent fieldwork.

Secondary Data

To complement the empirical data gathered at the selected research sites, the research design required the systematic collection of written documents and secondary aggregate data relating to the destinations under investigation (refer to Table 3.2). Published archival data from sources such as government agencies, private companies, non-government organisations, and journal articles were used primarily to provide an appreciation of the relevant historical and social context. The continuous monitoring and compilation of contemporary material assisted the identification of general facts, assumptions, values and priorities. Similarly, this strategy allowed for the recognition of auxiliary events and actions that may have been influential to the recovery process. Quantitative data such as demographics, socio-economic indicators and tourism statistics (where available) were also gathered for comparison and analysis.

Table 3.2: Source of Primary and Secondary Documents[5]

Source Type	Kuta/Bali	Patong/Southern Thailand
Government Institutions/Official Documents	Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Statistics Indonesia Indonesian Government Ministries Report Bali Tourism Board (BTB)	National Statistics Office (NSO) Thailand Department Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) Phuket Tourist Association (PTA)
Non-government Organisation (NGOs)	Parum Samigita BaliSOS Bali Recovery Group	Raks Thai Rotary Patong
International	Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) (The World Bank, USAID, UNDP) WHO Red Cross/Red Crescent	CARE World Vision UNDP WHO
Media	Jakarta Post Time Magazines/Marketing/Promotion Lonely Planet	The Nation Bangkok Post Magazines/Marketing/Promotion Lonely Planet
On-line Sources	Bali Discovery (Update) ABC Online Parum Samigita Group Forum Travel/web blogs Google web search	Phuket Gazette BBC World Relief Web Travel/web blogs Google web search
Academic and Research Bodies	Various journal articles/papers	Various journal articles/papers
Professional Bodies	PATA Gavin Anderson and Company Bali Hotel Association (BHA)	PATA WTO Andaman Recovery Centre
Other	Personal fieldwork (primary data collection) Digital photographs Personal emails/letters	Personal fieldwork (primary data collection) Digital photographs Personal emails

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[5] On-line sources and web-sites are included within the bibliography

Data Analysis

Coding

Consistent with a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1998), data analysis was an ongoing and iterative process. Through interim analysis, the field data and contents of the supplementary resources were divided into meaningful analytical units (segmented). Each segment identified was coded into a systematic category. While some codes were suggested *a priori* by the disaster and tourism crisis literature, most were developed through direct examination of the data (inductive). Due to the interrelated character of many impacts, organisations and response mechanisms, some components of the data were recorded in more than one category (co-occurring code). Memos were used extensively throughout the coding process and as themes, patterns, and regularities, became apparent the codes were gradually revised and refined. A process of constant comparison was continued until theoretical saturation was obtained (no new significant concepts or categories emerging). The storage and management of this abundant qualitative data was assisted by NVivo computer software.

Analysis

As systematic categories were determined it became possible for the researcher to conduct further qualitative analysis. The development of visual displays such as matrices and tables assisted to summarise specific details, while characteristic informant anecdotes and quotes were selected to provide a hermeneutic 'emic' perspective (to ensure informant anonymity these have been integrated within the text as *personal communication* or direct quotes). As ideas were formulated to explain the relationships among and between existing groups of data (induction) they were subsequently tested against the processed field-notes and available literature (deduction) (Gilbert 1993:22-23). Themes of significance have been expounded and collated with relevant literature to provide external validity to the interpretation and analysis of this exploratory research. Selective member checks (presenting the analysis of the data to informants for their confirmation or revision) and peer debriefing also helped determine credibility.

With the triangulation of various research methods and utility of primary and secondary data sources it is possible to establish the context of vulnerability and capacity, accurately document the diversity of impacts and issues associated with the experience

of tourism crisis and examine both formal and informal processes of mitigation and recovery.

Limitations and Bias

As exploratory research, this paper has restricted scope and accuracy. Various limitations are apparent due to the temporal, spatial and financial constraints on the fieldwork conducted, and inherent researcher subjectivity. While a consistent effort was made to collect a comprehensive and representative range of secondary data, resources were confined by access and availability.

Given that this research project emerged following the first Bali Bombings on October 12, 2002, it was not possible for the researcher to experience or observe the immediate emergency/response phase of the Kuta tourism crisis. Although lacking such primary data on initial response efforts in Bali, the rapid deployment to Patong, post-tsunami, provided a direct insight and understanding of this hectic, yet crucial period. As recovery is an ongoing process, the longitudinal approach was designed to encompass more medium to long term issues. For both Bali and Phuket the on-site primary data collected for this thesis does not extend beyond the five year anniversary of the South Asia tsunami, however continued informant communication and secondary resources have made it possible to encompass the period up to and beyond the 10 year commemoration of the original Bali Bombings (2012).

While the researcher made all reasonable attempts to preserve objectivity during data collection, a level of subjectivity is inevitable. Language issues (moderated through a translator), informant relations, researcher bias and the selection of variables may have influenced the outcomes of interviews and analysis. The intentional triangulation of research strategies and data sources was designed to minimise the effect and bearing of such limitations. As reports and research papers have been produced from the data, copies were returned to several key informants for revision and verification prior to publication.

Ethical Considerations

Consistent with university policy (refer James Cook University 2005) this research was conducted with due consideration, approval, and compliance with official ethical

guidelines (Ethics Approval Number H1764 and H2631 refer Appendix 2). International research access and conduct was legitimated through invitation and voluntary arrangements with the local host organisations of Parum Samigita, BaliSOS (in Bali) and Raks Thai (Thailand). In addition to specific research guides and resources, a pre-prepared fieldwork folder included personal business cards, explanatory information sheets and informed consent forms for all potential respondents. Where uncertainty, language and/or literacy were an issue, such information and intent were conveyed through oral briefings. Given the stress and emotion of any crisis situation, researcher sensitivity was imperative, particularly during the interview process (Oliver-Smith 1996 p319). Participation in the research process remained entirely voluntary and confidentiality of informant identity was assured.

Investigating Tourism Crisis Management

In the absence of a prescriptive approach to empirically test the congruence of a holistic integrated tourism crisis management framework, scientific process recommends the adaptation and synthesis of relevant established tourism and disaster research methodologies. Posited in the post-event context, a phenomenological case study approach assists to critically examine the context of vulnerability, event impacts (direct and indirect), community response, mitigation, recovery and change. In understanding the direct experiences of tourism crisis it is possible to systematically evaluate key lessons and help identify priorities to inform the development of enhanced disaster management strategies for similarly vulnerable tourist destinations (Blackman and Ritchie 2008:52) .

To effectively appreciate the range of impacts of such significant disasters and the nature of change and recovery, it is necessary to understand the pre-existing destination context including the vulnerability and capacity of prevailing social, political, economic and environmental systems.

Chapter 4

~ ESTABLISHING THE CONTEXT ~

Any popular tourist destination, examined at the local community level, reveals a dynamic and complex system of physical, environmental, social, economic and institutional factors. While many locations are naturally exposed and highly susceptible to climatic and geophysical hazards, other vulnerabilities have been engendered through processes of development and changing social systems (Cohen 2010, Calgaro 2005, 2008, Nankervis 2000). As the degree of relative vulnerability is variable - over people, place and time - effective understanding of any specific crisis phenomenon recommends familiarity with the broader context in which it has emerged (Bankoff 2003).

Bali – "Island of the Gods" (Bali Glory 2013)

While amenity, proximity to the airport, and reputation, seem to have established Kuta as an unofficial tourist 'Mecca' of Bali, this "island of the gods" **"** is marketed as a complete and dynamic package for its prospective international and domestic audience. Glossy travel brochures and internet sites accentuate physical and natural characteristics such as the abundant beaches, lush tropical landscapes, stunning limestone cliff faces, natural lakes, scenic rice terraces and intriguing animals. Similarly, Bali's distinguished artistic traditions, history, and authentic cultural activities feature strongly in promotional material and traveller testimonies. Despite common concerns regarding the degree of overdevelopment and commercialisation, the tourist image of Bali remains inextricably intertwined with its unique and "exotic" milieu.

Physical and environmental characteristics

Beyond the built environment of hotels, resorts, health spas, villas and tourist infrastructure, Bali reveals a rich and diverse natural landscape. A relatively small archipelagic island of Indonesia, 153 km long and 112 km wide (5620 km^2), its geography and physical terrain reflect its position within the "Pacific Ring of Fire". Dominated by a prominent east-west mountain range the highest point, Mt Agung, is an active volcano which last erupted in 1963. Reflecting the verdant splendour and fertility associated with an extensive volcanic history, the rich alluvial plain south of the

mountain range progressively extends towards the more arid limestone plateaus of the Bukit peninsula. Sustained by a heavy wet season between the months of November to March, the island boasts a variety of crater lakes, waterfalls, fast flowing rivers and deep ravines.   Other natural attractions include the 'therapeutic' thermal springs, 'mystical' caves and the imposing cliff drops of Uluwatu. Encircled by coral reefs and abundant sandy beaches, Bali is renowned for idyllic surfing conditions and world-class sunsets (Lonely Planet 2005a, Vickers 1989).

Consistent with its tropical environment and enriched soils, Bali also sustains an abundance of flora and fauna. The Bali Barat National Park and associated marine reserve was established in 1941 to protect several endangered species and the areas unique bio-diversity. Despite a history of destructive coral mining and reef exploitation, local marine systems along the east and northwest coast still maintain a number of dolphins, whale sharks, turtles, corals and reef fish. Balinese tigers are still believed to inhabit remote areas of the National Park, yet credible sightings are increasingly rare. More common inhabitants of the island include monkeys, lizards, bats, and domesticated farm animals such as chickens, ducks, pigs, cows and buffalos. Despite being imbued with a cultural significance, "wild" and roaming dog numbers have significantly decreased in the past decade following several rabies fatalities on the island (Lonely Planet 2005a, Vickers 1989).

In addition to the typically photographed rice fields (refer Plate 4.1) and tropical "monkey forests" the island supports an abundance of fruit and vegetables as well as commercially grown crops. Agricultural products such as rice, coffee, copra, chillies and seaweed (aquaculture) are exported overseas; but the majority of produce on the island remains traditional subsistence. Villages and streetscapes reveal huge banyan tress, coconut palms, bamboo, and fragrant gardens of hibiscus, bougainvillea, orchids, jasmine and frangipani. Lotus and water lilies are equally abundant in ponds and lakes. Both the flora and fauna of Bali remain integral to daily ritual, ceremony and the spiritual ethos of *Tri Hita Karana* – a harmonious balance between human and god, human and human, human and nature (Parum Samigita 2012).

Plate 4.1: Scenic rice paddies of Bali

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 4.2: Balinese culture, art and dance remains important in traditional Balinese lives

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Society and Culture

In 2001, the official population of Bali was recorded at just over three million (3,048,317 BPS Bali 2012)[6]. Reflecting the historical significance of agriculture, fishing and trade, the majority of residents remain concentrated within the fertile southern region of the island or along the coastal fringes. With a population density of 541 per km^2, it was estimated that over 50% of the populace were urban (CGI 2003:2) While the provincial capital of Denpasar is recognised as the only official city on the island, contemporary Balinese society remains centred around the traditional village and community social system (*banjar*).

Ethnically, Bali reveals a long and often turbulent past of migration and settlement. From ancient Melanesians, indigenous Malay maritime traders, through successive expansion of Hindu kingdoms, Portuguese and Dutch settlement, Japanese occupation, a national policy of transmigration, and increasing expatriate migrants (estimated at 33,000 in 2001) most modern Balinese tend to characterise themselves by a shared religion, language, and culture, rather than by race and ethnicity (Vickers 1989). In contrast to the majority of Indonesian nationals, 84.4% of the population identified as Balinese Hindu with 10.3% as Muslims (BPS 2012). Similarly, although compliant with official Indonesian legislation, governance, and administration, native Balinese language, social, religious, and political functions are primarily dictated by the local belief system and enforced by traditional and customary law. Bali continues to operate a modified caste social structure.

Even within the more urbanised areas of Bali, strong community and social ties are maintained through the cultural obligations of kinship, Hindu religion and ceremony. The elaborate traditions for individuals, families, structures and daily rituals each reflect the omnipresent Balinese belief and commitment to the Gods. Music, dance, woodcarving, weaving, metalwork, and even cuisine, are each considered significant artistic expressions of faith, which appear to have been increasingly commoditised through tourism (refer Plate 4.2). Regular community meetings, ceremonial gatherings, and performance, function to strengthen communication, public awareness and social networks.

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[6] The statistics utilised in this chapter, reflect the context of Bali and Phuket prior to their respective disaster events

Having maintained its own monarchy until 1945, Bali was unified within the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. Governed under the mandate of a national government located in Jakarta, all policy on social and economic development including migration, health, safety, education, and tourism, was developed centrally from Java. As Indonesian politics has always reflected a strong military influence, prior to 1999 the entire nation was managed under strict authoritarian control (Lonely Planet 2005a, Vickers 1989). Decades of such rule however, established an international reputation for nepotism, corruption, censorship, civil unrest and human rights abuses (*personal communications 2004*). Following the "Asian financial crisis" and political turmoil of the late 1990's, the first democratically elected government introduced an overt policy of decentralisation, allowing each province greater autonomy and control over the development process. As a distinctive Hindu enclave in a predominantly Muslim nation however, official development efforts on Bali have remained sporadic.

Economics

Although tourism grew fiscally significant to Bali following the development of the international airport in 1969, in 2001 agriculture still accounted for approximately 40% of Bali's total economic output (BPS 2012). Despite the introduction of alternative crops and high-yield varieties of rice, most of the island's agriculture has only been sufficient to sustain its own population. Much of the rural community continues to exist through non-cash subsistence and barter. Small-scale agricultural exports only represented 21% of the island's formal economy (refer to Figure 4.1). With the progressive encroachment of urban areas into traditional farming land, unemployment has forced many traditional Balinese farmers to seek alternative sources of income.

In 2001, trade and hospitality represented a third of Bali's formal economy, while manufacturing of crafts, garments/textiles, and furniture, was emerging as a growth industry (BPS 2012). Similarly, smaller home-based local businesses were successfully expanding exports of handicrafts, silverware and souvenirs. Lacking sufficient resources and infrastructure on the island, activities such as mining and utility development has been marginal. Existing construction projects, roads, transport, telecommunications and utility network services typically reflect patterns or "nodes" of international investment and private enterprise, further exposing the disparity between the economically significant south and the rest of the island.

Consistent with the formal economic statistics, investigation of Bali's employment figures (refer to Figure 4.2), reveals that the majority of residents were employed in agriculture, retail trade and manufacturing industries. Although hotels and restaurants only accounted for 5% of formal employment in the 2000 census, given the highly dependent, integrated service-based nature of tourism the CGI (2003:3) estimated that more than 50% of Bali's official income was derived indirectly from tourism. The tourist centres of the island additionally support a flourishing informal economy including, guide services, beggars, touts, criminal activity and a prevalent sex industry. Inclusive of such informal sector income and related remittances, between 50 – 80% of the island's residents depended on tourism expenditure (CGI 2003). As Bali has been more affluent than many provinces of Indonesia (with a regional per capita income of approximately US$600), unemployment (2.82%) and poverty (8.15%) registered below the national average. There is however no social welfare/entitlement system to support the poor or marginalised and few residents have possessed private savings or any form of financial insurance.

Tourism development

> "*Me, my family, we are warrior caste. Once we served Kings. Now we serve tourist*" – Driver, Bali January 2003

Bali first experienced organised tourism during the 1920's as an exclusive port-stop for cruise ships. Through the 1930's to 1940's patronage progressively increased to approximately 250 people per month. However, with the outbreak of World War II and Japanese occupation, this venture soon came to a halt (Craig-Smith and French 1994: 148) Cumulative turmoil created through the War of Independence (fought against the Dutch), kept visitor numbers to Bali at a minimum late into the 1950's and 1960's. Despite numerous marketing strategies adopted by the 'new' Sukarno government, tourism in Bali didn't experience a revival until the Ngurah Rai airport was enlarged to receive international flights in 1968 (Vickers 1989:184-191).

Figure 4.1 Structure of the Formal Economy by Sector – Bali 2001

Structure of the Formal Economy by Sector - Bali 2001

- Agriculture
- Mining and quarrying
- Manufacturing
- Utilities
- Construction
- Wholesale and retail

21%, 1%, 10%, 1%, 4%, 12%, 21%, 11%, 6%, 13%

Adapted from CGI (2003)

Figure 4.2 Formal Employment by Sector – Bali 2000

Formal Employment by Sector - Bali 2000

- Agriculture
- Mining and quarrying
- Manufacturing
- Utilities
- Construction
- Wholesale and retail

14%, 1%, 4%, 5%, 21%, 8%, 0%, 14%, 1%, 32%

Source: Budan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Bali (BPS 2012)

Plate 4.3: Temples and water are highly symbolic in Balinese culture

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 4.4: Evening convergence of tourists and locals for Kuta Beach sunset

Source: Gurtner, Y (2004)

Realising the potential of tourism as a means of economic development and foreign exchange earnings, the Suharto government incorporated this industry within Indonesia's First Development Plan (Repelita I, 1971-75). Instead of the anticipated "rich American tourists who would boost the Indonesian economy", the majority of Bali's new visitors were constituted by low-budget aficionados, "western middle-class youth", better known as hippies. With a growing reputation for cheap drugs, sexual freedom and eastern mysticism, Bali became an ideal destination in which to live an alternative lifestyle (Vickers 1989:186). Reflecting the popularity of a sun, surf and sand culture, development was initially concentrated on the southern peninsula including Nusa Dua, Sanur, Kuta and Legian.

As the 1980's saw an expansion in small scale cultural tourism, the 1990's heralded a period of unrivalled growth consistent with mass tourism (averaging 12 – 15% annual growth) (BPS 2012). While the Gulf War and political instability resulted in a slight decrease in international visitor arrivals at the start of the decade, domestic tourism experienced significant growth. Supported by successive national government development strategies, economic planning and private investments, this period also saw a rapid increase in the number of resorts, hotels, restaurants, transportation services, guides, crafts, performances, and related tourist services and facilities. Cheap airfares and low prices, as well as proximity to Australia, resulted in Bali emerging as a high demand tourism destination for Australians. As the region experienced further uncertainty generated by the Asian Financial Crisis, the East Timor Crisis and political reorganization following the resignation of President Suharto in the late 1990's, local residents articulated mounting concern about the impacts of uncontrolled tourism development.

Despite decentralisation reforms supporting greater provincial and local administration over regional development in Bali, "leakage" of substantial revenues overseas and continued remittance to the central government in Java severely restricted available finances, resources or independent authority. Lacking effective regulation and control, changes in human settlement, agricultural practices, and modern development, resulted in significant environmental issues including pollution, water supply/quality, waste control and management, species protection, deforestation and unsustainable resource exploitation. As other islands of Indonesia experienced conditions of rising

unemployment, social, and political instability, the tourism "boom" of Bali was perceived as an economic opportunity resulting in considerable in-migration – particularly in the informal sector.

With an ethos of tolerance and acceptance, Bali's tourism image remained relatively immune from negative perceptions affecting the rest of the country, even following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America. In 2001, direct international tourist arrivals to Bali were estimated to be 1.36 million representing 26 per cent of Indonesia's direct arrivals (BPS 2012).

Phuket – "The Pearl of the South"(Phuket Tourist Association, 2012)

In the context of tourism promotion and marketing, the popular destination of Phuket generally connotes more than the Thai administrative province, political boundaries, or singular geographic island. Encompassing an international airport and easy road access to the mainland, Phuket is used as a general referent for the more extensive region of the Andaman Triangle (extending north towards Khao Lak and the Surin Islands in the province of Phang Nga, and south-east to encompass the Phi Phi Islands and mainland resorts of Krabi) (refer to Figure 3.3) Both physically and economically, the island of Phuket forms the apex or hub of this triangle, with Patong a central locale in appreciating the diverse features associated with the area.

Considered the "showpiece" of Thai tourism, Phuket ranks as the most visited destination in Thailand, particularly for the international "package tour" clientele. Picturesque palm-fringed white beaches, crystal blue sparkling oceans, abundant seafood, a lush tropical landscape, hospitable people, and a multitude of quality accommodation and leisure choices all coalesce to generate an image of tropical paradise (refer Plate 4.5). Beyond the "sun, surf and sand" Phuket also offers a rich natural environment, history, and diverse culture which create a distinctive ambience.

Geography and environment

The largest island of Thailand, Phuket is located in the Andaman Sea on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Approximately 543km^2 (570km^2 if the 39 proximate islets are included), it is connected to the Thai mainland by the Sarasin and Thep Krasattri Bridge. The island's topography is dominated by a western mountain range running

from north to south, with low plains extending from the centre to the east coast. It is estimated that between 50 - 70% of the islands interior is still covered in forest, while the popular west coast features sandy bays, rocky peninsulas and limestone cliffs. The coastal mainland and proximate islands of the Phang Nga and Krabi provinces (including the Phi Phi Islands) reveal a similar geography of dramatic limestone ("karst') while Surin and the Similan islands reflect low relief granite intrusions (Lonely Planet 2005b, Phuket.com 2005).

With no natural rivers, most water based activities remain focused around the region's ocean environments. The southwest monsoon season between May – October however generates unpredictable weather, rain, strong rip tides, and frequent swells off the Indian Ocean. Presenting numerous tropical island alternatives and vibrant coral reefs, sport diving and snorkelling have become major Phuket-based recreational activities (Phuket.com 2005). Despite growing concerns regarding the impact of trawling and over-fishing of commercial species, the area continues to support a rich marine and mangrove ecosystem (*personal communication* 2005). This includes both coral reef and pelagic fish species, soft and hard coral, crustaceans, marlins, turtles and dolphins. The dugong, or "sea cow", is now all but extinct; and the Thai Fisheries Department has declared it a protected species. Fishing however, remains integral to most traditional coastal communities.

In recognition of the regions unique and sensitive flora and fauna, authorities have established several national parks to protect the remaining natural marine habitats and rainforests. Tigers are still believed to exist in remote dense jungle areas; but gibbons, elephants, reptiles and insects are more common (Lonely Planet 2005b). Synonymous with "wild jungle" and bamboo forests, the islands interior also supports agriculture and commercial plantations including rice paddies, rubber, oil palm, cashew, cacao, pineapple and coconut plantations. Possessing significant tin ore deposits, mining was a major industry on the island from the 16th century until the last mine closed in 1992. Internationally renowned for its beaches and natural beauty, Phuket's destination branding also emphasises its enviable hospitality and culture (Phuket.com 2005, Lonely Planet 2005b).

Plate 4.5: Sun lounges, umbrellas and tourist crowds at Patong Beach

Source: Gurtner, Y (2006)

Plate 4.6: Phi Phi Leh – the main set used for the movie "The Beach" (2000)

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Society and Culture

In 2004, the island of Phuket had a registered population of approximately 287,500; but this number does not include semi-permanent workers, semi-resident foreigners, or unregistered residents within the informal sector. Hosting an estimated 75,000 tourists, the area had a high season capacity of around 500,000 at any one time. Reflecting seasonal fluctuations and transience, regional statistics from 2000[7] showed that 20% of the population had migrated to the island in the preceding 5 years, up 12.6% from 1990 (National Statistics Office of Thailand [NSO] 2013). Away from the commercial and entrepreneurial history of the island's capital, Phuket Town, the majority of this growth was experienced in coastal tourist resort towns and destinations.

Centuries of cultural migrations, exchange and interrelations with foreign traders has resulted in a very ethnically diverse community on the island of Phuket. Successive inhabitants include indigenous Thais from the mainland, Indian traders, European colonists, Chinese who worked the tin mines, Muslims of Malaysian extraction (many of who came to work the rubber plantations) and even the Chao Nam or sea gypsies (alternatively referred to as Chao Le – sea nomads) (Ebsen 2005). While approximately 81.6% of the population was nominally Buddhist in 2004, the influence of Chinese and Indonesian-Malayan culture is still apparent in the language, art, and religion of many of these southern Thais. This is also reflected in the population statistics where 17.1% identified as Muslim - significantly higher than the national average (below 5%) (NSO 2013). With distinctive Sino Portuguese architecture found in many of the older cities, additional influences include Indian, Arabic and more recently, European expatriate populations (Lonely Planet 2005b). The rapid growth of tourism has also increased numbers of Burmese, Lao and Cambodian workers legally (and illegally) residing on the island (*personal communication* 2005).

With the exception of the Chao Le who have a language and culture distinct from the mainstream Thai, the majority of people in Phuket follow Buddhist beliefs and principles(NSO 2013). As Buddhist temples (*wats*) and monasteries are generally established at the centre of town, socio-cultural life typically revolves around these

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[7] Thai population and census data are only collected every 10 years

locations. Serving a religious, cultural and educational function, residents congregate for religious activities, feasts, festivals, ceremonies, and to educate themselves. Family values, social obligations and respect remain integral to the local belief system and day-to-day living, earning the region its acclaimed reputation for tolerance and warm friendly hospitality. While tourism and western culture has promoted the development of shopping complexes, restaurants, large entertainment and recreation centres, Phuket still maintains its traditional evening/night markets selling local produce, garments and also souvenirs.

Supported by tourist demand, the more notorious side of cultural tolerance and acceptance in the region is the thriving sex industry. Most prominent in Patong, entertainment venues tout Thai "companionship", live flesh shows, and numerous shows and cabarets featuring transgender performers, unglamorously referred to as Ladybois (*ga-teu-i*) (*personal communication* 2004). Lucrative tourism earnings from both the formal and informal sector are frequently remitted to support entire families in other regional areas of Thailand. Underage prostitution/paedophilia and human trafficking was once considered relatively prolific but seems to have become less prevalent with the implementation of strict international laws and penalties.

As a country that was never formally colonised, Thailand retains a constitutional Monarchy supported by a strongly centralised system of government. Local authorities and council members are elected, but they are governed at the Provincial level by an appointed civil servant. With executive, legislation and judiciary policy centralised in Bangkok there is limited regional control over development and decision making regarding issues of agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, foreign affairs, communications, labour and social welfare, education, public health, science and technology and environment (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UN ESCAP] 2013). Contributing approximately 20% of the total tourism revenue generated by foreign tourists to Thailand, tourism development has remained a high economic priority for the region of Phuket.

