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MOONLIGHTING IN MOFFATT:

RESTRUCTURING ART AS PERSONAL

EXPERIENCE.

A thesis

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by

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ABSTRACT.

This research probes the complex interplay between art and personal experience. The recent burgeoning of multiculturalism and an awareness of global economy have contributed to rapidly increasing visual communication which now challenges the primacy of verbal signs thus leading to the possibility that established and confirmed notions of both verbal signs and visual signs might require re-thinking. It is also possible that, in a world in which mass communication is used by the few to foster a sense of vicarious experience in the many, the notion of experience as the compulsion to think otherwise than one has been thinking, might also need examination from a singular point of view.

Such a point of view must be personal; hence this research emanates from my own experience of making artworks. However, the context in which artworks are made can be seen to influence the way in which one decides either to foreground or background certain data. Inevitably one's roles of artist, art educator and community member contribute to ways in which background experiences and knowledge are recognized as continuing forces that agitate the tools in one's head leading to new ways of thinking about one's artwork and the impact/s such artwork might have on other members of the community.

In adopting a personal point of view, this research operates within the realm of visual and narrative autobiography although, because artworks are created to be seen by others, philosophical speculation is necessary to prepare the ground for heuristic inquiry to take place on behalf of others. In this sense, this research offers a synthesis whereby an overview of our Australian heritage, an investigation of ideas emanating from semiotics, meaning, politics and cognitive psychology uncover the ground upon which I make a body of artworks. While such a synthesis presents an appropriate setting for investigating ways in which art might be seen as a social construct or as a means of artistic expression from a global perspective, the

significance of art as personal experience can only be exposed by the artist probing beneath the surface of communal conventions.

In examining my own processes of making artworks I unpack various background associations which influence the way in which I respond to visual and verbal data gathered from field trips to the Mt. Moffatt National Park, a remote area of western Queensland. During these field trips such data were compiled using photographic means and a visual diary, both of which serve as reference material for this research in which changes to my thinking about art and modifications to techniques used for creating artworks, can be noted. Of particular significance is the way in which narrative suggests connections between people, places and myself as artist while also functioning to link visual and verbal data.

Such changes to my thinking and processes of making art objects influence the direction the work takes as a visual instrument in the form of an exhibition which might be used by others as a means of facilitating their sensory responses to artworks. In this way the continuum of making, interpreting, translating and re-making images using the familiar genre of narrative as a conduit for exploring the less familiar artworks displayed in a public gallery is investigated. Such investigation exposes forces which play dominant roles in challenging me to probe the internal nature of experience leading to changes in my perception whilst also highlighting ways in which viewers make connections between an artwork and themselves. On the one hand, from a personal perspective, I am aware of multiple implications for my art practice and for art education. On the other hand, viewer responses indicate ways in which art can be personally experienced by someone external to the artist.

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1.1: The Personal Bridge.

The way in which we articulate new ideas involves using a colourful kaleidoscope of stories, images and actions that change like a chameleon skin depending on time, place and context. How this transformation may affect personal experience with regard to art, opens a window from which we can view the Australian context. In this context, images and words facilitate interpretation and translation of the environment so that singular persons might experience some sense of personal identity.

The question of whether or not singular persons are the source of creating their own meaning has peculiar relevance to artists. Throughout time the quest for knowledge of the origin of all things has had its roots in mythology and religion supported by artistic rituals through which individuals 'lived' the myth and were perceived to master and manipulate things at will. Bonnefoy (1992: 5) considers that "[T]o 'live' myths thus implies a truly 'religious' experience, for it is distinct from the ordinary experience of daily life". Also apart from everyday life, according to Bloom and Trilling (1981: 5), was the Romantic insistence "that the Imagination or creative power [was] autonomous" in perceiving and, to some degree, creating reality and truth.

The notion of living an extraordinary reality which communicates its presence through epiphanic qualities is considered by Heywood (1997) as a unique characteristic of art which resists analysis and theorising through spoken and written language. He argues (1997: 190) that such analysis "emphasises a view of language as the source for all available ordering, shaping, constructing, poeticising possibilities" whereby specific mechanisms of languages construct discourses within which debate about a discourse's identity, its status and exploration of its language as such, give rise to problematics of cultural theory. While such a theoretical voice might be necessary in stimulating questions about the social as such, Heywood (1997) challenges the "viciously reductive" nature of some social history of visual culture which denies a sense of the transcendent or "the other" that is unique to art.

The concept of "religious experience" in Heywood's (1997) sense of imbuing an event with a sense of the transcendent as distinct from "ordinary experience of daily life" forms the basis for this research into how art may become part of personal experience, and how personal involvement with art may be enriched and deepened through employing relevant metaphoric links so that the art experience may be changed from ordinary to something special. It may be argued that experience consists *in* sense perception, and it is the *degree of intensity* of the experience that may deem it either 'religious' or 'ordinary'. This involves singular acquaintanceship with events in the environment and the way in which personal perception is altered because of those events. It entails investigating the way in which our physical situation in the world, and the way in which we personally experience things outside us, particularly artworks, might lead to ways in which we internalise actions, beliefs, values and emotions and, in so doing, decide what validity they hold for us which in turn determines our internal realism. Thus, the *compulsion* to think otherwise than we have been thinking is what may be identified as 'personal experience' and the force of the compulsion to think anew determines our degree of commitment to a new action or belief.

This is our beginning. As the voyage into investigating personal experience progresses, my own thoughts and actions come into focus from time to time because, in dealing with personal experience, we must acknowledge the person involved in the experiencing. For the purposes of this research, I am researcher and artist at one and the same time and thus my own experiences serve to foreground and exemplify the key research questions as they emerge.

1.2 Centrality of Artistic Experience: Essential Australian Heritage.

Dutton (1982: 31) talks of the development of two veins of culture in our early history - the self-created colonial upper class whose values permeated the baronial halls, the galleries, libraries and schools, and the working class whose popular 'battler' values owed much to the convict society. The parallel existence of these two veins of culture rose from the "first substantial batch of imaginative writers" who were "men and women of the middle class, reared exclusively (...) in the English literary tradition" (Dutton, 1982: 28), and the democratic lower-class, (for example Lawson, 1867-1922; Paterson, 1864-1941; Furphy, 1897; Dyson, 1865-1931, and 'Steele Rudd', 1868-1935), who drew their inspiration from the music-halls, convict ballads and campfire yarns in which bushrangers, 'duffers' and Anglo/Irish 'larrikins' flaunted the system, defied authority and grew 'taller' in every telling.

In contrast, the earliest visual representations of Australia in the 1800s came from 'the brush' of artists such as Glover (1767-1849), Buvelot (1814-88) and Martens (1801-78) who painted images infused with European learning and technique. Later federation artists such as Streeton (1867-1943), McCubbin (1855-1917), Roberts (1856-1931) and Conder (1868-1909) played a "significant role in the creation of a national symbolism," through which the landscape, the economic significance of pastoral wealth, the patriarchal structure of society, and expression of regional characteristics were reflected (Burn et al, 1988: 5-6). Both visual and verbal systems have played significant roles in structuring our different ways of seeing Australia.

However, the techniques of making visual works could not compete with the immediacy of storytelling in that the process of producing an artwork may take up to months to complete and, only then is the end product available to viewers who take the time to visit a gallery, and further time to view the work. On the other hand, storytelling takes place within a short time amongst a group of people who may then individually relay the story in like manner to yet another group of people. Thus the story may be transmitted far and wide in a very short time span, whereas visual images could not. This may be one reason why art in the 1800s, broadly speaking, was not considered an integral part of personal experience, but rather something 'artists' did.

Salomon (1979: 127) argues that it is interaction between a person and the social community that accounts for internalization of a specific symbolic system and, if we are active members in a speech community, we acquire language through *dialogue*, thus internalising the specific symbolic system of language. This argument appears to confirm, and may help to explain, the popularity of stories that abounded in written and oral form in early Australian history before the advent of television. Equally compelling is Sless's (1981: 73) suggestion that the written word and its uses in language is associated with thinking, whereas pictures are associated with looking. The former is considered intellectual, the latter sensory and mindless. Hence it may be argued that the cultivation of language was part of *personal experience* through apprenticeship and practice within the social group, whereas art existed *outside* the personal experience of many people.

Yet images did exist within sectors of the wider social group and, while they were produced by fewer members of the social group, the influence of visual representations must have been profound. In retrospect we find how a sense of "attachment and belonging ... was socially constructed within visual forms" (Burn et al. 1988: 5). In this sense art may be seen to have been part of personal experience, not through active participation, but through passive absorption by members of the wider social community.

Another reason for misunderstanding the silent impact of images may lie in the peculiar role played by critics who have always wielded the power of granting a privileged place to particular artists or artistic practices, thus plucking art from the 'heart' of the people and placing it in the 'tabernacle' of the gallery. Art criticism has done much to sever the links between works of art and the people and, we might suggest, that much 'bullcrit' blurred the view that artworks are part of the essential core of human identity.

For Australians the search for identity has produced a rich heritage of what we might term *double vision*. By this I mean the dilemma posed in recognising our origins and value systems as European while forging a new identity as Australians that demanded reassessing those value systems and modifying them to suit the burgeoning multiculturalism of our population.

However, with Federation at the beginning of this century, came the determination to create a nation of unified Australians in which the disparate beliefs of our forebears were to be focussed on making Australia a "respected place as part of civilisation" (Burn et al, 1988: 12).

In the fields of visual art and literature the idealisation of a pastoral way of life in Australia reflected Australia's historical relationship with Britain, while the spirit of 'mateship' fostered elements of larrikinism and social realism. Inglis Moore (1971) identifies ten patterns in Australian Literature that appear to have evolved because of the substantial numbers of Irish immigrants in the late 1800s, the rejection of traditional aristocracy, and the revolt against authority. Included in these patterns are such themes as the spell of the bush, the clash of cultures, the creed of mateship, the great Australian dream, radical democracy and the earth-vigour relationship that are treated accordingly with realism, sombreness, irony and an essential humanism. However, we must not forget an underlying humour that has permeated much of early Australian literature and art which at times could range from the comical, such as Lawson's story *Send Round the Hat* and sketches by S. T. Gill, to the incongruous exemplified in the poetry of Slessor and the images of Nolan.

The identity of the *fair dinkum Aussie* has had a colourful and rough passage in its development that is still ongoing. Irving (1980) shows that immigration and the transportation system populated our shores in the early 1800s with sons of some of the leading British upper class who dominated and almost monopolised colonial politics; with unsuccessful European revolutionaries who agitated the atmosphere of 'delirious loyalty' as did the Irishman Henry James O'Farrell who shot and wounded the Duke at Clontarf in March 1868; with dream merchants who squatted upon the land wearing "a pair of boots with soles tied on with wire" ('Steele Rudd'), and convicts who, in the style of 'Price Warung's' Convict Glancy "scattered J.J.'s brains over a good six square yards of metalled roadway" while fellow-gangers "rapturously applauded" the deed (Dutton, 1982).

Our records (Buxton, 1980) show that, owing to an imbalance between men and women in pastoral districts, Irish female immigrants were sent as domestics to aid the balance through

possible marriage and the production of children. However, recognition of a basic incompatibility between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon immigrants gave rise to the 'Irish Question' that highlighted the racial conflict between the two races that was not new to Australia, simply transported from the 'old country' where the Irish had been recognised as morally, socially and intellectually inferior. In the main, the Irish immigrants were farm workers and labourers used to conditions of rural servitude, but who also understood best how to exercise raw power that was unleashed by many in the debate over the issue of British Home Rule in the early 1880s. Fiery, young Irish extremists, such as the Redmond brothers, gained support in Australia for the Irish independence movement, and clashes over education, religion and equality were fierce in establishing nationhood where indoctrination was aimed at British-Australian loyalty through approaches to history, geography, art and literature that were openly racist in their support of the Queen and Empire.

While an actual art industry did not appear in Australia until the early 1900s, the production, exchange and appreciation of artworks had begun largely by transferring the values of the British system to Australia (Burn et al: 1988). Figures such as Julian Ashton, Conrad Martens and the Heidelberg artists played a dominant role in manufacturing an Australian landscape and perpetuating myths of the outback. In paintings, such as Streeton's *Land of the Golden Fleece* (1926) and Robert's *Bailed Up* and *Shearing the Rams* (c1889), we can see the symbolization of the utopian pastoral domain, the glorification of bushranging, and the morality of man's struggle with nature through hard physical work.

These symbols can be seen in Harpur's metaphoric "great company of archaeons", the mountains that "opened westward(!)", where Gordon's *Sick Stockrider* remembered "...we had a glorious gallop after 'Starlight' and his gang," or where Paterson's *Saltbush Bill* allowed his sheep to "ravage the squatter's grass till never a blade remains" (Heseltine, 1984). These images conjure up memories of Australia's colonial days when the 'land' epitomised struggle, survival and power, upon it, within it, against it and over it In particular, Paterson's poem paints a vivid picture of how "... the squatters' dogs and the drovers' dogs get mixed in a deadly fight". This fight between the dogs can be seen metaphorically as a battle between

"honour's sake" or pride, and "daily bread" or survival, exemplified in the "new chum" and "the drover", both of whom vied for land use from opposing gentry or battler perspectives.

In the 1870s country land in Queensland was cheaper than in the other colonies, and relationships on pastoral stations between permanent station hands, managers installed by banks or finance companies, and squatters were uneasy. These relationships were fuelled by the 'civilising mission' of those who saw it as their duty to foster local pride and uphold the Masters and Servants Act that was still in force until the end of the 1800s. Hatred of authority, and growing 'mateship' amongst the 'battlers', led to confrontation that stemmed from the older 'convict-Irish-landless' versus landowner tradition that aroused sympathy to the extent that local newspapers featured 'Bushranging for the Week' (Buxton, 1980: 187).

From the above glimpse of history we can see that the identikit of the 'fair dinkum Aussie' was seen from many different perspectives that favoured particular sectors of the society. Dutton (1982) suggests that at all times the "first essential was to stay alive", and the second, it appears, was to accumulate material wealth that gave rise to a "demand for entertainment rather than self-culture". Burn (1988), argues that:

> From its outset, the ideal of a pastoral way of life in Australia was not so much a reaction against the 'progressive' (that is, industrial) forces within the society, as it was a reflection of Australia's historical relationship with Britain and of the manner in which Australia was locked into the development of the form of capitalism at the centre. (Burn, 1988: 25)

Staying alive meant making sense of a strange environment and locating self within this environment. A rich use of metaphor linked reality to fantasy so that identifying oneself as "Type of a coming nation, In the land of cattle and sheep," could range from Lawson's "Tall and solid and stout;" 'Andy', to Baynton's 'Squeaker's Mate', to Lawson's 'Giraffe', or to Paterson's 'Man from Snowy River'. Each type had certain attributes drawn from the environment that evoked an image of that sort of person. For example 'Squeaker's Mate' can be seen to exemplify working the land with resolute care and tenderness, the 'Giraffe' conjures up a Jesus-like peace-maker and friend, while 'Man from Snowy River' evokes action, dare-devil feats and great skill and courage.

The early use of verbal and visual symbolic systems in Australia has provided us with differing perspectives of our identity. On the one hand many Australians revere the stories of Lawson, the poetry of Paterson, and the images of Streeton and Roberts as the 'tap root' system of our cultural heritage. Words and images have provided metaphoric projections through which many of our grandparents and parents saw:

> A wondrous country, where nature's ways
> Were revealed to me in the droving days.
> (A.B. Paterson, *In the Droving Days*, 1891)

On the other hand, the 'ideal of a pastoral way of life' led to the oppression of many Australians who drifted around the countryside surviving as shearers, stockmen and 'odd-job' men (see McCubbin's *Home Again*, 1884), while the 'landed' gentry spent much of their time in the cities where:

> ... her five cities, like five teeming sores,
> Each drains her: a vast parasite robber-state
> Where second-hand Europeans pullulate
> Timidly on the edge of alien shores.
> (A. D. Hope, *Australia*. 1950s)

1.3 Images and Words: Metaphoric & Environmental Interactions.

As argued in Section 1.2, verbal and visual symbolic systems are a means through which we can experience some sense of identity. In this process verbal and visual symbolic systems may act as reciprocal partners in facilitating awareness of self by linking various ways of understanding in what Culler (1981: 26) calls a "system of relations", Gee (1992) terms "Discourses" and Johnson (1987) refers to as "embodiment". Work done in the fields of linguistics, semiotics and sociology (Gordon, 1961; Salomon, 1979; Sless, 1981; Lakoff, 1987; Barthes, 1988; Gardner, 1989; Wolff, 1990; Dissanayake, 1992; Giroux, 1994; Solso, 1994) investigates the way in which we arrive at understanding something, or, in other words how we make·sense of something. Thus, in considering the role of art as personal experience, questions regarding the authority of the author/artist, the uniqueness of the artwork, and the relationship between public expression and private meaning are now seen as more complex and problematic.

Various theories regarding reader-oriented approaches to literature and the social production of art, highlight the swing in emphasis to the active participation of the reader, the demise of the text as sole entity and the demotion of the author (Selden and Widdowson, 1993; Wolff, 1981). *Avant-garde* artists, according to Josephson (1996: 72), attempted to "give people a new experience" whereby they (the people) could participate in the creative process in any way they pleased thus allowing idiosyncratic interpretation of the artwork while relieving artists of any responsibility. It seems that in the midst of this re-evaluation of stereotypical attitudes towards artistic outcomes, the art object was freed to join in the circulation of commodities in our postmodern society in which multiple, temporary and unstable moods diffuse the ego, undermine autonomy and challenge the very centre of our beliefs. Grossberg (1988: 36) suggests that texts (in the Postmodern view) may be "sites of many different activities and effects" at which we may stop and "install" our "selves" into practices as we shuttle across the surfaces of culture.

The notion of *surfaces* is crucial because it supposes many reflections that make it increasingly difficult to differentiate between reality and its images. This is an important point because it demands re-thinking our notions of personal experience and the *degree* of effort required to maintain some form of stability upon and within *surfaces* that, as Grossberg (1988) argues, question our ability to anchor ourselves into their imaginary depths. The constant transformation of places into spaces, and spaces into places, disperses stable systems and offers no depth of commitment into which we can anchor ourselves ideologically, and thus we experience an identity roundabout on which we are constantly seeking some sort of stability amidst the fluctuating images of meaning.

The mental image evoked by Grossberg's (1988) *surface* metaphor conjures up in one's mind another metaphor of *thin ice* and, associations of sliding, falling, and deep, dark coldness below a fragile support, are linked to the *surface* metaphor. Thus an act of balancing is metaphorically evoked that has its origin in physical efforts to maintain a sense of equilibrium. Through calling to mind a certain image schemata, a pattern obtained from physical experience, we might make a new connection using a realist orientation in line with Johnson's (1987) notion of "embodiment" which leads to the suggestion that, in reality, our interaction with the environment consists of struggle at every step along the way, again implying an effort to maintain a sense of balance and harmony in our everyday living.

This is because we are surrounded by objects, people and ideas that do not emanate from ourselves, but that act upon us in stirring our emotions, confronting our beliefs and confusing our personal maps of meaning that no longer seem to correlate with what happens in everyday life. For example, the simple task of grocery shopping is now a voyage into a fantasy world where one enters a huge cool (or warm, depending on the opposite *real* weather outside) supermarket where fruit and vegies sparkle under adjusted lighting, freshly dripping from aerosol irrigation, where packages promise *ultra white*, *daily squeezed* or *no cholesterol*, and where our power to pay is validated by the zip of a metallic strip.

Or, for example, we walk into the latest blockbuster exhibition of Matisse (Brisbane, 1995) where the work of contemporaries clutter the walls of context so that we may appreciate his ("whose?" we may ask in our confusion) genius amidst a simulation of *his* cultural environment. Luckily labels tell us where to look, what to look for and, if we miss anything important, we are sure to be able to buy it in the Matisse shop at the exit.

Our task is to negotiate some form of meaning or relevance from these things, and, in doing this, we utilize our own value system in the act of understanding or appreciation. This is becoming more difficult because, as Grossberg (1988: 40) points out, "[P]ostmodernity points to a crisis in our ability to locate any meaning as a possible and appropriate source for an impassioned commitment". By this he means the conflict we experience between trying to recognise that our inherited meanings are no longer connected to our affective experiences. In other words, the exclusion of feelings demanded by our "theoretic culture" (Josephson, 1996: 193) does not satisfy our cognitive needs because our everyday lives and our cultural identities no longer provide a sense of purpose and place in the overarching global stories that once gave us a sense of connection and identity in nature and our environment. Instead, we find ourselves situated in cultural niches, cocoons of manufactured meanings that envelop us.

Gee (1992: 49) argues that meaning is embedded in the social practices, the "Discourses", to which we may belong and which reside outside our heads. This is the immediate environment of which we are part, and on which we rely for confirmation of our actions as members of a community. Thus we have inherited the communal meanings. For example, we, as members of a Western society, have inherited an attitude that regards art as unimportant to cognitive development, and yet many of our affective experiences are triggered by images - images on television, images on billboards, images on computer screens, movie images and corporate images. The problem is how to deal with visual information that confronts us, eludes us, and teases us in changing form, when we have been accustomed to thinking of images as peripheral to our survival.

Our own value system, our inherited meanings, have developed as a result of our personal experiences that have been greatly affected by years of schooling in which the value systems of our immediate environment have been imposed upon us and which, in turn, we have had to re-think at a later stage as we have moved into other communities beyond schooling. An example of this is the way in which our methods of making sense of something are directed from imagery to writing through education. As young children, the most immediate way of coming to know the world is through development of a personal repertoire of image symbols and the manipulation of media (Dover et al, 1986). By Year Six, however, many students are embarrassed to use imagery because, on the one hand no guidance in refining skills has been available and so they feel inadequate and, on the other hand, imagery, as argued by Sless (1981), is too often regarded as peripheral to learning and therefore unnecessary. It is possible that production of art objects by artsworkers within the culture industry has led many to consider art as a commodity and, in similar fashion to the way texts have become "sites of many different activities and effects" (Grossberg, 1988: 35), it can be argued that art too has become another *site* for the consumer. In other words, art is not seen as a means of *personal experience* in the classroom and beyond, but rather something other people make that we might respond to as a form of entertainment or amusement. Josephson (1996: 105) uses the expression "vicarious experience" that suggests the secondary aspect of this sort of sensational reception that highlights our educated loss of childhood *imaging horizons*, the ability to imagine, that we now need to help us make some sense of our world in which reality and images have become so confused.

Questions of how and why images were superseded by written words in the civilised Western world hark back to the influence of the humanistic *literati* of the Renaissance but, questions of how images are now being used in place of written words (for example logos) raise issues to do with perception and understanding that have not kept pace with the changing relationship between a text and images. If images are now *sites* that might suggest different activities and effects, this means that a new type of sense-perception is required. Gordon (1961: 92) cautions us that "[L]earned conventions can be windowless fortresses which exclude viewing

the world in new ways" and, it is the learned conventions which present verbal and written language as more important than visual language that are open to challenge.

Both words and images have a vital role to play as symbolic systems that allow a singular person to make sense of his or her world through metaphoric connections linking personal experience to his or her cultural environment. For example, as an artist, I am also the author and, in producing works, I select a particular area or site I want to investigate. Based on memories, sketches and photographs, the possible forms of the images are rehearsed in my imagination, or a particular past experience seeps into my being and suggests a new way in which the work might take form. In either case I cannot separate myself from all the influences of my context, but my past experience is not that of the audience's, and so the relationship between public expression of the works and private meaning constantly moves through transforming temporary alliances in which a variety of interpretations are possible. I am *making worlds* that, in Rosenblatt's words, exist

> ... in the live circuit set up between reader and text; the reader infuses intellectual and emotional meanings into the pattern of verbal symbols, and those symbols channel his (sic) thoughts and feelings. Out of this complex process emerges a more or less organised imaginative experience". (Rosenblatt, 1968: 25)

While Rosenblatt (1968) is speaking of literature, the essence of her perception is appropriate to expressing the type of relationship that is offered to the viewer of artworks as well as literature.

As an educator I have particular functions to fulfil for students as a resource, as a mentor, as someone who can present new ways of looking at things and, as someone who, from time to time, acts as the devil's advocate to challenge and upset zones of comfort. In such roles, which Grossberg (1988) terms "fans and intellectual laborers", the position of authority carries with it access to specialised practices, vocabularies and modes of production that empower our stories but do not guarantee their effects. We can only attempt to be well-informed guides, mindful of personal biases and remembering that the way in which we translate or interpret particular works is always determined by our own perspective and our own position in an ideology. Understanding only exists for the person who understands.