Plate 4.7: Soi Bang La – the notorious entertainment strip of Patong

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

Plate 4.8:12m high brass Buddha built from local and tourist donations, Phuket


Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Economic structure

In recent history Phuket's local economy was predominantly supported by tin mining and the rubber industry. Following a prolonged recession of the metal industries and increased restrictions on tin dredging in coastal waters during the 1980's, the economic importance of tin in the region rapidly declined. Similarly, a decreasing international demand for rubber resulted in many of the island's plantations being converted to other uses. Traditional agriculture and other commercial plantations including coconuts, pineapples, banana and cashews have remained economically significant (NSO 2013). However modern development and urban expansion has resulted in increasing farming lands subsumed by housing, roads and other infrastructure (refer to Figure 4.3) Indigenous fishing, small scale fisheries and aquaculture (prawn farming) have continued to be important to many residents living along the coast, but modern trawling and over-fishing have limited extensive commercial viability.

As tourism was first integrated into the Thai government's Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972 – 1981) to boost foreign-exchange earnings, trade, and create and expand employment opportunities, Phuket saw a concurrent investment in utilities, local roads and transport infrastructure (UN ESCAP 2013). With increasing popularity and rapid development, by 2004 the region was hosting over 3 million international visitors annually, with hotels and restaurants accounting for approximately 44% of the formal economy (Phuket Tourism Association 2012). The wholesale and retail sector contributed an additional 9%. Consistently in 2000, services, commerce and the construction sector comprised over 70% of formal employment within the region (NSO 2013) (refer to Figure 4.4). Despite the extensive contribution of tourism and foreign exchange earnings to the national economy, the majority of growth since the 1980's has been stimulated by private investment and foreign ownership, with limited assistance from the Thai government (*personal communication* 2005). Consequently significant earnings are "leaked" overseas. Even with such revenue losses in 2004 Phuket had the second highest per capita income of any province in Thailand outside of Bangkok (approximately US$5780) (NSO 2013).

Figure 4.3: Structure of the Formal Economy by Sector – Phuket 2000

Structure of the Formal Economy by Sector - Phuket 2000

- Agriculture: 10%
- Mining and quarrying: 0%
- Manufacturing: 3%
- Utilities: 4%
- Construction: 3%
- Wholesale and retail: 9%
- Hotels and restaurants: 44%
- Transport and communications: 15%
- Financial Services: 5%
- Public administration and Services: 7%

Source: National Statistics Office of Thailand – 2000 Census (NSO 2013)

Figure 4.4: Formal Employment by Sector – Phuket 2000

Formal Employment by Sector - Phuket 2000

- Agriculture: 8%
- Mining and quarrying: 0%
- Manufacturing: 10%
- Utilities: 1%
- Construction: 8%
- Commerce: 25%
- Services: 38%
- Transport and communications: 10%

Source: National Statistics Office of Thailand – 2000 Census (NSO 2013)

Tourism development

Prior to the 1970's, tourism in Phuket was limited to low budget, small scale guest houses and cheap bungalow facilities for travellers who were interested in a "more authentic, less commercialised" Thai experience. With improved road networks, bridge connection to the mainland, and the establishment of a regular air transport service, 1973 saw the first seaside resort developed on Phuket Island (Cohen 2008). The construction of the Phuket International Airport in 1976 further facilitated overseas access to the area, rapidly increasing the number of visitor arrivals (Lonely Planet, 2005b). Introduced as a special and undiscovered destination in "Newsweek" magazine and additionally featured in the 1974 James Bond movie "The Man with the Golden Gun" the region quickly developed a favourable international profile – encompassing its tropical island, sun, sea and sand image.

By the 1980s and early 1990s the region had become synonymous with resort tourism, providing amenity, personal comfort and affordability. Consistent with visitor expectations and demands, accommodation and support services were developed as close as feasible to the coastline – in some cases businesses were established directly on the beach foreshore. Although the region maintains many alternative types of physical and cultural attractions, tourist centres consisting of hotels, restaurants, tour companies, entertainment, and souvenir shops were soon found at most sandy beaches along the west coast of Phuket – during the 1990s this extended progressively north to Khao Lak (Phang Nga province) and east to the Phi Phi Islands and Krabi (*personal communication* 2005). With the release of the adventure drama film "The Beach" (2000) starring Leonardo DiCaprio, Phi Phi became an instantly recognisable and popular destination (refer Plate 4.6).

Symptomatic of rapid expansion and poorly regulated commercial development, the turn of the century also saw increasing recognition of critical environmental problems – specifically the destruction of the coastal environment. Clearance of natural vegetation and intrusion of uncontrolled human settlements on natural shorelines resulted in increasing incidences of foreshore erosion, resource stress, coral destruction, declining fish populations and poorly controlled rubbish accumulation (Calgaro and Llyod 2008, *personal communication* 2004). The extent of negative impacts generally mirrored the degree of investment and expansion of tourism.

Although cooperative arrangements created through the formation of the Ministry of Tourism and Sport in 2003 awarded provincial governments greater input and control over localised policy strategies and development plans, local institutions continued to lack the authority to monitor, regulate or set standards for any segment of the tourist industry. As the industry appeared to be ascribed a virtual autonomy in exchange for high hotel and restaurant tax (Richter 1989: 94) a continuing culture of corruption, money, and political connections, helped secure approval for developments contravening existing planning policy and regulations (ie national park encroachment and disregard for prescribed set-backs). Furthermore, most buildings and property developments were not required to comply with any minimum structural standards or codes (Calgaro and Llyod 2008).

While opportunity and perceived prosperity lured increasing numbers of illegal migrants, unskilled workers and micro-business owners, formal tourism initiatives saw the diversification of the tourism product from its traditional nature and culture base, towards 'niche' markets including ecotourism, wedding tourism and perhaps most lucratively, health and medical tourism. In 2004 the region supported 7 health, hospitals and medical centres offering world class facilities and professional services ranging from cosmetic surgery, gender reassignment, optical and dental treatment and health spas. As the global tourism industry experienced instability associated with external events such as the Asian Financial Crisis, September 11 2001 attacks, 2002 Bali Bombings and the regional Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic (SARS) Phuket continued to prosper as a major tourist province internationally and domestically, attracting over 4,000,000 visitors annually (TAT, 2005a)

Exploring Vulnerability and Capacity

As rapid tourism development and increasing tourism reliance transformed the traditional character of both Bali and Phuket, it also influenced the context of relative vulnerability. Consistent with the type of assessment recommended within the pre-event stage of Ritchie's strategic management framework (2004), an environmental scan and issues analysis reveals significantly changed geographic, physical, socio-cultural, economic, institutional, governance, and environmental factors. While exposure and vulnerability remain dynamic and variable across temporal and spatial

scales, modernization and tourism development amplified many casual factors and pressures.

Physical – natural and built environments

Consistent with their tropical climate and geography, both destinations remain directly exposed to a wide range of known geophysical and climatic hazards including monsoonal rain, flooding, drought, landslides and mudslides. While uncommon, the regions are similarly liable to high winds, cyclones and associated storm surge. Given its position along the "Pacific Ring of Fire", Bali also experiences significant earthquakes and volcanic activity. Although these are considered inherent risks or natural phenomena, changes in traditional resource use, increasing populations and urbanisation, and environmental degradation has increased the level of sensitivity and human exposure to such hazards.

The evidence of this transformation in both Bali and Phuket is extensive. Changes in many traditional fishing practices of coastal populations have resulted in marine damage, declining fish stocks and destruction of sensitive mangrove ecosystems. Similarly, the move from subsistence agriculture to expanding commercial exports, cash cropping, and resource extraction has altered long established land use patterns and significantly degraded the natural environment. Poor sanitation, expanding populations, agricultural encroachment and badly regulated settlement patterns have affected air and water quality leading to increased incidences of tropical diseases and epidemics. Rapid urbanisation and limited planning, compliance or development standards has resulted in construction of facilities, critical infrastructure, transport and buildings in highly exposed hazardous locations – particularly the coastal zones. Ad hoc land management and development practices have also exacerbated incidences of coastal erosion, landslides, mudslides and urban flooding.

While the tropical climate, natural environment and sun, sea and sand image are integral to the popularity of these regions as tourist destinations, development, investment and expansion of the tourism industry has effectively multiplied the degree of physical exposure of people, assets and the environment to routine natural hazards.

Social

Reflecting successive periods of historical migration, expansion and population growth, particularly over the last century, the islands of Bali and Phuket demonstrate increasing heterogeneity. Greater mobility and urbanisation has resulted in changes to established age structures, gender distribution, ethnicity, class, and other social and cultural characteristics. While both societies reveal extensive tolerance, acceptance and syncretism of diverse ideas and beliefs, many minority groups are marginalised (*personal communication 2003, 2004*). With disparate access to wealth, education, and health facilities, there has been increasing isolation of the traditional subsistence fishing and the rural sector. As many farmers and unskilled workers have migrated to urban centres seeking economic opportunities, such employment is often only seasonal, or within the informal sector. Demographic profiles suggest that the popular tourist centres have highly transitional populations.

While tourism has generated significant tax revenues, foreign investment, and development for the region, Bali in particular, is renowned for its large number of poor, beggars, destitute, and people with compromised health. With no government based social support network or services, residents must be self-sufficient or rely on donations from community networks or non-government organisations. Although the island supports two major public hospitals, limited finances, resources and capacity means that the general population of Bali relies on small clinics, community health care centres (*puskesmas*) and local healers. With no formal emergency medical services or specialist facilities for residents, disability, special needs, malnutrition, tropical infection, and sexually transmitted diseases are poorly accommodated. In contrast, tourists with the financial resources have access to a number of small internationally owned private health clinics and pharmacies, with the option of evacuation/repatriation in more severe medical cases.

As health and medical tourism is a significant component of Phuket's tourism market there are numerous service options available to residents in the region. Privately owned hospitals are generally of international standard, although a number of these facilities and clinics cater exclusively to foreign patients. Emergency and ambulance services are privately contracted by each individual facility. With several government funded public hospitals administered by the Ministry of Public Health, medical help is considered

accessible to the entire population. Generally the standard of health care in Phuket is relatively high, with the primary concerns relating to hygiene, water and mosquito-borne diseases and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). With the exception of the STDs most incidences of hygiene and disease occur in rural locations or within concentrated construction camps.

Despite the concentration of most critical infrastructure, utilities, services and facilities within urban and tourism centres, the majority of regional social indicators such as literacy, education, mortality and income levels, suggest that conditions for both Bali and Phuket are above average national standards for their respective countries. In many respects an orientation and commitment to tourism has generated a degree of social cohesion for each host population, evidenced in considerable international reputations for affability and friendliness towards visitors. Similarly, despite concerns regarding the increasing commodification of people and culture, local residents in each destination have managed to maintain their own strong social networks and cultural traditions. While contemporary social structures do reveal spatially variable vulnerabilities and capacities, the most significant transformations for the host communities have occurred within local economies and livelihoods.

Economy

While tourism occurred in both Bali and Phuket prior to the introduction of formal government development programs, visitor numbers to these regions increased dramatically in the 1970's following the construction of international airports. Traditionally, local economies were predominantly subsistence and primary resource based. As Phuket suffered a down-turn in established tin and rubber markets, Bali's "Green Revolution" failed to achieve the anticipated commoditisation of rice as a cash crop. Local communities retained a foundation in agricultural and fishing production.

Early tourism initiatives were isolated, small scale and low budget. Following significant government, private, and foreign investment in tourism and related infrastructure, new economic and employment opportunities were generated. A growth in visitor arrivals saw increasing numbers of hotels, restaurants and tourism support services and created increasing demand in associated sectors including retail, commerce, construction and transportation. Rather than reflecting unilateral growth,

such accelerated development was mainly concentrated within prospective tourist destinations and urban nodes. While tourism offered new jobs prospects and opportunities for host communities, it also disrupted the traditional social structure. Common issues included disparate distribution of benefits, changes in economic status, loss of control over local resources, increasing prices, alienation, marginalisation and commodification of people and culture. As many reoriented their livelihoods to support tourism enterprises, employment was often limited to unskilled or low skill positions, and seasonal in nature.

Despite such rapid growth and development, the majority of skilled labourers remained dependent on the local economy, with limited market demand for their livelihoods. Similarly, to maintain an income, craftsmen and artisans became self-employed or joined cooperative micro-businesses, particularly focused on wholesale and retail trade to overseas markets. As entire host communities progressively reorientated their livelihoods to accommodate tourism, rural and remote communities also experienced economic growth due to remittances and increasing demand for agricultural production. Continued prosperity increased reliance on tourism income, and reduced traditional sectoral diversification. With the majority of taxes and foreign earnings diverted to centralised governments and significant income leaked overseas due to foreign ownership, local residents demonstrated a limited culture of asset accumulation, capital savings, or insurance.

As both Bali and Phuket recorded per capita incomes above national averages it is apparent that tourism did generate positive economic growth and changes for the host communities. Continued poverty and marginalisation of subsistence based coastal and rural communities also highlights economic inequalities and polarisation. Opportunity and promise associated with tourism income attracted significant in-migration from surrounding islands and regions; but the majority of individuals have become employed in a transitional informal sector. Rather than wealth and fortune many are forced by necessity to resort to crime, drugs, sex tourism, prostitution, and touting almost everything and anything. While visitor numbers flourish, local incomes and livelihoods are relatively assured. However, as more people become reliant on tourism earnings there is increasing exposure and sensitivity to any volatility in the tourism market.

Organisational capacity

Although tourism investment and development have remained national priorities since the early 1970's, contemporary governments of Indonesia and Thailand have both experienced periods of significant civil disruption and unrest leading to the implementation of decentralisation strategies and restructuring. While local institutions have been formally granted greater control and authority over planning processes and development, the legacy of former practices and governance has remained. As regional and provincial administrations are still obliged to remit taxes and foreign exchange earnings to the central government there have been limited resources available for direct monitoring, regulation or enforcement of issues at the local level. The imposition of national government authority, law and policies over traditional social institutions and structures has created further political complexity.

Similarly, while national agendas have mandated issues of sovereign language, religion, health, and education, there is strict control over public communication and access to information through censorship laws. In recent years there has been increasing internet filtering and restrictions on issues deemed of national security and/or political sensitivity. With international reputations for corruption, nepotism and cronyism there has been limited transparency or accountability in government actions. As local government and institutions have been restricted in their capacity to secure meaningful authority and change, a lot of "grass-roots" community-based support activities have been achieved by non-government organisations (NGOs). Extra familial ties and community networks facilitated by interaction between tourists and members of the host community have often provided the necessary finances and resources to support local initiatives. Health, education, poverty alleviation and environmental issues have remained high priorities. Customary practices and such social support networks have assisted communities to self-adapt when many aspects of lifestyles and livelihoods have significantly changed.

Psycho social resilience

The swift transition from traditional subsistence to thriving tourism enterprise is demonstrative of the adaptive strategies and coping capacity of the host communities within each tourism destination. While the majority of investment and development may have been driven by foreign and "top-down" government policies, these

communities provide most of the physical labour, employees and support services. More innovative, affluent or politically connected locals have been able to establish their own businesses or commerce, while others are dependent on transitional employment and the informal sector. Opportunity, prosperity, and an ideology of tolerance maintain a relatively mutual social cohesion, despite the apparent ethnic heterogeneity.

With low levels of personal savings, financial or capital reserves, community members have generally been supported by familial networks, cultural values and social traditions. Such relationships are regularly established and/or renewed through participation in a number of community wide ceremonies, festivals and events. These occasions also provide a means of local communication, consultation, sharing, and transference of information. Although tourism has helped maintain many of these traditional events, performances, and arts and crafts skills, it has proved detrimental to other customary livelihood practices. The expansion of tourism development, employment and opportunities has resulted in a concurrent reduction in economic diversification and livelihood alternatives.

Risk Management and Awareness

At the turn of the 21st century neither Bali nor Phuket had experienced significant catastrophe or natural disaster for over 35 years. The threat of volcanic activity remained present for the Balinese, yet since the eruption of Mount Agung in 1963 the level of direct local awareness and concern had diminished. Flooding, landslides, monsoonal rain, drought and disease have remained familiar hazards yet have generally been localised in impact. Widespread civil and political unrest has also occurred in both locations but has rarely been significant enough to disrupt tourism arrivals or international reputations. For most tourists the main dangers of these destinations included motorcycle/traffic and Jet Ski accidents, theft, drug possession, infection and STDs (Lonely Planet 2005a, *personal communication* 2005, 2006).

Lacking relevant experience or familiarity with major disaster events, limited consideration and few local resources had ever been dedicated to developing risk management plans for these popular tourist destinations (an issue which appears to have been endemic within the whole tourism industry prior to the turn of the century). As

existing infrastructure and capacities had generally been sufficient to cope with most events, the pressures and issues of day-to-day living were often considered a higher priority than contemplation of future adversity. Without extensive hazard awareness or an established disaster subculture, businesses and the community had no formal disaster planning, preparation or contingencies. Similarly governments and institutions seemed more focused on continued development and administration than on specific hazard identification, mitigation or risk reduction. As a consequence of such complacency and apathy both tourists and locals were highly susceptible to the impacts and adversity associated with any significant hazard.

The Context of Change

From a physical, environmental, social, and economic perspective, tourism development has affected significant change for the host communities of Bali and Phuket. Consistent with Butler's "tourism area life cycle" (2011) increasing visitor demand and investment rapidly stimulated the evolution of each location from traditional villages supporting peripheral tourism to internationally renowned tourist destinations continuously developing, expanding, and changing, to avoid stagnation or a decline in consumer demand.

Impacts have been variable across individuals and communities but it is evident that associated investment facilitated new infrastructure, employment and opportunity for many residents. As the tourism sector became more influential many traditional lifestyles and livelihoods were subsumed or made redundant. Within several decades tourism revenue had expanded to permeate most local economies and activities. While continued growth and prosperity generally overshadowed local concerns about environmental degradation, access to resources and social disparity, change and increasing reliance on tourism exposed a new and significant vulnerability to the threat of tourism crisis.

Despite the frequency of disaster and crisis events in other tourist regions and a growing body of literature dedicated to proactive disaster management, both destinations were apathetic and ill prepared for any significant adversity.

Chapter 5

~HAZARD AGENTS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND EMERGENT PHENOMENA ~

Although the dynamic and complex interrelationship of human and natural systems suggests it is artificial to delineate a crisis anatomy (Ritchie 2004, Scott and Laws 2005, Hill 1998, Ren 2000), academic researchers and practitioners still employ this approach as a convenient analytical tool. Accordingly, a singular, specific crisis or disaster may be represented with a pre-event setting, a spatially and temporally defined "trigger" and a post-event environment (ie. the life cycle approach). From a pre-event setting of relative complacency and poorly mitigated tourism reliance, the case study areas of Bali and Phuket were highly sensitive to any hazard that could potentially damage image and reputation. When confronted with the immediate demands of a significant disaster event, each destination was forced to develop a series of reactive emergency response and relief strategies. While the context and hazard agents vary, the manifestation of crisis and short term issues for both destinations reveal many similarities.

Bali – A deliberate attack on tourists

In tropical Bali, late September to October represents high tourist season. Hotel occupancy rates have averaged approximately 85% while businesses throughout popular tourist centres also conduct substantial trade (Lonely Planet 2005a). Although Ubud, Sanur and Nusa Dua are well established destinations on the island, the Kuta area is renowned as the unofficial entertainment capital and tourism mecca. For travellers in Kuta, days are typically occupied with tours, shopping, and relaxing on the beach or pool side. During the more temperate nights, visitors explore the multitude of restaurants, shops, bars and/or night spots. In peak holiday periods, local venues have been packed with an eclectic mix of youthful surfers, backpackers, package deal travellers, local residents, ex-patriots and various international sporting teams on their annual end of season trips. Redolent of hedonism and decadence Kuta emanated an atmosphere of fun and freedom, while most patrons appeared equally relaxed and carefree.

The Agent – the 2002 Bali Bombings

At approximately 23:05 (local time) on a typically busy Saturday night, October 12, 2002, the primary entertainment strip of Jalan Legian in Kuta, was to become the focus of an unmitigated act of deliberate violence and terrorism. The first explosion, a small backpack bomb, was triggered amongst the unsuspecting crowd on the ground floor of the popular Paddy's Bar (Australian Federal Police 2005). As injured patrons and staff fled into the street, a second more powerful bomb of ammonium nitrate, estimated to weigh between 50-150kg, was detonated in a van parked in front of the adjacent Sari Club (refer to Figure 5.1 and Plate 5.1). An open-plan, outdoor club with high surrounding walls and a thatched-roof bar, the venue was almost instantaneously engulfed in flames. While most victims inside the Sari Club died in the immediate impact of the second explosion, by-passers and evacuees of the Paddy's blast were also subjected to the flying debris. Although exact timings are difficult to determine, another small bomb packed with excrement, was remotely detonated seconds later in the vicinity of the American consulate in the Denpasar suburb of Renon, injuring one person (Australian Federal Police 2005).

Physical impacts and emergency response efforts

> *"I remember that night – I am so grateful to god. I normally work the early shift at Frankies and then go to the Sari Club. That night some old Swedish friends came in and I told them to stay and have a drink and talk with me instead of going to Sari Club straight away – I even paid. We heard a loud noise and thought maybe it was electricity or something, then there was another one– it was then we saw the orange glow and smoke. People came running down the street saying something bad had happened at the Sari Club – there were bodies everywhere. We all looked at each other in shock and then just did a big group hug – grateful that we were safe"* Bartender, Kuta January 2003

The sheer force of the largest blast in front of the Sari Club shattered windows throughout Kuta, with the sound reportedly heard up to 15km away. As the power supply was immediately interrupted, many residents mistakenly believed that the noise had been caused by a blown electricity transformer (*personal communication, 2003*). Creating a crater approximately one-metre deep, the initial explosion destroyed

Figure 5.1: Location of the October 12, 2002 Bali Bomb explosions

Source Travel Guardian (2002)

Plate 5.1: Aerial view of the damage at Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club

Source: Nick Burgoyn, (November 2002)

numerous vehicles, proximate buildings and houses, and scattered debris in a radius of several hundred metres. As the resultant inferno quickly spread, both inside and outside of the devastated bars were revealed as scenes of panic, destruction and carnage. Eye witness reports describe how bystanders, capable victims and those drawn by curiosity invariably became the first responders (Ellis 2002, *personal communication* 2003). The main priority became saving human lives – this included search and rescue efforts, locating and bringing survivors to safety, provision of basic first aid, and crowd control in the immediate vicinity of the incident.

Those injured who could walk or be carried, were taken to the closest surrounding medical facilities by any means available. As volunteers and the privately financed emergency response teams gained vehicle access to the site, remaining victims were transported in cars and ambulances. The severity of burns and injuries and rapid influx of patients at the limited medical centres proved overwhelming (Ellis 2002, Stevenson and Baker 2002). There was an obvious lack of trained medical personnel, inadequate supplies and facilities, and deficient mass emergency medical capacity (Bali Recovery Group 2003, *personal communication* 2003). Many patients were treated in hallways while doctors and medical staff tried vainly to maintain sterile conditions (refer Plate 5.2). The morgue was unable to accommodate the growing numbers of the deceased. Volunteers from all sectors of society, including tourists, immediately made themselves available to the hospitals to help in tasks such as nursing and comforting the wounded, giving blood, operating the telephone lines and helping to establish a database of the missing and dead (refer Plate 5.3).

> *"The ice trucks kept coming in but the morgue just wasn't big enough. There were people everywhere, mainly foreigners looking purposely at the remains of each charred body in both shock and fear, searching for loved ones but hoping not to find them here. Other people seemed to be there just to look.*
>
> *In the unairconditioned wards the beds were full, mostly Australians. One older guy tried to take charge and get all but family and essential medical staff to leave, but the media and journalists just wouldn't go. The burns and injuries all looked so bad even the doctors didn't seem to know where to start...."*
> International tourist and volunteer at Sanglah May 2003

Plate 5.2: Sanglah Hospital - limited supplies and facilities to treat the injured

Source: Nick Burgoyne (October 2002)

Plate 5.3: Volunteers keeping bulletin board of victims, injured and missing at Bali Hospital

Source: Nick Burgoyne (October 2002)

In Kuta, the first 24 hours following the bombing have been collectively described as chaotic and confusing (*personal communication 2003*). As the immediate vicinity was cordoned off, the media began to transmit horrific images and reports to a global audience. With growing awareness both locally and internationally, direct responders became frustrated with the increasing difficulty in coordinating personnel and efforts. A predominance of Australian's amongst the victims also served to generate unprecedented interest and attention within Australia. An investigative team from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) was quickly assembled and flew directly to Bali to assist in the identification of victims and search for perpetrators. While concerned friends, families and locals rallied together, arrangements were made to evacuate the worst injured to overseas facilities.

Within 48 hours the Bali Recovery Group, a coordination committee of existing local Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), was created with the aim to "help deliver the best services, collect data and minimise duplication of effort"(Bali Recovery Group 2003, Bali Relief Ubud 2002). Through physical and fiscal donations from around the world, more medical supplies and trained surgeons arrived, office equipment was attained to assist administration, and basic needs such as food, clothing and emergency shelter were provided. Local hoteliers provided for the needs of victims and volunteers at the main hospital (Sanglah) while local businesses donated ice and cold storage containers for the morgue. Grief and trauma counselling was established for victims, their families, and those affected by the bombing. Daily updates and briefings were also conducted in an attempt to help keep everyone informed (BaliSOS 2004).

With victims represented from 22 different countries, international media attention remained intense over these subsequent days. Lacking any prior experience in disaster situations, Bali officials were unsuccessful in establishing a formal media centre or an identifiable spokesman to distinguish or clarify the facts. With limited written records or data sharing capacity, concerned friends and families experienced delays and confusion in tracing missing persons. Sensationalism and speculation ensued with the clearest message that western tourists had been specifically targeted in this terrorist act. With committee members already in Bali, PATA committed to helping Bali's tourism authorities and industry partners with early tourism crisis communications and to establish a "Crisis Task Force" (PATA 2003b).

As local and provincial governments immediately prioritised the provision of further assistance for survivors and increased security measures, tourists began a mass exodus of Bali. Similarly, many Muslim residents concerned about a potential cultural backlash travelled to other Indonesian islands (*personal communication* 2003). Extra international flights were provided to repatriate victims, survivors and concerned travellers. It has been estimated that within days only 15,000 of the former 100,000 tourists remained on the island (CGI 2003).

Physical Reconstruction

As the immediacy and urgency of most medical needs were met, official efforts began to focus on the physical clean up and restoration of the vital functions of the community. Forensic investigative teams continued to sort, remove and analyse the structural debris, while businesses and construction crews began the arduous task of repairing damaged infrastructure. The area in and around the blast vicinity became closed to all public traffic. Consistent with an altruistic, high consensus approach following such significant adversity (Comfort 1988, Norman 2006), the host-community of Kuta worked together to re-establish a sense of normality. Although few locals were amongst the victims, floral tributes predominantly from members of the Balinese community began to appear at local consulates and "Ground Zero" (*personal communication* 2003).