Often this means seeing familiar things in a new light and seeing strange things in a familiar way. For example, work I do with tertiary students in forming metaphoric connections is important in demonstrating that *how* something is presented makes the difference. By this I mean the type of metaphors, analogies and examples that are used to suggest associations between lived experiences, words that describe those experiences, and images that depict those experiences. From my point of view, words and images are of vital importance because I use them constantly as both an artist and an educator, and I often find myself in the position of having to change roles depending on the context. This means that the way in which I use words and images changes from *making worlds* as an artist to *interpreting worlds* as an educator.

This work causes me to reflect more deeply on my own artistic practice, and this reflection in turn motivates a deeper interest in the nature of art as personal experience. The process is cyclic with my own practice informing my teaching, and my teaching informing my art making. As both practising artist and art educator, I find myself sandwiched between practice and theory , and thus the notion of connection between the aspects of practice and theory which inform personal experience is integral to this research. The practice concerns the actual making of artworks while the theory concerns what is said and written about artworks. But neither is separate, and yet, for many people, art practice and art theory appear unrelated as reflected in many approaches that consider art outside personal experience, and thus the doing is separated from thinking by catch phrases such as "hands on, brains off". In searching for ways and words that facilitate student understanding, the use of metaphoric associations allows a variety of pathways for experiencing new ways of thinking about art which facilitate other ways of reviewing both familiar and strange things so that we might feel *at home* in a situation.

1.4: Metaphoric Pathways: Making the Familiar Strange, Making the Strange Familiar.

Survival and comfort rely on understanding the environment so that we can feel *at home* in a particular context. Gee (1992: 99) draws attention to the difficulty people have living in a state of cognitive dissonance, and that "explanations" (to self and others) are necessary to reconcile mental unease. This means that individuals are either faced with making reasoned connections using their own previous experience and beliefs to explain and access the strange situation, or to dismiss the strange situation and justify their dismissal using another explanation based on previous experience and beliefs. A strange situation might involve looking at art objects and images within our own culture that are new to our previous experience of art objects, and because we do not understand the art object, we might sense feelings of anxiety and discomfort. Our desire to rid ourselves of feelings of anxiety and discomfort results in what Peirce (1978a) refers to as some sort of struggle between passive effort or active effort. Solso (1994) suggests that we explain away the cause of our discomfort as being unimportant, or we excuse our discomfort because the image has deeper meaning, or we reconfigure the image to meet our impression of the world.

Similarly, a feeling of unease can be exacerbated between two individuals when one person appears *at home* with a skill or concept that seems so strange and so beyond reach of the other person. This is especially true in the field of visual art. As an artist I am often reminded by some students that I am an *artist* and thus different from them. In that simple reminder the notions of work, research, self-discipline, commitment and passion are excised from my artistic performance. It is as though I am some other being possessing some sort of special skill, some insight and understanding that is denied ordinary people.

This is a long way from the truth. Gee (1992: 123) reminds us that "one of the main results of current research on cognition [is] that human beings know only what they have practised over and over again". This explains my competence in certain areas. Yet, it can be argued that the author/artist does play a key role as *the site* of artistic experience. Certain aspects of skill, insight or understanding I have might arise from the fact that my networks of associations have

been influenced by the Discourse of Art of which I am a member, and thus certain ways of thinking, acting, and valuing artistic practice, have underpinned many of my experiences. It could be that I have developed what Gee (1992: 83) calls a "sixth sense" emanating from "soul" that he defines as an "internalization of the structures of the social world" which is achieved through "the experience each uniquely endowed individual has of holding various 'positions' in social space". "Soul" appears to develop as a result of what Steiner (1989: 9-10) terms "ingestion", and Peirce (1978a: 33) refers to as instinctive "inward power", a strong sensation triggering real determinations of our subconscious volitional beings. I believe this accounts for the perceived difference between my world and that of students and, while I am not sure exactly what our inner *soul* is, this unquantifiable *something* that each person has within them, suggests inferences, constructs explanations, directs decisions and moderates emotions so that we become aware of resultant feelings initiated by sensational struggle that I shall look at in detail in Chapter Two.

What causes the struggle in the first place depends largely on the environment outside the person. Various researchers (Arnheim, 1986; Churchland, 1988; Gardner, 1993; Gee, 1992; Solso, 1994) discuss the biological processes within the human body and eye that are triggered by external sensations that activate neural impulses which are sent to the brain. The interesting part from my perspective is the way in which these impulses affect our thinking. If every impulse carried the same force our cognitive apparatus could not deal with the volume of traffic, so the 'something' within us applies a culling system and sorts out the important from the not-so-important sensations depending on our established value system. Competing stimuli are like voices in a crowd that are heard only if they are loud enough unless we have a particular focus stemming from personal knowledge and relevance that may present an opportunity for personal engagement while we are oblivious to other noise.

This collection of personal knowledge offers collateral experience that singular persons may draw upon in gradually modifying existing habits through using metaphoric associations that encourage linkage from personal experiences to the new experience. The work I do with students using metaphoric associations demonstrates that their acquired attitudes and feelings

towards making art change in the process of formal learning in which acquisition of skills is combined with learning about theoretical principles.

Thus it can be argued that our tools for understanding art symbols may be modified and increased to enable us to plug into personal and technological art processes without losing our own sense of being part of those processes. In doing this we need to consider not only the human aspects of creating symbols, but also the enormous collective external *nervous* system of the electronics revolution and how it affects human experience. All this strangeness needs to be made familiar so that we may re-start inventing unique images enabled by our own imaginative processes, and re-establish the primacy of physical sensory experiences.

We need to build bridges of understanding between our different worlds and experiences because networks of systems often remain separate and unconnected in our everyday life. However, if, in investigating ways of restructuring art as personal experience in which making reasoned connections between personal association and novel situations are possible, does this mean that we might come into conflict with clubs of meaning, or what Gee (1992) calls "Discourses"?

When talking with individual students about difficulties they experience in trying to articulate their own personal awareness of themselves and the world around them through visual imagery, I find it important and relevant to start with something they understand, and so we start with writing. This is something that many people in a Western society, and in particular a university, can do with some degree of mastery, and yet no one was born with the ability. It is only with practice and repetition that a particular vocabulary is learned and the relevant skill developed.

In using the strategy of starting with something familiar and moving into something different while establishing links between the old and new skills, we start to dissolve the barrier of novelty and begin to feel comfortable with the new skill as we become more competent. Gordon (1961: 34-36) admits that the human organism is basically conservative and thus

attempts to make the familiar strange, and to make the strange familiar, can provoke feelings of anxiety and insecurity. He cautions that acceptance of a new viewpoint, "... depends on the capacity to risk and to understand the mechanisms by which the mind can make tolerable the temporary ambiguity implicit in risking" and, because both risk and ambiguity are feared and avoided by many students, the transition process needs to incorporate a sense of non-threatening play, play with associations and memorabilia, play through metaphor.

This process involves using a metaphorical approach of projecting structure from one known domain to another domain of a different kind as discussed by Johnson (1987). An important point highlighted by both Johnson (1987) and Gee (1992) relates to our relative unawareness of the structures or networks we have in our heads, and yet the ease with which we can assemble patterns of associative configurations or schema when needed. I find that progress in establishing links between the known and the unknown largely depends on how often one has attempted to make a correlation between apparently disparate things, and whether or not one has an open attitude that allows experimentation, and a willingness to see things from a new or different perspective. But the important part is firstly to see *relevant and familiar* things in a *new* way, because it is only by starting with things that are part of our world and re-viewing them so that we can see them from another perspective, that we can then become tolerant of how other people see things that are part of their world. This is a major step towards viewing self in a wider context.

When working with undergraduate education students my interest in noting factors that enrich personal experience has been informed by recent work in the field of semiotics and the accelerating use of technological tools in processing information. Both of these fields will be dealt with in Chapter Two, but I mention them now because semiotics and technology are integrally linked with "reality [that] is already stranger than any fantasy we could construct", and thus the lines between the familiar and the estranged are disappearing (Grossberg, 1988: 42). For example, Josephson (1966: 176) points out our obsession for wrapping ourselves in an "art package" of fashion statements that project our profession and class identity as a stereotypical and easily read object in the mass-media language of form. However, this is a

context that is continually changing and, if cultivation of a contextual awareness is deemed necessary for understanding an artwork, we need to heed Lovejoy's (1989) discussion about the way in which modern technology disrupts the history of experience in shaping perception and inducing a new kind of uneasiness.

Awareness of context, including the environment and historical associations, underpins my own artistic practice in which immersion in the mood and atmosphere of the site through camping, walking, touching, smelling and listening to the actual physical surroundings seems to correlate with what Johnson (1987) calls "embodiment" that I shall explore in discussing my own work in Part Three, Chapter Six. My approach to making images allows me to make connections between my own personal experiences, art history and works of literature, and this influences the way in which I work with tertiary students who seem caught up in a peculiar dilemma of trying to understand art jargon and trying to differentiate between what is termed *high art* or *popular art*. For many students art theory and art practice seem to be divorced from their personal experience.

As an example of making connections between everyday, popular occurrences, and creating artworks, I will outline the strategy I use in helping undergraduate education students make reasoned connections using their own previous experience to make a strange situation accessible. For students who have little background understanding about the function of images, the challenge is to see images as more than pure decoration or a kind of magic. Their previous experience in making images is very limited, but previous experience in writing diaries, letters and conversation about families, friends, hobbies and ambitions offers a rich source of collateral experience that the student can draw from in making connections between past and present events. Making these connections causes effort for students to think differently about making art.

In this way the images can be seen as a type of autobiography - instead of asking students to write a story about themselves, I ask them to produce their statement of self using two dimensional and three dimensional media, *but we start with writing*. Students collect personal

memorabilia and we make lists of things that are individually important; we describe them through writing and drawing, and then we start to analyse why particular things are important to us such as clothes or a particular trinket, a photo, or a person. We try to understand what these chosen things represent about our particular lifestyle. Put simply, I guide students in trying to identify who they are in their particular world. In this process, perceptions start to change because together we see things differently - from an internal perspective, not a perspective dictated by other people external to the process.

Having started with the notion of an autobiography that allows students to act as author and metaphorically link a personal story using writing to a personal story using images, I then begin talking about a self portrait so that we gradually move into an art frame of reference. In doing this I stress that a self portrait can involve a lot more than an image of a face - it may start with a facial structure, but a person's cognitive tools are in the mind, and thus the *workings of the mind* becomes our subject matter, the content of our *self portrait*. By taking this approach I encourage students to investigate their thoughts as part of a wider system of relations in which their own sense of identity, or personal persona, is based on a store of personal experience and consciousness *that brings into focus their immediate situation and aspects of lived experiences that connect them to a wider social group.*

We concentrate on the *workings of the mind* because much Western thought perpetuates the mind/body dualism, while it is the *connection* of mind and body that is of interest to me. Most students have a Western background, and most regard art making as doing without thinking. The challenge is, in Peirce's (1978a: 162) words to "become aware of ourself (sic) in becoming aware of the not-self". Most students have had little experience in focusing on *what they are not doing* as a means of clarifying what they *are* doing. As an artist I am aware of the tension formed between positive and negative space, between complementary colours, and between contrasting value that, when concentrating on one aspect, allows greater recognition of the *other*. Thus, when I suggest that students use the theme *workings of the mind* we are actually investigating the *negative* area of their normal approach to making artworks, the

thinking processes. Many students expect the *subject matter* to be provided, and wait to be shown *what* to do and *how* to do it without actually thinking through these processes.

The challenge is to create a personal need for visual expression through getting students to generate their own subject matter that will, in turn, suggest techniques appropriate for making the artwork. By concentrating on thinking, the non-practical area often overlooked by students and hence a *negative* area, students come to realise that they have to connect thoughts in their mind to ways of doing. They have to suggest appropriate links between the workings of the mind and the subsequent activity. This poses a problem because it makes them realise how dependent they have been on following instructions and simply *doing*. They also become aware of how various attitudes may have separated the thinking from the doing with regard to artworks and other areas of their normal education.

This other-than-normal approach may modify behaviour accordingly so that concentration of making *includes* using the "cognitive tools" in the head (Gee 1992: 141). The experience of connecting mind and body through making artworks might acquaint students with changes of perception that, in turn, suggest networks of associations that link them to specific social groups.

To help students understand the complexity of images as they themselves move from simple to more abstract ways of using their own drawings and objects, we investigate the way in which the elements of line, shape, texture, colour, value and size may be used to emphasise a message, to depict a mood, to beautify an object or to serve any other function dictated by the artist or community. It is a futile exercise to expect anyone to understand or appreciate these formal and technical aspects of image making if there is no perceived need to utilise them, so, in the doing, an awareness of design elements becomes osmotic. In such an approach, Steiner's (1989) notion of "ingestion" suggests we become so familiar with concepts and techniques that we internalise them through doing. It is through the doing that we come to understand something.

At this stage I adopt a variety of metaphorical roles ranging from *marriage counsellor*, *gynaecologist* to *architect* so that these metaphorical associations offer students the possibility of making connections between something relevant in their environment to their changing perceptual development in understanding images. The use of metaphor also allows students to recognise the process of making images as normal, as an extension of everyday living in which various ideas and materials are worked over and changed in the process.

As *marriage counsellor* I suggest various artists or art movements that may be comfortable examples of subject matter, style and technique for a particular student to use as a reference partner. For example, many students have a rural background and so I introduce them to artists such as Olsen, Williams, Cézanne, Wyeth and others who have used the landscape. Many students are involved in sport and so I suggest artists who use a lot of action and figures in their work. In this way I attempt to dispel fear of personal inadequacy and notions of *art for the élite* that many students associate with visual art. In looking at other works of art to find something that stirs associations, memories and relevance, and to realise that there is no *correct* way of making art, but many *different* ways, we work at producing personal interpretations enriched by investigating the humus of the past.

As a *gynaecologist* I talk about the notion of giving birth to an idea that is the result of a gestation period in which associations and imaginative powers are nurtured and enriched from sensory data. We start to *see* things rather than just look at them; we feel the memorabilia, smell them, listen to them and talk about them. At first this seems strange to students who are not accustomed to using bodily senses in this fashion but it is a fundamental way of coming to know something. Johnson (1987: Preface) points out that the "body has been ignored because reason has been thought to be abstract and transcendent". He suggests that imaginative structuring of experience grows out of bodily experience to produce "image schemata" and "metaphorical projections". The former consists of recurring, dynamic patterns of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that contribute to understanding; the latter is a mode of understanding that allows us to use patterns obtained through physical experience to organise our more abstract understanding. As an example of how concrete bodily experience

influences our understanding, Johnson (1987: 75-100) uses the bodily experience of *balance* to trace our correlation to psychological and perceptual metaphorical structuring that contributes to our understanding. Of particular relevance, is his discussion of balance in visual perception which only exists in our perceptual grasp of order attributed to "force" or "weight" in figures. Such "weight" does not exist in any literal sense in the marks on a page. Johnson (1987: 137) concludes that understanding is a way of being in, or having a world, of "one's embodiment" comprising perceptual mechanisms, patterns of discrimination, motor programs, and various bodily skills that embed us within culture, language, institutions and historical traditions.

As an *architect* I discuss the need for plans that can be re-made, re-thought and refined so that students do not need to worry about making mistakes. In fact I encourage students to play with 'mistakes' they might see as irrelevant, because mistakes provoke effort and generate energy for thinking in a new way. Gordon (1961) suggests that willingness to entertain the possibility that any accident, distraction, or interruption may be revealing requires intuition, and this, he maintains, can be learned.

We talk about the possibility of building a house, of selecting a site, of choosing appropriate materials, of looking at examples that stimulate new ways of thinking. I encourage students to apply this sort of thinking to planning their own work so that the eventual art object has meaning and a sense of direction. We then start with making an object, something that is tactile and concrete, before we move onto interpreting this in a more abstract two dimensional picture. Again this reinforces the idea of *getting inside* the materials so that we can understand concepts of texture, shape, size, colour and nuances of dark and light through feeling, looking at, and manipulating real materials before we try and simulate these concepts on a flat surface.

The end products may range from symbolic structures such as a book or a windmill, to an image of a shoe, or to complex designs that involve several motifs that express a person's sense of self but, in each case, the student moves from a familiar way of thinking about self to a new way of seeing self. Students use the cognitive tools in their heads to interpret their

networks of associations through sense perception and metaphorical projections to think otherwise than they were originally thinking. They use art as a means of personal experience.

The complexity of the work we do may not be obvious in the process I have outlined, but the important point is the part I play as the connecting link, or lens, between the student, their background experience and a meaningful artwork. In all stages students tap into my pantry of knowledge so that they can get the particular ingredients they need to make their story of self through imagery. But before they can do this they need to feel comfortable and, metaphors of marriage, birth and houses, are closely associated with the lifestyles of many of the students. The fact that students make artworks becomes an extension of experiencing who they are, and this enriches their perception of the world in which they live because they have taken that vital step in connecting their past associations to the present through a process of semiosis, the on going reasoning from sign to sign as a continuum of learning.

However, it is important to remember the strong influence the environment and social groups play in moulding personal experience. Gee (1992: 48) suggests that "a *social community* (large or small) provides experiences and focuses the attention through carrying out its social practices and apprenticing newcomers to it". He terms the social practices of social communities as "Discourses" that are mastered through acquisition and enculturation. I shall deal with Gee's theory of "Discourses" in Chapter Two, but firstly it is appropriate to consider why the concept of personal experience actually needs investigating.

1.5 The Purpose of the Study: Restructuring Art as Personal Experience.

In a multicultural Australia, people of different races, creeds, religions, political affiliations, educational levels and varying socio-economic backgrounds contribute to our society in peculiar ways. We might think of our environment as a playground in which idiosyncratic meanings of various discourses collide, and within which singular persons seek to arrive at some sense of personal meaning derived from identification with particular belief systems. Such systems enhance personal commitment through fostering niches within a discourse.

Seldom, however, do persons affiliate with only one particular niche. The potential of ambiguity for the singular person in membership of a large number of groups is probably inevitable as there are both consonances and dissonances requiring resolution. This appears to have been the case in our early Australian cultural evolution in which those persons, empathic to either verbal or visual symbolic systems, sought to foster a sense of Australian identity using predominantly one system or the other. However, owing to the familiarity of verbal signs embedded in a complex system of language acknowledged as our main conduit of communication, the word or text assumed a dominant role while images played a peripheral role. Nevertheless, the dominance of verbal language, perpetuated within our educational system, is now being challenged by those who use spheres of visual discourse alien to those habituated to using only words. But, even within the ambience of a group which might be perceived to be cohesive by those outside it, ambiguity exists.

So it is within the discourse of Art. Figure 1.5.1. provides a spatial representation of the potential secondary discourses within the Art environment and signals some of the ideologies, traditions, and societal forces which may impact on and shape the groups within which singular persons experience the environment of Art. Often, perhaps because of size and complexity, or as a result of differentially focused missions, there are virtual schisms between these groups. This may not matter for the majority whose

satisfaction and sense of personal identification derives from primary group membership, but it may be of vital importance for eclectic individuals who seek to establish webs of affiliation within and across the secondary groups.

Figure 1.5.1 Art Discourse and Its Environment.

Eclectic persons may thus seek, by virtue of experience or desire or both, to have dual membership. To what extent is this possible? desirable? For example, what are the compatibilities/incompatibilities between artist *qua* artist and mediators of art experience? Traditionally in the tertiary sector of Australia artists have been trained in one context, and those who are being educated to experience art (for whatever purpose) in another.

While it might be argued that the relationships between the art discourses are incompatible, it might also be argued that this apparent incompatibility lies in how one defines personal experience within the art milieu. It may be that reasons for the collision of professions and ideologies within the Art Discourse might be found in tracing the

continuum that stretches between individualism and socialisation. The search for a link between art as meaningful personal experience and art as a social construct poses a central question for this research because reconciliation between opposing professions and ideologies within the Art Discourse is necessary if we are to understand art as a natural, embodied process of making sense of ourselves and of the world in which we live. How one might retain a sense of personal artistic identity as an organism capable of meaningful thought and unique contribution to the community entails identification of, and debate with, some of the voices in the crowd of art talk through conversation with the literature and examination of one's own art practice as process, product and pathway of personal experience linked to the wider community.

Figure 1.5.2. conceptualises the singular person at the centre of a vortex of influences shaped by exposure to both the micro and macro environments. How does a singular person, in fact, make sense of, or reconcile, the dissonances implicit herein? Some persons may be able to verbalise this if asked and some biographical material may implicitly or explicitly refer to this. Yet systematic documented research of this nature does not yet exist.

Figure 1.5.2 Singular Person at Centre: Micro and Macro Environments

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct this exploration at a personal level and, given my position of joint membership in several clubs within the Art Discourse, the following research questions are posed for investigation:

- If meaningfulness is internal to human beings depending on their position within systems of relations from a global perspective, how do singular persons make reasoned connections in experiencing art from a personal perspective?

- Within systems of relations, what are some of the forces that might compel one to consider art as a social construct or as individual expression? Are such views mutually exclusive?

- Do such beliefs shape the artistic consciousness of singular persons so that idiosyncratically meaningful experience is or is not possible alongside a global sense of art as a type of behaviour within a civilized community?

- What are the possibilities for creating links between personal experience of the artist and personal experience of members of the viewing public within a milieu of uncertainity prevailing within the Art Discourse?

- If, as an artist, one were to wish to maximize the potential bridges between artist experience and viewer experience, how might one create a framework of personal experiential realism to encompass both?

In essence, then, this research aims to:-

a) Probe various forces which influence the artistic consciousness of an artist,

b) Investigate the potential of visual narrative in creating a focus for artworks,

c) Explore the potential of bridging artist and viewer experience through the creation of an exhibition of artworks.

1.6 Setting Up the Scaffolding: An On-Going Conflictual Site.

We cannot ignore a world of reality that does exist independent of human beings. How this external reality exerts certain constraints on a person's conceptual system through suggesting many different views of reality depending on the biological make-up of a person, their position within a culture, and the way in which truth corresponds with the beliefs and experiences that are considered meaningful within the cultural group, raises questions concerning personal experience and the position an ordinary human being plays in our complex environment in which images play a very important part.

However, if meaning lies in the collective biological capacities of our physical and social experiences as living beings, can meaningfulness be internal to singular persons? It can be argued that for something to be meaningful to a single person, it must first be sanctioned as having meaning for the group of which one is a member. In this sense, experience might be seen as including basic perceptual, motor-programme, emotional, historical, social, and linguistic dimensions within some scheme, network, or system of meaning structures. However, it is possible that, within systems, coding elements may deviate from one's anticipatory schemata and hence skills of translation are required that might lead to difficulties, errors, and variations of interpretation amongst various persons.

We can agree that *habitually accepted* dictates and practices of a specific discourse guide our anticipatory schemata about what we should know, unless we are prepared to question such primed anticipatory schemata. The crux of the problem lies in how we grasp these things, how we make sense of these things, and this raises questions concerning identification of determining forces that effect the most influence on us as singular persons. In investigating systems of relations we may find various reasons why schisms do exist between and within groups of people thus suggesting possible answers to the following questions that are integral to this research dealing with art as personal experience.

Do singular experiences and consequent imaginings contribute to generalisations within specific social groups, or, on the other hand, if experience is seen as the totality of human experience, how does this totality contribute to the primacy of a person's imaginative capacity to organise mental representations into meaningful, coherent unities?

How does our physical situation in the world, and the way in which we experience those things outside us, lead to ways in which we internalise actions, beliefs, values and emotions, and decide what validity they hold for us which determines our internal realism?

On the one hand it can be argued that we experience things as a group of like-minded people, whereas on the other hand, it can be argued that we experience things as single persons who interpret and infer certain things that may be similar, but are not the same. It is arguable that experience is a very singular thing and, it is the similarity of interpretation and inference that allows like-minded people to converge as a group. In investigating groups within systems of relations we can establish a broad framework of ideas within which we can identify and challenge some of the voices in the crowd of philosophical talk through conversation and debate with the literature. From this wide perspective we can then gradually zoom in to survey the groundscape of artistic expression and personal experience as modes of behaviour within which people employ verbal and visual signs through spinning yarns and framing meanings that are sustained by a cultural industry.

This contextual awareness points to the type of literature that then provides a window through which we can glimpse *Inventing Games* in Part Two. Within this playground, individual struggle between perception and action, play with cognitive tools in the head, and suggestions about how the mind and body may work in concert using metaphoric projections, are examined.