While both regional and national authorities eventually conveyed sympathy and condolences, greater security was committed to provide reassurance to both residents and visitors to the island (Beratha 2002, Indo.com 2002). Local security patrols were also established by community based groups to assist calm and prevent looting of damaged premises.

> *"The people of Bali are very gentle, peaceful people, they are friendly they don't want to hurt anybody - peace is good for tourist"* Local banjar security, Kuta January 2003

Despite such overt attempts to restore stability, most foreign embassies opted to release strong travel advisories. The Indonesian Minister for Culture and Tourism I Gede

Ardika appealed for the international audience to adopt a more considered approach, "we ask for the understanding and assistance of the world to come to the aid of the Balinese people who love and cherish peace. It makes no sense to isolate them (the people of Bali). If we compare, when the WTC was attacked no one issued a travel ban on the U.S.A., did they?" (Bali Discovery, 2002, October 21). With declining demand, airlines began to reduce flights. Cancellations of high profile events and meetings soon followed. Already personally distressed by the incident, locals and businesses in Kuta continued to suffer a rapid decline in trade. Within a week hotel occupancy rates for most hotels had dropped to single figures (BPS 2012).

As the businesses and host community of Kuta laboured to deal with the immediate physical and emotional damage, the security and prosperity of the local tourism sector had become increasingly uncertain (*personal communication* 2003).

Phuket – the wave of destruction

As a relatively clean, modern, and economical "sun, surf, sand" tourist destination, Phuket and the Andaman region had established a particularly strong market base amongst travellers of Northern Europe hoping to escape colder winter climates (Calgaro 2005). Accordingly, November to April reflected 'high' tourist season for this region. During the apex period of Christmas and New Year, occupancy rates throughout Southern Thailand generally ran close to capacity. While tourist centres consistently catered for the daily hedonism, adventure and leisure demands of their clients, this period was commonly associated with an additional flourish of celebration, activities and profitable business. As a popular and notorious "party" destination the Christmas weekend in Patong represented a special opportunity for festivities, social gatherings and relaxation for both residents and holiday makers.

The Agent – the South Asian "Boxing-Day" Tsunami

At approximately 7:58am local time, Sunday 26 December, 2004, submarine seismic activity in the Sunda Trench fault (700km southwest of Phuket) triggered a 9.2 magnitude earthquake. In Southern Thailand many reported the shaking of an earth tremor, yet as it was short in duration with limited impact, few gave it any further consideration (*personal communication* 2004, 2005). Within 10 minutes, as the first of the ensuing tsunami waves swept over the Indonesian province of Banda Aceh, seismic

monitoring stations in the Pacific had only just begun to collate and analyse available data regarding this "considerable activity" (Lambourne 2005). As the generated waves continued their destructive path both east and west of the fault line, it took more than an hour before scientists were able to confirm the threat of a *possible* tsunami and issue relevant warnings. Thai authorities reportedly received this precautionary warning 15 minutes prior to the first waves reaching the region, yet no details were subsequently relayed to the general "at risk" public (Bangkok Post 2005, January 27).

As a Sunday morning following wide-spread Christmas celebrations, many in the immediate impact vicinity slept, while others enjoyed a late breakfast, indulged in a morning swim or pursued normal daily activities – oblivious of the impending danger (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). While there were numerous natural indicators including the precursor earth tremor and the ocean ominously appearing to withdraw and bubble, few lacked the familiarity to effectively interpret or understand these signs[8]. Without any official public warning or notification the first of the turbulent tsunami waves had impacted throughout the region by 09:38am, leaving extensive damage, death and destruction in its wake. Having effected such a vast expanse of coastline (approximately 300km in a total of six Thai provinces refer Figure 3.4) there have been many conflicting and even contradictory accounts regarding the timing of the first wave, associated sea movements and even the height and number of subsequent waves (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). Apart from the obvious stress and immediacy of the situation, much of this disparity has been attributed to variability in physical landscapes, direct obstacles and location.

> *"I felt the quake at about 8:00am and my coffee cup shook on the table - at the time I didn't think much about it. When I noticed the ocean withdrawing around 9:20 I realised it meant a tsunami was coming. My wife and I rushed to get all the guests from their rooms urging them to run inland to safety. There were 2 wave tides – the second was the biggest about 7- 8 metres, you can still see the marks on the walls. … We were lucky, not everyone managed to get out from the place next door"* Hotel owner, Kamala Beach January 2004

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[8] Numerous witnesses and informants also reported observing erratic animal behaviour prior to the tsunami however there is no empirical evidence to support that animals have an innate capacity to sense such danger.

Figure 5.2: The South Asia Tsunami – 26 December 2004

Source: BBC Online (2004)

Plate 5.4: Hotels and infrastructure proximate to the coastline suffered extensive damage from the tsunami– Khao Lak, Thailand

Source: Gurtner, Y (2004)

Regional impacts and emergency response demands

Despite the unbalanced media attention that has been given to the popular beach resort of Patong, the greatest physical damage was sustained in the low lying areas of Khao Lak and on the relatively exposed island of Phi Phi Don - with waves measuring in excess of 10 metres (TAT, 2005). Along the west coast of Phuket Island most waves were estimated at between two and five metres. The less established tourist centre of Kamala Beach, just north of Patong experienced significant damage and destruction (*personal communication* 2004). Rather than one large devastating wave, the earthquake generated a series of waves that continued to batter the coastline with tremendous force and accumulated debris. In some low lying areas the deluge extended over a kilometre inland, destroying or sweeping up anything in its path – including vegetation, people, vehicles, building and fishing materials and even a Thai navy patrol vessel (refer Plate 7.8). The only reliable refuge was found to be higher ground, consequently many people perished.

As the waves finally withdrew, survivors were faced with scenes of death and destruction. Amidst such turmoil many turned to plans for search and rescue operations, yet the uncertainty regarding further "after-shocks" and more waves remained. In the direct impact zones; power, water and telephones (land-lines) were disrupted, and the mobile telecommunications network became quickly overburdened (*personal communication* 2004). Many roads were swept away or inundated with water. In other areas mounds of debris restricted any type of vehicle movement or access. Without access to adequate communications or information few understood the cause or specifics of the event. As attempts were made to assist the injured and move them to the closest available medical facilities much of the world remained ignorant to the plight of those affected.

Despite being unprepared for the relative scale and magnitude of such a tragedy, the Thai government had extensive experience in dealing with human disasters. The available disaster management plan for the region was quickly judged outdated and inadequate (Phuket Gazette 2005, May 5). Within hours official operations and personnel were organised to develop and implement alternative strategies assist local search and rescue efforts. As victims were extracted from the ocean, collapsed buildings and piles of wreckage, medical facilities progressively became overwhelmed

(*personal communications* 2004).   While most of the urban hospitals were reasonably well furnished and resourced; medicine, trained personnel and adequate sterile space soon proved in short supply. Volunteers from every sector of society promptly arrived to offer assistance and donations.   With no access to reliable transport or communication however, many survivors in small and remote coastal communities remained completely isolated for days after the first wave struck (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

In the unaffected provincial capital of Phuket City, an emergency operations centre (EOC) was quickly established at Provincial Hall to centralise and coordinate the official response efforts (refer Plate 5.5). All victims, volunteers, businesses, residents, foreign aid workers, and media services were progressively directed to this location (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).   Basic first-aid and temporary accommodation was arranged for those who were injured and displaced. Given that many victims had lost family, friends, and all personal possessions, over subsequent days and weeks this area became the focus of foreign embassies (to assist search efforts and issue temporary identification), communication facilities (offering free internet and international phone calls), language interpreters, food, water and donation tents, travel/flight assistance (offering free flights to Bangkok) and an unofficial message and notification area for those looking for those still missing (*personal communications* 2004, 2005) (refer Plate 5.6).

> *"I have lost my brother – I don't know where to start looking. He was staying in a bungalow on Phi Phi Island with his girlfriend and last sent us an email to say how beautiful the place was and that he was having so much fun. We haven't heard from him since the tsunami. We have tried ringing his mobile but it goes straight to voice-mail. I got on the first plane from South Africa. … A friend organised a car and driver, I will go to the hospitals first – I have brought photos of him. … I hear that the tsunami was really bad on Phi Phi, I just keep imagining him hurt and injured in the debris. We are Jewish, if he is not alive I still need to find his body."* Victim's brother, Phuket December 2004

Plate 5.5: Influx of material donations at Phuket Provincial Hall (EOC)

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Plate 5.6: Media interest and victim bulletin board at Phuket Provincial Hall

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Smaller operation centres were similarly erected in other provinces to direct the rescue efforts and assist victims to larger facilities. Despite numerous advisories to follow more established victim identification processes, many anxious relatives continued to trawl through the makeshift morgues located at the local hospitals and temples (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). As authorities struggled to establish a level of control and order, raw emotions, confusion and differing religious and cultural requirements resulted in numerous cases of mistaken identity. As significant time and resources seemed to be allocated to the higher profile demands of tourists and foreign victims, there was growing resentment over the relative neglect of Thai residents and the needs of those in the more marginalised villages and communities (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

Amidst continued search, rescue and salvage efforts, safety and security was recognised as a major priority for authorities. Remaining residents and tourists reported localised looting, scavenging, harassment and mafia standover tactics (*personal communication* 2004). A number of survivors that had run to higher ground also expressed concerns about returning to the coastline. Additional uncertainty emerged as authorities were unable to accurately determine the likelihood of more aftershocks and damage. As concerted efforts were made to restore general access to clean water, food and basic amenities, assistance was slower to reach more remote locations. With the possibility of decomposing corpses undiscovered amidst the debris, health became a more imposing issue. An abundance of large stagnant water bodies and insufficient quantities of antiseptics and antibiotics added to concerns regarding local disease outbreak and epidemics (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

Despite the scale and breadth of the damage it was almost 12 hours before information about this natural disaster was widely transmitted by the popular international media. As the tsunami had impacted throughout South Asia, specific regional details were difficult to ascertain. While the media teams began to arrive in Phuket, the logistics of search and rescue efforts, medical treatment, survivor assistance and victim identification were treated as more immediate responder priorities. Many tourists that were not searching for lost friends and relatives demonstrated a desire to leave the region as soon as possible (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). As the international airport had suffered minimal damage, extra flights were established to assist their

evacuation (refer Plate 5.7). Scheduled incoming flights also began to bring in much needed resources and supplies. With the emergence of graphic video footage and photos, personal stories and images of the tsunami were broadcast to a global audience.

"The journalist here, they are like vultures. They come after the tsunami and show pictures of death, damage and destruction so people think all of Patong is affected. But less than 250 metres from the beach they stay in their perfect 5 star hotels drinking Chang beer and eating prawns and green curry. They only tell the bad stories or talk about all the people missing – what about all the people that survived or helped others?" Tailor, Patong Beach January 2005.

Tentative estimates of the damage and growing death tolls publicised within the first 24 hours were sufficient to elicit worldwide shock and sympathy. As proximate foreign embassy representatives worked to assist with the diverse demands of both victims and relatives, travel advisories were issued to cover all of the affected provinces. Despite the fact most damage had been limited to the coastline and that 80% of hospitality establishments on the island of Phuket remained operational, occupancy rates in most places quickly dropped to single figures. With headquarter offices located in Bangkok, PATA and the Thai Tourism Authority quickly established, maintained and published accurate records regarding the extent of damage and operability of tourism infrastructure, offering further support and recovery strategies for affected businesses

Tourists continued a mass exodus of the region while there appeared to be a reciprocal influx of concerned relatives, international rescue workers, medical and forensic teams. Even as officials and medical establishments managed to restore a semblance of control and order, the media continued to convey impressions of absolute destruction and devastation in which Patong and Phuket remained foremost. Beyond the extensive physical, emotional and psychological damage it became quickly apparent that the tsunami had created an imposing crisis for tourism enterprises.

Plate 5.7: Mass exodus of tourists at Phuket International Airport – December 30, 2004

Source: Gurtner, Y (2004)

Plate 5.8: Clean-up of damaged buildings and debris – Patong January 2005

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Rebuilding infrastructure and livelihoods

As official government and military rescue efforts gradually managed to reach more remote areas and communities, in Patong the rebuilding efforts were well underway. Having accounted for most immediate needs, many business and residents began to take stock of the damage (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). While many felt overwhelmed, clean-up efforts began within 48 hours (refer Plate 5.8). Understandably establishments closest to the foreshore had sustained the worst damage, with some losing absolutely everything. In contrast, 300 metres inland other venues were able to maintain operational capacity with minimal interruption.

Cognisant of the value of the local beach as a prominent tourist feature, volunteers businesses and construction workers participated in daily workgroups to clear the sand and water of debris. Tractors, dump trucks and prime earth movers were quickly transported to Patong to remove the ever increasing accumulation of debris as residents sorted through possessions. On the streets where tourist business remained, makeshift stalls were constructed to sell salvaged merchandise and soiled goods. As larger hotels and establishments began to 'board off' the damage from public view, most of the smaller businesses that lacked insurance began the extensive repairs and renovations necessary to rebuild. Even without electricity, construction activity for some continued 24 hours a day. Others opted to simply abandon what was left of their premises (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

While the tourist centre of Patong revealed a profusion of privately and publicly sponsored reconstruction activity, circumstances in neighbouring Kamala were comparatively subdued. Despite the significant level of damage, a week after the tsunami contractors had yet to restore most utilities or remove any accumulated debris. Locally this was ascribed to a lack of international investments and political marginalisation (*personal communication* 2004). Although the tourist resorts of Phi Phi and Khao Lak had established a larger international profile, physical distance from major resource centres delayed the provision of aid and equipment. Decimated coastal villages were predominantly left to their own resources.

Throughout the region hospitals, morgues, airports, and emergency operation centres remained a hive of activity. Official statements of sympathy and condolences were

made domestically and internationally. As the international community began to donate an unprecedented level of material and financial assistance, humanitarian non-government organisations, volunteer and aid agencies became prolific. Contrary to other afflicted countries, the King of Thailand (who himself lost his grandson in the tsunami) publicly declared that Thailand required no fiscal contributions but instead requested international advice and expertise in helping his country to recover from the disaster. The establishment of an Indian Ocean tsunami early warning system became a highly topical and consensual issue.

As urban residents found themselves immediately unemployed, many migrants (particularly those engaged in the informal sector), chose to repatriate or seek work in other popular tourist centres. Experienced construction workers and clean-up crews were in high demand yet most of the locally owned businesses expressed a lack of sufficient finances or resources to pay. Largely supported by private enterprise and multinational corporations, the regional and national tourism association worked fervently to establish a tourism recovery plan to minimise further impacts on the significantly damaged tourism sector. Within 10 days of the disaster the Thai Immigration Bureau had already assisted almost 5000 victims, mostly foreigners, to leave the country (UNDP 2006). While areas of Patong had managed sufficiently to host substantial New Year's celebrations, rebuilding efforts elsewhere were far less advanced, and many Thais remained in temporary shelters.

> *"We need international help and money now more than medicine, food and clothes. We need to build back houses, shops, businesses, and hotels. Build back better, safer, and have tourist come back to Thailand"* Street vendor, Patong January 2005

An insight into disaster warnings and emergency response phenomena
In appreciating the details and short term behaviour associated with direct disaster impacts in Bali and Southern Thailand, it is apparent that these locations experienced a range of analogous issues. Quarantelli (1997:20) observed that, "response generated demands exist in all disasters, somewhat independent of any disaster agent … certain response patterns and functions are inherent including warnings, evacuations, sheltering, emergency medical care, search and rescue and protection of life and

property." Despite the obvious disparities of hazard agent, scale, magnitude, and extent of physical damage, Bali and Phuket revealed differing resources, capabilities and response actions. Examined from a holistic disaster management perspective, it is possible to identify numerous strengths and weaknesses related to the applied strategies of mitigation and early recovery. From a consistent context of rapid development and complacency however, neither destination could be considered adequately organised or prepared in the pre-event periods of disaster prevention and mitigation.

Prodromal – mobilisation, warnings and alerts

Following the literature of Faulkner (2001) and Ritchie (2004), the prodromal stage of the disaster/crisis process occurs "when it is apparent that a disaster is imminent" (Faulkner 2001:338). In terms of mitigation and management strategies, this phase is generally characterised by identification, notification, mobilisation of warning systems, contingency planning and protection/relocation of people and vital resources (Sharpely 2004). Based in effective communication and perception, the provision of appropriate information is expected to assist people to take actions that save lives, reduce damage, reduce human suffering and speed recovery. If time and circumstances allow, recommended practice includes the establishment of a crisis management/communication centre (WTO 2003).

Although other areas of Indonesia had been previously subjected to small-scale terrorist attacks, residents and tourists in Kuta had no immediate reason to suspect the existence of the terrorist-bombing plot.[9] As an unexpected, sudden, and direct event, the October 12, 2002 bombings reveal minimal evidence of a prodromal disaster period. Even as patrons were evacuating the area of the Paddy's blast, there was restricted time or scope to anticipate further attacks. Comparable incidents of terrorism in Luxor (Egypt), Madrid and London, demonstrate that there is limited capacity to prevent the advent of such assaults beyond enhanced intelligence, awareness, and security initiatives. In direct contrast, circumstances associated with Thailand's tsunami preparedness and warning measures reveals significant oversights and lapses in official management decisions.

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[9] While an official Australian inquiry confirmed that related intelligence advice had been issued by the British Foreign Office and American CIA, it concluded that there was no "specific" intelligence warning of the attack in Bali (Tiernan 2003).

Despite the fact that a tsunami had not hit Thailand for several decades, the possibility of such a catastrophic event was not entirely unfamiliar. In 1998 the Director General of the Thai Meteorological Department, Smith Dharmasajora, articulated a public warning regarding the threat of tsunami to Thailand's Andaman Coast, (*The Internationalist* January 2005). As this speech was spread by newspapers across the country, it resulted in widespread panic, outrage and derision. "Government officials, fearful of a washed-up tourist season, branded Mr. Smith *(sic)* a dangerous man with a screw loose. Authorities on the resort island of Phuket fastened loudspeakers to pickup trucks to broadcast a mollifying message to beachgoers – and warned Mr. Smith *(sic)* not to come to town." (Barta 2005). Smith Dharmasajora was subsequently encouraged to retire from his official position of responsibility.

In September 2004 (three months prior to the devastating South Asian tsunami), a leading article in Australian government publication, *AusGEO,* similarly highlighted the danger of a massive undersea earthquake and tsunami generated in the north-western sector of the Sunda Trench (Cummins 2004:4-7). While the article content was based on the threat and implications to Australia, it noted "There is an international tsunami warning system for the Pacific Ocean, but none for the Indian Ocean" (Cummins 2004:4). Using modelling from the 1833 Sumatra earthquake, Cummins (2004:6) clearly demonstrated the potential of such a high magnitude earthquake to affect the entire Indian Ocean basin. Unfortunately, neither of these qualified forecasts resulted in significant action, warning or preparation for exposed populations.

With more than 90 minutes lead time between the initial earthquake and the impact of the first waves on the west coast of Thailand on December 26, 2004, there has been additional inquiry and criticism regarding Thailand's conservative approach to the threat of tsunami. Despite the numerous natural indicators it is apparent that few were familiar with such characteristic tsunami warning signs. In places like Patong, it was observed that as the tide initially withdrew scores of people (locals and tourists alike) where drawn by curiosity to the newly exposed ocean bed and stranded fish (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). On another beach in Phuket, a 10-year-old female British tourist was credited with saving numerous lives by recognising the precursors to a tsunami, taught in a recent school geography lesson (The Daily Telegraph 2005,

January 1). Despite direct exposure to all forms of sea based hazards, there was no formal system of natural hazard education and awareness for coastal Thais.

Following the disaster, numerous articles have referred to an emergency meeting of Thai meteorological department officials, convened on advice of the high magnitude earthquake.   Although the veracity of such a meeting and other warnings has become the focus of legal investigations (*Bangkok Post* 2005, 27 January, *Bangkok Post* 2005 21 February), there was no formal warning issued. An undisclosed source cited in a national Thai newspaper conferred, "The very important factor in making the decision was that it's high [tourist] season and hotel rooms were nearly 100-per-cent full. If we issued a warning, which would have led to evacuation [and if nothing happened], what would happen then? Business would be instantaneously affected. It would be beyond the Meteorological Department's ability to handle. We could go under, if [the tsunami] didn't come." (*The Nation* 2004*,* 28 December) As the afflicted area lacked the communication network and capability to rapidly issue any form of comprehensive warning message the significance of this decision can only remain open to conjecture (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). .

The Emergency Period/Acute Crisis

The initial "triggers" or agents of these crises for Bali and Southern Thailand have been illustrated as abnormal, rapid onset, high impact and high intensity situations. Consistent with popular definitions of crisis in tourism literature, the events were outside typical operational frameworks (Santana 2004) and characterised by a perception of an inability to cope by those directly affected, at least in the short term (Faulkner 2001).   The loss of lives and extent of damage from direct impact was increased due to inadequate mitigation measures and poorly regulated development practices.

Constructed from highly flammable materials, the popular entertainment venues in Kuta had no accessible form of fire suppression. Additionally, the physical plan and design of these buildings actually impeded immediate evacuations.   Survivors of the initial blasts have described the difficulties in trying to reach safety as the inferno intensified (Ellis 2002*, personal communication* 2003).   The congestion of debris, people and

vehicles in the narrow surrounding streets also delayed access to vital medical attention. In Thailand, the most apparent issue has been the direct proximity of buildings and structures to the coastline. While many traditional villages had always relied on fishing and coastal resources for their livelihoods, tourism facilities were primarily constructed for access and amenity. Issues of shoreline encroachment, illegal buildings and the destruction of natural "buffer" zones (ie clearance of mangroves and vegetation) were already well recognised in Thailand (*personal communications* 2004, 2005). Preliminary observation also suggests that singular "stand-alone" structures directly parallel to the coastline suffered more significant damage than adjacent buildings.

Consistent with the Bali blasts, immediate evacuation was problematic in Southern Thailand. On popular tourist beaches the haphazard distribution of wooden sun lounges, umbrellas and other equipment prevented a direct route away from the oncoming waves. Many were unsure where to seek safety. Proximate roads were quickly blocked with people, cars and abandoned vehicles. Like many villagers, workers and tourists, less fortunate motorists were caught completely unaware as the first wave hit. People survived by holding on to fixed objects, buoyant material or were fortunately swept to safety. While some sought the refuge of any elevated premises, the structural integrity of many impacted buildings had become significantly compromised. From each scene of damage and destruction there were many tales of tragedy, fortune and altruism (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

Organised Response

As the immediate danger of the bombings and tsunami receded, survivors, witnesses and nearby civilians became spontaneous volunteers in early search and rescue efforts, with little apparent concern for personal safety. While Auf der Heide (1989) observed that these volunteers generally turn over such tasks to formal, organised agencies, with no official local emergency response systems and limited experience, trained responders in the immediate aftermath environments purportedly lacked any real authority or established protocols. In the absence of recognised plans many important decisions and actions were described as ad hoc, inconsistent and contradictory (*personal communication*s 2003, 2004).

Causative of local telephone disruption (landlines) and mobile network congestion, these disaster situations also revealed limited alternative communication options for emergency response coordination. Unlike authorities in Bali however, the Thais were effective in rapidly establishing a centralised Emergency Operations Centre. While the Thai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation progressively took responsibility for situational assessment and coordination of formal response efforts, the country equally lacked a coherent system or database for disaster information processing. As impact victims and relatives started to converge at hospitals, medical centres and emergency shelters, each facility implemented its own form of documentation and record keeping. Emotional trauma, confusion, and foreign language command created consistent problems of replication and inaccuracy (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

Conditions at Bali's primary hospital of Sanglah were considered additionally distressing for the injured, friends and relatives. Although there has been universal praise for the medical professionals and volunteers, facilities were rudimentary. Foreigners were frequently observed as receiving priority treatment and attention over injured locals. Lack of organisation and authority in the morgue resulted in extensive mishandling and cross contamination of the bodies (*personal communication* 2003). While disasters characteristically overwhelm community resources, Bali obviously lacked the medical capacity to cope with any large scale emergency.

As a localised event, search and rescue efforts in Kuta were quickly scaled down. Rather than expecting or waiting for external assistance, communities and survivors collectively provided initial labour and resources. Beyond conventional issues of shock and distress, the post-impact community environment epitomised increased solidarity, collaboration and a consensus to prove resilient (*personal communications* 2003). Consequent to a high media profile, large numbers of international emergency specialists, aid agencies and anxious relatives appeared over subsequent hours and days. While such conduct was also evident in post-impact Thailand, the scale and logistics of the tsunami damage necessitated extended search and rescue operations. Even when it was apparent that few survivors were likely to be found at sea or amidst the wreckage, many residents and families continued to conduct personal searches (*personal communications* 2004, 2005).

With few definitive facts or information regarding the possibility of further incidents, authorities in both destinations struggled to provide credible assurances of safety and security. Although quick to announce official investigations and security upgrades, numerous high level officials in Indonesia have been openly criticised for delays in expressing formal sentiments of victim support and empathy (Bali Discovery 2002, 24 November). While affected residents, private enterprise and local tourism networks generously contributed to regional relief efforts, consumer confidence appeared to be simultaneously eroded by continued media sensationalism and international travel advisories issued with limited consultation with local officials, diplomats or even a general situational awareness of the event context. Lacking recommended crisis communication and media relation strategies (eg PATA 2003a, PATA 2003b, Wilks and Moore 2004, WTO 2003a, 2003b) neither destination was particularly successful in establishing early factual consistency or balanced reporting.

Intermediate Response

As practical activities following such disaster events involve damage assessments, salvage, clean-up operations and restoration of critical facilities, response and recovery patterns typically become dominated by agent specific needs (Quarantelli 1997, Comfort 1989, Norman 2006). The confined physical impacts of Bali's terrorist attacks were significantly different to the extensive logistical, environmental and humanitarian demands of Southern Thailand. Accordingly, Thailand reflected significant variation in response periods, priorities, organisational activity, and resources. Yet as tourism reliance existed as a common denominator for both destinations, the failure of most short term initiatives to prevent rapidly declining tourist numbers indicated the onset of tourism crisis.

Chapter 6

~ INTEGRATING RESILIENCE
AND DESTINATION RECOVERY ~

While the Bali Bombings and South Asia tsunami had a direct impact on individuals, infrastructure, assets, and the physical environment, subsequent experiences of response and recovery efforts also significantly challenged local systems and communities. Numerous reports have quantified the associated "disaster statistics", yet often reveal variable figures and assessments depending on the parameters used and source of information (CGI 2003, ADPC 2005). Similarly, a wealth of related literature has emerged within the fields of disaster management (including emergency response, humanitarian relief/aid, development, and recovery strategies), medicine (primary care, health and trauma psychology) and tourism. As each analysis reviews the facts and events from their own prescribed disciplinary perspective - interdisciplinary, multi-level stakeholder perspectives demonstrate the variable approaches used towards intermediate and longer term recovery.

Bali – changes and crisis escalation

Despite lingering questions regarding missing residents and DNA contamination, the official death toll from the October 12, 2002 bombings has been fixed at 202. With 38 Indonesian citizens, 164 bodies were identified as foreign nationals (including 88 Australians). An additional 350 people were reportedly treated for injuries of varying severity. While utilities and peripheral damage were quickly repaired, more structurally affected buildings were closed indefinitely or demolished. Given the importance of preserving any forensic evidence, the removal of wreckage and accumulated debris from the blast site became a painstaking process. It was several weeks before Jalan Legian was reopened to public vehicles.

Although it is has been suggested that relatively few local Balinese were actually caught up in the main explosion (Hitchcock and Putra 2006) many devoutly religious residents turned to ritual, prayers and ceremony in an attempt to restore physical and spiritual harmony to the island, and renew their own faith (Indo.com (a) 2002, Ballinger 2002)

In the Balinese view of the cosmos, this is a period in which every attempt must be made to accede to the three basic ordering principles of Balinese life - *Tri Hita Kirana* - the absolute need for balance to prevail in all matters between Man and Nature; Man and God; and Man and Man.*(sic)* (Bali Discovery 2005, 10 October)

On November 15, 2002 a formal purification ceremony was held in front of the Sari Club ruins to cleanse the area of all residual chaotic influences. Inviting government representatives, journalists and participants from all religious denominations and nationalities, Bali publicly revealed the extent of grief and anxiety caused by the bombings (BaliSOS 2002). While such ritual and ceremony were intended to assist the emotional and psychological healing process, there were growing concerns regarding the potential for social tension, conflict and increased poverty amongst local residents (CGI 2002, Karyadi 2003, Kalla 2003, Hitchcock and Putra 2006).

The host community – coping strategies and adaptation

As locals struggled to resume regular activities and commerce, within weeks it was apparent that the terrorist attacks had significantly undermined Bali's enviable reputation as a safe and tranquil tourist destination (*personal communication* 2003*)*. Early assessments conducted by the World Bank and Consultative Group of Indonesia (CGI 2003) identified further unemployment, unresolved credit, social tension, economic slowdown and a downfall in foreign exchange earnings as probable outcomes of continued lags in tourism revenues. When follow-on impacts to small-scale industries and the informal sector were taken into account, tentative predictions suggested that up to 300,000 residents were likely to lose their livelihoods (CGI 2003). Less conservative forecasts speculated that more than 1,000,000 Balinese would be significantly affected (BaliSOS 2004). While the government and industry pursued wider agendas, most members of the host community were faced with trying to pay bills and meet daily cost of living without the accustomed level of tourism revenues they had previously relied on (*personal communication* 2003).

"No tourist after the bomb – I no work, I no food. Food, everything cost more since bomb. Friends all leaving, gone. People from Indonesia they still come here to beach to watch sun and water – but they don't want my massages"
Beach Masseuse, Kuta January 2003

In early 2003, indigenous civil society observer Ngurah Karyadi (2003:1) asserted, "the community post-terror will never be the same". As it had been confirmed that Muslim extremists were directly responsible for the attack, there were continuing fears of unsanctioned attacks and reprisals against Muslim residents in Bali. While there were few substantiated incidents of mistreatment, many Balinese informants did express resentment towards any religion that would advocate such terrorism and violence (*personal communication* 2003). Local security details and law enforcement officers were also seen to be particularly vigilant and thorough in their "questioning" of some Muslim migrants (*personal communication* 2003).

"Muslims are susah – you know trouble – always problems with the prostitutes and gigolos here from Java. They bring trouble to Bali way of life – they brought the bomb here. Bali people are peaceful, happy if they all left again"
Balinese shop assistant, Kuta February 2003

As decreasing commerce forced businesses to implement cost-cutting measures, typical strategies involved reduction of staff wages, shorter working hours, voluntary severance, leave without pay, and quite often indiscriminate lay-offs (CGI 2003). Other initiatives in local tourist centres included dramatic discounts, consolidation of shop space to reduce rental costs, and the production of anti-terrorism/solidarity merchandise for public sale. Lacking any formalised working arrangements or available social safety net, the self-employed, commission-based vendors and operatives within the informal sector were left particularly vulnerable. Reflecting an environment of limited employment or income stability, less fortunate individuals and families were forced to become more transient. Faced with continuing issues of widespread unemployment, unpaid loans with heavy interest rates, and inevitable overhead costs, residents developed various personal survival strategies to persevere endure (*personal communication* 2003).

"For over one month after the bomb I sleep all the time. No work, I look after the children and my wife has to work to buy food. Now maybe a little better but still not many business, Christmas New year very quiet. No money to send children to school" Driver/guide, Kuta February 2003

Depending on associated social circumstances and resources, such arrangements included expenditure reduction, accessing savings, pawning/selling assets, diminished remittance to villages, smaller community contributions, return migration to family villages, and removing children from school (*personal communication* 2003, Kalla 2003, CGI 2003). While most respondents expressed an early capacity to meet basic needs through existing family and cultural networks, these were only considered short term options. Many migrant workers stated that they intended to leave Bali to seek alternative employment (*personal communication* 2003). Although the economic impacts did not appear as immediately significant in rural subsistence-based communities on the island, the subsequent influx of residents from the 'tourist south' generated extra stress on an already burdened agricultural system. The multiplier effect of reduced incomes, expenditure, and nominal tourism revenues, was progressively observed in neighbouring island communities of Lombok and Eastern Java (Fallon 2003).

As some optimistic forecasters were predicting the return of tourism by June/July 2003 (CGI 2003, PATA 2003a, PATA 2003b) stories began to emerge about blatant sexual exploitation (particularly prostitution and paedophilia), pessimism and increasing rates of depression (*personal communication* 2003). Public graffiti revealed local frustration and contempt (refer Plate 6.1), while cock fights and overt gambling were more common. There also seemed to be unprecedented sale and development of traditional ancestral land (*personal communication* 2004). In tourist centres the palpable desperation of many vendors manifested itself in increasingly aggressive touts and pleas for business. More passive diversions included sleep, board games and seemingly unnecessary rearrangements of product displays. Many Balinese were observed to be increasingly fervent and devout in their religious observance (*personal communication* 2004) (refer Plate 6.2).

Plate 6.1: Local graffiti showing contempt for the bombing events

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 6.2: Daily offerings remain important within Balinese Hindu beliefs

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Despite repeated counsel to re-orient economic and social policies to "stimulate production, create business opportunities, and provide an environment of social justice" (Karyadi 2003:1) declining resources and investment left little prospect for such diversification. Although tourism suffered, some export related craft industries including wood, garments, textile, stone and silver, did report an influx *of* international orders, "eager to profit from a depressed retail market" (*personal communication* 2003). Such business however, did little to improve the flailing economy. Throughout the island foreign tourists were constantly assailed by apologies and pleas to tell other tourists that "Bali is again a safe place to visit" *(personal communication* 2003).

Donors and Non-government Organisations

From the provision of aid and services to event victims and their families immediately following the bombings, it was the NGO's and aid organisations in Bali that assumed the primary responsibility for relief to the greater community. Incorporating volunteers, newly formed interest groups, pre-existing local organisations, and well established international development and aid agencies; the Bali Recovery Group appeared foremost in such efforts. Given the emergent issues of socio-economic adversity the highest priority was determined to be security and social welfare protection (Bali Recovery Group 2003). Direct concerns included an accurate database on victims/donor recipients, education, family assistance, medical assistance (short and long term), counselling, public awareness, environment and economic (*personal communication* 2003).

While contributing to numerous successful initiatives such as; the hospital and emergency response upgrades, the Kuta beach clean–up, subsidised programmes for education, rice and health, and the establishment of a small-scale community based craft industry; not all endeavours were effective. Often fortified with well-intentioned aims and agendas, many donor organisations lacked the knowledge or experience to implement effective or sustainable programs. With limited public consultation or participation, finances and resources were invested in culturally inappropriate schemes and events, and consequently failed to achieve the anticipated level of results (*personal communication* 2003). Topical issues such as terrorism, a burns units, and memorial development, were actively supported while appearing to ignore local preferences for free public health clinics, immunisation and economic diversification (Parum Samigita

2012). As monthly stakeholder meetings were designed to strengthen, co-ordinate and institutionalise relationships, succeeding months saw increased questions about operational and financial transparency, accountability and sustainability (BaliSOS 2004).

As most Kuta residents interviewed in January 2003 expressed ignorance of any official and/or unofficial response efforts, the CGI assessment group (2003:55) observed that,

> donor responses have on the whole been supporting either social protection responses or medium-term diversification initiatives through a combination of changes in existing programs and additional new ones, although many of these are yet to show tangible impacts on the ground. These issues and delays in the realization of responses have contributed to the overall sense in Bali that pledges for support immediately following the bombing have not been followed through with concrete outcomes.

With limited public awareness or communication regarding available assistance, most of the host-community considered survival as an exercise in self-sufficiency and adaptation. For many, the event victims and their families were viewed as high profile and topical, while the traditionally marginalised remained neglected by the officials (*personal communication* 2003). Due to a legacy of colonialism and imperialism the apparent influx of international donors and financial aid was commonly regarded with local mistrust and suspicion. As economic hardship increased, many residents also felt excluded and abandoned (*personal communication* 2003). In a country renowned for corruption and nepotism, a vast number of arrangements made in the aftermath of the bombing have been similarly regarded with local scepticism (Karyadi 2003).

> *"Government and international donor money is spent on things like a burns trauma unit, facilities for better blood collection and storage, and tractors – but no one has consulted the people that live here. That money would be better spent on equipment, services and facilities that can benefit all rather than the few"* Local NGO coordinator, Kuta January 2003

While the NGOs endeavoured to address many underlying social and economic issues, attempts to develop greater co-ordination with government experienced mixed success (*personal communication* 2003).

A Governmental approach

On a national level, government approaches to the Bali bombing were premised on security, tourism recovery and the provision of a social safety net for the vulnerable (Kalla 2003). Consistent with international opinion, Indonesian officials were publicly committed to justice and finding those responsible for the Bali attacks. As emergency decrees were introduced to combat the threat of terrorism, security upgrades were commissioned for all air and sea ports. Additional police and military personnel were sent directly to Bali to assist local security efforts and ascertain regional stability. While international forensic teams worked with the Indonesians at "ground zero", formal negotiations strengthened anti-terrorism training and intelligence sharing efforts. As the apprehension of several bombing suspects confirmed links to Jemah Islamiah and a global network of terrorism, international media reports revealed the continued presence of 'extremist' terrorist training camps in other Indonesian provinces.

With rapidly declining tourism tax revenues throughout the country, the government embarked on a recovery package to revitalise the industry. Appointing a "National Tourism Recovery Team", direct responsibilities included security, promotions, infrastructure development, transportation, fiscal stimulus and social welfare (Kalla 2003). Approximately USD 12 million was allocated to reviving the international image of Indonesia, as more localised initiatives focussed on assistance for afflicted businesses, supporting special packages for domestic travellers and stimulating the meetings, incentives, conference and events (MICE) sector (CGI 2003). As part of this expenditure the Indonesia Culture and Tourism Board (ICTB) contracted international tourism consultants Gavin Anderson & Company (GA&Co) to develop a comprehensive tourism recovery program based on re-establishing, building and expanding destination image (B&T 2003, 24 January). Despite overt efforts to increase safety, security and reputation, continued travel warnings became a point of diplomatic contention for Indonesia (*personal communication* 2003).

While the first three months after the bombing were officially dedicated to a rescue and clean-up 'phase', an "Economic Recovery Team" was also appointed to assist with the humanitarian needs of the community (Kalla 2003,). Expected to establish a social safety net for the vulnerable and greater donor coordination, many of the early months reflected an informal monitoring/ assessment role rather developing any tangible programs. A comprehensive report conducted by the UNDP and World Bank found that,

> Regrettably, issues of financing, especially for short-term recovery funds from the central government, and poor coordination, planning and budgetary mechanisms among the various levels and parts of government – central, provincial, and local – has meant the Bali Recovery Team has not yet been effective in initiating a comprehensive recovery response. The level of effective response potentially provides not only lessons for moving forward, but center-regional collaboration in other future regional/sub-national crisis response initiatives (CGI 2003:48)

As both the provincial and local government expressed a verbal commitment to security and tourism promotion, efforts were consistently undermined by lack of fiscal resources. The CGI (2003:49) found that, "local governments on both ends of the directly and indirectly impacted spectrum have been affected and will compromise the ability of district governments to meet the additional resource needs for initiating recovery responses as well as meeting regular commitments." Consistent with government policy and processes of decentralisation, many officials in Bali anticipated that recovery would have to be self-funded (Bali Recovery Group 2003). With limited formal support or assistance, the majority of local crisis response strategies demonstrated restricted scope and efficacy.

Highly visible endeavours to improve regional security and minimise cultural conflict did focus on a crack-down on formal residency and work permits. For many migrants, lack of the appropriate identification and documentation provided further impetus to leave the island. Between added police patrols and greater local vigilance "illegal" migrants and vendors became more marginalised. Muslim migrants with the requisite

letters of official support and employment reported open discrimination and "difficulties" in the registration process (*personal communication* 2003). As special tourist police were trained to assist the various demands of foreign visitors, most establishments implemented visible security measures including surveillance, individual security checks and vehicle inspections (refer Plate 6.4). With a reported decrease in official crime rates (CGI 2003:36) there were serious concerns regarding the incidence of increasing tourist kidnappings, fraud and extortion (*personal communication* 2003). Despite official safety and security efforts many Balinese and tourists expressed an unprecedented nervousness about walking alone at night (*personal communication* 2003).

The Tourism Sector

For the devastated tourism industry, attempts to restore Bali's image and reputation primarily focused on promotion, marketing and communication. PATA's Bali Recovery Taskforce (2003b) provided broader recommendations about addressing safety and security, integrated crisis management planning, aviation sector inclusion and strategies for recreating and expanding the Bali brand, however without significant financial support, commitment and leadership, efforts remained uncoordinated.

The Bali Tourism Board and Visa launched both a domestic and international campaign based on discounts and concessions, as complimentary initiatives targeted prospective travel agents and trade fairs/marts. Revival slogans such as "Bali for the World" and "Bali Loves Peace" were used extensively in re-branding and remarketing efforts. Promotional concerts and sporting events were similarly conducted to increase the island's profile and assurances of safety. Affecting limited market improvements in the short term, invitations were extended to international journalists and agents to experience the hospitality and merits of the island "first-hand" (*personal communication* 2003).

As aggressive marketing in both the domestic and ASEAN region produced some tangible results, reduced prices and increasing promotional costs limited profitability. Rather than a consolidation of available budgets and resources many service providers launched independent internet web promotions generating further competitive cost-cutting. For many smaller, locally owned businesses and enterprises closure and

bankruptcy became a reality (*personal communication* 2003) (refer Plate 6.3). With mounting overheads and low occupation rates many of the larger hotels opted to shut down temporarily to conduct maintenance and/or renovations.

Cognisant of the continued security concerns for tourists, many hoteliers in Bali participated in a regional security workshop, making a verbal commitment to implement and conform to minimum standards and security measures (*personal communication* 2003). Security became visible at most larger establishments and commercial venues popular with tourists (refer Plate 6.4). The significantly diminished airline sector similarly implemented additional security checks of travellers and luggage. While travel bans to Bali were gradually relaxed in many countries, visitor numbers remained low. As it became apparent that most short term initiatives had failed to restore the region's flailing tourism industry, analysts renewed calls for Bali to diversify, "much of the response requires finding ways to make it less vulnerable to shocks, to promote and integrate other sectors, to make tourism's impacts more benign, to increase public participation in the process and to ensure that all segments of the population benefit from development" (CG1 2003:2).

Evolution and escalation

Despite improvements in regional safety standards and the launch of locally owned airline *Air Paradise*, growing uncertainty regarding the war in Iraq and the risk of contracting Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) heavily influenced international travel decisions in early 2003. While the Indonesian government implemented various antiterrorism initiatives and progressively secured convictions of the Bali bombers, the August 5, 2003 terrorist bombing of the JW Mariott Hotel in Jakarta, quickly undermined assurances of improved safety. Following the successful conduct of the local Kuta Karnival (September 11 – October 12, 2003) and one year bombing anniversary, the close of the year saw increasing visitor numbers and gradual improvements in tourism business prospects (*personal communication* 2004).

Plate 6.3: Closure of tourism related businesses and services, Kuta

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 6.4: Security check points established at larger hotel establishments, Kuta

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

As January 2004 reflected a record month for foreign visitor arrivals to Bali, closer investigation of the associated socio-economic statistics suggested a less optimistic story (BPS 2012). While taking advantage of the continued discounts, sales and bonus incentives offered by local tourism providers, international visitors were actually staying for shorter periods of time and spending less money. Revealing an increase in domestic and regional travellers, remarketing and promotion efforts had failed to regain the more lucrative North American and European market segment. Despite increased activity, most business profit margins were considered minimal (*personal communication* 2004). The Indonesian government's introduction of a controversial visa fee for international travellers in February 2004 was met with mutual disdain by both consumers and operators (*personal communication* 2004).

As few of the post-bombing donor agencies continued to function in Bali long term, many community members were forced to sell additional possessions and property to endure the sustained economic downturn (*personal communication* 2004). A large number of the recovery programs developed to increase economic diversification and social support had already collapsed due to inadequate investment, commitment and finances (BaliSOS 2004). Some reports have suggested that such experiences of shared adversity may have actually strengthened many traditional and familial support networks (Hitchcock and Putra 2005). With monthly tourism statistics finally indicating a steady return to pre-crisis levels by September 2004, the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta generated additional uncertainty in an already sensitive market. Negative media attention, public speculation and the implications of the high profile Schapelle Corby drug smuggling incident caused further instability for Bali's tourism sector (*personal communication* 2004). Within Australia, this apprehension was reinforced after arrest and conviction of the "Bali Nine" on heroin charges.

> *Bali has changed – before it was relaxed and friendly. You could sit on the street with people - if you had a guitar you would drink and laugh the night through. Now people are still playing the guitar and singing but the smiles are short and the drinks are absent. Hands are out begging for money, many warungs are closed or have limited menus. Food sits at markets or expired on shelves because no one can afford it and no one is buying. I was supposed to*

stay in Bali for 5 weeks but I don't feel happy or safe here anymore. I think I might go to Thailand instead" Australian tourist May 2004

While the devastating South Asia tsunami of December 26, 2004 did not physically damage the island of Bali, local tourist operators reported immediate cancellations caused by association with the distant Indonesian province of Aceh (*personal communication* 2005). Familiar with issues of trauma and hardship, empathetic community members, private sector businesses and non-government organisations within Bali reactivated many informal support networks to provide material resources and assistance for the Indonesian tsunami victims. With improved coordination, control, and media management skills, the local tourism industry was quickly able establish that infrastructure and services on Bali remained completely unaffected and operational. Although businesses and residents appeared relatively buoyant through early 2005, many vendors mused over which adversity would next set back Bali's tourism revival (*personal communication* 2005).

Southern Thailand – humanitarian issues and the "second wave"

With the abundant stories and images of destruction immediately following the Indian Ocean tsunami many prospective tourists opted to change their travel plans or substitute Phuket with alternative tropical destinations – including Bali. However, numerous travellers still within the affected area did choose to extend their stay to search for friends and relatives or offer volunteer and support services. As numbers progressively dwindled the authorities and community members began to measure the toll and damage caused by the event.

Although the marginality of many migrants and villagers suggests that precise figures may never be truly known, official statistics related to the December 26, 2004 tsunami in Thailand record; 8212 fatalities (confirmed dead and missing) and 8457 injured (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 2005). Of this final death toll, 2448 were foreign nationals, representing 37 countries (DDPM October 2005). Estimates of associated damage and losses have been set at approximately USD 2.09 billion (UNDP 2006). While the economic significance of tourism revenues to the region encouraged rapid restoration of hospitality services and public destination image, this disaster

created a diverse range of issues and concerns for proximate individuals, communities, and the environment (*personal communications* 2005, 2010).

Host communities – survival and rebuilding

While inland communities of Southern Thailand remained intact, it has been estimated that 407 coastal villages within the provinces of Krabi, Phang Nga, Phuket, Ranong, Satun, and Trang were directly impacted by the tsunami (UNDP 2006). Beyond the images of ruined hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues and tourism infrastructure, residents lost homes, schools, vehicles, fishing equipment, personal possessions, friends and family (*personal communication* 2005). Forty-seven local villages were completely destroyed (UNDP 2006). Consequent to the force of the tsunami and accumulation of debris and hazardous materials, popular coral reefs, marine and coastal habitats were also damaged. The direct loss of local agriculture and livestock was often amplified by associated salt water intrusion, soil deposits and land subsidence. As NGOs, humanitarian agencies and government centres provided initial support for the thousands of homeless and displaced people, health, education, permanent housing, and livelihood restoration emerged as significant issues (DDPM 2005). With almost 6,000 houses directly damaged or destroyed by the tsunami, and over 1,750 hectares of agricultural land affected, it is estimated that more than 35,000 families lost their livelihoods (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006:6, ADPC 2005).

Short term initiatives for residents living in temporary shelters and refugee camps were primarily focused on medical aid and sanitation. Although the majority of health-based intervention programs were effective in controlling the spread of infection and tropical diseases, conditions in these settlements were often less than ideal. With limited resources, income and employment options officials expressed a growing concern about the potential exploitation of the poor, marginalised and vulnerable – particularly widows and orphaned children (*personal communication* 2005). Micro loans were provided to some centres to rebuild damaged sea craft and fishing equipment while other organisations promoted the development of arts and crafts skills in an effort to diversify limited employment options. Mental health issues became more apparent as the weeks of interim living extended into months (*personal communication* 2005).

While resident resettlement and rebuilding of permanent structures remained a recovery priority, aid providers were faced with a number of challenges. Traumatised by the tsunami event and the extent of loss, some villagers no longer wanted to work or live in close proximity to the ocean (*personal communication* 2005). Although the general relocation of settlements inland was consistent with newly developed government guidelines regarding structural setbacks, adequate land had to be formally acquired to accommodate such arrangements. Where construction was viable, subsequent community concerns related to the limited development of public infrastructure and utilities. Distance to services, access to clean water and sanitation and limited public transport options were commonly cited problems in many of the newly established settlements (*personal communication* 2005).

> *"The government has spent millions of baht on constructing houses in places like Ban Bam Muang but these are essentially shells – no toilet, no washing area, no canteen – there was no water supplied. The community was told that houses could get connected to metered water but they would have to continually pay for usage. But with no jobs and no money they have no capacity to pay. Seeing this problem some NGOs have made private donations of water tanks so they can at least have their own water."* NGO volunteer, Phang Nga April 2005

With limited consideration of household function, needs and utility, a significant proportion of premises supplied were found to be small, hot and unappealing. As government bulletins publicised that permanent housing had been provided for the majority of displaced residents, concurrent media reports and informant stories continued to deliberate on the scores of Thais and illegal Burmese migrants that were unwilling to return from the perceived safety of the mountain rainforests (Asian Coalition of Housing Rights [ACHR] June 2006, *personal communication* 2005).

In contrast, large number of survivors who were determined to return to their traditional family and ancestral lands on the coastline met with political and legal disputes. Approximately 83 local villages faced direct problems related to insecure land tenure and fishing rights following the tsunami (Paphavasit, Chotiyaputta & Siriboon 2006). While many of these ethnic groups and fishing communities have inhabited the Andaman coast for generations, most lacked any legal title deeds. Formally owned by

public agencies (such as Forestry Department, National Parks Department and Treasury) or private investors; a burgeoning tourism industry interest in recent years had made many of these tracts of land "prime real estate". Despite legal precedence for customary allowance for settlement and traditional usage rights in Thailand, in most cases the tsunami destroyed specific evidence or proof of tenure (*personal communication* 2005). In numerous locations along the Thai coastline (particularly around the resort areas of Khao Lak and Phi Phi Island) local villagers, developers and government officials fought to re-establish formal land title and occupation (Paphavasit et al, 2006 AHCR 2006).

Although plans to restore land, vessels, and equipment, were anticipated to assist the affected rural agricultural and fishing sectors, employment and economic opportunities within the tourism industry were less certain (*personal communication* 2005). Vastly decreased visitor arrivals and expenditure soon resulted in widespread wage reduction, limited employment hours and even dismissal. Many larger establishments effected temporary closures for repairs, reconstruction and renovations. As residents sought alternative forms of income and employment, increased competition generated greater social tension – particularly in the informal sector (*personal communication* 2005). Migrants and minority ethnic groups were frequently accused of creating problems within the community. Return migration to other provinces in Thailand seemed a popular coping strategy for the more transient populations, while local residents increasingly relied on traditional family and community based social support networks. While local temples became refuges of grief, prayer and contemplation throughout Southern Thailand, many Thais also began to question their belief system and faith (*personal communication* 2005, PTSD Forum 2006).

For many of the host community, the emotional distress and psychological trauma became a more immediate concern than any economic loss or implications. Traditional fishermen expressed fear of returning to the ocean while other residents could no longer abide the sound of waves crashing. As thousands of the deceased had been washed out to the ocean, many residents and tourists chose to avoid eating any fish that may have fed on human remains (*personal communication* 2005). The local seafood industry was decimated. Similarly, reports and urban legends flourished about ghosts and lost souls haunting the tsunami zones. As Buddhist monks and ethnic Chinese performed

numerous rituals to free such spirits, for many the fear and superstitions remained. Mental health issues including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression associated with loss of livelihoods were particularly prevalent amongst the displaced (PTSD Forum 2006, *personal communication* 2005).

Humanitarian response and support

While the Thai government was confident in its capacity to provide the necessary financial and material support for its affected citizens, a large portion of the post-tsunami assistance was provided by volunteers, survivors, individual donations, local NGOs, and international development/aid agencies (*personal communication* 2005).