Because this inquiry does involve human experience, my own process of creating a framework from which to view aspects of human experience does become part of the

scaffolding. Thus my search for links between available meanings is a constant tinkering with ideas that, as with a painting, cannot disclose the negative and positive areas separately; both evolve together in the organic process of making. In Part Three, *Devising Rules*, we move into the field where my own process of making artworks is offered as a means for investigating personal artistic practice. In a manner of speaking, I become a live cog in the framework pondering possible reasons why and how my paintings develop as my ideas are stimulated by past and current reading. This involves firstly, discussion regarding the organisation of field trips that will provide data for the images and stories, and secondly, personal reflection during the time spent in producing the artworks and stories in the studio environment using both traditional painting and drawing techniques, and experimental computer methods in preparation for exhibition of the works at the Toowoomba Regional Gallery.

The fourth and final stage, *Checking the Scoreboard*, brings the research to a climax in which void or negative areas in the framework might possibly be filled by other people's ideas. In using methods of heuristic sensorial inquiry that allow various people to find out things for themselves, I envisage an exhibition of artworks that will include drawings, paintings, three dimensional artefacts, maps, written stories and computer images that might encourage singular persons to experience the exhibition in a very personal way.

CHAPTER TWO: A FRAMEWORK OF IDEAS.

2.1 Systems of Relations: The Environment Outside the Head.

As foreshadowed in Section 1.4, the notion of forming links between available meanings within the totality of human experience supposes an on-going process of reflection and re-thinking that, according to Lendon (1992), leads us in unpredictable ways to find whatever it is we are looking for which we recognise only once it is found. Because my own process of making artworks forms part of this investigation I am at one and the same time the hunter and the hunted, and thus, from time to time, I investigate myself within and amongst the framework as part of the scaffolding.

Both Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) argue that one of the strongest influences upon thinking in Western society is the widely held belief that the mind and body are two distinct entities, and this erroneous belief leads to a legacy of undue emphasis being given to the power of reason and all its accumulated trappings of status - including the written word that Steiner (1989) and Dissanayake (1992) consider erases much art through dissection and scrutiny involving interpretation, analysis and evaluation that replaces the artistic form. These researchers argue that people come to know through bodily awareness and that the mind and body are one.

Further arguments generated by Peirce (1978a) and Gee (1992) indicate that reason is often used as an egotistical excuse for actions emanating from unconscious instinct, and that collective meaning grows and changes as we constantly re-sign ourselves through symbol-concepts based on sensory experiences that modify our behaviour. In support of these arguments, Solso (1994) draws attention to the way in which the visual sensory system has remained unchanged in human beings for thousands of years while recognising that what we see in the world around us has been radically transformed in a very short time span by people.

Other arguments put forth by Wheale (1995) and Josephson (1996) alert us to the growing impact of mass media foreshadowed by Sless (1981), Lovejoy (1989), and Giroux (1994), while critics of Postmodernism (for example, Grossberg (1988), Baudrillard (1980) and Hughes (1990)) question the diminishing role of individuals in a society where reality is socially constructed and art socially produced according to social theorists such as Wolff (1981) and Pollock (1996).

Thus it may be argued that we have a problem in deciding where artists fit into the scheme of things given a certain type of behaviour which, according to Lippard (1996: 9), causes conflict between inner feelings of knowing "we are special" while, at the same time, recognising a need to be treated as "workers like everyone else …".

In arguing for restructuring art as personal experience, the debate about what constitutes experience needs to be articulated, and this means ransacking our knowledge base to find out what we can about our cultural understanding of experience. It is feasible to suggest that human embodiment directly influences the way we make sense of artworks; experience entails degrees of personal resistance and effort in using basic perceptual, motor-programme, emotional and linguistic dimensions; and the investigation of beliefs and memories is the study of social practices which do not reside in anyone's head but offer strong exemplars that may be either embraced or rejected according to the will of a singular person. Environment is outside us offering us experiences that percolate through the body to acquaint us with events that somehow influence us to use the tools we have in the head in making sense of our environment.

2.2. The Big 'S' and its smaller siblings: Survival, signs, semiotics, systems and social practices.

Our prime concern as human beings lies in Survival. This entails responding to signs and symbols because the way in which we decipher signs and symbols determines our systematic understanding of our environment, and thus our ability to act in accordance with our surroundings.

2.2.1 Signs.

For something to be considered a sign means that sounds or visual patterns are interpreted as mental concepts that require representation (Eco, 1984; Gowans, 1981). According to Peirce:

> [A] sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. (Peirce, 1978b: 135)

In other words, we think only in signs, and their sensorial variety is limited only by the person doing the thinking who searches the environment and interrogates it according to the concepts available to that person. A sign functions to bring something other than itself into an organism's awareness; for example, colour brings with it an awareness of plurality, positions, shapes, movements (Deely, 1982), that then require interpretation through another sign. This raises the issue of individual autonomy because, if, as Gee (1992) suggests, meaning lies outside the head, this could confirm the notion held by Wolff (1981: 23) that "agency is wholly determined". However, Gee (1992) highlights the most important function of unique neural systems inside the head that he calls the *interpreter*, and these, it can be argued, give rise to choice on behalf of a singular person to exercise some form of autonomy in making that choice.

It seems agreed that a sign offers a *stand-for* relation between anything in the environment and a person. However, once we start to investigate this relation, we enter the debate about meaning and interpretation. Peirce (1978a: 175) was committed to investigating those conventions that underlie modes of behaviour and representation in which he proposed that "the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of quality and

reaction" because meaning moulds reactions in the future to itself and thus, by imparting a quality to reactions, meaning involves a three-way process. His argument is based on the notion of a "triadic relation" that challenges our Western understanding of polar distinctions and binary relations as postulated by Saussure. At the time of Peirce's extensive writings in this area, the actual discipline of semiotics had not been fully developed. However, in recent years, his thoughts have come under scrutiny by some researchers (Pajaczkowska, 1996; Smith-Shank, 1995: Scholes, 1985: Culler, 1981).

On the other hand, the influence of Saussure's (1959) binary system of signifier and signified has played an important part in the way members of the Western Discourse have interpreted the function of signs. The term Discourse is adopted according to Gee's (1992) definition of a group of people in which behaviour counts as meaningful in specific ways within the practices of the specific group and thus the meanings embedded in consensus of beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and opinions are *free* to members.

According to Fernstein (1982), a sign is the *paired* relationship that exists in nature and indicates the existence of an event, a thing or a condition. In accordance with objectivist classical categories, Fernstein argues that signs get their meaning via correspondences to things in the external world. The notions of pairing and correspondences appear to ignore the crucial human element of *intention* that makes these connections, and this oversight may confirm the duality of sign/thing or signifier/signified attributed to Saussure (1959). He does point out, however, that "[I]n language everything boils down to differences but also to groupings" which consist of "the interplay of successive terms" (Saussure 1959: 128).

From the point of view of an artist, it may be the case that too much emphasis on language and the written word as systems of signs tends to ignore or depreciate non-verbal *representamens*, and this neglect may be attributed at least partially to Saussure's (1959) concentration on verbal signs. Saussure, according to Scholes (1985), believed that each language produces a different set of signifieds, which means that *the*

object/thing is a different object/thing depending on what language is used to do the signifying. From this interpretation it appears that language offers a nomenclature, that, according to Thibault (1997) reinforces the scientific and commonsense views of language and completely misses the intention of Saussure whose

> ... social-semiological theory reveals that language users make the world in which they live in and through the value-producing potential of the language system itself. (Thibault, 1997: 46)

While agreeing that canonical texts "get re-read, re-written, and revised from generation to generation", Thibault (1997: xix) argues that this has resulted in much "conventional wisdom concerning Saussure". We can also argue that a misreading which implies that linguistic activity is causally determined by *langue* and that language reflects or labels a pre-given objective reality might have considerable influence on our understanding of language. It is also conceivable that Figure 2.2.1, Saussure's (1959: 66) visual representation reproduced below, might be misunderstood.

Figure 2.2.1. Linguistic Sign

Recent work by Thibault (1997) questions much of the conventional reading of Saussure that assumes a Saussurean separation of the individual from society, separation of language from other non-linguistic sign systems and language as a code to be decoded by the listener. On the contrary, Thibault (1997) argues that Saussure attempted to articulate a theory in which people, as speaking subjects, situated at the intersection of both social-semiological and biophysical factors, contribute to social meanings through *langue* and are regulated by social meanings through *parole*. Nevertheless, while we may have inherited many mistaken views, and while Thibault's (1997) work illuminates possible misunderstandings, it is reasonable to suggest that, in attributing difference to

theories postulated by Saussure (1959) and Peirce (1978), the following figures (Figures 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) might reflect an aspect of that difference.

Figure 2.2.2 Triadic Relations Derived from C. S. Peirce 1895.

As can be suggested, the way in which we arrive at meaning involves a three-way process according to Peirce who suggests:

> We think only in signs. These mental signs are of a mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and experience, its meaning grows. (Peirce, 1978b: 169)

On the other hand, it appears that Saussure's (1959) system of meaning emanates from the sign's correlation to the thing, event or condition thus negating any need for interpretation on by a person. While Thibault (1997) refers to the exposure of unfortunate effects resulting from former interpretations of Saussure's work, we cannot dismiss those interpretations and thus Figure 2.2.3 reflects only one interpretation.

Peirce (1895) and Saussure (1878) appear to have left us with two different perspectives regarding signs, and since it is beneficial to differentiate one perspective from the other so that we can better understand what underpins our approach to sensory experience, especially visual perception, the following outline of the two theories that gave rise to the study of semiotics suggests introductory scaffolding for the following framework of ideas underpinning this research.

2.2.2 Semiotics.

Culler (1981: 22) regards Charles Sanders Peirce and the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure as the precursors of semiology, the investigation of symbolic systems in human experience but, as he points out, they were an "ill-sorted couple". On the one hand, Culler (1981) argues that Saussure was a successful and respectable professor, whereas, on the other, Peirce was a "wayward philosophical genius". Saussure, as some interpretations hold, was able to promote a simple programme for semiotics that involved a system of a functioning totality in which there were two kinds of relations - the signifier, and the signified. Peirce, in contrast, developed the theory of pragmatism in which practical considerations play a pivotal role in the appraisal of ideas, and in which he identified three modes of being within his complex doctrine of signs.

In Peirce's schema of things, it appears that the individual is responsible for the creation of signs, whereas the Objectivist view, mistakenly purported (Thibault, 1997) to be followed by Saussure, absolves individuals of this responsibility by designating the external world of fact as the main source of information from whence come the signals to which we respond.

On the whole, it can be argued that the Objectivist view is much easier to understand because we do not have to worry too much about interpretation (things either are, or they are not according to classical categories). Nor do we have to worry about the complex characteristics of individual people because they are seen to be separate from the world of objective reality in which thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols in a signified/signifier relation. Symbols get their meaning via correspondences to things in the external world. In this system of meaning the mind is a mirror of nature, and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world in which categories must be symbols that can designate categories in the real world, or possible world, and are defined by properties common to all members. These theories reflect the *commonsense view* that, Thibault (1997: 46) argues, remains effective because of habitual thinking in which entities and states of affairs in the material world "exist independently of the meanings which the 'reciprocal determination of values' in the language system allows its users to make". Figure 2.2.4 suggests the Objectivist view of meaning.

Figure 2.2.4 Objectivist Separation Between External Things, Mind and Body.

As reflected in Figure 2.2.4, objectivist theories suggest a *God's Eye* view of matter as quite distinct from, but mirrored by the mind that, in turn, controls a separate body.

Owing to the prevailing status of objectivity derived from Plato and confirmed by Descartes in the 1630s, it is reasonable to suggest that Saussure's programme for

semiotics, filtered through various readings that suggested meaning lay in the dual interaction of signifier and signified, was very convincing. As Westerners, we have developed systems of understanding based on classical categories and rules of human behaviour in which the importance of bodily experience has been virtually ignored.

2.2.3 Systems.

Harrison (1991) challenges the notion of classical categories and rules that control individuals who are seen to be part of the externalised nature identified through formal logical demonstration of universal characteristics. She points out that the basic rule underlying efforts to maximise the appearance of *scientific objectivity* consists of using principles and manipulating symbols that correspond to objective categories and objective properties conforming to *classical* identification in which thought is seen as the correct and truthful product of reason, and thought is reported using the traditional method of categorical writing. The problem highlighted by Harrison is that of the separation of thought as an objective entity from the body thus denying the actual instrument that does the thinking.

This problem is of fundamental concern in any attempt to re-structure art as personal experience because *both* the author and the audience are erased by the message that stands independent of either. Every message, as an entity, is an encounter between a level of expression (or signifier) and a level of content (or signified) that mirrors the logic of the external world in a strictly defined way. Thus we can recognise the developmental links in objective thinking that provided a basis for Saussure's approach to semiotics.

The work of Saussure, according to Culler (1981), has been very influential because of its duality and it was easy to understand that a sign pointed to, signified, some other independent thing. The other independent thing could then be understood using the classical theory of categories through which common, shared properties of similar

things, could be identified through reasoning and association that confirmed the accumulated weight of two thousand years of philosophy.

Our recognition of categories underpins the way in which we normally make sense of things because we think of categories as quite natural. But in fact we have been *taught* to think this way. Theorists such as Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) question the validity of classical categories and, in so doing, propose changes to the way in which we make sense of the world that involves what they term "embodiment", the link between conceptual schema and the world via human experience.

It can be argued that the work of Peirce has influenced much of the new thinking that is now questioning the system of duality consolidated by Saussure. Culler (1981) admits that the work of Peirce "remained unreadable and unpublished" because of its complexity, but reference to Peirce's work by Gee (1992) and Smith-Shank (1995) points to growing interest in his ideas that challenge many of our accepted systems of understanding. For example, Peirce (1978a) foreshadows concerns with the ambiguity of representations that has fascinated both literary and art critics throughout this century in saying:

> The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (Peirce, 1978a: 171)

In talking of categories, Peirce (1978a) shows scepticism toward the prevailing notion of a "synthesizing law" by arguing that categories

> ... suggest our looking for a synthesizing law; and this we find in the power of assimilation, incident to which is the habit-making faculty. This is all the categories pretend to do. (Peirce, 1978a: 179)

Further throughout Peirce's writings, one can find recurring thoughts that rebut the dual divisions of logic as a false way of looking at things, and confirm the instincts as the substance of the soul with cognition "only its surface". In this way Peirce (1978a) puts the human being as the focus of making sense of things and, while respecting to some degree and using already accepted theories, he questions those theories as neglecting the primary role of the human being. His list of categories is exhaustive, but he suggests that they only serve a way of thinking, and human thinking "partakes of whatever character is diffused through the whole universe, and that its natural modes have some tendency to be the modes of action of the universe" (1978a: 179).

The way in which Peirce (1978a) deals with three areas he identifies as *firstness*, *secondness* and *thirdness* as three modes of being has peculiar relevance to arguments concerning personal experience. He invests *firstness* and *thirdness* with attributes that are not tangible, while secondness is nominated as the actuality, the something that happens, or is, because it lies in its relations to the universe of existents. In other words, it is the *secondness* that makes its presence most obvious because we can recognise it as something that actually took place and, because of this objectification we tend to focus on the actuality, and often remain unaware of how and why this action/thing came into being. We can know that qualities of feelings do exist, that concepts of life, freedom and such, are present to the mind as a *firstness*, but it is when these feelings and concepts somehow affect us that we actually recognise or sense them. This is the difference between *firstness* and *secondness*. What we do not often recognise, or often think about, is the *desire in seeking to attach the one to the other*, the *thirdness*. Peirce (1978: 170) states this very simply: "The end is second, the means third".

However, this is an example of a message that could not be understood by everyone because Peirce (1978b: 50) proposed three prime categories that opposed the recognised duality of human understanding. Peirce called these prime categories *originality* (being an unrealised quality), *obsistence* (suggesting obviate, object, obstinate, obstacle,

insistence, resistance) and *transausion* (suggesting translation, transaction, transfusion, transcendental). It can be suggested that the three prime categories and the three modes of being are synonymous terms that Peirce uses to articulate his theory of human understanding in which he further undermines accepted thought by strongly denying the pivotal place of reason. In fact he says: "[T]he very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates his own reasoning is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is" because most reasons attributed to actions "are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the teasing "'whys' of the *ego*" (Peirce: 1978a: 345-346). Peirce placed total emphasis on experience as the way through which we come to know something, and relegated logic and reasoning to a position of secondary importance.

This is a crucial point to note because reason and logic are considered to be the cornerstones upon which our Western system of understanding is based. Experience is usually associated with the body, and thus of secondary importance to our Western ways of understanding.

It would seem arguable, however, that the basic difference does not start with Peirce and Saussure. It may be that their investigation of the signifying process focused attention on what we now call semiology, but it was the theories of Plato and Aristotle that gave rise to the differing viewpoints concerning human knowledge and behaviour which need to be positioned so that we can recognise the differing views of knowledge that have played such an important part in directing the traffic of our ideas and, in particular, the way in which we experience works of art. There exists, of course, two thousand years of debate regarding these differing viewpoints and, while I cannot follow Johnson's (late eighteenth century) advice that

> To judge rightly of an author, we must transport ourselves to his time, and
> examine what were the wants of his contemporaries, and what were his
> means of supplying them. (Novak, 1983: 55),

it is feasible at least to adopt Eliot's "historical sense" that "... involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence;" (Eliot, 1951: 14). In the case of

Peirce and Saussure, the presence of Aristotle in the former's writing, and of Plato in the latter's, is noted.

According to Olson (1965), Aristotle placed great importance on experience (*empeiria*) that provides knowledge of fact which, in turn, produces artistic and scientific knowledge that provides knowledge of the cause. Aristotle was concerned with art as a state of making, and stressed the importance of art as:

> ... contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being and whose origin is in the maker, not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are or come into being by necessity nor with things that do so in accordance with nature, since these latter have their origin in themselves (Olsen, 1965: 176-180).

Butcher (1951: 152-160) tells us that Aristotle's artist aimed at something better than the actual and, in imitating the universal, produced an "idealized representation of human life - of character, emotion, action - under forms manifested to sense" in which the process of *Becoming* was the unfolding, development and embodiment of sensible appearances culminating in a concrete individual thing, a primary reality or *Being*. This was an organic process through which a self-sufficient purified world, according to laws of probability or necessity, could be invented or arranged to illuminate an aspect of the external world. The object of all art was to excite the passions, to give pleasure, (not self-fulfilment, not self-enjoyment), but that higher form of catharsis that facilitates a special insight, new knowledge, aesthetic satisfaction and a better state of mind.

On the other hand Plato's philosophy of human knowledge was a search for a reality that was absolute, perfect and fixed. Bate (1959) points out that the fluctuating and uncertain world of matter, of concrete circumstances was, in Plato's view, an imperfect "copy" of a final and absolute reality which had value only if it served reason. Plato argued that one cannot know something that is false, and one cannot know something that is uncertain or changing, and the entire physical world that we perceive is manifestly a world of change and uncertainty. Therefore it cannot be known. It is a world of shifting appearances. Conversely, "true knowledge, is knowledge of the world of forms or ideas, for only they are constant and unchanging" (Barrow, 1976: 46).

Because Plato regarded artistic interpretations as dangerous in fostering false conceit through appealing to inferior faculties, he attacked the techniques or forms of artistic creation. In both *Phaedrus* and *Ion* he emphasised inspiration rather than artistic skill because he considered the true poet as an inspired rhapsodist who dealt only with ideas. According to Plato, those who interpreted nature through a work of art, an act of mimesis, were suspect in offering intuitions of things and their meanings beyond what sensory experience could truthfully perceive or depict. As Warbecke (1947: 261) succinctly notes, "we tend to become like that to which we listen or gaze upon, when the charm of the artist is upon us". Plato feared this kind of diversion from the true philosophical knowledge, and thus considered art inferior and false.

In contrast, in *Poetics* Aristotle speculated on the human faculty for imitation, and discussed the methods of communication, embodiment and language employed in developing the concrete into unified meaning and completeness. Because artistry, he considered, creates its own probable truth, it acts as a cognitive step in exploring the nature of reality, and through the unity and formal perfection of the work, aesthetic appreciation and functional knowledge are enhanced. At all times Aristotle stressed the creative activity of the artist, and clearly rebuffed Plato's "madness" when he states that "poetic art is the affair of the gifted man rather than of the madman". According to the content of the work, Aristotle emphasised the differing forms of representation that may function through the senses in "exciting pity and fear, bringing about the catharsis of such emotions" in a controlling and directing fashion (*Poetics*, Chapter XVII).

In drawing together Plato and Aristotle's theories we can identify areas of different emphasis. For example, both Plato and Aristotle understood the importance of pleasure and both were vitally concerned with goodness and beauty. Warbeke (1947: 246) points out that in a later dialogue, *Philebus*, Plato analysed the different forms of pleasure, and attributed aesthetic pleasures to the highest rank because the pleasures of <u>inspired</u> art have no antecedent thirst or craving which would debase them. On the other hand, Bate (1959: 25-31) tells us that Aristotle considered the arts as having their own concrete

body of material that could have a healthful and formative effect on the mind as long as the form (in the sense of direction or development) had "a certain magnitude" and *harmonia*.

Plato, in recognising that the value of artistry lay only in its propensity to promote good, appears to have held a less flexible view than Aristotle who considered that art's test of excellence lay not in its didactic function, but in the aesthetic pleasure that could only be derived from the idealised poetic truth (Butcher, 1951: 226). However, it can be argued that both Plato and Aristotle approach the store of human knowledge from opposite epistemological poles concerning the value of art in which Plato sees art as contributing nothing towards knowledge, while Aristotle postulates that the world of change can be understood through art . Plato's theory of knowledge was based on his notion of absolute, perfect Being; Aristotle's theory of knowledge was based on his notion of exploring probable truth in Becoming.

Perhaps we can better understand Plato's emphasis on morally edifying 'divine truths' if we look at the time in which he expressed his theory of human knowledge. In his *Seventh Letter* (324 BC) he attacks the incompetence of the governors of Athens, The Thirty, and asks why the skill and knowledge that is demanded of doctors, shoemakers and naval captains is not also demanded of those who "are going to steer the ship of state". His repulsion at the excesses, the social disarray, the changing values, the confusion and the injustice of his times led him to propose government by reason, by the few who had the reasoning ability, for the sake of security and the well-being of all (Barrow, 1976: 11).

Ironically, what Plato said and what he did were two very different things. While he cautioned against artistic skill and considered writing also suspect, his own writings are heavily laden with metaphor. For example, his use of a relevant and apt metaphor, "ship of state" demonstrates metaphoric projection used in an appropriate context. It could be argued that Plato, as a human being, was obliged to utilise attributes of language as the

only possible means at his disposal to advocate aspirations beyond reality. In using the same strategy of calling upon various forms of analogy in forming a link between what is familiar and possible new ways of thinking, Plato appears to align himself with other mortals such as Gordon (1961) who finds analogy essential to the creative process, and that Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) believe is a natural and basic tendency of human beings.

The interesting point for us in the twentieth century is to note the shoplifting from both Aristotle and Plato that has occurred. We can note in the late seventeenth century, the flavour of Aristotle in Dryden's opinion that "To instruct delightfully is the general end of all poetry" (Dryden, 1971: 245); and in Wordsworth's words "... for she can so inform The mind that is within us, so impress With quietness and beauty, ..." (*Tintern Abbey*, 125-127) we can recognise the guiding force of nature so admired by Aristotle. Later in the work of T. S. Eliot (1951) we are reminded of an Aristotelian scientist who approaches his store of knowledge with an awareness of what will produce the best result.

On the other hand, it can be argued that Descartes' seventeenth century notion of knowing as independent of the knower's bodily organs and activities, echoes Plato's concept of "inspired genius" and confirms the separation of mind from body that Renaissance intellectuals advocated. Warbeke (1947: 265) suggests that, from Plato's idea of knowledge comes the "Intellectualist" interpretations; from the revelations of higher sensations comes the "Mystical" theories; from the "divine madness" comes the "Intuitionists", "Expressionists" and "Hedonists"; from the educative aspects comes the "Utilitarians" and, from the implication that true beauty rests on harmony within the soul comes the "Subjectivist" theories.

In looking at the range of interpretive systems attributed to Plato exemplified above, it can be argued that various persons at particular times in history have selected certain facets of the Platonic story that best suited their interests and, in the re-telling, have

emphasised what they considered the important parts and deleted the not so important according to their survival tendency to tell the best story. Thus, it seems logical to suggest that generalizations grew from the way in which singular persons changed their way of thinking and, through chains of translation over time, we seem to have re-signed Plato's legacy of understanding based on divine truths and reason, and have packaged them into classical categories and rules of human behaviour while ignoring Plato's own artistic propensity.