Beyond the popular tourism centres, urgent humanitarian issues included water quality, sanitation, hygiene, food security, nutrition, shelter, settlement, property and health (North Andaman Tsunami Relief 2005). Although able to accommodate the essential human demands, many well-intentioned support efforts lacked coordination, integration and an understanding of the local needs. As many displaced communities received international donations of winter blankets, incongruous clothing and expired medication, there was a short supply of viable shelters, food and cooking equipment (*personal communication* 2005). While more experienced agencies sought to establish community cooperatives premised on minimum standards, restoring livelihoods, diversification of skills and longer term sustainable development, other donors simply provided short term financial assistance to displaced staff.

> *"In the beginning there were probably about 2-300 organisations and agencies working around the Phang Nga province, however most left after the first 4-6 weeks. I guess it is obvious which ones are really interested in providing longer-term assistance. ... Even with the 20-50 organisations that remain there is no real co-ordination. Most organisations are concerned with their own agenda and politics. They are competitive and want to be seen to achieve and receive credit for direct results – this is counterproductive. ... There have been meetings with the UN in Bangkok and Phuket etc but no real resolutions. ... Most have good intentions but lack the resources to get results – projects become stagnant and most volunteers get frustrated."* NGO volunteer Phang Nga May 2005

Without established coordination or organisational arrangements there was extensive overlap and duplication of effort within numerous communities. Many marginal coastal and rural villages were also overlooked, receiving no real external aid or assistance. Some agencies adopted a policy of intervention or command and control, as more successful recovery strategies were achieved in consultation with local residents and communities. Anecdotes from informants suggested that some response agencies even premised aid conditions on willingness to accept or consider religious conversion (*personal communication* 2005). In most cases there was no requirement for accountability or transparency of actions.

A number of interagency evaluations of the aid response have found the response of the international community to fall short in a number of areas. Specific concerns included the lack of coordination, the quality and professionalism of the response, accountability to beneficiaries, relations with local partners and the effective targeting of needs. The net result of this is that despite the liberal availability of funding, certain vulnerable groups may still have been missed out leading to a worsening of their socio-economic condition. The different phases of the response, assessment, relief and reconstruction, raised a variety of issues. MRS30 (International Organisation for Migration [IMO] 2007:28)

> *"We haven't had much government support here – most aid comes from foreign NGOs and tourists. So far we have rebuilt the school, homes, fishing boats and the local mosque. Local businesses sponsored a new community bridge but we still need far more donations of building materials"* Business owner, Kamala Beach. May 2005

In smaller tourist centres like Kamala (north of Patong) residents utilised extra familial (kin) support networks and personal friendships established with tourists, foreign patrons and expatriates to provide the financial support for the rebuilding of public schools, temples, fishing vessels and many of the locally operated businesses (*personal communication* 2005) (refer to Plate 6.5). As internationally based altruistic agencies and donor contributions dissipated over subsequent months, many local Thais expressed distaste for the culture of external aid dependency that seemed to have developed (*personal communication* 2005).

Plate 6.5: Building replacement fishing vessels, NGO sponsored project, Kamala

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Plate 6.6: Durable temporary housing arrangements for displaced villagers, Khao Lak

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Government Response

Although lacking an adequate disaster plan for the region, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) was quick to implement initiatives to assist recovery efforts. Having activated its entire civil and military apparatus to assist with search and rescue and the recovery and identification of human remains, subsequent strategies were aimed at the prevention of infectious diseases and secondary losses amongst surviving victims. Consistent with the aims of many non-government organisations and agencies, early government relief plans were designed to implement social protection measures, psychological support and assist livelihood restoration. Appointing nine sub-committees to oversee the process of reconstruction and longer-term rehabilitation, primary objectives included rehabilitation of infrastructure, business resumption, safety and tourism restoration (Cohen 2010).

While tourism represented the dominant enterprise within the affected region, the government compensation scheme was established to assist all members of the fisheries, tourism, business and agricultural sectors that had suffered tsunami related losses of lives, property, homes, businesses and jobs (*personal communication* 2005). The RTG approved tax relief for businesses while the Bank of Thailand provided soft loans through commercial banks to assist entrepreneurs affected by the disaster. Micro and small businesses were specifically identified as requiring access to adequate financial services. Although the majority of residents were either uninsured or underinsured, the King of Thailand issued a personal warning to brokers not to complicate or delay payment for damages and losses submitted by legitimate claimants (Cohen 2010).

As the government actively supported and encouraged businesses to rebuild, it was concurrently dedicated to minimising future risk and restoring the environmental destruction caused by the tsunami. Working in association with national, international and technical institutions, numerous projects were funded to determine the level of impact on surrounding coral reefs and marine reserves, with the aim of assisting rehabilitation and protection (UNDP 2006). Given the level of structural damage sustained proximate to the shoreline, additional attention was given to legislative reforms regarding future planning, zoning set-backs and the requirement for minimum structural standards (documented in the government "Master Plan" refer Calgaro and Llyod 2008).

Perhaps one of the highest profile agendas of the RTG became the establishment of an early warning system and national disaster preparedness plan. While the development of an Indian Ocean tsunami warning system was recognised as a priority for the entire South Asia region, Thailand committed to establishing a locally operational network of watchtowers and evacuation procedures within 4 months of the December tragedy.

Financed and developed at the national level, actual implementation and operation of many recovery projects was left to local and provincial authorities. Extensive networks were established throughout the public and private sector to maximise the available assessment capacity, and facilitate the distribution of resources. While there were disgruntled claims of official corruption, nepotism and dishonesty, there were also many instances of fraudulent claims and bribery attempts by residents (Rice 2005, *personal communication* 2005). As physical reconstruction progressed, the media was actively engaged to facilitate communication and promotion in the recovery of the tourism market.

Restoring tourism confidence

Given that the travel and tourism economy supported almost 3 million employees in Thailand one of the government's highest priorities was the development of initiatives to attract tourists back (*personal communication* 2005). The newly funded Tourism Restoration Committee was tasked with the objective of influencing foreign governments to revise blanket travel advisories to reflect actual circumstances. With Cabinet approving a budget of US$93.7 million to revive the tsunami-affected provinces, other official strategies included incentives to stimulate domestic tourism through low priced fares and room rates, encouraging civil servants and state enterprise employees to vacation in the Andaman region and establishing duty free shopping. An additional US$19.5 million was added to the national marketing and promotional budget for tourism, with a post-disaster strategy focusing on developing new markets and products (Cohen 2010).

Effectively engaging with both the national and regional tourism sector, campaigns targeted 'quality tourism' high spenders over down-market mass tourists (Cohen 2010). In proposing alternative destinations such as Koh Samoi or Pattaya, products such as medical tourism, wellbeing and spa holidays were also promoted extensively in

potential new source markets including China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In late January 2005, the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) hosted an emergency taskforce of tourism experts from 42 countries in Phuket to facilitate the development of a recovery plan for all destinations afflicted by the South Asia tsunami.

The resultant "Phuket Action Plan" represented a comprehensive series of activities intended to reinvigorate the region's economically-vital tourism industry and advance long term, sustainable tourism recovery. Key priorities included community relief /assistance to small tourism-related businesses, diversification of tourism offerings to include more ecotourism and culture-based products, targeted staff training/retraining, ongoing destination operational status updates, extensive marketing and communication strategies and the drafting of a regional master plan centred on greater community involvement (WTO 2005a). Following this meeting in March 2005 the Tourism Authority of Thailand publicised plans to develop new tourism attractions that included a Tsunami Trail Tour and a controversial Tsunami Memorial Museum (Rice 2005).

As the government endeavoured to restore tourism and implement reforms to mitigate future contingencies it consistently reinforced the message that Thailand placed a premium on visitor safety. With the proliferation of internet web-sites displaying adverse images and conveying frightening victim's stories, alternative constructive pictures and testimonies were widely offered to demonstrate aspects of community resilience, spirit and the rapid reconstruction efforts (Phuket Gazette 2005, Phuket Tourist Association 2005). Local pleas for visitors to return were supplemented with initiatives that sponsored invitational visits from celebrities, travel agents, journalists and foreign dignitaries, the hosting of large scale international conventions and events, and extensive promotions demonstrating actual conditions in the region (TAT 2005a, *personal communication* 2005).

> *"We are tourism majors from Chulalongkorn University and have come here to get training and work experience with a local tour agency. So far we have worked one month with one month to go. We asked to come to Phuket because of the tsunami, to learn about the area and what has happened. We want to tell everyone it is a beautiful place to visit – and safe"* Thai university students. Patong May 2005

As an alternative to pledges of financial aid and international donations, industry representatives recommended that travellers demonstrate support of the local community by volunteering and/or returning to holiday in afflicted tourist centres (PATA 2005). With the increased budget committed to promotion and marketing, public relations firms were contracted to assist in the re-creation and re-establishment of the Thai tourism brand, with the aim of additional international market diversification and expansion. Yet as tourism arrival numbers continued to decrease and occupancy dropped as low as 10% airline carriers were forced to reduce services, redirect routes and suspend flights (Phuket Gazette 2005, March 22).

While rebuilding in the worst affected areas of Khao Lak and Phi Phi continued to be delayed by limited resources and bureaucracy, early optimistic forecasts for the Phuket region were proving unfounded. Despite the Thai government's commitment to establishing an early warning system, repeat tsunami concerns remained, as did issues of traveller health and safety. For residents within these tourist destinations the emotional and psychological trauma of the tsunami was exacerbated by an intensifying tourism crisis (PTSD Forum 2006, *personal communication* 2005). In the first economic quarter of 2005 tourism revenues for Phuket were estimated to be down by 90% (Bangkok Post 2005, August 20).

Revitalization and Uncertainty

Although the popular tourist destination of Patong managed to quickly and effectively remove most physical traces of tsunami damage, infrastructure recovery was slower in other locations. Rebuilding was strictly in a hiatus on the narrow, formerly overpopulated isthmus of Phi Phi Don as the government and local community debated extensively about the appropriate direction for redevelopment (*personal communication* 2005, 2010). As land tenure issues were progressively resolved or overcome in other areas of the Krabi and Phang Nga provinces, resorts and businesses once again began to encroach upon the shorelines (AHCR 2006). Rapid reconstruction of accommodation facilities soon resulted in an over-supply, vastly outnumbering existing tourist demand.

Plate 6.7: Tourism entertainment and businesses for sale post-tsunami, Patong

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Plate 6.8: Tsunami warning evacuation drill, Patong May 2005

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

With safety remaining a priority concern the Thai government did erect its tsunami warning towers and signage along the exposed coastline, progressively linking up to a national warning system. Community education programs and evacuation drills were subsequently conducted to ensure exposed residents were familiar with the threats and appropriate response to a tsunami risk (*personal communication* 2005) (refer Plate 6.8).

On popular beaches traditional wooden sun lounges were replaced with less cumbersome plastic style lounges, while provisional laws were introduced to restrict both the quantity and distribution of amenities to maintain a beach access/escape route. Lacking any real regulation or effective enforcement, succeeding months saw a return to a shoreline crowded by sun lounges, jet skis, water craft, and informal establishments for food, drinks and souvenirs (Phuket Gazette 2005, January 15).

In contrast to such issues of renewed infrastructure and coastal encroachment, the tsunami did stimulate an increased interest in more sustainable marine and environmental management (Paphavasit et al 2006, UNEP 2005). With the water purportedly clearer than it had been for over two decades, researchers, scientists, government, local community, and volunteer divers embarked on initiatives to remove accumulated debris, promote improved reef health, and to continue to assess, monitor and publicise local water quality conditions. In less populated regions, other projects focused on the restoration of traditional mangrove ecosystems and more efficient aquaculture practices (UNEP 2005). While agencies and the media were quick to publicise positive results - individual program agendas and objectives often conflicted (*personal communication* 2005). As some organisations worked to develop more sustainable local fishing practices and management, the provision of new, more numerous, more reliable, better equipped, fishing vessels for coastal residents raised the obvious issue of fishing sustainability.

Despite obvious industry volatility, tourism continues to be perceived as the panacea for the region's economic issues. Heavy discounting and increased advertising and promotion of low-cost package deals generated a change of market towards domestic and lower income tourists who were staying longer and spending less (Prangsritong 2008). Although most of the larger multinational companies and businesses appeared to have the capacity to absorb the losses sustained to rebuild, most locally owned small to

medium business enterprises (SMEs) lacked sufficient insurance and resources (*personal communication* 2005).

Traditionally reliant on the income derived during high season to sustain business during the slower periods, many were forced to shut down and/or sell for significantly reduced prices (*personal communication* 2005, 2010). In the post-tsunami environment prime real estate and property were seen as a lucrative market for potential investors. With fewer businesses, services and accommodation options available it became increasingly difficult for some destinations to entice visitors, particularly around Khao Lak and Phi Phi. Without tourism many members of the host community struggled to meet daily living costs (*personal communication* 2005).

> *"Tourists and the government, they keep talking about tsunami memorials, monuments. Money spent to remember a bad time most would like to forget. People here don't want or need statues to remember – locals want useful things like jobs, better education and medicine for the sick"* Street vendor, Patong. May 2005

Statistics from the one year anniversary of the tsunami indicated that tourism arrivals (2.4 million) were down 47% on the previous year (Tourism Authority of Thailand 2013). Tourism income was estimated to have decreased by 67% (NSO 2013). As "thana" tourism did generate a growth in unofficial memorial sites and disaster opportunism evidenced in tsunami trail tours and renaming the badly affected Baan Nam Khem "The Tsunami Village", the newly emergent concern of a potential avian influenza epidemic (H5N1 or bird flu) was affecting tourism globally (*personal communication* 2010).

Implementing destination response and recovery strategies

Consistent with the diverse contexts and impacts of the initial disaster events, specific details and recovery demands for the communities of Bali and Phuket clearly varied. Following the models of Faulkner (2001) and Ritchie (2004) this time frame may be referred to as the intermediate crisis period, where the immediacy and short term response needs of the disaster are dealt with, and strategic efforts are directed towards evaluation, control, rehabilitation, and destination recovery. As many of the approaches

adopted were common to both destinations, the most evident issue seemed to be a lack of comprehensive strategic management, organisation or inclusive stakeholder collaboration. While recovery appeared to be a uniform objective, the key priorities differed significantly for the individuals and families of the host communities, non-government organisations, the tourism industry and government.

Lacking significant experience or contingency planning, a large proportion of the initial strategies developed were reactive, ad hoc, restricted in scope, and poorly implemented. Prescribed tourism disaster management recovery frameworks recommend an initial evaluation or audit of impacts and damage as the first step to developing effective recovery management. While the direct physical scale of the Bali Bombings was far less dramatic than the expansive coastline destroyed by the tsunami, the psychological stigma of an act of terrorism that specifically targeted tourists was similarly damaging to Bali's destination image. Although emergency operation centres and agencies were progressively able to develop tangible disaster statistics based on the best available information, it was difficult to accurately gauge or anticipate the extent of damage caused to the tourism industry. As stakeholders developed their own coping, restoration and recovery strategies with limited consultation or collaboration, efforts were consistently undermined by inadequate resources, duplication of effort, competition, and poor understanding of local needs and demands.

For the host communities, amidst the extensive psychological grief and trauma there was a consistent desire for a return to a "sense of normalcy". On-the-ground activities included clean-up and removal of debris, rebuilding homes, businesses, and a desire for livelihood restoration. Similarly, for most non-government organisations priorities included shelter, safety and a return to a degree of self-sufficiency. However, as many strategies were imposed without community consultation, engagement or even consideration of concurrent activities and competing agendas, resultant efforts had limited success, in many cases leading to a growing culture of aid dependency.

Aspects of social vulnerability, marginality and exploitation became more overt. Proactive and inclusive programs directed at general health, sanitation, education, environment and greater social cohesion achieved better results. While diversification of the economy, with less reliance on tourism was clearly identified as an issue for both

destinations, alternative livelihoods appeared limited, as tourism remained a favoured and customary option for most. Early forecasts for the return of a resistant and resilient tourism industry were cautiously optimistic.

Rather than the much desired and anticipated return of profitable tourist numbers, months following the disaster events saw an intensifying tourism crisis and second wave of socioeconomic impacts. While Thailand had more success in developing a coordinated crisis media communication strategy premised in assurances of destination safety, international travel advisories and bans lingered. Although PATA committed extensively to providing post-crisis communications and recovery strategies for Bali, Phuket, and other regional tourist destinations afflicted by the South Asia tsunami many of the recommendations were never effectively resourced or implemented. With decreased consumer demand, air carrier capacity to these destinations was also reduced. Industry initiatives including destination slogans/rebranding, media and agent familiarisation trips, saturation at travel trade fairs, and niche market development achieved variable success.

With millions of dollars invested in advertising and new public confidence campaigns, extensive discounting and a change of market segmentation from high spending tourists to short-haul domestic and regional travellers saw decreased profits and declining daily expenditure rates. Destination substitution, competitive marketing, and conflicting messages regarding issues of safety and security reveal a general lack of strategic control or effective communication at both the local sector and industry levels.

Highly publicised national government plans to improve destination safety through anti-terrorism initiatives in Bali, and the establishment of a tsunami early warning system in Thailand, did appear to be well received, but apprehension remained for much of the potential travelling public. Former images of idyllic tropical beach side locations had been tarnished by memories and association with death, destruction and devastation. Extensive commitments were made to rebuilding, restoration of business and consumer confidence, and community support, yet tangible results were sporadic (Calgaro and Llyod 2008). Without adequate finances, resources, governance or authority to implement significant change at the local level, many members of the host community

felt forsaken by government officials, as the tourism industry and international interests were given precedence in official policy and decision making.

Despite the rhetoric of the Phuket Action Plan and recovery frameworks which advocate "understanding and collaborating with stakeholders" (including those within the tourism industry, tourists, industry related sectors, government agencies, general public and the media) few efforts in the intermediate recovery period considered the important functional role of either the tourist or host community. Highly emotive issues including memorial development and anniversary arrangements were openly criticised for lacking adequate victim consultation or sensitivity (*personal communication* 2010). As many community members were forced to self-adapt to declining incomes and social conditions, elements of resilience, independent coping capacity, and social transformation became more evident. Familial, local, regional and international networks and linkages developed in the aftermath of the disaster events facilitated a growing sense of solidarity, activism and political reorganisation which worked to petition the central government for further funding and quicker restoration.

Transition and long-term recovery
As the affected host communities of Bali and Southern Thailand struggled to regain a semblance of former living conditions and standards, tourism recovery continued as a primary policy objective for most stakeholders. With non-government organisations and agencies working to deliver effective aid to direct victims, many communities encouraged residents to develop inherent self-sufficiency and social capital through traditional structures and networks. In contrast, most tourism and government strategies appeared to lack effective integration or cohesive direction. As the one year anniversary of each disaster event did reveal a slight resurgence in visitor arrival numbers, dramatic fluctuations in market demand revealed a new sensitivity to negative association and external events. Rather than the ideal of holistic recovery and restoration of destination to improved, more sustainable, conditions, the issue of tourism vulnerability and community over-reliance had not been adequately addressed.

Plate 6.9: Exploiting the terrorist event as commercial opportunity, Bali

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 6.10: Exploiting the tsunami event as commercial opportunity, Phuket

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Chapter 7

~ ADAPTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY ~

From a tourism industry perspective, the return of high visitor arrival numbers and occupancy rates suggested an optimistic post-crisis recovery for Bali and Phuket. With no apparent studies employing a comprehensive or longitudinal approach, both destinations were considered to have returned to operational capacity relatively quickly and effectively (Nidhiprabha 2007). Evidence from Bali however, demonstrates that the scope and direction of recovery experiences can be highly variable. Beyond macroeconomics and selective statistical indicators, holistic destination recovery should also demonstrate enhanced adaptive strategies, resilience and sustainability.

Bali – Adaptation, Trial and Change

Following the 2002 "Kuta nightclub attacks" and subsequent incidents attracting negative media attention, local communities in Bali were fully cognisant of the vulnerability and sensitivity of the tourism industry. As more residents from the popular resort areas progressively migrated or return to familial villages, others sought alternative employment, education and training (*personal communication* 2005). With overseas entrepreneurs capitalising on reduced direct custom and prices, the export market for Balinese craft, furniture and textiles was successfully expanded (Bali Discovery 2004, June 21). Conversely, as a consequence of diminishing personal incomes, reduced profits, and declining foreign investment, opportunities for widespread economic diversification were limited.

Using new networks, skills and resources developed post-bombing, the philanthropic community of Bali continued to tackle perennial issues of education access and quality, poverty alleviation and environmental problems (Parum Samigita 2012) (refer Plate 7.1). Strategies from government and the tourism sector included improving training standards, reinforcement of safety and security measures, and the promotion and delivery of a high value experience for all visitors (*personal communication* 2005). While no formal disaster management plan was implemented for the island, introduced measures, experience and understanding indirectly enhanced risk and resource management capacity.

Plate 7.1: Beach clean-up initiative Kuta Beach

Source: Gurtner, Y (2003)

Plate 7.2: 2002 Bali Bombing Memorial

Source: Gurtner, Y (2005)

Revival and Torment

Despite continued cautionary travel advisories and a changed consumer demographic, by September 2005 visitor arrivals at the international airport in Bali had passed all previous records (BPS 2012). As tourists were once again enjoying the "Bali experience" on the evening of October 1, 2005, a second series of terrorist attacks were instigated within Raja's Restaurant in the popular shopping district of Kuta Square and at the eating area of nearby Jimberan Bay (refer Plate 7.3). Rather than a remotely detonated large explosive, these bombs were smaller and concealed inside backpacks. Compacted with projectiles, the explosions caused 22 fatalities (including three suicide bombers) with a further 123 injured. Fortunately, an additional three prepared bombs failed to detonate. Most of the victims were Indonesian, with the fatalities also including four Australians and one Japanese tourist (The Guardian 2005, October 3).

Given the recent experience, the emergency response to this incident was relatively efficient and coordinated. As the local community, industry and international leaders again expressed condemnation, media and operational centres were quickly established to coordinate information and assistance. Medical responders utilised the recently established burns unit in Sanglah Hospital, repatriated injured international victims and directly oversaw DNA identification protocols. Remaining non-government organisations and volunteers served to provide additional administration, transportation and victim support (*personal communication* 2005). Tourism service providers and the government released regular and timely joint public statements providing credible information and updates when available (Bali Discovery 2005, October 3).

While international media attention focused on the damage, death, injuries, and destruction, General I Made Mangku Made Pastika, Provincial Head of Bali's Police Department, and official spokesperson (responsible for investigations following the first series of bombings), provided the known facts, outlined investigations and highlighted the efforts of government, community and the tourism industry in responding and maintaining safety and security measures. Rather than accentuate the negative aspects of the incident, General Pastika suggested that the change in terrorist tactics towards smaller concealed bombs was a testament to Bali's improved security measures and that in the context of similar recent attacks in London and Madrid, terrorism had obviously become a global concern (Bali Discovery 2005, October 3).

Plate 7.3: Jimberan Bay – terrorist attacks October 2005

Source: Adrees Latif , Reuters (2005)

Plate 7.4: Development encroachment on traditional rice paddies, Bali

Source: Lengkong, A (2013)

Unlike the first terrorist bombings in Bali, there was no mass exodus or immediate decline in tourist numbers. Bali's second tourism crisis was more measured and gradual (BPS 2013). Optimistic observers initially speculated that perhaps the travelling public had become "more tolerant and accepting of the inevitability of terrorism" (*personal communication* 2005). Although the second attacks were less destructive or severe, they did establish an underlying trepidation that Bali had become an easy terrorist target with the prospect of further incidents. Travel advisories were reinstated by overseas governments, with frequent renewed warnings regarding the threat of "imminent" terrorist attacks directed at tourists. As Bali became increasingly associated with the problems of greater Indonesia, including political and social unrest, terrorism and natural disasters, many of these foreign advisories maintained a high alert status. While the resort island was winning various international tourism awards for quality of product and service, at the personal level risk perceptions, safety and security remained a concern (*personal communication* 2005).

Community Coping

Although the physical damage from the second attacks was less extensive, the additional psychological and financial stress affected most of the island's residents to some degree. As tourist numbers fell by approximately 30% from the previous month (The Guardian 2005, December 3), local businesses and residents that persevered after the first terrorist attack were forced to adopt strict coping mechanism once more. More locally owned/operated vendors were forced to shut down with increasing takeover and encroachment from multinational corporations (*personal communication* 2011). Lacking stable income or employment opportunities many residents could no longer afford to remain within Kuta or the popular "tourist south".

> *"I used to be driver but now business has become slow again. I have a wife and five year old girl. With no business the company cancelled my driving contract. Life is not as good as it was before. I am lucky I have the support of my kampong – they always help me when times are tough."* Former driver, Kuta June 2006

Within the Kuta district, Baker and Coulter (2007) observed frequent gambling, stress, depression, alcoholism, crime, anxiety, religious tension, competition between vendors,

increased participation of women in the work force, reduced assets and increased loans and debts. As residents migrated to villages and familial homes they placed further stress on limited subsistence resources. Reduced tourism earnings similarly impacted on the level of regional and provincial government expenditure available to support community concerns such as local health, education and critical infrastructure (*personal communication 2008*). Despite the increasing hardship it was observed that the role and function of traditional Balinese *banjar* network helped to support and maintain those families most in need (Collinson 2012).

Tourism decline and discounts

Domestic and regional tourism promotions employing heavy discounting were once again introduced to support the local market, but proved insufficient to meet the increasing shortfalls in business and income. Seemingly buoyed by initial tourism indicators following the 2005 attacks, limited additional government or industry funding was allocated to support medium to long-term revival initiatives. Gradually declining numbers resulted in a direct reduction in air services and routes. In November 2005, the locally established Air Paradise airline collapsed as a consequence of mounting business costs (Bali Discovery 2005, December 26).

Rather than pursue the traditional market base, new advertising campaigns focused on niche markets such as health/spa tourism and a more "culturally based" Bali experience. Although this strategy did appear to have mixed success, it still failed to address the crisis in consumer confidence. With ongoing travel warnings, terrorist concerns and civil unrest on neighbouring islands, the 5 year anniversary memorial of the original Kuta bombings was relatively modest and restrained (The Sydney Morning Herald 2007, October 1).

Government Disaster Management Planning

In 2007 as Amrozi, Mukhlas and Imam Sumudra were finally executed by firing squad for their role in the 2002 Bali bombings, formal disaster planning was finally advanced as a national priority in the enactment of Disaster Management Law No.24. The BNPD (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana* – National Disaster Mitigation Agency) was established in 2008 to develop the first National Disaster Management Plan for 2010-2014 (Asian Disaster Reduction Centre [ADRC] 2013). Consistent with the

national government policy of decentralisation, the national disaster preparedness, mitigation and reconstruction plan proposed the establishment of provincial and regional centres with their own disaster response and disaster management plans.

For Bali, each region was designated an Area Office - *Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah* (BPBD). Area offices are structured into 3 divisions: Prevention & Preparedness, Emergency Logistics and Reconstruction & Rehabilitation. The stated role of the Prevention Unit is to inform and educate the public about high probability natural hazards and appropriate actions. Emergency Logistics is responsible for acute event awareness, evacuation and communication strategies. The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation division manages and coordinates activities and rebuilding post-event (ADRC 2013). By 2012 the BPBD Kota Denpasar was the only office in Bali to have developed a working website with information limited to the Denpasar area and southern part of Bali (Wynn 2012).

Although the BNPD has made significant efforts towards hazard and vulnerability mapping in the area, the data and content remains primarily focused on higher profile earthquake and tsunami events. A more inclusive "all hazards" approach for Bali would also consider credible threats such pandemics, terrorism, civil unrest, floods, landslides, droughts, high impact transport accidents and even environmental disasters. With limited apparent tourism industry or community stakeholder engagement, the official disaster management policy for Bali still clearly emphasizes emergency response rather than disaster prevention and risk reduction (Wynn 2012). Further, as under-resourced traditional *banjars* are responsible for developing and implementing their own locally based disaster management planning, many residents remain unaware and unprepared for any significant hazard (*personal communication* 2013).

Tourism rebirth and poorly regulated development

Whether a consequence of restored confidence, consumer latitude, diminished risk perceptions, or inherent destination value and resilience, official statistics show that by 2008 Bali experienced a gradual return to visitor arrival numbers over 2 million (a peak of 4.4 million was recorded in 2004) with above 50% occupancy rates (BPS 2013). Closer analysis reveals that despite the revival, these tourists were staying for shorter periods of time and spending less over the duration of their stay than predecessors.

With domestic Indonesian tourists capitalising on greater access and affordability, the majority of international visitors originated from more proximate, short-haul regional markets of Australia, China and Japan (Bali Discovery 2009, August 24).

> *"We visited Bali as a cheap getaway, unaware of things that were going on. The Singapore government does not issue country advisories except when health issues are involved. We don't feel threatened or unsafe in Bali because we are an Asian family and unlikely to be the targets of any attack"* Singaporean family. Singapore 2010.

Renewed popularity and demand generated a resurgence of inbound flights, economic growth and investment. With Bali contributing approximately 30% of Indonesia's national tourism revenues in 2010 (BPS 2012) the government again committed to support and improve associated infrastructure. Cole (2012) identified that 80% of the island's income was again derived from tourism. Many Indonesians moved to Bali and the popular tourist centres seeking employment prospects, with an estimated 400,000 unregistered migrants (Cohen 2012). Rampant, unplanned development resumed, reflecting a familiar lack of regulation, weak law enforcement and corruption (*personal communication* 2009). As government and industry actively promote the charm and beauty of Bali's unique environment and culture, unsustainable tourism growth has progressively eroded these qualities foreboding a potential looming environmental crisis (*personal communication* 2013, Parum Samigita 2012).

Plagued by increasing problems of saltwater intrusion, water pollution and excessive consumption (attributed primarily to tourism resorts), natural water supplies have been rapidly dwindling (Cole 2012). More than a resource or commodity, water is revered in Balinese culture and integral in maintaining the unique irrigation system (*subak*) that supports the panoramic rice fields (*sawah*). Despite the fact that over a thousand hectares of rice paddies are cleared every year, traditional rice farmers are increasingly competing with the tourism industry for the allocation of water resources (The Jakarta Post 2012, March 4) (refer Plate 7.4). A study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (cited in Collinson 2012) predicts that Bali will face a water crisis by 2015 if nothing is done. Current planning and development strategies fail to adequately address this issue of water security. Correspondingly, intensified tourism infrastructure and real

estate expansion have been deemed unsustainable at current levels (Cassrels 2011, Cole 2012).

Future and Outlook

Somewhat peripheral to concerns regarding the natural environment, future growth and development of the island, October 2012 marked the 10 year anniversary of 2002 bombings. Despite renewed threats and fears about repeat terrorist attacks, hundreds of invited guests, dignitaries, survivors, and victims' families, attended a solemn and emotional ceremony in Kuta. Safeguarded by over 2000 police and military security personnel, the multi faith service paid respect to the victims but also acknowledged the inherent strength and continued defiance demonstrated in the aftermath of the event (Bali Discovery 2012, October 12). While successfully hosting other high profile events including the Bali Climate Change Conference (2007), the ASEAN Leaders Conference (2011) and the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, the international media has continued to focus on other negative issues involving crime, racketeering, drug trafficking, rubbish, pollution, natural disasters, civil unrest, traffic congestion, road and alcohol based accidents, health issues (particularly HIV and rabies), poor infrastructure and overdevelopment.

Positive initiatives to increase the number and visibility of specifically trained "tourism police" in popular areas, a crackdown on drugs and criminal activities (including unregistered transport and questionable tourism operators) improved transport infrastructure, conservation efforts and stricter building standards (including a moratorium on hotel construction and new licences in tourism areas) appear to receive less direct media attention (*personal communication* 2013). Although significant changes and improvements have been initiated, it would appear that Bali has lost its enviable reputation for peace and "innocence" indefinitely.

Despite the negative images and reports, tourism proved a resilient form of income for Bali throughout the global financial crisis and continues to grow and prosper (BPS 2012). Government, industry, and residents remain strongly committed to further tourism development. As 85% of the tourism economy is now estimated to be in the hands of non-Balinese (McRae 2010 cited in Cole 2012) with the majority of remaining revenue unevenly concentrated in the southern provinces of the island, local

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communities have become even more marginalised and vulnerable. With a recent downturn in the handcraft sector, escalating costs of living throughout the island and service provision surpassing demand, the overall positive economic benefits of tourism for the inhabitants of Bali are increasingly questionable (*personal communication* 2011). While cruise and yacht tourism are explored as new growth "niche markets" many have suggested that tourism in Bali has already reached the point of saturation (Cole 2012).

Although a number of non-profit organisations have worked to implement sustainable tourism initiatives to support conservation and build stronger communities (Bali Community Based Tourism Organisation [BCBTA] 2013), such endeavours still remain highly vulnerable to the changes that affect visitor confidence.

Southern Thailand – peaks and troughs

As the affected Andaman provinces struggled to overcome the stigma of disaster, economic damages and losses estimated over US$2198 million (Larsen et al 2011), other tourist regions in Thailand such as Pattaya, Koh Samui, Bangkok, and Chaing Mai experienced renewed growth and popularity (Nidhiprabha 2007, Cohen and Neal 2010). Although it was apparent that much of Phuket had been restored and redeveloped within the year, continued destination substitution was attributed to superstition and concerns about repeat events (Cohen 2010). With several earthquakes and precautionary tsunami alerts issued over subsequent months, nerves and tension levels remained elevated. The risks associated with the high contagion of avian influenza (bird-flu) in 2005 further affected travel confidence and behaviour globally. Following the tsunami, Phuket's previously robust tourist market demonstrated a new sensitivity to both domestic and international events.

Continued waves of crisis

Although the terrorism of the Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand (predominantly in the Malay Pattani region) had persisted relatively unremarked since 2001, subsequent to the tsunami each new attack or regional threat generated negative overseas media attention (Cohen and Neal 2010). At the national level, widespread civil unrest led to a coup d'état in September 2006, removing Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the

elected caretaker government on allegations of cronyism, disregard for human rights, control of the mass media and self-aggrandisement (Cohen and Neal 2010: 460) Declaring martial law nationwide, the military banned protests and all political activity, suppressed and censored the media, and arrested numerous Cabinet members - adversely affecting the domestic tourism market.   An interim government was established followed by election in December 2007, yet in the transitional period there were several associated bombings in North and North east Thailand.

While the internal political crisis only had a marginal impact on international tourist numbers, an escalation in violent protests, rallies, and raids in August 2008 resulted in the temporary closure of a number of regional airports including the international airports at Phuket and Krabi.   On 25 November 2008 hundreds of armed protestors overwhelmed security at Bangkok's main international airport (Suvarnabhumi International Airport) suspending all flights and stranding thousands of travellers.   The domestic passenger terminal at Don Mueang Airport was similarly closed on 26 November. As a state of emergency was declared in Bangkok, heralded by several proximate explosions, international governments warned their citizens to avoid protestors at the airport or even travelling to Thailand.   The protest action blocked all passenger services until the siege ended and flights resumed eight days later, 4 December 2008.   By this stage irrevocable damage had been sustained to Thailand's tourism image and economy (Cohen and Neal 2010).

As smaller demonstrations and regional civil unrest continued, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had precipitated a decline in many of Thailand's key exports including manufacturing services and agriculture (Cohen and Neal 2010).   Reduced spending potential in the kingdom's most lucrative tourist source markets of the USA and Europe was partially offset by an increase in Chinese, Russian and South Korean tourists (NSO 2013).   With tourism perceived to be a resilient industry the government launched an initiative for greater investment in small to medium enterprise (SME) and additional tourist infrastructure.   There was a significant increase in domestic, health/wellness and medical tourism promotion but accommodation rates in Phuket remained at approximately 35% (NSO 2013).   Renowned as a popular sex-tourism destination this informal enterprise was additionally plagued by concerns regarding the growing incidence of HIV infection amongst the resident population (Goyder 2009).

Community Based Redevelopment

> *"Tsunami, bird-flu, political crisis all over Thailand, GFC – how much more can Phuket take?* Hospitality staff. Patong April 2010.

Despite the fact that the Thai government made a formal commitment to provide ongoing community support and assistance following the tsunami (WTO Phuket Action Plan 2005), the unstable political context and established policy of decentralisation meant that this responsibility was relegated down to the provincial and sub-district levels (Calgaro and Lloyd 2008). With an apparent emphasis on the tourist centre of Patong, many long term recovery initiatives were compromised due to funding shortages and weakness in governance structures. Larsen et al (2011) suggest that much of the required government aid did not reach those eligible due to the complex application process, discrimination, corruption and nepotism. Government efforts were subsequently short lived as the private sector, community, and social networks mobilised to facilitate their own recovery initiatives (*personal communication* 2010).

In many coastal communities such as Khao Lak and Phi Phi, elite and dominant landholder groups used existing network alliances and resources to influence the government to grant access and entitlement to development opportunities that often contravened official planning and zoning regulations (Calgaro and Llyod 2008). Such policy and initiatives resulted in pervasive tension, conflicts, controversy, and increasing disparity between social groups (Larsen et al 2011, *personal communication* 2010).   The political influence of this private sector further swayed the direction of official tourism marketing strategies to maximise self-interests, with limited input or consultation from other stakeholders groups.

Lacking such political associations or linkages, expatriates and smaller scale operators utilised established international and external contacts to support independent reconstruction and recovery efforts (*personal communication* 2010). Often revealing disparate and competing objectives, enthusiasm and the financial backing for many of these endeavours waned over subsequent months. More entrepreneurial residents established partnerships, leases or co-ownership arrangements. Having lost all official documentation (ie business registration, proof of assets etc) many small businesses were

unable to secure funding to rebuild (Calgaro and Llyod 2008). Some owners were forced to sell their struggling businesses and seek alternative income, while other establishments and infrastructure were left in abandoned disrepair. Numerous shop and store fronts became transitory, reflecting the seasonal and annual fluctuations in visitor demand (*personal communication* 2010).

At the host community level, the familial group functioned as the primary welfare and support structure throughout most of the local rebuilding and restoration process. Consistent with the strong role of the family unit and high value of self-sufficiency in Thai culture, extended kin members provided child minding, psychological care, spiritual support, informal education and monetary aid where possible (*personal communication* 2010). Residents that had previously remitted income to remote and rural family members were often forced to reduce or cease such payments as limited prospects resulted in higher employment attrition rates and migration (Nidhiprabha 2007).

> *"I moved to Patong from Bangkok, I have an eight year old son from previous marriage with Thai man. He lives with my mother in central Thailand and I send money when I can.… I trained in real estate and tried to get job in industry here but all places say they are full. I have had three relationships with Australian men – but each one has ended in heart ache – I don't understand. There are many pretty girls here. If I cannot get a job in one week I will leave"*
> Hostess Patong April 2010

Without significant improvement in visitor arrival numbers or occupancy rates many tourism industry employees found themselves in the predicament of no job, no land to sell or rebuild on, and few other livelihood options. Lacking insurance or significant assets, there was minimal access to credit or financial support. Many residents further struggled to repay existing bank loans and debts with no secure form of income (*personal communication* 2010). For those that were physically and mentally able, labour and construction work appeared one of the few available options.

The seemingly frenetic activity towards rebuilding and even increasing tourism capacity in popular tourist destinations was starkly contrasted in the more remote and marginal

communities. Smaller subsistence style coastal communities were left to fend almost completely for themselves. In more accessible locations, minority groups including Thai Muslims and indigenous Moken/Chao Le (sea gypsies) were directly discriminated against receiving no formal government aid or support. Lacking official documentation to demonstrate heritage or title deeds, legitimate land claims were often denied and misappropriated by corrupt local administrators (*personal communication* 2010).

> *"My friends live in Ban Nam Khem and their house was badly damaged by the tsunami. They wanted to move away but with no land papers occupancy still remains part of local law. They cannot sell, so they cannot afford new land or a new place."* Vendor, Patong April 2010.

Without acknowledged land ownership, many villagers were refused access to proper dwellings, running water and electricity. Increasing tourism development, overfishing, and the designation of extensive national parks and marine protected zones have further impacted on existing traditional fishing and sea faring livelihoods (UNEP 2007). Like many of the Burmese construction labourers and migrant survivors, those without recognised citizenship have struggled to access essential services such as healthcare, education and other public administration (Calgaro and Lloyd 2008).

The complexities of ongoing humanitarian relief

As the demand for permanent shelter was progressively resolved, the more experienced and resolute non-government agencies still operating within the region again prioritised the traditionally marginalised subsections of the population including ethnic minorities, elderly, women, children, and micro-enterprise (*personal communication* 2010). Despite a number of positive resettlement, micro finance, and economic diversification initiatives, most short to medium term recovery projects have been judged unsuccessful (Larsen et al 2011). Given the scale and sheer number of affected population, the relief environment in Southern Thailand revealed a chaotic multitude of agencies and organisations often having different mandates and agendas, working at various levels. Similarly, a lack of coordinated planning and policies with limited differentiation of beneficiary's needs and circumstances resulted in a range of new and emerging vulnerabilities, including natural resource depletion, overt profiteering, and aid dependency (*personal communication* 2010).

Despite the millions of dollars that had been provided in donor aid, numerous studies and reviews revealed ongoing villager isolation, poor service provision, contestable claims for payments, misappropriation, discrimination, and a general lack of action over identified needs. With several reports suggesting widespread corruption and graft, specifically that aid donations were being illegally absorbed by those responsible for distribution, seven foreign embassies in Thailand petitioned for a special investigation to provide direct transparency and accountability for all monies expended (Larsen et al 2011, ABC New 2006, December 28). In 2009 a police colonel responsible for the finances donated for disaster victim identification was found guilty of malfeasance by misappropriating funds (The Nation 2009, March 2).

Rather than providing an equal opportunity for community participation, growth and redevelopment, Southern Thailand's aid experience highlighted the significance of social and community dynamics in influencing the direction of resilience and recovery. Impacts were highly variable at the micro level, contrasting stakeholder innovation and informal initiatives against the weakness of the formal governance system. Similarly, a pervasive lack of trust of authorities and public officials seemed to increase existing social unrest undermining formal planning development proposals (*personal communication* 2010).

Government Tourism Related Policy and Redevelopment

As prevailing concerns regarding risk and safety and the associated spectre of death affected the rate of visitor return to Southern Thailand, the Thai government used the opportunity to rethink its' development priorities for the region. With a formal policy preference oriented toward "quality tourism" the plan was to substitute larger scale high-end tourist enterprise for the traditional small, lower-end enterprises and operators within the informal sector (Cohen 2008). Strict zoning regulations, building codes, and an integrated set back system were also mandated to mitigate future adversity and exposure to coastal hazards (UNEP 2007, Paphavasit et al 2006). Formulated without any community consultation or consideration for local businesses and vendors, all buildings and structures were strictly prohibited along the beach and coastline (*personal communication* 2010).

Just as sun lounges, Jet Skis and vendors returned to the beaches of Phuket in defiance of such government prohibitions, coastal development resumed in other restricted set-back zones (refer Plate 7.5). On the popular island of Phi Phi Don (*Koh Phi Phi Don*) hundreds of residents ignored construction bans to rebuild on the extensively damaged and exposed central isthmus of the Ton Sai Resort area, in an attempt to re-establish custom and livelihoods from any returning tourists. Similarly, both large and small scale development was undertaken in the Khao Lak coastal region with limited regulatory control or regard for government rehabilitation plans (Calgaro &Llyod 2008). Without the financial and/or human resources to enforce legislative changes, built structures and inhabitants were again directly exposed to a potential tsunami hazard (*personal communication* 2010).

> *"I came here after the tsunami – everything was flattened, it looked like a war zone. All the hotels and businesses had suffered damage or were destroyed. I cannot believe they were allowed to rebuild here. Some places are even closer to the ocean than before. Don't they know the risk?"* Norwegian tourist, Khao Lak. April 2010.

In direct response to the highly publicised political and civil unrest occurring throughout the country, the Thai government embarked upon an extensive international campaign to help restore confidence in all aspects of tourist safety and security. Having provided financial assistance to maintain and support the operational capacity of the national carrier, Thai International Airway (2007 – 2009) intensified marketing and promotional initiatives were employed to reinvigorate the domestic and international market. As confidence and occupancy rates continued to remain low throughout 2009, the government proposed a macroeconomic solution providing debt relief programs to affected companies in travel, hospitality and the souvenir production sectors (TAT 2013). Consistent with reviews of other government strategies, subsequent implementation demonstrated unequal resource distribution with an obvious emphasis on the luxury high-end market (Cohen and Neal 2010). With extensive monsoonal flooding and landslides affecting the travel plans of thousands of tourists in 2010 and 2011, safety and natural hazards management remained a national priority.

Plate 7.5: Rebuilding within the tsunami impact zone, Khao Lak

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

Plate 7.6: Poorly maintained tsunami warning sign, Khao Lak

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

Progressing Disaster Management

Concomitant to its assurances regarding visitor safety after the tsunami, the Thai government engaged in an extensive risk management assessment and planning process for the afflicted region. Advancing the recommendations of the Phuket Action Plan (WTO 2005a) the island of Phuket hosted a tourism industry focused training program *"Disaster Reduction through Awareness, Preparedness and Prevention Mechanisms in Coastal Settlements in Asia: Demonstration in Tourism Destinations"* (Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction [PEDRR] 2008). The Phuket Province Risk Management Plan (see Table 7.1) and Municipality Disaster Management Plan were further progressed in 2008 utilising an "all hazards" approach rating the overall level of risk for each identified hazard, based on likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences.

Table 7.1: Phuket Province Risk Management Plan (PPRMP)

Risk	Likelihood of Occurrence	Severity of Consequences	Overall Level of Risk
Nature			
Flood/Storm	Likely	Moderate	High
Landslide	Likely	Moderate	High
Earthquake	Rare	Catastrophic	Extreme
Tsunami	Rare	Catastrophic	Extreme
Drought	Rare	Moderate	Moderate
Typhoon	Possible	Major	Extreme
Health pandemic	Possible	Major	Extreme
Manmade			
Terrorism	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Fire	Likely	Moderate	High
Marine accident	Rare	Major	High
Road accident	Certain	Minor	High
Pollution (Chronic & Major incident)	Rare	Moderate	Moderate
Crime (Assault/Murder/Kidnapping)	Likely	Minor	High
Political unrest	Possible	Moderate	High

Source: Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction (2008:5)

With construction of the warning tower network completed, The National Tsunami Prevention and Mitigation Strategy (2008 – 2012) was implemented to reflect a proactive approach to knowledge transfer, enhancing community understanding, early warning, safety area preparation, evacuation, and community-based disaster risk reduction (Thomalla, Metusela, Naruchaikusol, Larsen & Tepa, 2009). In 2010 Phuket

was recognised by the United Nations as a "role-model city" in Disaster Management planning (Phuket Gazette 2010, October 20*)*.

While such initiatives have significantly progressed and improved the regions disaster management capacity, the much lauded tsunami warning system and network has not been without problems. In September 2009 the primary tsunami buoy stopped transmitting as the original battery power source had expired. Lacking a budget allocation to replace the system, it was only renewed in December 2009 following extensive media attention and criticism (Larsen et al 2011). In June 2010 the same buoy went adrift after breaking its anchor cable. This was not reattached until early 2011, as two more warnings buoy were also deployed (Phuket Gazette 2010, September 23, December 20).

The entire tsunami alert system has been additionally compromised as thieves have continued to steal the copper communications wire from existing warning towers. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were established across the region in 2010 to ensure that such maintenance issues were quickly addressed, but as signs have faded, fallen down (refer Plate 7.6), rusted or been taken as souvenirs, the warning system has since failed on numerous occasions (Phuketwan Tourism News 2010, April 7). With multiple stakeholders involved in the reinvigorated approach to disaster risk management, apportion of direct responsibility for such incidents has been difficult.

Tourism recovery beyond the tsunami

In an effort to remain competitive in a weakened and now highly volatile market, hotels and local proprietors offered extensive price reductions, discounts, and package deals to solicit improved custom (*personal communication* 2010). Increasing numbers of overseas tour groups took advantage of such bargain prices with Russia emerging as the second largest source market (NSO 2013). With such initiatives producing limited overall gains or profits, more entrepreneurial managers began to develop and expand on the success of niche markets, particularly dive and medical/wellness tourism. Many locally owned small and medium enterprises remained operational almost entirely through the patronage of expatriate contacts and return customer loyalty. Businesses experienced a high turnover in ownership and management (*personal communication* 2010).

For smaller, less tourist oriented coastal communities, *Thana* tourism, typified by memorials, monuments, tsunami tours/trails, resettlement villages and survivor arts and crafts became a regular source of income (Cohen 2009). While experiencing a slow but steady flow of visitors, sites such as the Baan Nam Khem tsunami memorial park, Police Boat 813 (refer Plate 7.8), *Stabile*, the Tsunami Memorial Wall in Mai Khao (Phuket), and the underwater memorial off Phi Phi were identified as key locations for the five year anniversary commemorations. Following the numerous religious services and ceremonies held on this date, it was widely agreed that no further "official" memorials be conducted to allow people to recover and remember in their own way (*personal communication* 2010).

As the years have progressed the physical impacts and destruction of the tsunami have become less evident in most of the popular tourist destinations of Southern Thailand. Many of the hotels that were extensively damaged and/or widely associated with high fatalities have been rebuilt, restored, and even renamed. While visitor safety remains an obvious concern for all operators, many have been reluctant to invest in expensive mitigation and precautionary measures when there is no legal requirement or mandate (*personal communication* 2010). Staff and community members have participated in scheduled warning and evacuation drills yet these occur less regularly. Similarly as contracts were not renewed for the life guards trained to facilitate beach evacuations, a number of tsunami threats have demonstrated significant deficiencies in preparedness and response (Morison 2012).

Future directions for Phuket, tourism and community
Demonstrating continued resilience and determination in spite of the political unrest and downturn in the wold economy, hotel and resorts throughout the Andaman Triangle have persisted in expanding facilities and available room capacity (Phuketwan 2010 January 2). Buoyed by increasing low-cost direct flights from Australia, Europe and Asia, unprecedented growth and visitor arrival rates have been forecast for the foreseeable future. With new areas zoned for further tourism development, increasing investment, and plans to double the size of the international airport, there have been renewed questions and concerns regarding the issue of sustainable tourism development (*personal communication* 2012).

Plate 7.7: Village resettlement through community consultation, Khao Lak

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

Plate 7.8: Unofficial Tsunami memorial – Patrol boat 813 swept over 2km inland

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

With dozens of recovery forums and online travel blogs asserting that Phuket has grown "too big, too quick" many pre-tsunami problems like water pollution, coral stress, over-fishing, environmental destruction and ad hoc development have escalated. Similarly, there have been increasing claims and media reports highlighting the violence and aggression directed at tourists (Tyler 2011) Informant and Phuket-based journalist Alasdair Forbes states "Phuket is getting quantity but not quality". While the experience of tsunami has indirectly increased the market profile of the region many believe that Phuket has lost its charm as the "land of smiles" (*personal communication* 2012)

Recovery evaluation and lessons learnt

Following years of instability, uncertainty, and change, both island destinations of Bali and Phuket have progressively managed to resume and even exceed pre-disaster tourist arrival numbers (BPS 2012, NSO 2013). Although memories and many physical reminders remain, the direction and future of the local tourism industry is no longer specifically dominated by their respective disaster events. Consistent with the crisis management continuum, such resolution and return to "normalcy" should prompt a review or post-mortem of actions and strategies. Evaluating, reassessing and identifying "lessons learnt" provides a valuable opportunity for organisational learning and feedback.

Community Resilience and adaptation

In terms of impacts on local community stakeholders and the medium to longer term experience of disaster recovery, the stories of Bali and Phuket demonstrate many similarities. At the individual, micro-industry, and small to medium business level, effects have been highly variable. Residents with influential family/contacts, access to extensive assets and resources, or well developed entrepreneurial skills have managed to adapt and in some cases expand and prosper. Others have received direct assistance from overseas contacts and networks of loyal return customers. Empirical evidence however, suggests that most members of the host community that were dependant on tourism for their livelihoods were forced to adopt difficult coping strategies.

In terms of financial resources, many local residents in the affected regions lacked significant savings, investments or assets. This was particularly evident for those working in the informal sector. As many people in southern Thailand had lost

everything in the tsunami they faced the additional challenge of having to prove their identity and demonstrate ownership of remaining possessions and land title. Compensation or disaster payments, where available, were limited and poorly distributed, further marginalising some ethnic and lower socio-economic groups. Direct assistance from most non-government organisations was often short term and has been largely criticised regarding issues such as distribution, agendas, appropriateness, duplication of effort, lack of transparency, and generating a culture of aid dependency.

Personal, health, income protection or business insurance was not routine practice for the majority of local community members, employees, vendors or operators. Even in cases where insurance or loans were able to cover direct damage and impacts, businesses still relied on customer patronage to remain operational. Exports in sectors such as arts and craft (Bali) and seafood (Thailand) were expanded although in the depressed global financial market associated profits were marginal. With limited local opportunities for livelihood diversification or retraining, alternative employment was difficult to attain. Unreliable tourism income and revenues resulted in extensive migration and continued hardship for many families.