As mentioned earlier, Peirce (1978a: 351) stressed the importance of experience underpinning all knowledge that may be traced back to Aristotle. In fact Peirce went so far as to nominate instinct as the prime mover in providing pathways for the growth and development of true reason that "springs from experience". Strong echoes of this are found in the work of both Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) who stress that reason is based on bodily experience, and that repetition of experiences facilitates our understanding. Certainly survival experiences, such as balancing, are basic, and we need to practise these so that we might, for example, ride a horse or bicycle. As a consequence of understanding bodily balance, we might be able to transfer this understanding to more abstract concepts such as symmetrical or asymmetrical balance in design, and these concepts become part of the principles of the Art Discourse through contributing relevant information to the folk theories and scientific principles of the Discourse. Gee (1992) suggests that, as members of a particular community group, for example, the Art Discourse, we are inculcated into the behaviour and beliefs of the group. Thus we have access to memories existing in our cultural milieu licensed by our 'club' as appropriate reports of past experience to guide our conduct and, it is probable that these reports, like Plato's legacy, will continue to undergo change as singular persons focus on beneficial aspects that enhance their survival.

2.2.4 Social Practices

According to Gee (1992) rules of behaviour are ingrained in social practices in which relevant and right experiences are fostered by a particular social community through apprenticing newcomers, and constantly checking and nudging each member towards some norm. Within a social community there may be many varied social practices, each having certain ways of acting, talking, valuing, and thinking associated with objects, settings, and events that define the nature of the Discourse, or social network. Because these practices are handed down through time, and membership is sanctioned and operated by a socioculturally defined group of people, human action is only meaningful and recognisable within some discourse framework. For example, a child belongs to a family, and thus the primary amalgam of ways of acting, interacting, talking, valuing and thinking are associated with objects, settings and events that are characteristic of that particular Family Discourse. The child acquires knowledge of the Discourse through a type of apprenticeship whereby other, more senior members, model appropriate values and behaviour thus inculcating "folk theories" within the child. As the child grows, the range of surrounding discourses increases with schooling, sport, religion, government and hundreds of other social practices vying for attention. Consequently it is the ideal norms of the Discourse that constitute meaning, memory, believing and knowing, and these belong in the community outside the head.

In the community outside the head, Gardner (1993: 237) draws attention to "authentic domains" that are socially valued disciplines that allow acquisition of skills and knowledge through effort over time supported by feedback; Grossberg (1988: 35) talks of sites at which we may stop and "install" our selves into practices; Rosenblatt (1983: 161) emphasises personality patterns dominated by automatically absorbed prejudices and expectations; Culler (1981: 26) includes the network of environmental data within his "system of relations" and Gordon (1961: 95) refers to conventions. All these things are outside us, influencing us and adding to a complex configuration of associations that we do have inside our heads, and it is these associations, and how we use them, that

allows us to claim experience as personal. But before the experience we need to have some understanding of the forces that motivate us to interpret the things outside us.

Gee's (1992) notion of Discourses highlights what we might think of as various clubs of meaning. Our Western society, in particular, cultivates clubs like metaphorical mushrooms that spring up all over the place. We have Church Clubs, Political Clubs, Race Clubs, Tennis Clubs, Golf Clubs, Surf Clubs, Needlework Clubs - clubs of all sorts including associations and institutions through which groups of people come together to define themselves, develop an interest, foster a passion, meet other like-minded people, or perhaps make money. Of particular interest to this research are the Art Clubs that regulate the social practices of members in ambiguous ways that shall be discussed in the following sections. However, all clubs seem to have one basic rule - you either conform or you are excluded. This means understanding the context and supporting the ideology of the group of which you are part.

Gee (1992) argues that the ideology of any group tends to evolve as dominant ideas become fashionable for a time thence to be supplanted by modifications that may lead to an opposing ideology. Such an argument is supported by Josephson (1996) who opines that the dominant ideology of Modernism sustained the notion of the autonomous artwork that Postmodernism now denies. Perhaps we can understand how this has come about by looking at the arguments of three prominent philosophers whose ideas have been very influential in the Art Discourse.

The work of philosophers such as Langer (1950s) and Barthes (1960s) has done much to highlight the pivotal position of the object in the binary system of signifier/signified developed by Saussure (1959), while the work of Derrida (1960s) attempts to bridge the two perspectives of Saussure and Peirce (1978) that have resided in the memory of Western communities. On the one hand, as previously discussed in Section 2.2.1, the ideas of Saussure have been foregrounded in much of the telling while, on the other

hand, the ideas of Peirce have remained in the background because, it could be argued, of his emphasis on the person doing the thinking rather than reliance on objective reality.

Langer (1957: 133) suggests that the prime office of signs lies in "their power of formulating experience, and presenting it objectively for contemplation, logical intuition, recognition, understanding". She considers that understanding of the object comes through the use of imagination and language which "grow up together in a reciprocal tutelage", and thus we classify and give meaning to objects and experiences which then allows us, through memory, to recall or anticipate associations and connotations assigned through usage and accepted within a tradition (1957: 71). In other words the club to which we belong directs the way in which we experience things. This, according to Langer (1957), involves discursive thinking which is a process of generalisation progressing through systematic relation patterns to concepts of abstraction as she states quite clearly:

> What discursive symbolism - language in its literal use - does for our awareness of things about us and our own relation to them, the arts do for our awareness of subjective reality, feeling and emotion; they give inward experiences form and thus make them conceivable. (Langer, 1957: 71)

Two ideas are central to Langer's (1957: 67) theory. Firstly, her understanding of language as "a symbolism", that is, a system of symbols governed by conventions of use, separately or in combination, and secondly her notion of artistic *form* as an autonomous expression of a conception of life, emotion, inward reality. In maintaining the autonomous entity of the artwork, Langer aligns herself strongly with Modernism's dream of a self-contained encounter between reader and text that Culler (1981) considers an insidious legacy of the New Criticism.

In fact Langer (1957: 153) suggests that "the common assumption that a poem becomes more significant to the reader if he [sic] can read it in a context of the author's reconstructed life" is a baneful occupation. She considers that a poem, a picture or an arrangement of music is, each in and of itself, an artistic "form":

> As a work of art is an expressive form somewhat like a symbol, and has import which is something like meaning, so it makes a logical abstraction, but not in the familiar way of genuine symbols - perhaps, indeed, a pseudo-abstraction. (Langer, 1957: 127)

There are, however, problems with Langer's assertion that "a work of art is an expressive form" in that while the work does exist as a separate tangible object and, as such, may be considered a sign, understanding the object as an "expressive form" must question its origin of *expressiveness* as influenced by a tradition. This must take into consideration all the historical and social aspects of that tradition that Arnheim (1986: 312) suggests add to what is seen and also modify what is seen. If the work is "expressive", one can only ask for whom? and in what context?

A major problem with Langer's (1957) concept of the artwork as an autonomous entity appears in the way in which the object is personified in the same way in which Saussure is seen by some to personify language as the producer of signifieds. Both endow a sign with inappropriate powers that, we might argue, negates the person who *interprets* the sign.

This same tendency can be seen in the work of Barthes (1988: 173-175), where he suggests that every message is "a veritable architecture" of encounters between signifiers and signifieds in which the whole mysterious operation may be impregnated with secondary meanings. He refers to a "certain innocence of objects", and also suggests that objects, such as paintings, sculpture, poems and music, maintain a stubbornness in being external to us and persist in existing of themselves. In doing so, these self-contained objects are continuously breaking loose toward the infinitely subjective, ultimately developing "a kind of absurdity" or the meaning of a non-meaning; the object "is there to signify that it has no meaning" while "it also serves to communicate information" (1988: 181-182) and, in personifying the object, Barthes argues that:

> ... if we are to study the meaning of objects we must give ourselves a shock of detachment, in order to objectivize the object, to structure its signification. (Barthes, 1988: 184)

It is as though the object confronts us and, while psychologically we may feel as though this is happening, Barthes' concentration on the signifier/signified aspects of signs does not appear to give sufficient attention to the nature of the human being perceiving the object. While he states that an object is polysemous and each "reader" has "several reservoirs of reading", Barthes (1988: 188) states firmly that there are no objects which do not supply a meaning. One can only ask "for whom?"

However, from the perspective of an artist it is important to recognise that both Langer (1957) and Barthes (1988) include art objects and other things into a category beyond the normally accepted category of linguistic signs according to Saussure. For Langer (1957: 74), "[T]he arts objectify subjective reality", but are not genuine symbols because they do not actually signify anything else beyond themselves, while similarly for Barthes, (1988: 180), the art object falls into his connotation group as something non-human "which persists in existing, somewhat *against* us". While we might not agree with this apparent isolation of the art object in a conceptual sense, recognition of art objects is sufficient to draw attention to the possibility of non-linguistic signs existing and this opens doors to new avenues for considering non-linguistic modes of communication.

In further attempting to understand the legacy of Saussure's binary system in which a singular person is separated from the object, it is interesting to look at Derrida's theory of "traces" because he set out to question, or deconstruct, the system of structure that appears to give centredness to meaning. Derrida (1993: 144) is credited with identifying what he termed, "logocentrism", the desire that people have for some "centre that guarantees being as *presence*". In particular, he argues against privileging speech over writing through which, he claims, Western philosophy supported a 'violent hierarchy' based on the Christian belief that the "Word" (from the New Testament) "underwrites the full presence of the world" (1993: 145). Derrida argues that the hierarchy exists because the spoken word appears to be closer to an originating thought than a written word and thus has a *presence*, while the physical written mark appears as a contaminated

form of speech. However, he argues that cultivation of oratorical eloquence can also cloud the purity of thought and reverse the status of the spoken word to that of a signifier lacking presence which seems to support Barthes' notion of non-meaning. In this, the process of deconstruction has begun that, in itself, might be an interesting exercise which can only suggest that any sign, visual, spoken, gestural, written or whatever, originates in a person sensorially perceiving the sign.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Derrida's work is noted by Scholes (1985: 90) who draws attention to the way in which Derrida, in proposing his theory of the instituted trace, combines "Saussure's notion of the arbitrary sign with Peirce's notion of unlimited semiosis". Further, Weber (1992: 83) interprets Derrida's theory of "differance or trace" as "that which in the presence of the present does not present itself" and thus its presence can not be guaranteed.

According to Derrida there are three deconstructive characteristics of a written sign that render it void. Firstly, it can be repeated in the absence of author, specific context and specific addressee; secondly, it can be read in any fashion whatsoever and may be grafted into a discourse in another context; and thirdly, the written sign is subject to 'spacing' in two senses; through separation from other signs in a particular chain, and, separated from present reference in that it can refer only to something not actually present in it (1993: 147). What Derrida calls to attention is the concept of *present* time as *non-existent* and, as a consequence, no thing can actually be perceived except the sign of the thing. In other words, in the act of becoming aware, the moment of instant perception is immediately a *has-been*. It can be argued that the concept of instant perception is fundamental to Peirce's thinking and thus we can recognise Derrida's argument for the instituted trace as a link between the objective perspective of Saussure, and Peirce's emphasis on the endless network of signs. However, Peirce (1978a) emphasises the *continuity* of present time:

> His whole life is in the present. But when he asks what is the content of the present instant, his question always comes too late. The present has gone by, and what remains of it is greatly metamorphosed. (Peirce, 1978a: 154)

It appears that Derrida's concept of deconstruction, as outlined by Attridge (1992: 26), insists "on the structural interconnectedness of the absolutely singular and the absolutely general" as an interconnection of absolutes. This seems very similar to Peirce's notion of the continuity of immediate consciousness that he nominates as the *state* of feeling (1978a).

It can be argued that the whole theory of deconstruction was built upon the notion of "traces of traces" which led to considerable impact upon the artworld in which the total negation of the art object gave rise to Conceptualism. For example, Lynn (1994: 235-236), in discussing minimalist works of the 1960s, comments that the works "manifest a continual questioning and sense of impermanence" which, she considers, "contained within it the seeds of conceptual art and the dematerialisation of the art object throughout the 1970s".

This brief examination of the theories of Langer, Barthes and Derrida serves as an example to show us firstly, the major role Saussure's theory played in promoting and maintaining the separateness between the individual and the object which was pivotal in fostering aesthetic and modern attitudes concerned with the discreteness, the uniqueness and the totality of the artwork itself as an autonomous object until secondly, the object was theorised out of existence. As noted above, Langer considered works of art to be subjective reality objectified, Barthes grouped works of art into the infinitely subjective "non-human" category that persists in existing apart from people, and Derrida set out to question, or deconstruct, the system of structure that gives centredness to meaning.

It can be suggested that the dissolution of an anchoring centre of meaning in our Postmodern society has given rise to uncertainty and ambiguity in making sense of art works because, as argued by Smith-Shank (1995: 238), "[I]nteracting within one's culture becomes a habit", and people do not readily recognise sign systems that depart from those with which they are familiar. It is reasonable to propose that Saussure's

system of recognising signs consolidated the habitual way of understanding things as either physical or metaphysical, whereas Peirce's (1978) confrontational notion that the nature of signs is arbitrary, that signs are not only confined to language, and that "intellectual triplicity" (intention) is essential in arriving at meaning, now disrupts some existing comfortable habits of belief and inherited meanings.

The thesis proposed here is that refurbishing our inherited meanings entails making the strange familiar and the familiar strange through recognising that grasping meaning is an event of understanding, an experience, which goes beyond the linguistic use of word symbols to encompass all image schemata, their metaphorical projections as well as propositions. Such a thesis supports Johnson's (1987) opinion that:

> Meaning is thus a matter of relatedness (as a form of intentionality). An event becomes meaningful by pointing beyond itself to prior event structures in experience or toward possible future structures. The event is meaningful insofar as it stands against, and is related to, a background stretching from the past into the future. A word or sentence is meaningful because it calls to mind a set of related structures of understanding that are directed either to some set of structures in experience (either actual or potential), or else to other symbols. (Johnson, 1987: 177)

A key question to ask is, if the existing skills of members of a particular group do not include appropriate schema to structure alien information into some form of meaning, if there is no background knowledge of the new phenomenon, how can the message carrying the alien information about the new phenomenon be understood? Our current environment of changing relationships between words, images and sense of self seems an appropriate setting for investigating the ideas of Peirce (1978) who was exploring ideas at odds with the accepted way of thinking in his time. He envisioned human experience as a network of symbolic systems in a time when common understanding was underpinned by the notion of autonomous objects. He was talking about the human desire that makes connections between concepts and actuality when the majority of society still believed in the *God's Eye View* of rationality as separate from bodily experience.

It is only now, a century later, that current theories, such as those proposed by Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), Gee (1992), Dissanayake (1992) and Solso (1994) suggest appropriate schema to unravel some of the complexity of Peirce's messages and, in the unravelling, we may be shocked to find that we change our perceptions because of this experience. However, do we need to develop new kinds of perception to facilitate this experience? Might we find that the stories passed down through generations have other possible interpretations? What are the forces within our environment that suggest changing relationships between words, images and sense of self? and, if meaning does lie outside the head, is this not another way of restating a God's Eye view of objective things?

We might argue that more meaning is now produced in print and framed in visual and mass media images and thus our need to exert effort is actually less, so why would we wish to upset an habitual way of interacting with our culture that has sufficed for thousands of years? Or is there something within us that compels us to continue spinning yarns and framing meanings from our personal point of view?

2.3 Constructing Myths: Spinning Yarns & Framing Meaning

2.3.1 *Spinning Yarns.*

Before the advent of the printing press the oral tradition was dominant as the vehicle for manifestation of essence because it was mainly through verbal signs that meaning was possible. This meant that cultivation of memory tools inside the head played a very important part in a person's ability to relay the spoken word through time. But it was not just the ability to relay the exact words, but the ability to express the *supreme truth* through living myths that constituted the total framework of the spiritual life of a community. According to Bonnefoy (1992: 7) myths codified the beliefs, founded moral rules and determined every practice of daily life and, while remarkable common patterns of thought permeate all myths, Jordon (1995: xi) argues that the "quality and complexity of a myth is frequently determined by the degree of sophistication of the vocabulary at the disposal of the storyteller". This means that myths, as a living symbolic system, also drew upon a rich body of visual images through which the caprices and moods of nature were attributed to gods having similar moods and characteristics embodied in the stories and images depending on the fundamental laws underpinning the mindset of the society. As an example, Jordan (1995: xii) argues that clans eking out an existence in the wastes of Siberia or in the rugged isolation of the Hindu Kush are supported by chauvinistic gods, while "[T]he fabric and laws of society among the ancient Celts were based largely on a need for conquest of territory and on cattle rustling".

If one's survival depended on combat one needed supreme beings such as Medb, goddess queen of Connacht who captured the Brown Bull of Cuailgne, howling dogs such as Adhnuall, the hound of Culann, and incredible horses such as the unruly grey horse of Abarta (Jordan, 1995). Irish history abounds with factual and mythological stories of conflict, battles and raids stemming from five invasions and the two major battles of Magh Tuiredh, and thence the division of Ireland into the five major states of

Ulster, Meath, Leinster, Munster and Connaught (Willis, 1993: 180). Ireland was a land in which

> Bitter and violent men, might rear in stone
> The sweetness that all longed for night and day,
> The gentleness none there had ever known;
> (W. B. Yeats *Ancestral Houses*, 1928)

Jordon (1995) suggests that understanding the mythological store reveals much about the culture which spawned it. For the purposes of this study, Irish mythology plays an important part because many of our forebears were of Irish decent and thus such heroic activities as conquest of territory and cattle rustling were rich subject matter for campfire yarns in most parts of outback Australia at the turn of this century and even to recent times. In noting the growing interest in Celtic origins shared by many of us, Bell (1984) points out that throughout time story telling has been based on personal experience which, in the telling, ignites initial interest within the family group until the interest widens to include the community and, through further oral transmission, might mature into legend involving names, times and places.

An example of the way in which the *yarn* is stretched is recounted by McKenry (1984: 44) who tells us about the transmission of *McArthur's Fart*, conceived by Bath and Bleby as a 62 line poem for the Adelaide University's Dramatic Society's Revue in 1974. In a decade of spinning the recitation some 118 variations (mainly presentation, phraseology and innovations from memory lapses) occurred while the actual plot remained intact! In like manner, Wannan (1970: 504) draws attention to Australian yarnspinners who delighted in the tale that "began and ended nowhere", while the manner of narration played the significant part, or themes, such as 'Irish convict attempts to escape from Sydney *overland to China*', 'cleverness of bush dogs', 'extraordinary feats and characteristics of bullock-teamsters' and heroic 'ringers' that formed a core for on-going yarns.

As a child I remember eagerly waiting for sundown because that heralded story time when my father would gather us children around and tell us stories about mustering,

branding, or of some remarkable stockman or animal that had become a legend in the district. The stories were never written down, but everyone seemed to know of them, and it only took someone to remark, "Remember the time ..." and a whole new batch of evidence, opinions and memories would pour forth. These stories were not myths or fables. To us they were *yarns* that grew in the on-going spinning and weaving of words emanating from personal experience coloured by mythological inference. The yarns were ingredients for the widely shared creative memory of many rural Australians that owes much to the oral traditions of mythology, fables and folklore. The yarns affect the way in which we form what Gee (1992) calls "folk theories" that reflect membership within a particular Discourse or, as Dissanayake (1992) expresses it:

> For every human society can be found to possess traditional beliefs, encoded and expressed if not in books then in oral traditions and ceremonial practices of abiding value to its members. (Dissanayake, 1992: 3)

Wannan (1970) tells us that the essence of folklore is in the "handed-down" aspect that may retain its validity and aliveness in writing, and in the reciprocity of oral and written tradition and flux of cultural change and exchange where:

> ... revival plays as important a part as survival, popularization is as essential as scholarship, and the final responsibility rests upon the accumulative and collective taste and judgment of the many rather than the few. (Wannan, 1970: Preface)

However, in talking of myths, Bonnefoy (1992: 10) argues that "the truth of the myth is enclosed in a speechlike nature, which writing more or less obliterates ..." by imposing the constraints of rules foreign to the self-expressive memory, or by reducing the myth's own speech to silence. Thus, when it became possible to capture words and lock them in time, contain them on paper by using a type of reference mark, the written word then became the province of the academically trained, and the prime status of the spoken word gave way to that of the written word, and thence the printed word from the Renaissance period onward in which knowledge appeared packaged in texts and thus appeared to carry the weight of authority.

We are told that human beings seek balance and patterning to feel comfortable in the environment that allows them to exert some form of control over nature (Arnheim, 1986: Johnson, 1987: Lakoff, 1987: Dissanayake, 1992: Gee, 1992: Solso, 1994) and, in striving for this comfort, we organise things into categories and habitual ways of thinking so that we feel safe and secure. This may explain why people place a lot of faith in those identified independent truths found in *classical* categories external to the body that are able to be isolated and dissected through testing and comparison so that we can convince ourselves of their authority because the results are recorded in texts. Lakoff (1987) argues that, from a Western perspective, the assumption of disembodied and abstract reason has fostered our acceptance of classical categories that are taught as unquestionable, definitional truths when, in fact, categories are fluid and changing depending on how a person identifies a best example, or prototype, of something.

It can be suggested that the disagreement between whether or not the written word fosters living thought, or kills it, lies in the notion of control. Constantly the meaning of a word is questioned as though meaning is the property of the word rather than residing within the intention of the author or interpretation of the reader. Reddy (1981: 287) talks of our propensity to search for the meaning "right there in the words", to attempt to extract thoughts and feelings from the text and, in so doing, we develop habits of relying on thoughts that are already packaged through the conduit of words. All we have to do is accept the meaning which, Reddy (1981) considers, trivializes the function of the reader or listener by allowing she or he success without effort.

Thus, it can be argued that meaning is framed. Personification of words does endow them with authority that places us in the position of "patient" in Peirce's (1978a) terms. He makes the distinction between *will* and *sense*:

> In will, the events leading up to the act are internal, and we say that we are agents more than patients. In sense, the antecedent events are not within us; and besides, the object of which we form a perception ... remains unaffected. Consequently, we say that we are patients, not agents. (Peirce, 1978a: 163)

Objectification of the word places it outside us. It is a sign that stands for something and, the way in which we perceive the sign depends on our degree of familiarity with the Literary Discourse. It is arguable that most people are happy to accept the package without having to exert too much effort. Many teachers constantly challenge students to interrogate words, to move beyond their zones of comfort and to pose their own thoughts because, by seeing newness in something that is taken for granted, they may then have the curiosity and courage to make inferences about the personal experience of thinking about words and the personal experience of making art. This however, requires intrinsic motivation that, as argued by Dissanayake (1992), can only come from emotional commitment and, while signs of any sort continue to be treated as authoritative containers, it can be argued that we will remain "patients" awaiting results. Josephson (1996), Rosenblatt (1968) and Baudrillard (1980) suggest that most readers want comfort, amusement and fulfilment of dreams, and Leed (1980: 49), in referring to the autonomy of the text, considers that it offers a neutral, impersonal or "cool" medium of communication, while Ellul (1980) poses the most disturbing thought that, in to-day's technological society, only correct practice (not intentions or motivation) has currency.

To compound this rather passive picture, Steiner (1989) considers that much of the analytic and structural study of language is the erasure and severing of empirical experience and untutored intuition from language-acts. He stresses that

> No formalization is of an order adequate to the semantic mass and motion of a culture, to the wealth of denotation, connotation, implicit reference, elision and tonal register which envelop saying what one means, meaning what one says or neither. (Steiner, 1989: 83)

We can argue that the notion of intention in "meaning what one says" is crucial to investigating words and images as personal experience because it places a person in a decision-making position between effort and resistance. To elicit meaning from something that is read, either image or word, means that some relationship is established between the object and the user; meaning is not a property of the object itself but resides in the act of interpretation that takes place between the user and the object even though

the physical form of the sign (such as a painting or a text) may exist independently of the author or the user. We might ask, how is it possible to link the two?

In establishing a connection between user and object we could use a method based on Peirce's (1978b) argument discussed in Section 2.1, that meaning can only be understood through a genuine triadic relation that involves the referent, the sign/object and the interpretant. Such a method involves spinning a yarn as an example of how we make triadic links between an idea of some quality, for example warmth, our intention or desire to somehow make the dream come true, and our realization of the dream of warmth through some action.

If we were to look at a mob of sheep grazing in the paddock we might not see warmth, but might anticipate that the dream of being warm might be realised through making a woollen jumper from the soft, outer covering of the sheep's body based on past experience with spinning and knitting. As Gee (1992) suggests, our folk theories allow us to interpret expectations and make decisions based on our degree of involvement within a specific social group. As a member of this group, for example Wool Growers, we pick up many of the existing meanings and mannerisms, and thus can infer actions in the future emanating from our experience of actually looking at the object, sheep. Thus, through inference, one might imagine the steps of shearing, cleaning the wool and spinning the fibre into a long thread suitable for knitting into another sign - the jumper. The dream of warmth associated with the jumper is not grazing in the paddock, but the metaphorical jumper may be grazing in the mind. After having had this sense experience in the beginning, if one was to read the word "sheep" at a later date, it is possible that one could also think of knitting a jumper and thus go out to find some wool. In this way, the notion of reading signs is a never-ending process of wishing to link a quality to an action and this process is grounded in intention, the connecting bond between the wish and action. But we cannot intend or predict without prerequisite experience.

The experience of raising sheep is, for some people, a part of the Australian heritage that has given rise to certain folk theories and these are useful to illustrate the metaphorical connection between the bodily experience and the way in which many Australians refer to story-telling as *spinning yarns*. Johnson (1987: xv) considers that concrete bodily experience constrains the "input" to metaphorical projections and the kinds of mappings that can occur across domains. He also argues that image schema provide a means of structuring particular experiences schematically so as to give order and connectedness to our perceptions and conceptions that Gee (1992) says emerge when needed. Lakoff (1987) calls this link between conceptual schemes and the world of real human experience an *internal realism*, that relies on the ability to use image schema as structuring devices in forming Idealized Cognitive Models. ICMs lie in the ability to form complex concepts and general categories using image schema as structuring devices that include two major abilities. Firstly there is the ability to form symbolic structures that correlate with preconceptual structures in everyday experience and, secondly there is the ability to project metaphorically from structures in the physical domain to structures in the abstract domains.

These arguments would appear to support Peirce's (1978) emphasis on the actual totality of human experience in a broad sense as the main source for understanding things that involve forming patterns and categories and thus inferences that emanate from repetition and practice. According to Peirce (1978b), inference is the conscious and controlled adoption of a belief as a consequence of other knowledge. In the analogy of spinning yarns it was suggested that we might imagine woolly jumpers in the paddock when, in fact, we look at sheep. As members of the Wool Growers' Club we can infer certain possibilities; we may become fixated upon certain qualities of the sheep (wool), and we can propose that what was possible in the past would be possible again. Figure 2.3.1 suggests the triadic process of inference in which the conscious and controlled adoption of a belief is a consequence of other knowledge involving the three stages of colligation, observation and judgement according to Peirce (1978b: 267).

Figure 2.3.1 The Three Stages of Inference Derived from C. S. Peirce

The process of inference according to Peirce (1978b) involves firstly, bringing together propositions that hitherto were not considered similar or united in any way through a process he terms colligation. This step occasions some unification of the propositions into a complex icon that secondly, demands concentration on a particular aspect that suggests something else while retaining aspects of its disparate origin and thus allows us thirdly, to draw a conclusion that if C has attributes of A and B, D would have attributes of A, B and C and so on through a chain of inference.

It could be argued that Petrie (1981: 438) bases his notion of triangulation on the same process by nominating "anomaly" as step one in which irregular aspects are considered in existing-framework terms that suggest a new characterization of the situation through metaphor leading to secondly, activity in the world and thence thirdly, observation of the results that can suggest another anomaly and so on. Figure 2.3.2 reflects the pattern developing, as strangeness is made familiar through metaphor that facilitates some form of resolution through action that, in turn, suggests further possible meanings.

Figure 2.3.2 Process of Triangulation According to Petrie (1981)

Petrie (1981) argues that metaphor is one of the central ways of leaping the epistemological chasm between old knowledge and radically new knowledge because the anomalous step shows promise in providing a metaphor as a guide to new action and thus forms a bridge from the known to the unknown. The work of Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) strongly supports this argument through identifying shared patterns, that, through repetition and sameness, allow recognition of parts of the pattern (old knowledge) while also allowing the formation of connections to unfamiliar propositions. Thus we can argue that meaning involves a changing, organic system in which patterns of interpretation evolve depending on a person's desire in wanting to attach an idea to an object/action. Such an argument questions the dominance of the written text that fixes particular patterns of words in print, that, from a Western perspective, appear to represent the supreme symbol objectifying truth. We can ask why it is that written texts, in the main, are thoroughly investigated and learnt within educational systems for authoritative use beyond schooling? Why are other patterns of meaning seemingly ignored?

The irony is that peculiar patterns of meaning are also fixed in images as argued by Pajaczkowska (1996), and all artworks, according to Dissanayake (1992), have played a

vital role in the total sense-making schema of societies throughout history. However, Sless (1981), raises the question of why it is only in our Western society that images are considered unproblematic or peripheral to understanding and little attention is given to using and understanding images in schooling and, as a consequence, the signifying properties of images are overlooked. We can argue that this neglect widens a cultivated, educated gap that exists in our understanding of a world where images are used with increasing popularity, power and persuasion while, at the same time, we can question the credibility of those professing to understand the peculiar patterns of meaning within images and whose interpretations we are given second hand. In fact, Josephson (1996: 105) warns us about the "vicarious" nature of experiences also *given* by popular imagery to uninformed consumers targeted by media and advertising. The implications in this warning are horrific if we accept the personification of imagery, media and advertising that *gives* experiences and, the suggestion that experience is *vicarious*, further undermines any sense of will on behalf of individuals through implying interference with, or framing of, what Grossberg (1988) terms our "mattering maps".

2.3.2 *Framing Meaning.*

Given the dominance of positivist objectivity in Western society and the allure and status of scientific investigation heightened by analysis of texts, it appears that appraising artworks has become a means to its own end, separate from the accident of there being an artwork to internalise into our consciousness. Pajaczkowska (1996: 31) refers to this as the " 'iron laws' of institutional thinking" in which publishing is the most highly prized index of research. Previously, in Section 2.1, the problematic nature of using written words, and Derrida's argument of deconstruction, were discussed. If the written mark is seen as a form of contamination of the actual essence of spoken thought, it might be argued that the written word forms a similar contaminating function in relation to the actual essence of artistic thought. Hollingsworth (1994: 17) suggests that the "contextualising prism" of art language or theory can make the work "more palpably seen", but he insists that "visual art is *visual* art" and must not sacrifice its potential to

"engage directly with the audience". In other words, it is essential to employ the sensory and experiential level of direct engagement with works of art through which the viewer uses the senses and imagination.

However, this raises the whole dilemma of what we can believe with conviction and confidence. We have been taught to believe in the written word, and the way in which we respond to texts involves some sense of security within established norms that satisfies our need to demonstrate some degree of competency within the framework of norms. But if our intuition, our instinct, our affective domain and our experience appear to be in opposition to what we think we should believe, we are left in a state of utter confusion that Grossberg (1988: 39-40) terms dissolution of an "anchoring effect". This raises the possibility that we might, out of desperation, resort to denying our feelings and believing the text out of years of habitual reliance on the written word. Thus Solso's (1994) suggestion that attaching verbal labels to artworks can assist interpretation appears logical.

Often the attachment of a verbal label influences, not only what we remember, but also how long the object is remembered. It could be argued that the labelling process has become important since artworks were classified as separate from everyday behaviour and, in this separation, the concepts and expectations of the individual became synonymous with the artwork as idiosyncratic expressions of the individual which then needed a label to explain them. According to Dissanayake (1992: 61), the cultivation of personal expression as a private compulsion can be likened to "the display of a captive, lone peacock vainly performed for human (not peahen) spectators". Explanations of the display now need to be framed in aesthetic commentary.

This labelling process can be seen in the way in which Duchamp's (1917) act of placing a urinal in another context transformed it from a utilitarian object to a statement of art. Duchamp's intention at the time is debatable, and this is the issue at stake. Lucie-Smith (1977: 40) argues that "[B]y asserting that any object could be turned into a work of art

merely by labelling it as such, Duchamp gave free rein to a vein of distinctive irony". Reproduction in texts, analysis and criticism of the object, *The Fountain*, has ensured that the label, 'a work of art', be applied to this object (urinal) and many other such readymades.

This transformation process is integrally linked with what is said and written about the work. According to Josephson (1996), the rise of Neoplatonism and Humanism alerted artists to the need for both a theory of subject matter and style to validate their works, and thus the mission of the artist evolved into one of discovering personal identity and spiritual beauty reminiscent of ancient Greece which further developed into an academic monopoly on art education with the foundation of the *Academie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture* in 1648. Neoclassicism continued with the outer contours of Greek art while the spiritual essence became lost in intellectual appropriation from past stories directed at teaching about complex subject matter that needed interpretation. Thus a philosophy of *taste* and art history emerged. Josephson (1996) supports Dissanayake's (1992) argument that one of the major reasons for this was the beginning of an idea some hundred years after the Enlightenment, that there was a special frame of mind required for appreciating works of art, an unprecedented *disinterested* attitude, a kind of detached aesthetic experience that was considered to be one of the highest forms of mental activity.

In investigating the mechanisms used for aesthetic interpretation Pajaczkowska (1996: 34) argues that the problem of what we actually recognise in a painting lies in the "battle between word and image" in which those seeking to transcribe the iconic mode of signification into a linguistic code within codes of *figuration* struggle over ownership of territory and definition of powerful academic disciplines. Her argument draws attention to the fact that theories involving linguistic structures do not offer adequate conceptualisation of the unconscious. How, for example, do we apply a structural method of analysis to understanding the impact of colour? She argues that, in trying to

elicit meaning from colour we must consider the organisation of the body, and this draws attention to ways in which we bodily sense things.

Thus we might argue that our problem with trying to apply a disinterested attitude to aesthetics lies in the fact that we are dealing with the intangible, subjective areas of beauty, goodness, opinion and taste that, as Wheale (1995: 35) suggests, demonstrates possession of privileged knowledge which is related to social status. However, this sort of privileged knowledge, according to Josephson (1966: 176), is disappearing in to-day's climate of popular standards appeased through *niche marketing* that entices us to parcel ourselves as *fashion statements*. In other words we purchase things that imply some sort of relationship with the image created through advertising and, in so doing, mesh with the popular, trendy, replaceable fashion of the moment. The impact of advertising, we can suggest, might awaken Fromentin's (1872) advice to a young artist that:

> [T]he times are bad; moral sense is very low; public taste astray, if not lost. Let each one of us work to elevate it. It depends upon you, with such a subject, to give a lesson in art, a lesson in style, and a lesson in taste. (Nochlin, 1966: 25).

While one might agree that public taste has gone astray, there are those who continue to argue that the heritage of powerful academic traditions does have merit. A case for allegiance to the fine arts is advocated by aestheticians such as Smith (1985: 169) who presents the "idea of 'open élites (sic) of merit'", and Burton (1991: 36) who talks of the centuries of human effort represented in "the prime virtue of all great art" that "makes visible compelling visions of our shared reality". Both call for involvement with acclaimed art forms that act as inspiration in challenging new ways of thinking through making connections with the human need and desire to make sense of the world and the self in the world.

However, Smith (1985: 170) warns that "trust in experts is somewhat more guarded today" because it is possible that persons proclaiming to have this valued information about artworks may indeed be more interested in quantity rather than quality. It appears

that the written text itself has now become a paper parade of "secondary talk" that Steiner (1989: 4-10) refers to in identifying a "radical spirit[s] in current thought that has defined the task of this sombre age 'as learning anew to be human'". His field of discontent lies with the "annexation of the living arts and literature by the scholastics" in which he sees professionalization of the academic pursuit, and humanistic imitation of the scientific, as responsible for eroding the bridge between ourselves "and that which the heart knows". By this he means the human ability to afford the text, music or visual image an indwelling clarity and life-force that only felt meaning can engender. Steiner's (1989) major concern is with hybrid academic journalistic coverage that he considers adds nothing to our understanding of the artwork as he points out:

> Literate humanity is solicited daily by millions of words, printed, broadcast, screened, about books which it will never open, music it will not hear, works of art it will never set eyes on. A perpetual hum of aesthetic commentary, of on the minute judgements, of pre-packaged pontifications crowds the air. (Steiner, 1989: 24)

In other words, the aesthetic commentary in the main has no reference to any actual encounter with the work, but offers instead an object for dissection in seminars, lectures, dissertations and post-doctoral research. Following this line of thought, Hughes (1990: 399) offers another reason in saying that "to resurrect something, to study and endow it with a pedigree, is to make it saleable". Thus much aesthetic commentary may also be regarded as a type of professional "artmanna" for the armies of intellectual employees who constantly need to proclaim their credibility.

A telling example of this separation between aesthetic commentary and artworks can be seen in language that has become manufactured "impenetrable verbiage" according to Loppert (1992: 44-47) in her article *"Pet Noires"* in the journal *Modern Painters*. The discussion centres on what Loppert sees as the deplorable "language of obfuscation" used in particular by contemporary feminists, and the failure to communicate by artists and writers alike. Loppert's article takes to task those who secrete themselves in "a thicket of philosophical jargon" where theories and buzz words result in the "crucifixion of language". Loppert selects various samples of written critiques from catalogues and

papers, of which the following may give some indication of difficulties posed for understanding:

> On the planar surface of postmodernism the image of the body is perpetually intrusive, refusing to be accommodated into theories of representation, disrupting our linguistic and diagnostic frameworks, powerfully raising the intersubjective question of communication. Through the dutiful explanations of fantasmatically displaced bodies, the maternal body that is the unexamined rationale for this piece of elucidation silently maintains its call for attention. ... Paintings were compendia of motifs or structures which could readily be extrapolated and identified with agricultural depression, patriarchal oppression, cultural imperialism or other all-embracing and all too often unquestioned constructs. Or they were de-historicised puzzles of denotative and connotative signs waiting for the skilled deconstructionist to open them up. (Loppert, 1992: 46)

Loppert's "whew!" seems to sum up her understanding of the above message. The question we might ask is, if a reputed art historian such as Loppert, writing and broadcasting about visual arts and the art market in London, has this reaction, what chance is there for anyone, viewer, students or teachers of art, to have a glimmer of a chance of understanding texts such as this?

It could be argued that the above text constitutes some sort of meaning framed in aesthetic commentary that erases the image. Maybe the paintings were "de-historicised puzzles" to that particular critic and, more to the point, how can we decide if the "maternal body" is indeed the "unexamined rationale for this piece of elucidation ..."? Perhaps, for ordinary persons, any initial interest in the actual painting might be barricaded by the textual frame of meaning that denies us access to the image.

However, it may be that many members of the public generally rely on some sort of authority to guide their search for enlightenment and understanding, and texts are regarded as the main source in which the opinion of experts is framed and packaged for our consumption. As argued previously, objectification and personification of the word endow that unpretentious sign with powers beyond its purpose and, often the struggle by experts, critics, academics and art historians for inclusion of *their* findings in tomes and archives is ongoing and fiercely fought, mindless of any genuine attempt at enlightenment.

For example, Nelson (1995) recently looked at how power structures work when critics and writers quote from fashionable foreign theorists. His discussion concerns the way in which authority is sought in all discourses, and how efforts to establish an independent authority ignore the fact that the roots of our culture were "cultivated by superior powers" elsewhere. What Nelson (1995: 10-12) finds worrying is the way in which some Australian writers either reference "others" in the hopes of mixing prestige with home fare, or avoid international reference and serve up parochial opinion as authority. To Nelson, "suitors", international or parochial, are collectively our culture in its "greater inclusiveness of exchange", and appropriate reference enriches our argument and satisfies our curiosity about what is happening beyond our horizons. He sums up that "[N]othing is circulated if it does not have some use-value" albeit it "daggy" and the "function regional, provincial, parochial".

While Nelson (1995) admits that use of foreign philosophers as a prerequisite for local discourse is often "gratuitous", we can argue that the jargon of experts does hold a certain appeal for the masses. A perfect example of audience transfixed by the jargon of art is Hoffie's (1994) report of Jean Baudrillard's return to Australia for his lecture presentation to a worshipping audience at Griffith University, Brisbane. Hoffie (1994: 13) refers to the French theorist as one "who has amassed a greater word-count in citations, quotations and foot-notes than almost any other contemporary philosopher". It seems that his *presence* was not perceived less by those beyond the fifth row who could hear little (owing to lack of microphones), but who could still witness the performance, the delivery, absorb the aura, and participate through "embarrassed, apologetic giggles".

We can argue that our current cultural environment continues to separate objects or individuals out for moments of spotlighted fame, or to use Dissanayake's term, "make special". However, if we look at Dissanayake's (1992) thesis, it is grounded in the belief that the control of human behaviour and emotion is frequently intrinsic to the control of the means of production. In other words humans have the ability to cognise an extra-ordinary realm from the mundane, to recognise difference and to employ special

things for utilitarian and symbolic purposes so that survival and production is enhanced. An important distinction she makes concerns the word 'control' which is used in the sense of comprehension and negotiation with, not domination and subjugation as in conquest.

We might consider that "making special" was what Morris (1887) had in mind when he stated:

> Therefore the Aim of Art is to increase the happiness of men, by giving them beauty and interest of incident to amuse their leisure, and prevent them wearying even of rest, and by giving them hope and bodily pleasure in their work; or, shortly, to make man's work happy and his rest fruitful. (Nochlin, 1966: 132).

A similar sentiment is expressed by Thoma (1880) who considered that art creates "according to its own dictates - not according to external laws and directions, but according to laws which are embedded in the soul of man" (Nochlin, 1966: 163), and Fiedler (1876), who referred to perceptual comprehension and experience as an impartial, free activity "which serves no purpose beyond itself and which ends in that purpose" which is its immediate meaning based on a need "which in turn is an attribute of man's spiritual nature" (Nochlin, 1966: 170-171).

However, from a current perspective, Wheale (1995: 61) refers to new forms of eclecticism, new combinations of genre and textured meaning in our "imaged" culture that produce "intellectual livestock" to be tended and managed, while Lippard (1996: 16) sees the juxtapositioning of unlike realities as a "collage aesthetic" that not only confuses the public but reflects the "downright surrealist situation" of artists in which knowledge about art has assumed proportions of superiority (and confusion) that separate the object itself from its original context and transport it into a realm that mystifies the public. Thus we could argue that the accumulation of this knowledge might be compared to the publicity that manufactures glamour and reassurance that Berger (1972: 131-133) considers is a form of power that allows people to "look out *over* the looks of envy which sustain them". An example of this type of *imaged* culture can be found in Zipes's

(1980: 106) discussion of Sylvester Stallone's self-modelled, manufactured hero "Rocky", where we can see how media glamour can be used to elevate "underdogs" because "the system does allow them to make it to the top". But, while knowing that that is only an illusion necessary to perpetuate the "systematic alienation that results from commodity production" we, nevertheless, envy the hero for being what we are not. Ironically, in real life, according to Zipes (1980), our hero himself admits "passive recognition and acceptance of the fact that he will remain a commodity for the rest of this life" sustained by our envy.

Not only are people glamourized into something above the ordinary. Berger's (1972) discussion also pertains to the way an image is presented as a work of art, and how

> ... the art of the past is being mystified because a privileged minority is
> striving to invent a history which can retrospectively justify the role of
> the ruling classes, and such a justification can no longer make sense in
> modern times. (Berger, 1972: 11)

Thus we can argue that the problem in much current art industry practice is not the work of art itself, but firstly, *substitution of the artist* for art image, and secondly, various reasons underlying promotion of the artwork may reflect self-aggrandisement on behalf of the promoters who certainly do not remain silent in selling their wares.

Engagement with works of art has been the subject of debate amongst artists, art critics, art historians and art educators for many years. The focus of debate has centred on the types of appropriate artworks to include in the repertoire of those presented as worthy for ingestion into one's store of nourishment for appreciation and thus enlightenment, or those whose subject matter or technique is useful for simulation or appropriation in producing another art product. These functions concern investigating artworks as a means of understanding more about our environment and ourselves.

Pollock's (1996: 53-55) question concerning the "collision of two professions - artist and teacher; the collision of two ideologies - individualism and socialisation" has peculiar relevance for one who produces work within a "precious phrase" of *my work* that, according to Pollock, might appear to contradict the mission of education as a vital

site of social management. Thus the function of art and the interpretation of artworks might be seen from these two different points of view that contribute to the struggle of singular artists to resist being totally framed and packaged within the culture industry.

Nevertheless, researchers such as Kuhn (1984), Hamblen (1990), and Burton (1991), argue that the term *art* cannot satisfactorily be defined, and so what is either said or written about art may have a variety of meanings. As suggested previously, the meanings themselves can never be analysed in isolation because individual understanding and interpretation depends on the reader who, according to Salomon (1979), Solso (1994) Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) use their cognitive tools in personal and peculiar ways. However, Paivio (1981), Hollingworth (1994) and Pajaczkowska (1996) draw attention to the powerful influence of written texts in presenting meaning packaged in words that Steiner (1989) and Hughes (1990) argue become means unto themselves. Thus Josephson's (1996) cultural niche theory may account for the way in which art responds to the fashion of the times. Josephson (1996: 166) argues that Fine Art is passing into decline, Popular Art is developing power, and Design Art, with particular emphasis on advertising, is just discovering its power that, she says, "speaks with a whole community of institutions behind it" so that human needs of any sort, at any time, may be met with a promise of virtual fulfilment framed within our cultural niche.

2.4 Power Points: Politics and The Culture Industry.

It might be argued that our culture in Australia appears to have had a short but turbulent history in which a struggle revolving around material and personal control has predominated. Haese's (1981) discussion regarding the formation of the Australian Academy of Art, initiated by Menzies in 1937, has relevance for our current cultural climate. In particular, claims that public money would ensure a dictatorship over the dispensation of patronage and thus preserve mediocrity through hindering the development of art in Australia, appear to have echoes in the *Creative Nation Commonwealth Cultural Policy* (1994) where, on page seven we find one simple sentence: "Culture creates wealth".

At the launch of the Australian Centre for Arts Education, Archer (1994) stressed that learning was a consequence of wanting to know more about life, and that the outcome *may* result in being an artist, scientist, engineer or other. For Archer and many of her peers and colleagues, "art is life", and this was the message she wanted to get across to more Australians so that they too could be aware of the satisfaction and fulfilment of being "useful and responsible citizens". Her argument went on to emphasise that the arts would then "flourish naturally because arts and artists become beloved of the people". This, in turn, would lead to strength as a nation, strength of spirit and ideas, and economic strength "because artists will be naturally supplying the people's natural demand" (*NAAE News*, December 1994).

However, Haese's (1981) argument, that the art of Tucker, Nolan and later Boyd, Perceval and Vassilieff had two lessons:

> ... first, a wholly professional notion of an artist as one committed to art irrespective of financial return, since art was life; and second, a belief in painting as expression without any gesture to the idea of art as craft in an academic sense. (Haese, 1981: 78)

These lessons partially foreshadow the sentiment expressed by Archer that "art is life", but denies the inclusion of financial emphasis targeted in *Creative Nation Commonwealth Cultural Policy* (1994), our first national cultural policy launched in

Commonwealth Cultural Policy (1994), our first national cultural policy launched in Australia. We might argue that the notion of art as a spiritual current running within a community generating a desire to enhance and inform behaviour has been unplugged and replaced by the power of public money that, as reported by Haese (1981), led to dissent and division in the 1940s and stifled the necessary creative freedom advocated by the group, Angry Penguins (1940-46). This raises questions of whether or not culture creates wealth, or does wealth create culture, or is culture the mutation, integration and disintegration of a changing environment? How do things change from being *representamens* of the soul to *representamens* of the purse? Is knowledge becoming encoded in high value-added products and services that undermine art as personal experience?

From Archer's (1994) perspective it seems that she advocates placing faith in a natural desire to learn if artistic production is to "flourish". On the other hand Throsby (1995: 31) draws attention to an increase in output from the cultural sector in Australia over the past five years, but a decline in artists' incomes over the same period. He supposes that reasons for this apparent paradox lie, firstly, in an increase in the number of practising artists, and secondly, that artists "as a whole tend to be squeezed", being the most economically vulnerable group of the cultural workforce. From Throsby's perspective it seems that awareness of economic rights must be cultivated if artists are to survive economically in our culture that creates wealth. The problem is one of allowing the arts to "flourish naturally" because they are "beloved", and establishing economic viability because artists must live.