As locals persevered through successive years of instability, extensive social and psychological support was provided within familial, communal and extended kinship groups. The collectivist style society maintained through Hindu and Buddhist belief systems provided stability, strength and resilience in shared faith, culture and understanding. Minority ethnic and religious groups also revealed their own internal assistance and support mechanisms. For many, increased religious, ritual and ceremonial observance functioned as a primary coping mechanism. Increased incidences of criminal and deviant behaviour including gambling, ethnic conflict, theft, violence, drugs, and excessive alcohol were reported in the main tourist centres (Bali Discovery 2011, 2 May, The Sydney Morning Herald 2013, March 19).

Irrespective of the origin of any monetary assistance, coping strategies or behaviour, the affected communities of Bali and Southern Thailand have self-organised, adapted and endured. Community demographic compositions and dynamics have changed reflecting patterns of attrition and migration, but with the progressive return of tourists, resident populations in the main tourist centres are expanding (BPS 2012, NSO 2013). With few

alternatives, tourism revenues have resumed as the primary source of income for many community stakeholders. Rather than reflecting ignorance and complacency, experience has created direct awareness of the unreliable nature of tourism returns, providing an opportunity to be better prepared for future adversity.

Founded within the community, established local grass roots organisations such as Parum Samigita and Raks Thai continue to work on initiatives to strengthen and improve the inherent resilience and social capacity of all community members (Parum Samigita 2012). Beyond targeted education, health and poverty reduction programs for the most vulnerable and marginalised, extensive efforts have been made to inform and empower locals to become more involved in formal governance and decision making Increased knowledge and awareness has resulted in active local campaigns against further unsustainable tourism development and the issue of increasing foreign ownership. Similarly, understanding and concern over problems such as pollution, water security, over-fishing and environmental destruction have become more prevalent (*personal communication* 2012).

While not all residents are directly engaged or involved in such issues, the predominant attitude in both destinations appears consistent with the finding of Marzuki (2012) in post tsunami Phuket. In investigating local perceptions towards the economic impact of tourism (specifically in the context of over dependence) the research concluded that most residents were generally supportive of tourism development in their society as long as they experienced benefits such as increased income, employment and business opportunities, improved infrastructure and a better standard of living. In realising the benefits "the respondents are also rational in terms of the long-term tourism development… where most of them are very critical and concerned about the negative impacts to the local economy and natural environments" (Marzuki 2012: 210).

Based on the adaptive and coping strategies needed it appears that the host populations of both Bali and Southern Thailand were predominantly self-reliant post-event. Limited financial, business or occupational assistance was received from either government or the tourism industry. Similarly, opportunities for active community consultation, participation and engagement in redevelopment decision making and destination restoration were minimal. Non-government organisations did facilitate the

reconstruction of both physical and social infrastructure, but longer term gains have been made in the spheres of education, knowledge and awareness. Although host communities are now cognisant of future threats and the sensitivity of the tourism industry, at the individual and household level without livelihood security most still remain highly vulnerable to tourism crisis.

Industry restoration initiatives

Throughout the destination recovery process, peak national and regional tourism bodies (NTOs and Destination Management Organisations [DMOs]) have remained focused on safety, security and restoring consumer confidence. Reflecting the important contribution of tourism to national GDP, significant government and private sector investment was committed to market research, communication, rebranding, promotion, travel expos and familiarisation trips. As damaged communities were physically rebuilt, further marketing challenges included overseas destination substitution, repeat incidences of domestic terrorism, civil unrest, proximate natural hazards and epidemics, a downturn in the global economy and unfavourable travel advisories. National airline carriers and 'key' stakeholder organisations in both countries were provided supplementary financial support to remain operational.

As international tourist numbers fluctuated, greater incentives were provided to promote and grow domestic tourism. Industry partners in both Bali and Thailand committed extensively to re-establish top priority international source markets through trade fairs, exhibitions and shows. Similarly, new overseas source markets were identified and developed to supplement the traditional market segment. Expanding on existing potential and interest, Bali developed its niche markets of health and wellness and cruise tourism. Formal strategies in Southern Thailand focused on increasing high end quality tourism while attracting greater numbers towards health and wellness, medical and dive tourism.

Although such changes were successful in reviving arrival numbers and occupancy rates, the 'new' visitors generally represented quantity over former quality. Unlike previous European or American long haul tourists, the majority of new visitors represented short haul visitors on low cost, budget, pre-paid package tours, staying for shorter periods of time and spending less money. With increasing foreign investment

and multinational ownership at the destination level there was also significant overseas leakage of tourism earnings (*personal communication* 2013).

While there have been examples of collaborative efforts within the accommodation and service sectors, particularly on the prioritisation of visitor safety and media relations, over supply and reduced demand heightened competition between individual providers. Where income from customer loyalty and linkages was insufficient, most resorted to heavy discounts and bonus incentives such as extra accommodation, upgrades, meals and free tours. Social media and visitor testimonials were increasingly used to promote destination appeal and value. Although such strategies did attract tourists, there was limited revenue or profit margins. Declining income resulted in a high turnover in staff and business ownership. International and domestic investors used this depressed market as an opportunity to purchase and expand on existing infrastructure in anticipation of a tourism revival. Even as arrival numbers remained low, the number of hotels and hotel rooms continued to increase (*personal communication* 2013).

In response to international and visitor concerns, safety and security measures were visibly improved in Bali including stricter surveillance and monitoring at all access points to the island, regular vehicle inspections, personal searches and the introduction of dedicated tourist police. Similarly, employees and host communities had become more vigilant and responsive towards suspicious activities or erratic behaviour. Industry training in Southern Thailand focused around natural hazard awareness, familiarity with the newly installed tsunami warning system and efficient evacuation procedures. While effective, the majority of these practices were voluntary. Without any legal obligation, mandate, or enforcement, such efforts have not been widely sustained in either location. Additionally, in Southern Thailand a lack of effective development control has seen the construction and rebuilding of extensive infrastructure in coastal areas that were specifically designated as set-back areas post tsunami – leaving tourists and staff directly exposed to future threats.

As most of the industry has tried to move beyond reminders of the destruction and emotion of each disaster event, public demand for anniversary commemorations, memorials and a growth in special interest "dark or thana tourism" has raised both moral and ethical dilemmas. While it is undeniable that the Bali Bombings and South

Asia tsunami have increased the global profile of these tourist destinations, the promotion, consumption and commercial exploitation of such sites as visitor attractions because of their tragic history, raises apprehension over appropriateness and victim sensitivity. Many of these sentiments were reflected with the release of the disaster drama movie "The Impossible" (2012) based on the real life story of a tourist family in Thailand caught in the destruction and chaotic aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Phuket Gazette 2012, December 7). In contrast, some individuals and community groups specifically advertised their survivor status as a direct marketing tool to promote their products and services.

Whether as a consequence of the variety of strategies undertaken, quality and value of destination product, consumer forbearance, or testament to the resiliency of tourism, both Southern Thailand and Bali appear to have progressively recovered from significant adversity. Despite cautiously optimistic forecasts for continued industry growth, in respect of consumer confidence and risk perception, these destinations have been fundamentally changed. Having previously held enviable reputations for relative safety and carefree holidays, the extensive international media attention associated with each disaster event has heightened consumer sensitivity. Local and regional problems which involve tourists become quickly and highly publicised to a global audience. Similarly, association with proximate domestic issues and exogenous international concerns now appears to exert a stronger influence on the visitor decision making processes and the possibility of destination substitution.

While the initiatives of organisations such as UNWTO (2013c), PATA (2003), APEC (Robertson et al 2006), the Sustainable Tourism Research Centre (STCRC) (Gurtner and Morgan 2007) and the Tourism Crisis Management Institute (TCMI 2012) have produced extensive manuals and guides to facilitate proactive tourism crisis management planning, it appears that awareness and implementation at the local destination level has been negligible. Numerous seminars and training workshops have been held locally and regionally to address the management of hazards, ongoing safety concerns, and related crisis communication strategies, however despite interest and best intentions, subsequent follow up and actions are often supplanted by the reality and priorities of everyday business operation (PEDRR 2008). As demonstrated from the second Bali Bombing incident, familiarity and experience has directly resulted in a

better informed and prepared industry; however the challenge is to retain such corporate knowledge and avoid complacency.

Government influence and actions

Lacking adequate awareness or local disaster management planning, Indonesian and Thai government responses to the crisis events were almost entirely reactive. Unlike the disorganised chaos experienced in Bali, authorities in Southern Thailand were quickly able to organise personnel and resources to effectively coordinate emergency response efforts. Reflecting the different nature of the "trigger" events, subsequent safety and security measures and investments emphasised specific strategies. Indonesia focused on anti-terrorism and physical security while the Thai government prioritised the establishment of the tsunami early warning system. The advent of the second bombing and further tsunami threats tested the newly established management and organisational capacity with varying success.

Post-event, numerous national government departments assumed authority and control over disaster recovery policy and planning, resulting in a diverse range of directives, regulations and recommendations. Consistent with the predominant political principle of decentralisation, practical development, implementation and enforcement was invariably left to resource poor regional, provincial and local authorities. As significant financial resources were committed to providing direct aid and supporting the recovery efforts of the tourism industry, lawful distribution was undermined by well-established traditions of nepotism, abuse of power and corruption. Instead of helping to secure greater community faith and cooperation with government initiatives, such practices reinforced issues of mistrust and dissention.

In response to concerns about repeat disaster events and adversity, both governments proactively engaged in a review of existing disaster management knowledge, capacity and procedures. Extensive hazard and vulnerability mapping was performed, resulting in regional risk management planning and community education strategies. While representing an advance in hazard awareness and mitigation, efforts in Bali remain under-resourced and have failed to encompass an "all-hazards" assessment. Phuket was presented with an international award in recognition of its significant disaster management planning. However as the warning system has been plagued by problems,

and widespread development continues to encroach on exposed susceptible coastal zones, the true consequence of any planning has yet to be determined.

Plagued by successive problems such as natural disasters, civil unrest, terrorism, and political instability on the wider domestic arena, the national governments of Indonesia and Thailand have had limited resources or opportunity to address ongoing concerns of regional socio-economic vulnerability and renewed tourism dependence. Unplanned and uncontrolled development continues, while environmental problems such as degradation, coastal erosion, pollution and resource depletion are becoming more apparent. While better prepared for defined hazard events, neither government has planned effective contingencies for a crisis of consumer confidence associated with unsustainable, overdevelopment of their tourism product.

Lessons Learnt

A review of the extended recovery experiences of both popular tourist destinations post-crisis reveals several important insights and lessons. In appreciating the selection and consequences of key strategies, it is apparent that tourism was considered both synonymous and integral to effective destination recovery, with limited consideration of alternative development options. While the restoration of visitor numbers indicates a resolution and recovery from crisis conditions, continued tourism reliance and increasing development concerns suggests a return to pre-crisis vulnerability rather than the ideal of sustainable transformation.

Chapter 8

~ IT'S MORE THAN TOURISM… ~

From long established patterns of migration, settlement, exchange, and subsistence living, the tropical islands of Bali and Phuket rapidly emerged as internationally renowned tourist destinations. As associated development and investment continued to expand, residents progressively reoriented their livelihoods around tourism with limited consideration for any type of hazard or threat to the local tourism industry. Lacking adequate awareness, experience or planning, the targeted terrorist bombings in Kuta, and impact of the South Asia tsunami on Southern Thailand, precipitated an immediate and devastating tourism crisis for the respective host communities. As predominantly reactive strategies were developed and implemented, stakeholders faced continued adversity and challenges. Through adaptive approaches, change, and industry resilience, these destinations have since recovered from tourism crisis conditions and returned to "business as usual". Beyond a narrative of tourism crisis, as case studies of an integrated crisis management framework it remains necessary to assess the value and appropriateness of recovery efforts towards the objective of improved destination sustainability.

Assessing destination recovery

In examining community disaster coordination and response models in the 1960's Weller and Kreps (1970:17) claimed that assessing the effectiveness of disaster recovery is difficult analytically and practically. Consistent with more recent literature (Ritchie 2004, McEntire 2004, Santana 2003, Pforr and Hosie 2009, Cohen 2010), they recognised the complexity of interactions between highly variable elements, factors and sectors. Similarly, the impacts and effects of disasters on society and infrastructure are not universal, reflecting spatial and temporal dynamics, and stakeholder diversity (Passerini 2000). Comparative research on the disaster recovery experience is further impeded by the use of varying professional vernacular, poorly defined terms, extensive rhetoric and ambiguity. Subsequently, the terminology, theoretical paradigms and parameters already used in defining the holistic integrated crisis management framework will be extended to systematically assess the recovery efforts in Bali and Phuket.

Holistic Disaster Recovery and Sustainable Development

Within a holistic disaster management context Norman (2006:16) defines recovery as "The coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, medium and long term holistic regeneration of a community following a disaster". Further, recovery is a depicted as a developmental and remedial process encompassing the following activities:

• minimising the escalation of the consequences of the disaster;
• regeneration of the social, emotional, economic and physical wellbeing of individuals and communities;
• taking opportunities to adapt to meet the social, economic, natural and built environments future needs; and,
• reducing future exposure to hazards and their associated risks.

Consistent with other literature on sustainable development and disasters (Berke et al 1993, Fallon 2003), this approach recommends the disaster recovery process as a catalyst or opportunity for social change which incorporates remediation, sustainability and disaster risk reduction efforts.

Bankoff (2003:13) contends,

> In this context a disaster can also be defined as an intense period of change whereby the magnitude, scope and/or intensity of external agents, be they natural or human-induced or a combination of the two, are such as to cause the people affected to take stock of their present condition, reassess their normal behaviour and either choose to continue much as before or to adopt new stratagems that they hope might better meet the challenges that they now confront.

Based on the comprehensive case studies of Bali and Phuket it is evident that the disaster impacts and subsequent recovery did generate elements of change within the destinations and host communities, yet the degree of recovery or sustainable transformation appears far from definitive.

Minimising disaster escalation and consequence

As Bali and Phuket lacked proactive risk or disaster management planning there was limited likelihood or evidence of prevention or mitigation strategies in the disaster pre-event period. Improved intelligence, safety and security measures in Bali may have circumvented the terrorist activities, yet this was not assured. While there was greater scope for alert and warning in Southern Thailand, without sufficient hazard awareness or established warning systems, 'prodromal' mobilisation actions were informal and isolated. In both cases the hazard impacts experienced were tragic and devastating.

Initial response efforts after the first bombings in Bali were described as ad hoc, confusing and chaotic, demonstrating a lack of experience or familiarity with significant disaster events. Similarly, there was insufficient medical capacity or resources to effectively assist the number of injured victims. While safety and security actions were established as an immediate priority, the targeted violence and stigma of terrorism adversely affected all stakeholders, particularly tourists, members of the host community, local businesses, the tourism industry, and local government. Poor communication strategies and negative media attention seemed to magnify pervasive perceptions of risk and uncertainty, prolonging crisis conditions.

In contrast, despite the casualties and scale of physical destruction caused by the tsunami, authorities in Southern Thailand managed to establish a degree of command and control over the emergency situation within several days. Experienced disaster management personnel and resources were reassigned regionally to facilitate extensive search and rescue efforts, accommodate victims and provide medical aid and basic needs. As clean-up, restoration of services, and rebuilding rapidly commenced in the more populous coastal areas, the prolific images of devastation and uncertainty of further tsunami hazards undermined individual confidence and assurances of safety.

In both destinations disasters response efforts caused an impromptu convergence of large numbers of volunteers, victims, friends and relatives, donations, relief and aid agencies, the media, government officials, private sector groups and the general public. Revealing variable motives and agendas, cooperation and collaboration within or between each of the stakeholder groups was highly sporadic. With the exception of a small number of individuals and emergent groups, the primary emphasis of response

and recovery initiatives was a return to normalcy and/or pre-crisis conditions rather than address the broader social, economic and environmental issues that contributed to the context of vulnerability. Efforts were made to minimise the escalation of disaster conditions, however as each of the host communities achieved the coveted return of tourism income and revenues they have again become highly susceptible to any subsequent disaster or crisis in consumer confidence.

While the advent of the second series of bombings in Bali confirms the management value of disaster experience, effective communication (awareness, media and public relations) and a coordinated response effort, it equally expounds the significance of risk perception, safety and security, in managing tourism destination recovery.

Recovery and regeneration of wellbeing

Although possible to provide illustrative examples, assessing long term recovery and the regeneration of social, emotional, economic and physical wellbeing of individuals and communities in afflicted Bali and Phuket remains a subjective endeavour. Dodge, Daly, Huyton, & Sanders (2012) highlight the complexities in trying to define the intangible concept of wellbeing – variously described as life satisfaction, quality of life (health, happiness, prosperity) and a state of equilibrium/homeostasis/balance between challenges and available resources. Employing any of these descriptors, disaster impacts almost universally affected the wellbeing of individuals and communities of Bali and Phuket.

For individuals or families that suffered fatalities and/or physical injuries due to the disaster events, the regeneration of emotional and physical health has been highly differential. Survivors did not have the same provision or access to medical aid or support. With limited facilities, expertise and resources, government and agency funded assistance was often short term in duration. Amidst such loss and devastation however, many community members discovered adaptive capacities, greater self-sufficiency and new social support networks. Through shared experiences and understanding, individuals have learnt to manage grief, trauma and physical difficulties. As others suffer ongoing mental and health issues, measures of such wellbeing remain personal and context dependant.

Founded in familial, friendship, cultural, religious, and business relationships, the informal social and organisational support networks established in the aftermath of the disaster events often provided more than just spiritual and psychological support. Afflicted communities demonstrated abundant cases of generous sharing of valuable human, financial and material resources. Consistent with recognised patterns of post disaster social cohesion and altruism the maintenance of such relationships and social wellbeing is difficult to maintain long term. As competition increases for limited income, employment opportunities, physical and natural resources, many people may become less socially obliging and cooperative.

Reflecting the continued significance of tourism industry recovery for the each of the host communities a revival of tourist numbers and associated investment has seen a return of former livelihoods and a renewal of economic growth and prosperity. While it is evident not all stakeholders have prospered equally, increased happiness, satisfaction and quality of life is frequently aligned with improving economic conditions. Without accumulating significant assets, savings or other financial resources however, there is little chance of these individuals realising the long term ideal of economic security or stability.

In appreciating wellbeing as "a balance of challenges faced and resources on hand" (Dodge et al 2012:230) most of the impacted individuals and communities appear to have learnt to balance and adjust to their changed circumstances as part of the recovery process. Yet while this new homeostasis or equilibrium continues to be reliant on local tourism prospects, the challenges and resources are no less finite.

Addressing future needs
Central to the idea of maintaining and maximising community social, economic and physical wellbeing is the concept of sustainability. In the disaster recovery context sustainable redevelopment advocates meeting the present needs of host regions, while protecting and enhancing opportunities for the future (Nankervis 2009: 94). Reflecting a more integrated, holistic approach, the concept of physical wellbeing might be extended to encompass both the natural and built environment.

As decades of tourism development significantly expanded socio-economic opportunities for the communities of Bali and Phuket it also created a number of new problems. Common social issues include commercialisation, commodification of culture, decreased employment and livelihood alternatives, in-migration and rising criminal activity. Despite a general increase in income levels and investment, economic benefits have been unequally distributed creating perceptible disparity between urban and rural populations. Economic circumstances in popular mass tourist destinations such as Kuta and Patong also reveal increasing multinational ownership, low wages, seasonal employment, competition and escalating costs of living. Consequential of rapid overdevelopment and poorly regulated planning decisions both islands have endured extensive environmental degradation, exploitation of natural resources, pollution and progressive native species loss. Even prior to the onset of the disaster events, issues such as water consumption patterns and the decreasing availability of agricultural land had raised misgivings about tourism saturation, sustainability and carrying capacity (*personal communication* 2012).

In the article "Recovery after disaster: achieving sustainable development, mitigation and equity" Berke, Kartez and Wenger (1993) proposed that a key strategy in increasing sustainability and the effectiveness of recovery post-event was to move beyond a passive victim and dependency approach to strengthen local organisations. Following emergency response efforts and the provision of basic needs, external aid, humanitarian and recovery assistance needs to build and support communities to define goals, control resources, direct redevelopment and determine their own needs and capacities.

Response and recovery efforts from non-government organisations such as Parum Samigita and Raks Thai demonstrate how collaborative efforts between established local organisations and donors can provide effective targeted aid that meets community demands. Beyond disaster relief, medical aid and rehousing, longer term coordinated strategies included education, poverty alleviation and creating alternative livelihood opportunities (see Plate 8.1). While the process was not without initial discord or delays, early positive outcomes and improving conditions assisted to engender better community support. As priorities have progressively moved beyond disaster recovery such organisations have become less conspicuous yet often remain involved in local

Plate 8.1: Social development through education in rural areas, Western Bali

Source: Lengkong, A (2013)

Plate 8.2: Rubbish collection on Kuta Beach (accumulation of daily monsoonal wash)

Source: Lengkong, A (2013)

community issues such as health and hygiene awareness, waste reduction and environmental protection (refer Plate 8.2).

Unfortunately in responding to the immediacy of the disaster situations and vast demand for assistance, the majority of formal recovery initiatives proved temporary and insufficient. Without a coordinated approach marginalised and vulnerable populations were overlooked while some communities experienced a duplication of effort and oversupply of donated goods. External organisations often demonstrated poor local understanding and competing agendas, while government funded compensation payments were regularly mismanaged through bureaucracy and corruption. Perhaps most evident in both Bali and Phuket was the lack of comprehensive community consultation or engagement in the decision making process. As assistance funding and response agencies were progressively withdrawn from the impacted regions there was limited transition or handover planning, resulting in the collapse of many of the established microfinance and co-op programs. Amidst issues of aid dependency and disenchantment, communities returned to their own resources and methods to survive.

Revealing a wide range of adaptive and coping strategies, economic recovery remained a principal priority for the majority of stakeholders. While government and the tourism industry focused on the revival and restoration of tourism confidence, businesses and host communities competed for earning opportunities. Redevelopment resumed on exposed and vulnerable coastal zones with limited consideration for introduced policy or regulations. As building construction safety codes and standards were neither monitored, nor enforced, cost cutting measures were common. Local owners sold assets, property and businesses to more affluent investors while individuals and families pursued any lingering, viable income opportunities. Without additional skills, training or education, alternative livelihoods options were scarce and many residents anxiously awaited the return of tourism revenues (*personal communications* 2012).

As tourism confidence and demand was gradually restored to both island destinations, much of the renewed development and infrastructure appeared at the expense of the environment. In Thailand new resorts and luxury hotels encroached on national parks, protected areas and coastal zones, with minimal consideration of physical exposure and vulnerability. With the popular western coastline of Phuket becoming increasingly

overcrowded and expensive, developers began to explore opportunities on the east coast. Despite the obvious protection and ecological benefits, further mangroves were cleared and the aquaculture and seafood industry was increased (*personal communications* 2013). In Bali, the demand for luxury holiday villas and investment in improved infrastructure and facilities saw more agricultural and tropical landscape cleared. Increasing visitors and local populations generated further demand on finite environmental resources and exacerbated issues such as pollution, excess waste and ecological decline (*personal communications* 2012) (refer Plate 8.4).

Despite the variable contexts and disaster agents, neither island destination appeared to effectively embrace the opportunity to address current and future requirements of the social, economic, natural and built environments. The predominant political and economic processes emphasised immediate demands and a return to familiar conditions rather than accepting the planning and time necessary to remediate pre-existing social, economic and environmental concerns. While the return of high visitor numbers assisted to restore a degree of economic and social reassurance for host communities, local practice and conditions are far from the ideals of sustainable tourism (eg. Dodds and Butler 2010).

Hazard vulnerability and reducing future exposure
Although the concept of disaster risk reduction has become better recognised, following the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami the international disaster management community convened in Kobe, Japan, for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) to formulate tangible targets and commitments to guide effective disaster risk reduction efforts. The resultant Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005 – 2015 identified five priorities (UNISDR 2013):

- Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation;
- Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
- Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
- Reduce the underlying risk factors;
- Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Plate 8.3: Commercialising the tsunami experience

Source: Gurtner, Y (2010)

Plate 8.4: Tourism in the coastal mangroves Khao Lak

Source: Gray, J (2013)

Despite the frequency of natural hazards and disasters in Indonesia, it was only after the destruction of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and northern Sumatra (over 165,000 fatalities and a further 532,000 affected) that the government began to deliberate a change in focus from disaster response to preventative action (ADRC 2008). The National Action Plan wasn't formalised into the legal and political framework until November 2008. While policy and directives were provided at the national level, regional offices were made responsible for local risk identification, education, warnings, evacuation, and response strategies.

The regional office established in Bali demonstrates an emphasis on earthquake and tsunami despite the fact the island is similarly exposed to other natural hazards including floods, landslides, drought, volcanic eruption, cyclone, storm surge, and monsoonal rains. Contingency planning for alternative disaster agents (eg disease epidemic, social unrest, technological disaster) and community vulnerability reduction appears to have received little consideration or commitment. Furthermore, with the majority of information and hazard awareness campaigns concentrated on the populous south of the island, it is far from representative of the ideal integrated "all hazards, all stakeholders, all resources, all phases" disaster management approach. Lacking adequate data, knowledge, financial resources, or support, any real local resilience and capacity building has been self-directed (*personal communication* 2012).

As disaster management was first formalised in Thailand's 1979 Civil Defence Act, its' institutional and organisational basis has been well founded at the national level. In 2002 the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) was established as the prime agency for coordinating disaster risk management activities by all related organizations at all levels (ADRC 2008). Yet when the tsunami impacted on the Southern coast of Thailand in 2004 it was found that the existing written plan was out-dated, and that officials had failed to acknowledge credible scientific warnings regarding the risk of tsunami hazards for the impacted region. However with extensive experience from other disasters, authorities were able to quickly establish coordination and resources for response efforts.

As direct physical exposure was acknowledged as a key factor in the extent of damage and fatalities suffered in the tsunami, coastal setback zones and the implementation of

the extensive early warning network were identified as priority government actions. Succeeding months revealed political and economic expedience towards restoration of livelihoods and tourism revenues rather than the poorly enforced zoning regulations and future safety concerns. Public education, evacuation training, risk management plans and eventually the tsunami warning system were implemented yet with the passing of time and competing demands for resources, efforts have waned substantially (Rittichainuwat 2006).

At the community stakeholder level, in both Bali and Phuket there is demonstrated inherent resilience and an increased knowledge and understanding of disaster risk, yet there is very little to indicate an overall improvement in a culture of safety or risk reduction. Biophysical exposure to natural hazards has not significantly changed, and in some cases has increased due to poor planning decisions, over-development and further environmental destruction. Socially and economically, a return to a strong reliance on tourism revenues means that the host community remains equally vulnerable to the threat of tourism crisis. Recent experience with disaster events may have improved coordination and response capacity but there has been limited organisational commitment to integrated prevention, mitigation or preparedness strategies.