Looking back to the days of Fred McCubbin (1995) who wrote in 1894 that

> ... as a painter must live by his work, and although he be ever so anxious that prosperity may get the advantage of his labors, he has, at any rate for the present, to bring his work before a public little inclined to help him - a public so absorbed in industrial and mercantile pursuits, that it has little time to give to the appreciation of artistic efforts. (Mc Queen, 1995: 14)

we can see that this concern is not new and nothing has really changed. Earlier, in talking of the "glorious advance" made by France in the late 1900s in promoting local

art, McCubbin (1995: 13) mentioned the encouragement given to artists "to develop the best that is in them, not to pander to the bourgeois tastes of the masses of the people".

If we return to Archer's argument that learning and production are consequences of wanting to know more about life, and combine this with Throsby's observation that artists are the most economically vulnerable group of the cultural workforce, we can sympathize with McCubbin's concern that the artist must not only "develop the best" personally, but must also live by the work. We can argue that this is where reality challenges idealism - the cold hard facts are those of supply and demand. How then may the arts "flourish naturally"? Might they flourish to such an extent that they may have to mutate and reproduce to "pander to the bourgeois tastes of the masses" because they no longer have a special identity, but have become another popular commodity in the production line? Fry (1988: 80) comments that *popular* itself is an economically modified signifier used to measure the volume of consumption as terms such as *hit*, *smash* and *blockbuster* imply.

In commenting on the commercial focus of current exhibitions, Denholm (1995: 9) berates the curatorial staff of the National Gallery for falling prey to crowd pleasing in promoting uncritical blockbusters and prostituting itself to sell consumer goods. Even worse, he notes that advice from the curator that "people as they enact their lives already practise efficiently as artists", leads him to comment that making art may as well be replaced by simply watching people.

A similar concern comes from Knezic (1994: 20), a young artist from Victoria who attended the *4th Australian Contemporary Art Fair*, and found that it was more "an exposition of commercial galleries and their respective stables of artists" geared to making sales. She noted that the overall calibre of work lacked interest or innovation and suggested that the title should be changed to "Commercial Galleries Trade Fair". This is an observation that begs the question of artistic identity and raises the issue of individuals as a commodity within the culture industry.

While this shift has done little to advance the income of artists, it could be argued that it has done much to promote cultural output. Or it might be more truthful to refer to this as "[a]rt as a social instrument for education and entertainment as well as enlightenment" to quote Woodrow (1995) who takes a look at several recent major exhibitions in Australia and questions the current trend towards social relevance. While admitting that he is not calling for a return to the formalist adoration of the art object, Woodrow (1995: 12) finds it hard to find "any discernible or meaningful pattern" emerging from the exhibitions. Even when pinpointing exemplary works by artists such as Damien Hirst, Susan Norrie, Robert Macpherson and others, he concludes that "there is no predetermined pattern, no collective spirit, no all-pervasive pragmatic agenda, or no direction in contemporary art, except at the most superficial stylistic level".

Woodrow's (1995) search to find something beyond the "philosophy of the warm and fuzzy" seemingly expounded by Gablik in her latest "student-friendly" book, *The Re-enchantment of Art,* seems futile. Similarly, he despairs at Mary Eagle's "indulgent attempt to establish another defining metaphor for art" that colours her critique of the showcase of contemporary art *Virtual Reality* (1994) at the National Gallery, Canberra. An example from the former that Woodrow ridicules is the work of Wyoming artist, Lynne Hull, who makes 'art for animals' such as small etched holes in rocks from which desert lizards might drink. In the case of Eagle's search for another metaphor appropriate for the function of art (mirror, lamp, map) Woodrow is lost for words, and resorts to what he terms as a Habermas phrase - 'nonsense experiments', to describe Eagle's attempts. Woodrow (1995) argues that efforts to make art of the people, by the people and for the people result in "futuristic games arcades" lined with television screens, interactive computers and video clips, or the "Swiss army knife" approach that may be used where objects *et al* are neatly compartmentalised for everybody as he found at the *Sydney Biennale Perspecta 1995.*

Further concern for the state of contemporary art is expressed by Timms (1995: 3) when he argues that the interactives of new technologies are not so interactive after all. The manual engagement in pushing and pulling knobs of *new* electronic interactives appears to be all that is required and has made redundant the cognitive engagement of looking with eyes and inquiring with the mind that is required by traditional media such as painting. Another claim made by advocates of new technologies that Timms finds more politically power oriented than rational, is the relevance, accessibility and democracy of interactives. He argues that anyone can pick up a pencil or paints and engage in mark making which is relevant, accessible and democratic, so the vying for supremacy of media appears rather a waste of time if the artwork is important.

We can agree with much that Woodrow (1995) and Timms (1995) bemoan about current art practice and note that it appears to reinforce Gowans's (1981: 386) suggestion that as long "as these persuasive forms remain ends in themselves, avant garde (sic) talents will remain wasted and void, as far as society at large is concerned". Thus we can argue that the debate about these new art forms and their uses is only meaningful within the context of intention while the above references to sentiments expressed by artsworkers reinforce the notion that culture is an industry often oblivious to artistic intention.

Within this industry, the commercialism of packaging and presentation of exhibitions and Art Fairs is criticised as prostitution and crowd pleasing by Denholm (1995) and Knezic (1994); art as a social instrument for education, entertainment and enlightenment is questioned by Woodrow (1995); and the interactiveness of new art media is debunked by Timms (1995).

According to Timms (1994), pressure on state galleries to make exhibitions pay is dictating the type of programmes offered, and those with low entertainment value are considered too risky and are not pursued. On the other hand, if an artwork is to engage directly with the audience, does the work need to be palpable and also palatable thus

supporting suggestions put forth by Solso (1994) and Josephson (1996) that familiar visual configurations appear to offer greater enjoyment to the majority of viewers? The number of people who flock to blockbuster shows, as noted above, appears to confirm a positive response to this question. However, in noting the concern now being voiced about crowd pleasing as a major criterion in planning exhibitions, we might question, as do Timms (1994) and Woodrow (1995), the political orientation of such exhibitions. If crowd pleasing is considered a major criterion targeted by the culture industry, does this mean that, by focusing on extrinsic monetary rewards, those involved in the culture industry do play a significant role in determining the way in which people respond to the works displayed?

Sless (1981), Giroux (1994) and Josephson (1996) argue that the business of advertising now plays a very important part in the way in which visual images are promoted as commodity products which are dressed-up to lure purchasers to experience greater comfort and enjoyment when reality fails. Thus we might suggest that the culture industry, sustained by the economic focus of the government and thus education, dictates the preferred type of visual fare currently available to us in using techniques borrowed from advertising.

This raises the question of art as personal experience and the way in which images, like words, can be manipulated to serve a particular function. As previously argued in Section 2.2, images and the makers of the artworks, are now seen as a consumption commodity, products to be traded for commercial gain within the culture industry where, implicit in the purchase package, is the notion of knowledge that involves certain ideas that are unique and special in ways that connote a status and membership of preferred social groups. This begs the question of why this is so.

Hamblen (1990: 218) is forthright is her assessment of the upper-class DEWM's (dead European white males) legacy to education. She considers that there exists a preferred body of knowledge that has been "identified, examined, and refined by experts in their

respective fields of study" that is to be passed onto rightful heirs. Incomes, social and professional opportunities, and social mobility identify those eligible for membership into what Hamblen (1990) calls the "cash culture" that "consists of ideas, art forms, and social institutions created, maintained, and promulgated by the educated élite". In other words information is capital, and the more one knows the further one goes up the ladder of opportunity and advantage, or the better one deals with the "cash-culture literacy" in manipulating, promoting or bartering. Hamblen (1990) uses the analogy of the New York stock market where one with insider information has the advantage without the legal liabilities.

As with stocks and shares, Hamblen, (1990) argues that there are some aspects of the *cash culture* that are more profitable than others, some more socially useful, some requiring worthy credentials or preferential membership and, "in the cash-culture scheme of things, art-related occupations have a more lowly status than, for example medical and legal occupations" in which rank-ordering reflects the dominant culture and reproduces existing social orders that are closely aligned to power and the marketplace. In the art world Hamblen (1990) considers that:

> Those individuals who select out and designate some art forms as worthy of study and who deselect others are themselves part of the cash aesthetic; this is what makes them experts within a culture that they are constructing and maintaining. They are part of an aesthetic culture that depends on its existence and continued preferential status as cash aesthetic by promotions that this is the preferred aesthetic (Hamblen, 1990: 218).

Implicit in Hamblen's (1990) argument is the influential force of political power that promotes the ability to purchase objects that imply prestige sanctioned by members of the aesthetic culture. The question now raised concerns the type of motivation driving those manufacturing the information and selecting out those art objects, those symbols, that signify the preferred body of knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that cultivation of aesthetic awareness and recognition of what is deemed prestigious or beautiful is based on the opinion of experts.

Wolff (1981: 40) points out that social institutions determine *who* becomes an artist, *how* they become an artist and how they are then able to *practise* their art as well as promote their work. Thus, training systems, patronage systems and economic factors contribute in various ways to regulate the activities and beliefs of members in the Art Discourse. This argument recalls investigation of how meaning can be framed, previously discussed in Section 2.2, and suggests that initial academic and economic approaches to framing ideas is integrally linked to how culture is promoted as an industry.

Both Hughes (1990) and Josephson (1996) suggest that entry into the Art Discourse, which promotes the status of the individual through the recognition given to *his/her* art object, is fierce. As argued by Hughes (1990), pressure on young artists to expose work-in-progress to public gaze prematurely forces them into producing a *result* in order to justify a grant that allows entry into a university, or earn a fee that serves as credential in the art world. He complains of the overpopulation of the art world as "cultural feeding become gross" where the "manufacture of art-related glamour, the poverty of art training" ensures a slump in cultural history. Hughes (1990: 6) argues that the problem lies in the great number of artists vying for attention amongst an equally large number of collectors thus giving rise to "inflated claims and so little sense of measure". Similar concern can be found in Pollock's (1996) comment that art schools deliver very little education or preparation for life. According to Hughes (1990) and Pollock (1996), all that remains for art schools is to produce fulfilled personalities by allowing art students to do their own thing resulting in mediocre-to-bad art. The question raised by Hughes (1990) concerns how promoters and dealers in the art market might figure out ways to sell the work at prices high enough to stifle aesthetic dissent. The implication in this question is that perceived monetary value does influence aesthetic value.

It could be argued that the culture industry in Australia has become embroiled with marketing to such an extent that images and the makers of images represent saleable

commodities thus negating any legitimate notion of personal experiential understanding on behalf of the promoter, the viewer or the purchaser. Does this imply purchase of knowledge wrought from someone else's experience and, does it suggest that knowledge is an accumulation of habits and associations that can be accrued through membership within a particular discourse? What is the position of the artist whose peculiar *raison d'être* lies in creating illusions? and how is it possible to extend a sense of personal expression beyond the comfort zone of self-gratification to the struggle zone of experience that does involve an ideological collision between individualism and socialisation?

PART TWO: INVENTING GAMES

CHAPTER THREE: FERTILE PLAYGROUND.

3.1 A Few Words Before Beginning.

This Chapter provides a setting for rehearsing how we might engage our total body in playing with the cognitive tools in the head. As an artist in this setting, the process of arranging and re-arranging cognitive tools under the direction of various experts in the field, involves a dialogue with those who can offer informed advice. However, personal experience can be nothing other than personal and thus my own game might appear clumsy and awkward as I play with new ideas in an effort to make them familiar. Consequently, my own thinking and art practice contributes to this and the following chapters in mapping out a playground for rehearsing how we might juggle the cognitive tools in the head.

As researcher investigating the complexity of associations that contribute to directing the traffic of our mind housed in the body, and as artist intrigued with the design possibilities of how arguments and ideas might fit together as elements within a composition, I propose visual configurations that do no more than suggest other ways of thinking. Questions derived from the literary framework evolve into integral elements and thus I become enmeshed in tinkering with ideas so that some notion of personal experience might be suggested.

Other factors that might create a sense of ambiguity lie firstly, in what Lippard (1996) refers to as either passive or active distancing whereby artists might passively disassociate themselves from the work or actively inject art with personal commitment in a didactic way and, secondly, Pajaczkowska's (1996) discussion of identification, a process of stabilising the relations of subject to the unconscious that involves a splitting of self through representation. We can argue that the concepts of distancing and identification pose a greater problem for one actually involved in the process of distancing and identification while reflecting upon the process. How can one at the same time be both objective and subjective? How do we isolate out and place in some sequential order

those things that defy isolation because in the very separation of one element from another the symbiotic nature is denied? Is it possible to separate the thinking from the doing?

As artist and researcher, I admit to inadequacy in attempting such a separation of elements and thus, in playing around with the tools in the head, memories, associations, reflections, questions and on-going conversation with the literature may get woven into the text at various times and in seemingly unrelated places in this and the following chapters. While Sullivan (1996: 15) argues that the "interplay of the subjective and the objective provide a much more plausible account of the human enterprise" rather then concentrating on causes, Hawke (1996: 32) suggests that there is a need to "focus on formative influences, cognitive processes and professional practices of visual artists". In this Hawke (1996: 32) postulates that, as both primary researcher and subject concurrently, the ability to reflect on personal work and thinking includes the "important context(s) of experiences which have impacted on that work". Thus one has the opportunity to present material and important incidents that reveal the nature of something in allowing artists to attend to issues which give meaning to their thoughts and actions. In this way autobiography, according to Hawke (1996) has

> ... the ability to incorporate a deep sense of the intricate relationships of the
> meaning and process of artistic practice and its embeddedness in cultural
> influences, personal experience and aspirations" (Hawke, 1966: 35)

Because this game of labour and love has peculiar relevance to myself, and because this research involves a search for ways of restructuring art as personal experience, my on-going dialogue with the literature might expose ways in which my process of arranging and re-arranging ideas involves listening to whispers from the past that suggest different ways of daydreaming.

3.2 Preparing the Ground.

Concerns with the culture industry, as discussed in Section 2.3, focus on the productivity of individuals who struggle to produce results that Dissanayake (1992) regards as the devaluation of mythopoetic and visionary modes of thought in a world where we think it is natural to compete, to progress, to dissent, to acquire more and more possessions, regardless and ignorant of the possibility that persons in other societies may find these things disturbingly *un*natural.

However, Gee (1992) alerts us to the human proclivity to *outcompete* in matters of survival and thus our social interactions foster the social skills of manipulation and deceit. His argument emanates from evolutionary and political theories that highlight the need for an individual to survive within groups, and thus survival needs motivate behaviour in which self-interest, outcompeting, outwitting and manipulation of others is essential. A tempting way of achieving this success is to tell the best story through embellishing facts, actions and ideas to such an extent that the stories take on another reality, a deception. If there is advantage in deception, why is it that artists who might be argued to be masters of deception, appear to be at a disadvantage in a very competitive society?

We can argue that a dilemma exists in coming to terms with the opposing forces of exploring the beauty of the mind while outcompeting in a world that values the tangible results of the mind. Inextricably knotted within such a dilemma are the two veins of individualism and socialisation that Pollock (1996) identifies as potent forces in our environment that, depending on their separate strength, involve a struggle between those things that *directly* influence our perception and those things that *indirectly* influence our perceptions and thus modify, by degrees, our tendency to express and act in certain ways.

According to Josephson's (1996) theory of expressionism, *personal satisfaction* for the individual artist is the main factor, thus making it inappropriate to attempt to make any

critical judgment about the success or otherwise of the work. If this is the case, we could argue that an artist remains apart from a wider social context, imprisoned by a reflection of self *en train* that confirms only *that* reflection and denies the possibility of seeing beyond the mirror of self. From a somewhat different perspective, Pajaczkowska (1996) investigates the way in which self identification can be understood as a system of doubling and repetition in which an artist engages in the dynamic of mirroring ego in a transformed and stable mirror of the image that reflects identity. Within this space of self-reflection it could be argued that such work might be considered separate, experimental and even playful beyond the bounds of judgment.

However, Heywood (1997: 14) argues that "[W]ithout judgment art is impossible", and while much current judgment may smoother, intimidate, confuse or promote various types of artworks and artists, he argues that we must not succumb to the notion that judgment is always correct or timely. Rather, he advocates an active respect for tradition without being immobilised by it so that artists may continue their existing practice with self-confidence, inventiveness, insight, criticism or wit.

In discussing the work of art historians, Roberts (1994: 18), refers to the new pluralism that reduces them to writers of fables thus resulting in the downgrading of dialectical knowledge that is seen as "antithetical to the business of doing art history". He argues that the rise of theories of difference, in derogating totalising forms of knowledge, install a collapse of common sense on matters of explanation and determination. However, part of the derogation creates new kinds of problems, confusions and possibilities that include the subsumption of art under cultural studies, conferring of value through counter-hegemonic content, and failure to deal adequately with artistic intentions. Thus we can pose the following questions. How is it possible to link artistic specificity to the real and complex relationships of actual societies in which interpretation does play an integral part? Does recognition of artistic intention influence our interpretation and aesthetic experience of the work? Or is our interpretation swayed by ideological evaluations?

If judgment is necessary for art to exist, and thus mainstream values serve a peculiar ingredient in fostering art, how can we account for what Lippard (1996: 13) sees as a trend for young artists to follow reactionary aspects of punk art because they are seen "as a kind of catharsis to clear the decks and pave the way for change in the art world" dominated by mainstream values?

It could be argued that the crux of the matter lies in finding some meaningful intention buried within these new and ambiguous artforms. According to Pollock (1996: 54) this might prove impossible given the poverty of training that leaves art school graduates totally reliant on the notion of the self-motivating and self-creating artist that perpetuates a system of alienation and macho self-reliance and aggression. From this perspective, efforts to promote individualism might be questioned as destructive forces rather than beneficial if we consider the implications of the term.

Ojakangas (1997: 162), in probing Foucault's legacy of thought regarding practices of the self, reminds us that "individual, as the word indicates, is an atom without relation, an undivided". Thus, encouragement of individual practices might serve no other purpose than to abort any sense of self that is only possible through realising that a "being in common can make possible a being separated, being-self" that entails feeling at home in an on-going conflictual situation arising from what we perceive and consequently how we act. This raises questions of how artists can reconcile their position as visionary artists in a society devoted to a mainstream values promoted by the culture industry? and, how can artists work under the delusion of respected individuality when identical popular poses are produced and promulgated by mass media?

It can be argued that modern technological advances disrupt and shape perception in two ways. Firstly, Josephson (1996: 200) draws attention to the way in new mediums are used to create a body of *vicarious experiences*, a mythical culture consistent with our lifestyle in which patterns of human morality are reinforced. She argues that the human quest for "that other world" of gods and spirits is now satisfied by mass-media reality

inhabited by television gods in which "the media external mental space becomes our spiritual space". Secondly, Lovejoy (1989) and Wolff (1981) consider that modern technological developments liberate art from its ritual cult seclusion and locate the artist within the social production realm as an ordinary worker. Thus we have further conflict for artists who must decide whether or not to join the human quest for spiritual space within mass-media reality in which their cult training and awareness, and their very singularity, would be assets as workers in what is now normal practice. Would this mean aligning singularity and ritual cult seclusion with mass-media reality so that the very essence of artmaking becomes the greatest and most virtual delusion of all?

The personification of inanimate objects, and the way in which experience may be termed vicarious, raises the question of how artists can really claim ownership for what they do rather than what is done to them. It can be argued that Josephson's (1996) notion of *vicarious experience* has got little to do with experience as an absolute constraint to think otherwise than we have been thinking, but much to do with what Grossberg (1988: 43) terms "authentic inauthenticity" whereby we celebrate the possibility of a pose or, in other words, the way in which we accept the artificial as real. Within such an artificial reality, Schwabsky (1997: xii) suggests "mutually incomprehensible" languages are available thus making the artistic drive to make contact with meaning a hazardous leap.

While admitting that the intellectual range of popular visual experience in our culture is proscribed, Roberts (1994: 3) argues that there now exists a stronger commitment to critical realism in the study of art whereby "a greater sensitivity to the causal production of artworks" is evident. In contrast to Pollock (1996), he attributes this to the intellectual output of British art schools that has resulted in fruitful arguments, some of which situate art within an open system of causal relations allowing dialectical inquiry and challenge to hermeneutic circles of interpretation of both artists and critics. For example, both Orton (1994) and Wood (1994) highlight the need for art to be understood as a nexus of several texts or images within which it can sustain the manifold acts of interpretation without diminution of artistic integrity.

If however, as Gowans (1981) and Dissanayake (1992) opine, artmaking has changed from the unselfconscious way in which humans realised their world, clarified experience, sought meaning and pleasure, and transmitted established values from one generation to another, how can this nexus of several texts and images now sustain the manifold acts of interpretation without diminution of artistic integrity? Does this mean that artistic integrity may need redefining? If this is so, what roles do theories of direct and indirect perception play in promoting this change?

According to Solso (1994: 79), theories of direct perception hold that sensory perception in and of itself is sufficient for a person to perceive the world accurately, whereas theories of indirect perception hold that most of our perceptions are constructed from inferences about the real world. We have the possibility of acting or being acted upon. It can be argued that, from one perspective, we might exercise *will* in which internal events stimulate effort leading up to the action, or, from the other perspective, we might *sense* something in which the antecedent events are external, and whatever we form a perception of remains unchanged.

Does this mean that we have only two options for playing the perceptual game? Is it not possible to exercise varying degrees of perceptual effort ranging from passion to inertia in deciding what we want to believe? Cannot there be times when immediate and significant people and groups exert influence upon us as we become immersed within social practices? Are there not other times when we absorb and acquire practices and beliefs through paying attention to our sensory stimuli? Does not our sense of survival inform our actions that might oscillate between submission or provocation depending on the stake we have in the outcome?

These are questions that involve all of us and, before looking at ways in which some artists might deal with perception, it could be helpful to investigate ways in which perception can be seen, metaphorically speaking, as a game of charades.

3.3 What's in a Game of Charades?

If conscious experience is a basic source of knowledge about the world outside us, what role does personal perception play in providing reasons for empirical beliefs? This question might direct our game of *charades*, a term used by Brewer (1998) to highlight the way in which we tend to rely on switching arguments. By this he means our reliance on normal beliefs that may offer no *reason-giving* relations from the subject's point of view but do offer putative theories regarding the empirical content of beliefs in a neutral, identifiable, but not necessarily enlightening way.

However, the debate about reasons underlying behaviour offers conflicting concepts regarding phenomenal qualities, perception and experience that has led to some misunderstanding about the role a singular person might assume in playing with the tools in the head to direct their personal empirical beliefs. This is the field of experience that Hawke (1996) and Martin (1998) admit needs proper attention. Martin's (1998) work in this area offers a fertile playground with, as yet, few new players. Thus his work lends itself to investigation so that we might find avenues for further inquiry.

Martin (1998: 174) deals out some debatable ideas about experience and the current "talk of 'qualia', which collapses the distinction between properties of being appeared to and properties apparent to one" that he considers raises problems about the nature of perception and perceptual appearances. His argument appears to challenge many established players who insist on continuing the debate about the character of experience that, to Martin (1998: 158), "indicates that even if the character of experience is obvious to us, it is not obvious how obvious it is". In particular, he isolates the notion of *qualia* (the abbreviation for Chalmer's (1996) *qualitative feel*) for investigation because it seems to stand in the way of "our getting a proper over-view of the disagreements concerning the nature of perceptual experience" (Martin 1998: 159). Martin's main argument appears to be about whether we are talking about properties of conscious experience or properties of properties that he argues cannot be slipped together. He suggests that this common

practice relies on two historical theories, *sense-datum* theories of perception and so-called *adverbial* approaches. The former he attributes to Price (1932) who, in Martin's view (1998), postulates that:

> ... the occurrence of an experience involves a subject, a relation of being given which relates that subject to various objects, and the data, which are presented or given to her. (Martin, 1998: 164)

Martin (1998) interprets this proposition as follows:

> So, when one comes to know what one's experience is like, and how it may differ from other conscious states one could have come to have, one does so through attending to the objects of awareness given to one through having such states. (Martin, 1998: 164)

Thus, according to Martin (1998), this *sense-datum* theory supposes that:

> ... qualia (1) are partly constituted by the properties which objects appear to have or are presented as having, qualia (2). And one comes to know what the qualia (1) of one's experience are, through knowing what the qualia (2) of one's experience are. (Martin, 1998: 166)

Regarding the latter *adverbial* theories of perception, Martin (1998) criticises Ducasse's (1942) theory of thinking of experiences as having a distinctive qualitative character, for example, sensing blue as *bluely*. Such effects upon us by the environment that bring about beliefs regarding the environment are, according to Martin (1998), "merely a causal intermediary between world and our knowledge of it".