Evaluation

In undertaking a more holistic longitudinal examination of the disaster recovery process in Bali and Southern Thailand it is apparent that there have been some transitional improvements in community hazard awareness and response capacity, but minimal sustained institutional reformation. Changes in intra-organisational and inter-organisational dynamics, public and private sector collaborations, emergent groups and adaptive coping behaviours were primarily response driven and short lived. Rather than adopting extensive new stratagems to meet existing and future challenges, the destinations have supported a return to pre-crisis operational conditions.

Organisational Learning – review and feedback

To approach disaster management as an iterative self-appreciating continuum, effective organisational learning requires a better understanding of the reasons that these destinations were not able to transform recovery into a proactive process supporting greater self-sufficiency and well-being. Researchers including Quarantelli (1994),

Drabek (2007) Cohen (2010) and Larsen et al (2011) suggest that vulnerability and disasters are a partial consequence of broader social practices and problems rather than just a product of perturbation or exogenous agents. Consistent with many developing nations the pre-crisis context demonstrates that vulnerability existed as an inherent characteristic of biophysical exposure, dynamic historical processes and social-cultural, economic and political factors, intensified by tourism dependency. Consequently, successful vulnerability and risk reduction needs to extend beyond particular disaster impacts to address the underlying issues within the social structure. Drabek (2007:15) elaborates that "because social problems are socially constructed, so too must be their solutions".

Barriers to sustainable transformation

Beyond the rhetoric, ideals, and motherhood statements, the value of case studies is to assist in the identification of authentic barriers towards achieving a more sustainable redevelopment process. Ritchie (2008) contends that understanding such challenges and impediments is integral to the development of strategic and comprehensive planning for improved disaster management. The experience of Southern Thailand demonstrates that one of the first and foremost issues in disaster response and planning for sustainable recovery is appreciating the scale and degree of damage sustained.

Given that the tsunami substantially impacted over 945km of coastline within 6 provinces of Thailand, the realisation of individual communities needs analysis, participatory planning, cohesive decision making, provision of equitable resources and ongoing monitoring, represented a complex, protracted and consuming endeavour. Further complicating the reconstruction process were contentious issues of property rights, relocation, insurance, land use, rebuilding standards and competing interests. With variable communities, demands and dynamics, it was not possible, or feasible, to implement a universal formula towards positive recovery.

A retrospective examination of the recovery processes in Bali and Phuket also demonstrates that a significant barrier in achieving change and social transformation was a lack of clear goals. Despite virtuous intentions, most external relief and non-government agencies lacked the training, knowledge, relationships, trust, expertise or finances to facilitate or implement real sustained social change. In contrast, experienced

and established organisations that managed to access local knowledge, consult, collaborate and engage with community stakeholders were more successful in augmenting existing social capital and resources towards adaptation and longer term vulnerability reduction.

Although extensive resources were committed to the restoration of safety and security, the majority of government initiatives revealed a comparable lack of understanding and political determination. Decades of administrative decentralisation, authoritarian rule, control and corruption, appear to have undermined systematic communication between officials and destination stakeholders exposing a predominantly adversarial relationship of mutual suspicion (Fallon 2003). In Bali substantial government investments in destination marketing and promotion were similarly compromised by the perceived lack of tourism industry collaboration and cohesiveness. Official changes in rules, regulations and policies developed as a consequence of each disaster event received limited public support or adherence.

Even when recovery and risk reduction objectives have been clear and rational, a significant factor inhibiting social change can be community and stakeholder resistance. In Thailand extensive resources were committed to rebuilding and relocating traditional villages inland to minimise coastal hazard exposure, yet as many of these families were reliant on coastal fishing for their livelihoods such change was considered socially disruptive and inconvenient. Although the poor construction of the Sari Club was revealed as a major factor in the high number of burn victims in the Bali Bombings there stills continues to be a general reluctance to comply with recommended building codes and standards in any new developments.

Perhaps the most recognised challenges in affecting holistic, sustainable recovery relates to economic constraints and the lack of general awareness of alternate redevelopment possibilities. As demonstrated by concerns such as improved building codes, security changes, and even the maintenance of the tsunami warning system network, structural prevention and mitigation strategies require a significant and often ongoing financial commitment. While additional investment and funding may be available in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, this is often limited or short term. Similarly, as afflicted destinations struggle to recover from the depressed economic

conditions the urgency of political and economic priorities exert pressure on planning decision makers to expedite a return to normal rather than support longer term social capital strategies such as better education, training, and livelihood diversification. While the return to tourism approach has gradually proven to be economically productive for the host communities of Bali and Phuket the vicious cycle of dependency and vulnerability continues.

Recognised Enablers

Although not widely evident in the case studies reviewed, alternative disaster recovery literature (Berke et al. 1993, NHRAIC 2001, Drabek and Gee 2000, Buckle 2006) does propose a number of strategies or enablers that can contribute to greater sustainability and livelihood security. Not surprisingly, a significant number of the recognised attributes are a direct inverse to the elements identified as barriers to sustainable redevelopment. From a management perspective, key aspects involve governance and finance; leadership, vision, political will, mandates, authority, commitment, incentives, funding and resources. Effective integrated networks and working relationships can be fostered in an environment of good communication, collaboration, partnerships, mutual respect and trust.

In addition to working with government and non-government agencies Twigg (2002) and Henderson (2007b) recommend that private enterprise, specifically a profitable tourism sector, demonstrate greater moral and corporate social responsibility investing in the intellectual development of employees and host communities towards greater adaptability. Such strategies include skills training, education, environmental conservation and social welfare. At the grass-roots level, most examples of sustainable recovery have been founded in community based planning and decision making. Despite popular misconceptions, disaster afflicted communities are not perpetually vulnerable, static or passive victims. As key stakeholders with a direct interest in the recovery process, communities represent a significant and undervalued resource. When effectively engaged locals can play an active role in identifying priorities, needs and demands, and implementing positive actions.

Investment in social capital initiatives such as education, empowerment, equity and welfare provides enhanced resilience and more opportunities to diversify livelihoods.

Similarly access to appropriate knowledge, data and information can generate improved hazard awareness, preparation and capability. Rather than exploit or destroy the natural environment communities have been shown how to live more sustainably and even benefit from conservation efforts and ecotourism. While such integrated strategies towards social and economic change can reduce vulnerability and risk, the difficulty is in maintaining relevance to avoid apathy or competing interests which undermine sustainability efforts (McEntire 2004). This remains a particular challenge within developing economies and communities with limited capital, assets and resources.

Lessons towards holistic integrated crisis management

In recognising that vulnerability and risk evaluation exposes a complex and dynamic social-cultural, political, economic, and environmental context, it is apparent that it is not possible to develop a universal plan or best fit model for implementing holistic integrated crisis management. Hazards can also be infinitely variable in number, frequency, nature/agent, intensity, scale and duration (Sharpley 2004, Somnez 1999) resulting in distinctive and unique disaster or crisis situations. Rather than a simple static plan, disaster management planning should represent multifaceted realistic strategies to proactively meet the changing conditions and diverse interests of the operational environment.

Unlike the models presented by Faulkner (2001) or Ritchie (2004), the real value of a holistic crisis management framework is not as a progressive or linear guide to strategic actions for the tourism industry, but rather as a frame of reference for critical issues or principles in aiding comprehensive risk reduction, proactive disaster management and greater sustainability. For popular destinations such as Bali and Phuket which demonstrate extensive tourism reliance, such planning would integrate tourism based strategies. The key concepts within the proposed framework are:

- All hazards
- All phases
- All resources
- All stakeholders

"All Hazards"

Consistent with the Hyogo Framework for Action, disaster risk reduction and risk management advocates that decision makers "identify, assess and monitor disaster risks". In addition to focusing on specific, probable or established hazards, an all-hazards approach is the consideration of all possible threat types. This would include:

- Natural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunami, flooding, cyclone or pandemic;
- Organisational threats such mismanagement, issues with the communication structures, negative reputation or labour stoppage;
- Technological hazards such as transport accidents, services breakdown (eg. long term power failure, water shortage) or industrial pollution ;
- Human threats, both intentional (eg crime, terrorism) or accidental (eg.unsafe activities, poor health)

While certain risks necessitate specific strategies and arrangements, this approach assumes that a large number of hazards will require similar functions and activities, allowing for more general approach to the delivery of services.

"All Phases"

An "all phases" or comprehensive approach to disaster management recommends a balanced process of risk assessment, risk reduction, enhanced resilience, response capability and recovery capacity. Although disasters and crises do not necessarily present as autonomous, linear or chronological events, effective disaster management proactively appraises the needs and demands of each of the four functional phases in the disaster continuum – prevention, preparedness, response, recovery.

"All Resources"

A holistic approach to disaster management reveals a diversity of complementary resources that could be strategically used to better prepare and respond to disasters. These resources include:

- Human resources or human capital such as skills and knowledge levels, capacity, competencies, information, awareness, education, intellectual investment, training, experience, ability, health

- Socio-cultural resources or social capital encompassing social networks, institutions, organisational structures, corporate social responsibility, advocacy, civil society and private sector relationships, cohesion, collaboration participation, engagement, cultural traditions, leadership, politics and governance, collective action, political will, trust, norms
- Physical resources or built environment including infrastructure, facilities, business/industry, technology and equipment (material assets)
- Financial or economic capital referring to the economic environment such as money, income, investment, security, capital, savings, credit and insurance, and;
- Natural resources including land, water, flora, fauna, ecosystem, resources stocks and even aesthetic value

In practical terms, access to such resources may represents tangible enablers towards vulnerability reduction and more sustainable development.

"All Stakeholders"

When a stakeholder is defined as anybody that is affected by change, an "all stakeholders" approach extends beyond conventional agencies and organisations to realise a diversity of different interests (Sautter and Leisen 1999). Each stakeholder, whether individual, group or community occupies a role or responsibility within an integrated crisis management process. Although it may not be feasible to involve innumerable stakeholders in every facet or stage of formal decision making, the interests of each relevant cohort should be equally represented. Similarly such stakeholders should be provided the opportunity to collaborate in planning and functional activities. All measures should be both transparent and accountable.

Achieving integration and holism

Depicted as an iterative self-appreciating continuum, an all hazards, comprehensive, disaster management approach maximising all resources and all stakeholders, is advanced through an ongoing process of communication, consultation, review and monitoring. Consistently the process requires continuous assessment and evaluation integrating lessons learnt from knowledge transfer and experience (Page, Yeoman, Connell, Walker 2006). In cases like Phuket and Bali where a return to status quo has taken precedence over effective change and social transformation the challenge is to

proactively introduce intervention strategies to enhance existing resources and capacity. Rather than relying entirely on government, industry or external agencies to implement comprehensive disaster management planning, risk reduction and sustainable development should be considered shared responsibility in which everybody can take positive action. Information, awareness, education and understanding at all levels, is crucial to develop effective relationships and integrated efforts.

While a holistic integrated crisis management framework represents an "ideal type" model, its primary purpose is instruction and advocacy towards sustainable risk reduction. In an era of increasing uncertainty where processes of globalisation, population increase at the human/environment interface, and climate change have intensified the frequency and severity of hazards, effective risk and disaster management planning have become more important in mitigating adversity.

In popular destinations such as Bali and Phuket, it is apparent that additional planning and strategies are required to address any circumstance that may produce a crisis in consumer confidence. Advice provided by industry researchers (Rici 2011, Beirman 2011, Becken & Hughey 2013) and influential organisations such as APEC (2006) and UNTWO (2013) now recommend that the tourism industry "partner with government and community organisations in the development of multiagency, coordinated disaster management plans, system, procedures and processes which include the needs of tourism" (Robertson, Kean & Moore 2006:17). This relationship is particularly significant in addressing the implementation, accuracy, and types of warnings issued in national travel advisories which influence the travelling public (Beirman 2011). While further research is required to determine the extent to which this has been attempted or achieved in vulnerable destinations, a sustainable development approach suggests a change towards sustainable livelihoods that is "more than tourism".

Case studies of crisis recovery and lessons for other tourist-reliant destinations
Beyond documenting and describing the effects of significant tourism crisis and recovery, the value of empirical case study research is to appreciate the disaster impacts and experience from various stakeholder perspectives. While macroeconomics and formal tourism statistics reveal a volatile yet gradual post-crisis industry recovery for both Bali and Phuket, analysis at the local and regional destination level demonstrates

considerable variability in measures of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacities. Consequently, the strategies that were developed to mitigate and recover from adversity reflect a diversity of needs and demands.

For most non-government agencies, emergent organisations, families and individuals, the primary concern post-disaster was the protection of life, property, and the restoration of livelihoods. In the absence of a strategic coordinated approach to address established problems, definitive outcomes proved intermittent. As external financial and material aid was gradually withdrawn, circumstances necessitated that individuals and host communities learn to become more adaptable and self-sufficient. Lacking a formal social security network or previous tourism related incomes, families sold businesses, land and assets, or even migrated to prevail. Beyond the trauma, emotions, and hardships, most appeared to desire a return to normal, familiar, pre-crisis conditions.

Consistent with established models of tourism crisis recovery, the local tourism industry and national government responses prioritised issues of safety, security and the restoration of consumer confidence towards the revitalization of valuable tourism revenues. Key initiatives included crisis communication, marketing and promotion, improved infrastructure and media management. Despite repeated challenges and an apparent lack of host community consultation or engagement, tourism was progressively re-established in Bali and Phuket to exceed pre-crisis visitor numbers and capacity. Consequently, each destination was returned to a position of vulnerability to future tourism crises.

Rather than using the disaster recovery process as catalyst or opportunity to pursue a more holistic, sustainable approach to vulnerability reduction, economic viability and livelihood security, the behavioural responses exhibited by stakeholders in both destinations appear to have advocated rapid tourism redevelopment. Without consultative plans, preparation for change, or an assessment of alternatives, the pressures and demands of immediate relief appear to have transcended longer term benefits. A review of the status quo equally suggests that tangible economic imperatives took precedence over wider social or environmental considerations. Most constructive social changes have proved limited or temporary.

In exploring the interdependent relationship between development and disasters these case studies corroborate the historical causality of unsolved development problems. Beyond inherent bio-physical exposure and hazard susceptibility, decades of extensive tourism and infrastructure investment created additional new vulnerabilities within the host communities. The pre-crisis context reveals widespread social, political and economic dependencies stemming from increasing specialisation and reliance on tourism revenues. As the disaster agents directly affected lives and property, a significant reduction in visitor numbers exposed limited options for alternative income and negligible mitigation planning. The resultant tourism crisis exacerbated conditions of local and regional adversity.

Without the implementation of comprehensive sustainable redevelopment strategies or intervention initiatives, the disaster recovery experience in Bali and Phuket produced few significant long term social or institutional changes. Widely envisaged as the panacea to the depressed economic conditions the regrowth and expansion of tourism development in these destinations has served to further increase instances of dependency and vulnerability. Investigation reveals greater marginalisation of certain individuals, ethnic groups, small businesses and rural and remote communities. Similarly, the inequitable distribution of benefits is evidenced in mounting foreign partnerships, business ownership, and economic leakages. With improving investment and tourism returns, residents and regional communities have returned to conditions of extensive tourism reliance.

While sustainable development literature advocates human, institutional and legislative reform to reduce risk and vulnerability, without sufficient planning, resources or capital, ad hoc local disaster recovery efforts pursued familiar operational conditions. .As the majority of these reactive disaster management strategies fostered the restoration of the tourism industry they failed to address underlying social conditions and problems, perpetuating destination and host community vulnerability to tourism crisis. In investigating how tourist-reliant destinations recover from significant crisis or disaster, it is evident from these case studies that more proactive, integrated and holistic management strategies are required to affect sustainable hazard reduction and livelihood security.

As each tourist-reliant destination represents a distinctive, variable and dynamic context, the most significant lesson for any host community is to appreciate that no destination is immune to disaster or crisis conditions. Moreover, as hazard impacts and adversity are rarely isolated to the tourism sector, the disaster management process should involve all relevant stakeholders. While this research has been primarily restricted to an investigation of post-event response and recovery strategies, the advent of 2nd terrorist attack in Bali and subsequent ordeals have demonstrated the benefits of improved awareness, understanding and organisation. Proactive integrated crisis management planning is recommended to reduce vulnerability and sensitivity to the inherent volatility of local tourism enterprise. In recognising the unique nature of each destination and potential hazard, practical disaster management needs to be premised on flexibility and adaptability, maximising available knowledge and resources.

As an emergent, yet increasingly significant area of investigation there is extensive scope to develop a better understanding of the relationship between tourism, destinations and disasters, towards an improved management capacity. Each phase of a holistic integrated crisis and disaster management framework, from crisis/disaster management planning, response, recovery, resolution, evaluation and feedback, represents a complex and potentially voluminous area of study.

A proactive approach to effective crisis/disaster management planning remains premised in a comprehensive "all hazards" risk identification and assessment process. While there is substantial research on risks to tourism enterprise this should be extended to appreciate broader historical, social, political, economic, environment and development contexts. As tourist-reliant destinations are more apparent within developing nation economies which traditionally lack the financial, skilled human resources and emergency management infrastructure of developed countries, practical vulnerability reduction and mitigation measures are even more important to host communities. The issue of establishing and maintaining greater economic diversification remains a particular challenge.

Consistently, to improve destination crisis/disaster planning and management capacity there should be an emphasis on developing strategies which actively involve and engage community stakeholders and available resources. Although there is evidence of existing

partnerships between tourism industry and government, industry and emergency service providers and/or government and private enterprise, there are few examples of concerted planning or direct host community participation within the formal disaster management process. Beyond the rhetoric of collaboration and cooperation, the issue of effective stakeholder integration remains a research priority.

Destinations impacted by crisis and adversity provide an ongoing opportunity to further understand the dynamic role of social, human, physical and/or financial capital in response, recovery and longer term sustainability initiatives. As an iterative process, lessons learnt– both positive and negative - should be continuously documented and evaluated to guide and improve management capacity in any tourist destination.

Central to this treatise is the potential value of a holistic, integrated crisis management framework, recommending additional research to assess its cross cultural relevance, validity and utility. Although the tourism industry has proven to be resilient at a global scale, the experience and lessons from each afflicted regional destination presents an opportunity to keep disaster management on the public agenda and help direct relevant policy, management and decision making.

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~APPENDICES ~

APPENDIX 1

~ RESEARCH RELATED OUTPUTS ~

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Refereed Journal Articles

Gurtner, Y. (2006) "Understanding Tourism Crisis: Case Studies of Bali and Phuket" *Tourism Review International* Vol.10 pp.57-68

King, D. and Gurtner Y. (2005) "After the Wave: A Wake-Up Warning for Australian Coastal Locations" *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol. 20 No. 1, February 2005 pp.4-9

Gurtner, Y. (2004) "After the Bali bombing the long road to recovery". *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol. 19 No. 4, November 2004.

Academic Book Chapters

Gurtner, Y. (2007) "Tourism Crisis: Management and Recovery in Tourist Reliant Destinations" in King, D and Cottrell A. (Eds*.) Communities Living with Hazards*. Centre for Disaster Studies & James Cook University

Gurtner, Y. (2007) "Crisis in Bali: Lessons in Tourism Recovery" in Laws, E. Prideaux, B. and Chon, K. (Eds.) *Managing Tourism Crises.* CABI: United Kingdom pp. 81-97

Gurtner, Y. (2007) "Phuket, Tsunami and Tourism – A Preliminary Investigation" in Laws, E. Prideaux, B. and Chon, K. (Eds.) *Managing Tourism Crises.* CABI: United Kingdom. pp 217-233

Research Projects/Collaboration

Gurtner, Y., Cottrell, A. and King, D. (2008) *PRE and RAPID. Community Hazard Recovery Needs and Capacity Assessment*. Unpublished Report. Department of Communities & James Cook University Research Project.

Gurtner, Y. and Morgan D. (2007*) Risk Management for Small Tourism Business. One Day Training Programme and Practical Resource Guide*. Unpublished Manuals. Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre Project.

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Wilkes J. and Moore S. (2003) *Tourism Risk Management for the Asia Pacific Region: an authoritative guide for managing crises and disasters.* Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Tourism Working Group

Conference/Workshop Presentations

Gurtner, Y (2013) "Tourism – reassessing the priorities for effective, sustainable destination recovery" *Disaster Recovery and Community Renewal: Current and Future Focus Forum.* 6-7 May 2013 Australian Emergency Management Institute, Mt Macedon

Gurtner Y (2011) "How to measure community capacity and enhance community engagement". *Innovative Emergency Management Conference.* Post-conference Workshop. 24 March 2011 Citigate Central, Sydney

Gurtner, Y (2009) Enhancing Community Capacity in an Era of Increasing Uncertainty. *National Climate Change Adaptation Forum* 22 – 23 July 2009. Brisbane

Gurtner, Y. (2006) Reactive vs. Proactive: Learning from the Lessons of Bali. *The First Service Management Symposium.* School of Management, Curtin Business School. 13-14 November 2006 Perth

Gurtner, Y. (2005) "Understanding Tourism Crisis – Case Studies of Bali and Phuket" *BEST Education Network Think Tank V "Managing Risk and Crisis for Sustainable Tourism"* 16-19 June 2005. Kingston, Jamaica

Gurtner, Y. (2005) "Adversity, Crisis and Resilience; Developing Crisis Management Strategies for Tourism Reliant Destinations" *15th International Research Conference of Council of the Australian Universities Tourism and Hospitality Education.* 1– 5 February 2005. Alice Springs

King, D and Gurtner Y. (2003) "Community Participation in Disaster Response and Recovery". - *Safer Sustainable Communities - 2003 Australian Disaster Conference Emergency Management Australia.* 10 – 12 September 2003. Canberra

APPENIDIX 2

~ FIELDWORK – ETHICS, CONSENT AND QUESTION GUIDE ~

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Tourism, Terrorism and Recovery

Research Project by James Cook University Post-Graduate Student Yetta Gurtner in co-operation with BaliSOS and Parum Samigita

This study has been designed as part of a PhD research project into the impacts of a significant terrorist attack on a destination that has become dependent on tourism earnings. Using Kuta Beach as a case study, it is expected to:

- document and describe socio-economic impacts subsequent to the October 12 bombings
- outline changes in perceptions regarding Kuta as a place to live/work/visit
- demonstrate awareness, participation and understanding of aid/recovery initiatives
- investigate personal opinions and recommendations for achieving total recovery in Kuta

The purpose of this research is to develop observations and recommendations of relevance to communities, non-government organisations and institutions seeking to respond appropriately to both threats and acts of terrorism in a popular tourist destination.

Participants in this project will be required to answer a variety of questions regarding their personal background, lifestyle, views of Kuta and impressions of the recovery process, in a relaxed informal interview. Where possible, follow-up interviews will be conducted by the researcher over a 3 year period. While permission will be asked to audio-tape any interviews, it is ultimately at the informants' discretion.

Participation is completely voluntary and informants have the right to withdraw from the project at any stage. Data gathered will also remain strictly confidential unless prior consent has been obtained. Further information or details may be obtained directly from the researcher or through the local contact provided –

Researcher Contact:

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AUSTRALIA
Ph:(042) 1175451 Fax:(07) 47814020
Email: yetta.gurtner@jcu.edu.au

Bali Contact:

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Tourism Crisis and Destination Recovery

Research Project by James Cook University Post-Graduate Student Yetta Gurtner in co-operation with Raks Thai and Rotary Patong.

This study has been designed as part of a PhD research project into the impacts of a significant crisis on a destination that has become dependent on tourism earnings. Using Patong and affected areas of Southern Thailand as a case study, it is expected to:

- document and describe socio-economic impacts subsequent to the South Asia/Indian Ocean tsunami
- outline changes in perceptions regarding Patong/your community as a place to live/work/visit
- demonstrate awareness, participation and understanding of aid/recovery initiatives
- investigate personal opinions and recommendations for achieving total recovery in Patong/your community

The purpose of this research is to develop observations and recommendations of relevance to communities, non-government organisations and institutions seeking to respond appropriately to both hazard threats and disaster events in a popular tourist destination.

Participants in this project will be required to answer a variety of questions regarding their personal background, lifestyle, views of Patong/their affected community and impressions of the recovery process, in a relaxed informal interview. Where possible, follow-up interviews will be conducted by the researcher over a 3 year period. While permission will be asked to audio-tape any interviews, it is ultimately at the informants' discretion.

Participation is completely voluntary and informants have the right to withdraw from the project at any stage. Data gathered will also remain strictly confidential unless prior consent has been obtained. Further information or details may be obtained directly from the researcher or through the local contact provided –

Researcher Contact: **Thai Contact**:

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~FIELDWORK/QUESTION GUIDE ~

Field Guide - Key Questions and Variables

- personal details
  - ➢ name
  - ➢ age
  - ➢ gender
  - ➢ nationality/ethnicity (culture/religion)
  - ➢ residence (local, migrant, traveller)
  - ➢ length of time in locality
  - ➢ occupation/sector/trade/profession
  - ➢ employment (formal/informal, full time/part-time/voluntary/unemployed/ home duties etc, permanent/casual/seasonal)
  - ➢ income level (variable or stable)
  - ➢ education level (primary, secondary, tertiary)
  - ➢ language/s
  - ➢ identifiable disaster experience

- experience/knowledge/awareness/understanding of initial disaster event (ie Bali Bombing, South Asian tsunami and any subsequent event which affected local tourism)
  - ➢ event victim (direct physical impact – personally, friend, relative)
  - ➢ contextual (resident/community member, business, by-stander, traveller in vicinity)
  - ➢ volunteers, emergency response, medical and assistance agents, government, industry
  - ➢ peripheral (media, anecdotal, research, personal correspondence)

- impact of disaster/crisis on personal/family/community/business (experienced, observed and perceived - compared over subsequent visits)
  - ➢ physical
  - ➢ social
  - ➢ economic
  - ➢ emotional/psychological
  - ➢ vulnerability/safety/risk perception

- identifiable coping mechanisms/resilience/capacity and related strategies/actions (compared over subsequent visits)
  - ➢ level of support received
  - ➢ adaption measures
  - ➢ changes

- level of awareness/participation/support/understanding/knowledge of response, reconstruction, recovery and mitigation initiatives (expand details)
  - ➢ donor/volunteer/participant/coordinator

- direct recipient
- organisational involvement- business/industry/government/ngo/host community/external

- opinions/recommendations regarding recovery efforts
  - tourism
  - community
  - destination
  - disaster planning/mitigation efforts