Hence this *adverbialist* theory, as opposed to sense-datum theory, is interpreted by Martin (1998) thus:

> In contrast, for the adverbialist, properties of one's experience need to be sharply distinguished from properties that objects appear to have: the properties objects appear to have, on the whole, are those which our experiences are liable to cause us to believe that they have. The properties our experiences have, qualia (1), are the properties which are responsible for our coming to acquire these beliefs, but they are distinct and our awareness of them is distinct from our awareness of the properties that objects appear to have, qualia (2). (Martin, 1998: 166)

As Martin (1998) admits, there is substantive disagreement concerning the nature of *qualia*. It might also be argued that there is substantive disagreement concerning the nature of experience. Martin (1998: 168) suggests this in drawing attention to the fact that "[P]roper attention to experience" might show that "the adverbialist conception of our

knowledge of experience is in the end unintelligible" because, he argues, a description of what is apparent to us is not independent of our appreciation of what experience is like. In support of this condemnation he uses an example based on a discussion by an art theorist, whom, he considers, demonstrates counter adverbalist ways in which we can attend to environmental details that show how our perception of the environment may subtly change. The emphasis lies in the way in which things might look from the artist's perspective, the relation between the shadows and the texture and the type of phenomenological fact which the artist focuses on thus enabling us to know what experiences are like.

However, one could suggest that the art theorist does not actually specify any experience. In the passage referred to by Martin (1998: 168-169), the art theorist describes a wall viewed while writing at a table when, in noting the shifts in light, he is "very aware" of certain attributes "partly because of special interest" from which he gets "a sense of its surface quality" while admitting "it takes an effort of will" to attend to certain areas of the wall, "to categorize its shadow types, and read the bearing of their lighting". Martin (1998) considers that the person involved:

> ...draws our attention at least as much to what he is reporting himself as doing and how he is reporting it, as to what he discerns; we have the sense of what it is like keenly to attend to the visual world, so as to discern various of its elements, and the difficulty and effort involved in drawing out the role of shadow in our visual perception of the world. (Martin, 1998: 169)

We could suggest that, in this argument, awareness and sensations are considered sufficient to be called experience. It appears that what we are dealing with is interest and sense awareness and, while "effort of will" is noted, we are not told of any changes to thinking that might have arisen as a result of this effort. In fact, it could be further argued that Martin (1998) is investigating sensations and focus that substantiate a sense-datum theory which he interprets as understanding experience through attending to the objects of awareness given to one through having such states of awareness. However, Martin (1998) contends that the art theorist has described his visual experience, not merely the objects of perception and, through that description, we too learn things visually.

Within his argument supporting the passage as articulating what experience is like, Martin (1998) proposes four points for the defence. Firstly, while articulating aspects of what experience is like, much remains unsaid. Secondly, in indicating what he learns, the art theorist demonstrates the importance of paying careful attention and thus we, by following similar procedures, can learn about his inner life as well as our own. Thirdly, learning about one's experience can involve active explorations of the experienced world and of one's experience in doing so. Finally, in attending to one's experience, the processes of exploring and attending to features of the world are inseparable. We can agree with these points excepting the second. It is arguable that the art theorist did not actually indicate what he learnt and, while we may be party to his observations through some sort of association, are we really cognizant of his inner life beyond his and our own observations?

Martin (1998) argues that there are two distinct ways of attending on our experiences. For example, he talks of ways in which we focus our attention on things through thinking about something such as the rainfall, or attending to objects such as words on a page, both of which suggest possibilities for shifting attention to features of the environment of which we were not aware. His proposition that experience involves ways of attending, draws attention to the way in which, it can be argued, *awareness might be considered as heralding experience* as he explains:

> ... in perception, focal attention seems to range over objects which are already objects of awareness, and a motive for directing your attention to something is to find out more. (Martin, 1998: 171)

Experience in this sense does seem to have a lot to do with focussing attention because, as Martin (1998: 172) opines, "whether one is perceiving or merely hallucinating, there is an apparent array of objects for one to direct one's attention across". While this may not tell us anything about the objects in one's environment in the case of hallucination, Martin maintains that "exploiting perceptual attention is a way of coming to know about and attending to one's own experience" through attending to things not taken to be merely properties of the experience. In this he rejects the adverbialist claim of experience as a form of modification of the state of the subject. Rather, Martin (1998: 173) argues that

attention to experience is linked to attending to the objects of sense from the subject's viewpoint whereby "experiences intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is presented to that viewpoint". However, one can question what one does with the presented subject-matter. Does one simply note the subject-matter? Or does one accept or reject the subject-matter? We can argue that an affirmative response to the former might suggest awareness, while a negative response must lead us to the following question to which either a positive or negative response does entail some modification to the state of the subject.

If we were to condense the abverbalist and sense-datum concepts of experience to the basic opposing arguments presented by Martin (1998), we may find the following. On the one hand we have the adverbalist theory suggesting that effects of the environment cause our beliefs (as a causal intermediary) so that our experience is modified. On the other hand, we have the sense-datum theory that suggests that one's experience is partly constituted by properties of the objects that one perceives.

If effects of the environment generate beliefs about that environment and thus to some extent we change our way of thinking or, if the quality of our experiences is partly constituted by the properties objects appear to have that in some way expose our experience, does not this mean that effects of the environment impact upon us (adverbalist) and the way in which we experience something (quality of experience) is modified through attending to the objects of awareness (sense-datum)? In both cases the environment does affect us, but the arguments seem to nominate different starting points and, these starting points it might be argued, are incidental to the experience which could emanate from either depending on the degree to which the subject accepts personal perception that stimulates beliefs and recognition of objective properties, or the force of the objective stimulus, properties objects appear to have, which might affect our perception. The following visual representation, Figure 3.3.1 depicts the two opposing arguments.

Figure 3.3.1 Visualisation of Adverbalist and Sense-Datum Theories

Again we might ask whether experience is really the topic under discussion by Martin (1998) when it seems that sensations and "exploiting perceptual attention" appear to be the targets of inquiry. This raises the question of differentiating between the terms perception, sensation and experience and, according to Peirce (1978), experience does exist in sense perception but the actual change of perception, the experience, is an *event* that cannot be perceived. Nevertheless, Martin (1998) argues that, if we are to know what an experience is like, we must, in part, know how things are presented to one as being, which then raises the question of interpretation.

Within this question, Martin (1998) identifies two distinct components; firstly, the states of mind, the phenomenal properties of experiences and, secondly, the presented aspects of an experience. These form the framework of Martin's debate that centres upon the thesis that:

> ... reflection on sensory experience should lead one to accept that there are at least some phenomenal properties of experience which have corresponding presented

elements, and our understanding of the phenomenal properties is dependent on our understanding of their presented elements. (Martin, 1998: 174)

In other words some properties of the experience have corresponding presented elements that allow one to recognise the experience as suggested in the visual representation Figure 3.3.2.

Figure 3.3.2   Visual Interpretation of Sensory Experience Derived from Martin 1998

Martin's (1998: 176) concern is to understand what experience is like for the subject from the subject's point of view, and we can applaud his focus upon the "... manner or mode in which objects are presented to one in having experience". We can also agree that previous debate about experience may have focussed only on intentionality (sense-datum) and subjectivity (adverbalism) of experience. Intentional theories propose that states of awareness of mind-independent objects and properties allow identification of presented elements without a need to actually experience them. On the other hand, subjective theories of experience suggest that there are presented elements of experience which could not exist independent of one's awareness of them.

While Martin (1998: 178) exposes important differences between sense-datum and adverbialist theories of experience and we can agree with "a common conception that what experience is like is a matter of what is present to the mind", we must pose the

following questions. Is this common view not a matter of perception? or awareness? or sensations? Are these not the vital forces that might *lead* to experience that involves some degree of effort in wilfully using these forces? If experience consists in sense perception, how are we to gauge the shock of the moment that causes us to think differently? It could be argued that Martin's (1998) investigation into *experience* raises the same issue of interpretation as does the equivocal term *qualia*, and thus one can agree that proper attention to experience is needed.

Further inquiry into the debate about experience shows that Morris (1998) supports the concept that behavioural consequences are intrinsically linked to states of mind, and opposes causal theories of behaviour as treating experience as just another factor in a chain of events. In this, he appears to support Martin's (1998) theory that emphasises how we need to note the subject's viewpoint in understanding that experiences intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is presented to that subject's viewpoint. However, Morris (1998) goes further in highlighting the crucial elements of effort, passion and engagement necessary on behalf of the subject which Brewer (1998) also considers essential to conscious experience, although Brewer insists that experience must be *reason-giving* from the subject's point of view. In this Brewer (1998) appears to favour the adverbalist theory which holds that properties of experiences are responsible for beliefs and, if effort is integral to experience it is feasible to suggest that effort is also involved in believing. If we overlook the effort integral to experience, if we do not question what is involved in grasping the embedded singular demonstrative idea of a particular object in question, are we not playing a game of charades in which we just take on other beliefs?

We could suggest that a possible answer lies in Peirce's (1978) argument that there must be an element of effort in experience that compels us to think otherwise than we have been thinking. Peirce (1978a: 173) argues that "Me is an object of experience". Both "Me" and "experience" are singular, but *qualities* cannot be enumerated and, because experience stems from the desire to attach the idea of a quality to realisation in "Me", the

possibility of single experiences is only bounded by the qualities one can imagine in willing to form or shape personal conduct. Making a decision entails effort, and it is arguable that notions of awareness and sensations do not carry the weight of decision making.

Further debate about qualia can be noted in Kim's (1998) argument that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic properties of experience which seems compatible with Peirce's (1978) thesis noted above. However, Block (1998: 26) suggests that we might talk of the "phenomenal consciousness" as *experience*. Nevertheless, his example of how "one notices that the refrigerator has just gone off" appears to be synonymous with awareness and thus is not convincing. Secondly, he nominates access-consciousness as a kind of direct control in which reasoning is involved which, it can be argued, is more appropriate to consider as experience if we accept that effort is integral to experience. Similarly, Martin (1989) distinguishes two types of consciousness, firstly the perceptual situation that presents the "phenomenal character or properties" of the experience (which we might argue are sensations) and, secondly, the objects of experience and their "presented elements or aspects", properties which they appear to posses, (which we might argue are things or actions).

However, we can suggest that, by overlooking the crucial element of effort, arguments appear to target phenomenal characteristics of sensations leading to the object or action that Peirce (1978) calls "secondness", the end or result. Of course this is much easier to identify, whereas, it can be argued that the internal personal effort to think anew is identifiable only from one viewpoint, that of the person experiencing. It is reasonable to argue that only the person experiencing can grasp such an experience thus leaving the rest of us to continue conjecture about another's experience.

Nevertheless, if actions do have phenomenal properties does this mean that the world of perceptual consciousness cannot exist unperceived? According to Honderich (1998: 145), consciousness is what we *have* and a particular subject is a necessary condition to

that state of affairs "because it is in some manner a part of it". Thus, if there were no subject, the world whose existence is what perceptual consciousness consists in, would not exist. However, this does not mean that mind-independent worlds cannot exist but, as Brewer (1998) argues, we can only know these worlds by virtue of their standing in certain reason-giving relations with perceptual experiences. This raises the question of differentiating between reason-giving relations and non reason-giving relations that involves sifting through the arguments that, on the one hand, deem that certain immediately recognizable sensations constitute our experiences of the secondary qualities of things around us by virtue of the systematic causal relations between the two which Brewer (1989: 210) terms as "primed predicates". On the other hand there must be some observational concepts peculiar to the subject that stimulate a belief about the object. If this does not happen, Brewer (1989) considers that the charade of taking on beliefs for the sake of having a belief continues with fatal ignorance. Thus we must ask what role does *qualia* play in this game of belief?

When we talk of qualities, Peirce (1978a: 150) advances the compelling argument that "mere *quality*, or suchness, is not in itself an occurrence, as seeing a red object is; it is a mere may-be" that "gets along without any realization at all". What Peirce means is that the notion of quality is an abstract concept. Similarly, his argument that feeling is a state, our immediate consciousness, that exists only in a lapse of time, and the quality of which can only be described as a type of consciousness of the feeling, is also thought provoking because feeling cannot be considered as an active agent. According to Peirce (1978a: 168) feelings are "merely conscious indications of real determinations of our subconscious volitional beings". This argument is supported by Honderich (1998: 142) who considers that much talk about feelings is only the phenonomology of consciousness and, the over-worked items, qualia, "are elusive differences between kinds of perceptual consciousness".

The above arguments are drawn from outside the Art Discourse and demonstrate aspects of the debate about consciousness, quality and experience. These arguments, as

suggested in Figure 3.3.1, show that the main concern seems to be about deciding whether properties of experiences are responsible for beliefs (adverbalist) or whether one comes to know one's experiences through knowing properties objects appear to have (sense-datum).

We can suggest that a dilemma lies in playing with the complex and dynamic forces of our environment that, it can be argued, exert contextual influences of varying degrees. The thesis proposed here is that personal experience can only be identified within this on-going conflictual environment in which a singular person must exercise effort and must think otherwise than previously. It is argued that the influential source may be direct or indirect because, if art is to be a personal experience, we must acknowledge all those things that stimulate ways in which we use the imaginative tools in our head to think anew. How we use these tools seems to be amazingly simple; how we talk about them appears to pose an insoluble problem. Part of the problem might be seen to lie in discerning the context in which the talking and doing take place.

3.4 What's In A Context?

Psychological states may be caused by events in the environment causing states to interact with one another in giving rise to further states and thence bodily behaviour. We can argue that these states, and how they affect us as private singular persons or public persons, gives rise to conflict within both our internal and our immediate external states, and our job, in recognising the various states, is to grasp meaning that fosters our sense of identity and is relevant to our survival. Within this context, according to Heal (1998), a growing body of research is re-visiting the nature of imagination, the differences between practical and theoretical reasoning, and the nature of emotion.

Thus, we might pose four key questions which target ways in which we grapple with problems of personal identity. Firstly, can we consider that *primed predicates* (Brewer, 1998) play a major role in personal experience, or do they deem our experience to be second hand or vicarious? Secondly, if *vicarious experience* (Elster, 1986: Grossberg, 1988: Hawke, 1996: Josephson, 1996) enables us to identify with another's actions and allows us to assume multiple identities, what role does sensational delusion play in providing reasons for empirical beliefs? Thirdly, if we have only the choice between self-deception and akrasia as techniques for engaging in rational behaviour (Elster, 1986: Rorty, 1986), does this really mean that we are intrinsically agentless players? Or fourth, is it possible that our eyes are the joker in the pack, playing fantastic games that might confuse our minds with strategies to control behaviour so that, in becoming preoccupied with the behaviour, we ignore our biological emulator that, according to Clark (1998), often provides mental imagery as an inner surrogate for direct environmental data?

We can argue that, in seeking reinforcement, entertainment and some sense of identity, we do engage in vicarious experiences, we do rely on certain immediately recognisable sensations to constitute our causal experiences of the secondary qualities of things around us, we do play games of akrasia and self-deception in making rational attempts at integration in our world and we do allow our eyes to play fantastic games that confuse us.

If this is the case we must be intrinsically agentless players. But are we? Many artists might argue that they direct and control their personal artistic experiences. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, problems of self-determination for an artist do exist in our commodified environment. Perhaps these problems have always existed, but it can be argued that the accelerating impact of mass media has created a peculiar external force that demands peculiar internal opposition on behalf of those involved in making and appreciating artworks.

In response to the first question Brewer (1998) reminds us of the extreme rationalist suggestion that empirical beliefs and contents are engraved on the mind. From this perspective (not our own) the empirical content of experiences is such that its application to contents of a given kind is sufficient for these to be experiential contents in themselves. Thus, we believe that things are what they are because they bear resemblances to established empirical significance from an average or normal point of view, that according to Brewer (1998) may be termed *primed predicates* in that the resultant belief relies on normal givens. We may not understand the significance of these things but we believe them, and confirm this belief to ourselves in convincing ourselves that they fall within the realms of the norm. Brewer (1998) argues that this type of belief is a *charade* in which ignorance of semantic value is a familiar phenomenon compatible with grasping determinate empirical content.

It is arguable that this world of resemblances exists in the mind of the viewer, triggered by such things as the illusory reality and truth of a movie, a television series or a photograph. We must remember however, that from the objectivist point of view, the essence of truth lies in its ability to be separated from individual human subjectivity through the network of signs known as language that permits the formal analysis, scrutiny and testing of the written word.

This is a crucial point to consider because, since the 1830s, photography has been regarded by many as an objective record of the physical world, in contrast to paintings

that are seen as personal interpretation. Sless (1981: 95) talks about how, for many people, the status of the photograph becomes one with the status of information. If we accept this argument we can see how words that appear to relay information, and photographs used in photojournalism that appear to relay information, are very closely linked. Many people assume that the word and the photograph relay the information, while the intent of the author and the intent of the photographer is ignored. Both the word and the photograph are assumed to be valid. We are familiar with the saying 'the camera does not lie' but, as with other inherited truisms, we are now faced with recognising that the actual machine only performs the function directed by the author-photographer, and it is the *presentation* of the photographic image that may test our beliefs. In accepting the presentation without question we can consider it as a primed predicate facilitating a type of second hand or vicarious experience.

In response to our second question we might look at the two of us. Elster (1998: 17) argues that "in addition to our immediate personal experience we often enjoy the vicarious experience provided by daydreaming" that is hooked up to our own life in some way. However, there is an inherent problem in daydreaming in that it suffers from a *shortage of scarcity* that, according to Ainslie (1986), lacks unpredictability because we can direct the outcomes. As Schelling (1986) points out, a tension is created by scarcity and thus other stories, visual, verbal and written, provide suspense and mystery that allow us to live off these other forms through anticipated engagement of outcomes that provide us with a sense of different identity. Given that we have several alternatives in choosing which 'individual' will occupy our body and nervous system according to body chemistry stimulated by the tension, Schelling (1986: 180) argues that we "live in our minds" as consumers who seek some form of escape from the boredom of tedious consciousness through taking opportunities to identify with something other than what we are. Amongst these opportunities, entertainment in the form of stories offers the reader, viewer or listener a stake in the outcome through identification with characters in the story or, as an alternative to stories, methods of mind control are employed through using tranquillisers, caffeine, sensory deprivation or enhancement, hypnosis, subliminal

stimulation, electrical and chemical control. According to Schelling (1986), a type of disciplined fantasy allows us to juggle the two distinct roles our minds have to play between those of the

> ... reasoning machine by which we choose what to consume out of the array of things that our resources can be exchanged for, and that of the pleasure machine or consuming organ, the generator of direct consumer satisfaction. (Schelling, 1986: 193)

The notion of consumer satisfaction is highlighted by Ainslie (1986) who argues that most behaviour in prosperous societies is no longer driven by biological needs because these are satisfied by some agent external to the person involved thus removing deprivation as a criterion for seeking personal concrete rewards. Such considerations have alerted economists to the importance of non-concrete and non-purchasable rewards and this raises the question of what substitutes are now most effective. If, as Ainslie (1986) points out, people generally lack an ability to reward themselves, and if rock-hard reinforcers such as food, sex and aggression are losing their motivating force, and if rewards lose their power with delay, we might argue that artistic fantasy now offers the most promising, immediate and unpredictable source of reinforcement.

Such an argument is supported by Josephson (1996) who contends that emotional engagement and narrative thought foster associations through which viewers vicariously project themselves into art. The questions of how this is made possible and why people seem to want to be what they are not, raises a problem for those who create illusions and a further problem related to those who manipulate illusionist creations. We might ask, what are some of the reasons for manipulating images to look like what they are not, and who are the controlling agents behind electronic images and photographs? For example, Giroux (1994: 25) accuses those behind the Disney phenomenon as commodifying memory and rewriting narratives of national identity and global expansion in what he calls a "pedagogy of innocence", and Zipes (1980: 101) is critical of techniques through which original folk tales have now "assumed totalitarian proportions" because the narrative voice is no longer responsive to an active audience but, instead, is used to manipulate a passive audience "according to the vested interests of the state and private industry". The

manipulative power of technology, (here the pervasive presence of the machine is consciously personified to highlight the way in which it is now regarded), creates, what Josephson (1996: 204) terms the "spiritualism of commodities" through which we worship things and "plug ourselves into inanimate minds". Lovejoy (1989: 10) admits that the *Wizard of Oz* is the ultimate metaphor for manipulation of the consciousness by television, and Gowans (1981: 241-244) draws attention to "soap operas" and comic strips presenting average people with illustrative social functions as ways for making life meaningful but, in being cut off from the past, they direct us as "alienated atoms" towards some hierarchy for security and protection.

This consideration is central to those people working in advertising whose *raison d'être* is that they must sell a product. As Zipes (1980), Gowans (1981) Sless (1981), Grossberg (1988), Giroux (1994) and Josephson (1996) argue, we are becoming dislocated from art as personal experience because of our submission to compelling images that entice us into believing illusions. The irony is that we have become so over-educated in scrutinising the word and its ramifications, as previously argued in Section 2.2, that the word is now muted through political correctness. Advertising agents, as authors of a persuasive message, appear to be becoming more aware of the legal ramifications of the word and overkill of much jargon associated with the product. These could be two reasons why fewer words now appear on many advertising layouts. The image, as suggested by Sless (1981) Giroux (1994) and Josephson (1996), is becoming the symbol that stands for the integrity of the product, and the photograph is presumed to be the most true-to-life image, especially if it is presented over and over at well calculated intervals and positions so that it becomes part of our everyday life. A third possible reason for using photographs and electronic images in advertising lies in their immediacy and seemingly unproblematic nature. Richardson (1982) suggests that:

> [T]he immediacy and verisimilitude of visual media have built the television and film industries. Students accept these messages as easily as the slogans on bumper stickers and the oral pronouncements of disc jockeys and art instructors alike. (Richardson, 1982: 10)

We can agree with the immediacy of the image but to suggest that verisimilitude is integral to visual media is misleading. If the notion of reading information is crucial to investigating words and images as a means of personal experience, does the act of reading necessarily guarantee understanding of the message? As discussed in Section 2.2, to elicit meaning from something that is read, either image or word, means that some relationship is established between the object and the user; meaning is not a property of the object itself but resides in the act of interpretation between the user and object even though the physical form of the message (such as a painting, photograph or a text) may exist independently of the author or the user.

We might argue that as we become enticed into believing the compelling images made possible by technological innovations that seem to confuse us with unrelatable sensations, we believe that the dream of re-making ourselves is a reality. However, this dream has always been part of the human psyche. Dissanayake (1992) emphasises the biological tendency we humans have to make things special (including ourselves), and Gowans (1981: 208) reminds us that "being part animal as well as part angel" we desire dominion over nature and assume various guises in order to accomplish this. What some find disturbing is our current trend to wear these guises as unrelatable sensations that Arnheim (1986: 237-239) says may be found in "pleasure domes of capriciously moving shapes and lights, dancing colors, symphonies of noises, textures to touch and things to sniff" which may increase sensory stimulation but do little for perceptual challenge, or we make irrational associations in connecting juxtaposed images that are compelling in their truth effects.

According to Josephson (1996: 175-177), Design Art, using packaging to enhance the personal identity of the user, offers ways in which we can "wrap ourselves in an art package" according to our mood or social aspiration by selecting from the "*word(s)* in the mass-media language of form". Hebdige (1996: 290-296) refers to this phenomenon as "syntax selling" whereby we are invited to "live our whole lives out inside someone

else's borrowed frames" mutating into the ideal consumer, 'it', that buys potentially inhabitable, and easily relinquished, subject positions.

However, if we seek reinforcement, entertainment and some sense of identity through relying on others, who controls our minds? Or do we use techniques of self-deception in making rational attempts at integration in a world where our biological needs are no longer uppermost, and is it possible to have some say in which 'individual' we are and how can we ensure that we have a stake in the outcomes?

This brings us to question three. According to Elster (1986) each of us seems to be split between a private and a public self within a very serious playground of conflict between economic and social self wherein efforts to situate ourselves present possibilities of violating the norm without any cost to self. Such possibilities might involve deception in inducing a belief or strategic manipulation to induce an action that, Elster (1986) argues, are our central forms of interaction with the world around us.

Grossberg (1988: 42-48) terms this as "authentic inauthenticity" in which "every identity is equally fake, a pose that one takes on," so that we can celebrate the possibility of poses through a variety of moods. We can assume an *ironic inauthenticity* by feeling something, living some identity, however temporary, because anything is better than nothing. We can be *sentimentally inauthentic* in celebrating the magical possibility of making a difference against impossible odds, or we can go to the other extreme and become pessimistic and thus concerned with portraying the grim reality that we align ourselves with the *hyperreal inauthenticity* exemplified in Grim Reaper television commercials. Or finally, we can celebrate the terrifying, the destructive and the horrific in aligning ourselves with a *grotesque inauthenticity* in which the special effects of the media are so real that they actually blind us to reality through rendering the narrative and characters as irrelevant. In assuming various poses, is it possible to maintain some degree of rationality in celebrating our pose of the moment?

Our ways of engaging in rational attempts at integration are seen by Rorty (1986: 118) as ways of "steeling ourselves to endow our actions with the shimmering look of conviction" through efforts of weighing and assaying alternatives towards ends which are themselves evaluated by ourselves and others. On the one hand we need habits that provide conservative, normal action outcomes even though our motivational scheme might be indeterminate or fluid, while on the other hand we require critical capacities of unbounded inquiry in making ordinary rational action possible. Thus we all have potentially conflicting traits of self-deception and akrasia that are so pervasive, prevalent and powerful because the psychological processes that are operative in them are, as Davidson (1986) opines, benign.

The critical difference between akrasia and self-deception lies in the reasons underpinning the action. Rorty (1986) identifies strategies commonly found in akratic behaviour that highlight the coercive influence of power, habits, charismatic leadership and mechanisms of sympathy or antipathy that impel one into action routines that might conflict with the preferred alternative. Conversely, self-deception involves deception of the self, by the self, for or about the self. Both types of behaviour can occur as the result of a person's psychological habits and patterns of attention. Thus it could be suggested that we are doomed as intrinsically agentless players owing to the prevalence of akrasia or, through deceiving ourselves, we disqualify ourselves from the game because we no longer know who we are.

Our fourth question concerns the role our eyes might play in this deception. In talking of compelling images, Giroux (1994) maintains that the postmodernist approach acknowledges the expanding power of representations, texts, and images in producing identities and shaping the relationship between the self and society in a increasingly commodified world. Meanings mediated through claims to truth are represented in images that circulate in an electronic, informational hyperspace which disassociates itself from history and context through using a bland, almost passive approach. For example, Giroux (1994: 7) discusses the techniques used by Benetton, a very successful Italian

clothes company. This company uses *photographic images* that focus on individualism and difference (such as two males, a black and a white, handcuffed together wearing the sweaters of Benetton) in which the exaggerated precision of the models and the clarity of primary colours present a two-dimensional world of make-believe. Any difference, whether it be racial, gender or other "... is reduced to a set of simplified caricatures which are presented as archetypes" implying harmony and consensus that often mocks the concrete racial, social and cultural differences. A whole new (and surreal) world of possibility for the viewer/client is connoted.

Similarly, the use of photojournalist images in which the shocking truth-effects of pictures of AIDS victims, terrorists, or some racial confrontation, militate against a reading in which their context and content are historically and culturally situated. Instead, according to Giroux (1994), the photos seem suspended in *memories of style* so that the original context is changed to give a different possible reading of the image. It can be argued that the photo, like Duchamp's urinal (1917), is completely separated from its normal function, is transposed to a new site and thus assumes another identity or function. In the case of Benetton, the addition of the bright, simplistic logo "adds a representational 'zone of comfort' confirming a playfulness" that, Giroux (1994: 18) insists, compels the viewer to disregard any ethical or political understanding of the images. Although the company claims that its strategy allows diverse interpretations, Giroux argues that individuals produce meanings and that these meanings are not "free-floating". Rather he insists that:

> Such meanings and mediations are, in part, formed within wider social and cultural determinations that propose a range of reading practices that are privileged within power relations of dominance and subordination. The reading of any text cannot be understood independently of the historical and social experiences which construct how audiences interpret other texts. It is this notion of reading formation that is totally missing from Benetton's defense of its endless images of death, pain, danger, and shock. (Giroux, 1994: 19-20)

However, does not a notion of *reading formation* underpin the presentation of any image? Are not power relations part of the survival game in which images may be used to persuade people? Thus we might argue that, while the development of various machines

allows artists to create illusions that might differ from the "centred horizon creating the effect of a reflection" symbolising a balance between civilisation and nature in Arthur Streeton's *The Land of the Golden Fleece* (1926) (Burn 1988: 20), we still have the problem of interpretation. We cannot attribute any exact meaning to Streeton's painting, nor can we attribute any exact meaning to the two males, one black and one white, handcuffed together wearing Benetton sweaters. Burn (1988) suggests approximately twelve possible readings of Streeton's painting, while Giroux (1994) admits that "a range of reading practices" are formed within the wider social context.

This raises questions of how these reading practices are formed and how images are used to stimulate various sensations in viewers by acting as directing devices for certain types of experiences sanctioned by our culture in which, Josephson (1996: 181) contends, "we are growing an external group mind" comprising mass-media and computers that are shaping the texture of our thoughts and mental skills. Wheale (1995: 53) refers to this as a "dumbing down" invasive effect of media culture. But is it the media that is really responsible? To what extent can we attribute our thought processes to an agglomerate of machines and other people?

Such attribution might be possible, given that the rules of our survival game are evolving and changing. According to Clark (1998: 40), research in the field of Animate Vision demonstrates the way in which bodily functions, such as saccadic eye motions, might be reconfigured akin to sparser computational functions rather than rich, memory-intensive internal representations. Emphasis on the function of deictic pointers (such as saccadic eye movements) that enable fixation on certain elements and retrieval of more detailed information, use of task-specific cues and shortcuts (such as the use of a specific colour to identify an object) and, repeated environmental interactions that enable re-visitation of different aspects of the work or mental representations, demonstrate some current arguments that favour sparser, more action-oriented forms of representation along the lines of computational models.

According to Clark (1998: 43-46), such arguments are valuable in highlighting the possibility of inner representation which he argues, can "act as an inner surrogate *in the absence of* direct environmental control". For example, the motor emulation circuitry, once thought to deal solely with motor commands, might also produce visuo-motor imagery facilitating "*off-line mental rehearsal* of motor routines". It appears that such mental rehearsal can improve physical skills owing to identifiable circuitry that is, at times, strongly representational thus allowing us to deal with motor routines independent of real-world action. If this is the case, the larger scaffolding of external structures, tools and practices must be taken seriously as a master model. Clark's (1998: 50) argument, that such external and social organizations alter and transform tasks that human brains need to perform, also involves recognition of "computational economies afforded by real-world action" coupled with broader environmental structures.

Clark's (1998) thesis is very compelling because, in making images, we do use mental stand-ins and we do rehearse pictorial patterns in the mind as predictions of what form an artwork might take. If neural circuitry can take a visual copy of motor commands and provide predictive feedback before the action, such functions imply strategies for controlling behaviour and suggest implications for anyone dealing with visual imagery.

Are we now to think of ourselves as a type of computer? Is this the context in which we now find ourselves? Amongst the many arguments regarding the notion of minds as computational models, the Churchlands (1996: 280) propose that "brains are computers in a radically different style". The main thrust of their argument revolves around the fact that "nervous systems are parallel machines in the sense that signals are processed in millions of different pathways simultaneously" thus giving rise to a genuine dynamical system that behaves in a highly complex way somewhat independent of its peripheral stimuli (Churchland: 1996: 278). While this parallel architecture is not ideal for all types of computation, it does offer enormous information storage capacity, is fault-tolerant and functionally persistent.

While the Churchlands (1996) draw a close analogy between the mind and the computer, opposition to this view comes from Searle (1996) who argues that no formal mechanical programme could duplicate the specific causal powers of the brain. This opinion is supported by Honderich (1998) who draws attention to the external world as a necessary condition for a causal sequence of neural events, and by Clark (1998) who refers to the complex human cognition as an interface between a variety of action-oriented internal resources and the scaffolding of external structures It could be that this interface is the heart of the problem and we can ask if this interface is a type of bounce-back mirror system of external-internal reflections? or might we think of it as a pulsating circle of interacting change? In both cases the notions of location and time are important from the our point of view in order to keep the experiential game going.

Brewer (1998) argues that personal spatial location is essential to establishing an experiential point of view that provides *prima facie* reasons for the perceiver's beliefs about the way things are in the world. However, this involves the ability to entertain the notion of a corresponding appearance and this must be based on a person's prior experience and understanding that offers materials enabling that person to affirm a mind-independent, categorical property of the particular thing in question. In thus grasping the grounding of the object, various alternatives can be constructed in the mind through imaginative simulation. The notion of a corresponding appearance suggests a bounce-back mirror system, but Brewer (1998) is adamant that the player must immerse self in a personal perspective that allows a *reason-giving* relation between personal perceptual experiences and a mind-independent spatial reality. By this insistence Brewer (1998) rebuffs the argument of recognisable sensations as constituting our experiences of the secondary qualities of things around us. It is the person who is responsible for the recognising.

Emphasis is again given to the role of the person by Van Gelder and Port (1996) but their argument concentrates on the aspect of time and thus we get affirmation of a continuously co-evolving system of dynamic forces. This argument highlights cognitive performances

(perceiving, remembering, conversing, etc.) as evolving in a time frame that negates disparate theoretical gaps that some argue do exist between cognitive systems and their surrounds. Rather, Van Gelder and Port (1996) maintain that each system is a self-contained, yet interactive, set of changing aspects of the world in which past history is irrelevant and future behaviours are uniquely determined in space and time sequences. Is not this similar to the Churchlands' (1996) argument that our brains are dynamical systems and that our parallel architecture of neural population is somewhat independent of peripheral stimuli? Similarities do lie in the notions of dynamical systems, but Van Gelder and Port's (1996) emphasis on interaction with changing aspects of the world as a vital process is not supported by the Churchlands' (1996) emphasis on the information storage capacity and retrieval ability of the brain, though this emphasis does not totally deny the influence of peripheral stimuli.

Nevertheless, one might suggest that such a system configures singular persons as busily evolving within their own personal circuits of dynamic forces and thus we might ask how such a system accommodates other knowledge, other circuits of dynamic forces and other forms of symbolic representation? Van Gelder and Port (1996), while advocating the notion of self-contained dynamical systems, do stress that the environment is an integral element within these systems and all aspects, cognitive system, body and environment, interact in a continuously evolving and mutually influential way. They further maintain that:

> ... while dynamical models are not based on transformations of representational structures, they allow plenty of room for representation. (Van Gelder and Port, 1996: 335)

These structures include states, attractors, trajectories, bifurcations, and parameter settings that, in being complexes of interacting change, differ radically from computational models. Van Gelder and Port (1996) argue that a dynamical approach emphasises the embeddedness of the cognitive system in an essentially temporal environment. Their concept of mind as motion appears to support an analogy of a pulsating circle in which the cognitive system, body and environment are meshed as one. However, as Van Gelder and Port (1996) admit, this concept of a dynamical approach to

cognitive processes does pose a real problem. In particular, the extraordinarily diverse, subtle, complex and interactive states of human cognitive performance defy the precise, quantitative dynamical modeling. Nevertheless, from an artist's point of view, the concept of the coupling of inner and outer processes continuously and simultaneously in time and space suggests the important part played by our ability to use pictorial patterns in arranging the context.

3.5 How Can Artists Play?

We might ask how an akratic computer would play in our context of primed predicates, vicarious experience, self delusion and compelling vision? The possibilities may be intriguing, but in the event of a power failure, the game would end. This is, of course, a hypothetical situation. Artists however, might empathise with the situation or, in drawing on an awareness of what might be habitual, suggest new ways of looking at the situation. In our hypothetical context, a power failure is an end for the computer but, for an artist, a power failure is just another beginning. This is the vital difference between machines and people who are influenced by a host of various forces that may be direct or indirect beyond mechanical problems such as a power failure.

Solso (1994) proposes that the way in which we come to know something may be through either direct or indirect perception. We suggest that direct perception has similarities to the adverbalist approach regarding perceiving, whereas indirect perception appears to be more in alignment with the sense-datum approach to perception. Or we might consider the players as holding either empathy or expectation theories that may directly or indirectly influence one's experience of something.

According to Dissanayake (1992) the term empathy has undergone layers of translation over the past one hundred years to arrive at some kind of *super sympathy* whereby one can feel the needs of another as though they were one's own. However, Dissanayake (1992: 142) tells us that the notion of *Einfühlung*, an *inner imitation of the observed object* appears to have been used for the first time in Germany in 1873 by Robert Vischer and this use of the term refers to objects rather than beings. On the other hand, according to Solso (1992), an important aspect of indirect perception includes the top-down processing of visual stimuli that is driven by expectations that become habitual depending on the social practices of the community of which we are members. Also, Salomon (1979) tells us that anticipatory schemata, rather than the information entailed in a

stimulus, determine how a presentation is to be perceived. These appear to be the differences between immediate or second-hand perceptions.

Within the former, Vygotsky (1971), Rosenberg (1983), Solso (1994), Dissanayake (1992), Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) support arguments for re-thinking empathy theories in which direct perception through bodily experience is vital to understanding. These arguments are reflected from an art critic's perspective in Lippard's (1996: 18) acknowledgment that her "greatest pleasure comes from empathetic or almost kinaesthetic insights into how and why a work was made, its provocative elements".

In recognising "provocative elements" we need to examine how an artist uses direct bodily perception and how these sensorial messages allow artists to attend to their most serious and vital concerns - feeling good and making things special. Dissanayake (1992) argues that the study of raw materials in any form, even the study of meanings, is of less interest when it is the transforming, treating, or making special itself that is of crucial significance to the human species. This highlights the importance of people being involved in the actual experience rather than simply as recipients of products.

In discussing the artwork of Jasper Johns, Orton (1994) draws attention to the allegorical beguilement of interplay between image and text that Johns uses in his work which demands an immense amount of energy for both the artist and the viewer. Similarly, Wood (1994) advocates reinvigorating theories of historical materialism with a sense of the ineffable that only an aesthetic integration of embodiment can achieve, while Schwabsky (1997) draws attention to the fact that meanings given by viewers of works might count in negative ways. In these observations we can see that people do count, but for different reasons. On the one hand we have artistic input that might energise the work whereas, on the other hand, we have viewer input that might pacify the work.

Schwabsky's (1997) account of the unhappiness of Rothko and Guston, when faced with lack of reception for their work in the late 1960s, highlights the fact that intention is

not enough because if, through the transforming the work does not invite an interplay with the viewer, the work might be aborted. In the case of Rothko, Schwabsky (1997: 15) considers that his paintings then took on an aspect of "almost self-consciously slapdash" disillusionment as he "fingered a last few deep chords, but the church was empty". On the other hand, Guston did not paint for a further two years, after which his paintings became "exhibits for the defense and for the prosecution" in which scars of former paintings remained semi effaced by new paint as he sought to get the image right, irrespective of someone looking at it. Thus we can argue that the transforming, treating, or making special is of crucial significance to artists, and that the meaning, if ridiculed or dismissed, may have significant repercussions for that person's survival. For an artist, it can be further argued, that misunderstanding of intentions might lead to absolute exhaustion or reclusiveness. Nevertheless this does not deny playing with subsequent ideas as a result of misunderstanding as in the case of Guston, albeit the playing became introspective.

In transforming, treating or making special it can be argued that we need to engage in one of the most fundamental aspects of human behaviour, play. Artists call this aspect experimentation, but what we actually do is play with ideas, play with media and push to find ambiguous ways of making ordinary things special. Perhaps we use the term *experimentation* because it seems to carry more credibility than the word play which, in much current usage, implies simply having fun. Gordon (1961: 120) argues that play-theorists tend to neglect the scientific and inventive aspects of play, whereas he considers that play involves the constructive use of illusion, conscious self-deceit, daydreams and associations which seem to imply no immediate benefit. We can agree that play with apparent irrelevancies is used extensively to generate energy for problem-solving and to evoke new viewpoints, and the manner of playing can be directed, disciplined and controlled in Dissanayake's (1992: 76) sense of comprehension and negotiation with, in order to check and halt uncertainty rather than to conquer.

In theorizing about playing, Gordon (1961), Peirce (1978a), Derrida (1992b), Dissanayake (1992), Wheale (1995) and Wallgren (1997) emphasise the novelty and unpredictability that are actively sought, whereas in real life we seek the secure and predictable. Their arguments highlight the way in which those rare minds possessed by artists and scientists seek to uncover the deeper parts of the soul. Peirce (1978a) argues that true science is the study of *useless things*, because the useful things will be studied by people seeking only answers and, in line with Peirce's notion of the fossicking, inquiring mind of the artistic and scientific investigator, Gordon (1961), Derrida (1992b), Wheale (1995) and Wallgren (1997), emphasise the need to make the familiar strange, untranslatable or futuristic. Gordon's study (1961) of the creative process within a group of people from disparate disciplines, the Synectics Group, shows that the creative process in art and in science is essentially the same in that the inquiring and creative mind searches amongst seemingly irrelevant things, and juxtaposes seemingly unrelated things in ways that transpose and distort our everyday familiar ways of looking. Gordon's (1961: 95) observation that the "expert is often least able to create a new idea" challenges the intellectualised training of professionals who appear caught in a web of familiarity, or as Peirce (1978: 354-355) suggests, the sense of coming up against an invisible barrier is lost in the familiarity of *results*. Dissanayake (1992: 43) notes how young animals seem to "play for play's sake, for sheer enjoyment and intrinsic reward" and she concludes that this play appears to have hidden benefits regarding survival in later life. Thus we might argue that play is an innate form of rehearsal for life.

Often creative attempts to play with passion and purpose are regarded by some people as *arty* or eccentric behaviour. In defending this type of behaviour, Sless (1981) acknowledges the *magic* of exceptional human achievement that is not trivialised, debased or prostituted. For example, in looking at the work of *Pierre et Gilles*, Golds (1995: 4) draws attention to the "elaborately constructed set, often including lavishly kitsch elements" such as plastic flowers, cotton-wool clouds, glycerine tears and outrageous costumes that form part of a constructed imitation of glitzy, popular reality in which people pose as our saints of to-day. When taking photographs of this "blindingly

theatrical" portrait, the artists play with the iconographic notion of Catholic holy cards to emphasise the age old cult of personality crafted anew in a studied, contrived, mockingly perfect "ghastly assemblage" that Golds (1995) amusingly compares to a game of football. The latter, according to Golds, "displays many of the same audacious qualities of sadomasochism, glitz, machismo and camp pathos" that are presented in similar ways to the pomp, mystery and popular appeal of the exhibition, *Pierre et Gilles*.

Nevertheless, Sless's (1981) observation that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the exceptional and the merely slick raises the question of gimmicks to catch the eye that Josephson (1996), Pollock (1996) and Hebdige (1996) consider prolific, or what Langer (1957) refers to as a "confessional" or "frozen tantrum", or, in Dissanayake's opinion (1992: 61), represents "something that today we consider momentarily important because it has been made flashily if transiently special" under conditions of unprecedented leisure and comfort. Could we consider the work of *Pierre et Gilles*, "these two perverse Frenchmen" (Golds, 1995), as either exceptional or merely slick? Golds (1995) suggests that such celebrations of kitsch and camp are at the core of our culture in which such work may be seen as responding to the weight of political correctness.

Similarly, the expectations of popular culture, the fashionable desire for accessible shows and the way in which photography changes the way we view our surroundings, is discussed by Smee (1996: 4-7) when interviewing Bill Henson about his photographs exhibited in the Australian pavilion at Venice. The photographs of nudes sexually cavorting, caressing and holding within a landscape, appear to be torn, cut and layered over a timber base where the "truncated use of figures or their slightly awkward placement" allows ambiguous relationships between scale, depth and space. Henson's play is with an illusionist surface through which "people slip like a mirror into the interior of a photograph" seeking something we can never know, can never fully possess but which we know does inhabit our mental space. It is this sense of the ineffable that Henson feels is violated by critiques that have become "absolutely endemic, to the point where people need another's interpretation to help them form a comfortable relationship

with the work", whereas, he insists, it is the silent monologue of photography that evokes a separate yet intimate, fragile, breathing closeness or animated presence.

We could argue that play is vital to the work of the artists discussed. However, the game also requires an audience and thus Henson's mention of the role played by critiques raises the issue of interpretation and how this might deflect us from our bodily responses evidenced by Hoffie's (1996: 6) insistence that "[T]he most memorable art enters us through the loins or the guts or the heart and then travels to the brain". If this is the case, can we agree with Hoffie (1996) that much of the jargon creates misunderstanding, that emphasis on mainstream values only offers comfort, excitement and sales, and that our Discourse is not adequate to grasp the intuitive and imaginative understanding of life? However, if we rely on our "guts or the heart" in directing our appreciation of artworks, does this not simply stimulate sensational reaction to *flashily if transiently special* things as argued by Dissanayake (1992)?

Support for Dissanayake's (1992) concern about the confusing and unsatisfying state of art can be noted in Josephson's (1996) argument that advertising, the Design Arts and Popular Art, shape our contemporary reality. In particular, Josephson (1996) attributes much of shaping power to mass-media in which familiar images are used to appeal to the lowest common denominator through facilitating various associations with conventional images that allow people to imagine themselves in the depicted situation. Her argument (1996: 107) that "[F]ine Art gives the viewer disinterested pleasure, Popular Art gives the viewer interested pleasure" personifies the art form and implies passive reception rather than active engagement of people and, her lumping of representational imagery into one basket of Popular Art wrapped in sentimentality, association and narration through which people escape their own physical reality by mentally projecting themselves into the art, could seem a package of contradictions from an artist's point of view. Her argument that Fine Art is *sincere* in which each artist expresses true ideas and emotions in disinterested aesthetic form, whereas Popular Art gives the viewer interested pleasure, is questionable.

If we talk about expressing emotions, it can be suggested that this does involve interest -self-interest and, if we talk about escaping physical reality, is not this what numerous poets and artists (for example, Coleridge, Baudelaire, Pollock, Whiteley) attempted? It can be argued that there exist contradictory and confusing opinions when talking about facilitating various associations within viewers so that they might imagine themselves in the depicted situation. In talking about subjective accounts such as life stories as a fundamental way of gaining access to personal expert knowledge, Hawke (1996: 33) suggests they provide a means of providing "vicarious experiences and contextualised explanations of life events and influences" which allow a sense of identification on behalf of the reader/viewer. In this sense, *vicarious experience* is advocated whereas, in Josephson's (1996) sense, the term is used negatively to imply passive absorption as discussed in Section 3.4.

Is this the playground that many artists find themselves in, where commitment and passion seem to have been distilled into individual expression, whereby subjective interpretation, as in sheer sensationalism, is applauded? While Vygotsky (1971) argues that entertainment of feelings is not the final purpose of art, Patton (1988) reminds us that people have always made themselves into subjects of various kinds, and thus self-invention might be the way in which some artists can follow individual forms of desire and expression. How this is possible poses a challenge. Wallgren (1996) argues that self-determination for to-day's artist lies in experimenting with the different possibilities opened up by changing conditions and these, according to Roberts (1994) and Lippard (1996), will take place at least partially outside the orbit of the art world. These summations suggest profound implications for artists seeking to regain a sense of personal experience in making art, as well as those seeking some sense of personal connection with artworks that might stimulate them to think otherwise than they have been thinking. Lippard's (1996) conclusion highlights what might be considered the personal game that many artists find themselves in whereby:

> That fragile lifeline of vitality, the communication to the viewer of the ecstasy of the making process, the motive behind it and reasons for such a commitment can

all too easily be snapped by the circumstances under which most people see art - the stultifying classist atmosphere of most museums and galleries and, in the art world, the personal intimidation resulting from over-inflated individual reputations. (Lippard, 1996: 19)

This raises the question of determining the circumstances that might force artistic commitment to snap. Perhaps the answer lies in looking at theories of indirect perception.

Theories of networks play a pivotal role from the point of view of indirect perception because the notion of Discourses highlights the important influence that immediate, significant people and groups exert on an individual in forming their theme of personal persona. While immersion within the social practices of the Discourse means that we become more aligned with the values of the Discourse and thus are more deeply affected by stimuli coming from that particular Discourse, Gee (1992: 111) argues that Discourses are inherently "ideological" and cannot be taught. This appears quite an astounding argument when we consider all the things we try to teach people, or the methods that we use to persuade people to adopt another way of thinking as the following counter arguments exemplify.

Giroux (1994: 101) aligns himself with the work of Solomon-Godeau in advocating a pedagogy of representation in which "battles" over what constitutes art and art criticism might suppress "those who want to reinscribe the autonomy, nonutility, purity, and alleged self-reflexivity of the work of art". Lovejoy (1989) highlights the way in which Conceptualism began to play an integral part in altering perceptions and attitudes about the structure of art, and Wolff (1981) attacks the concept of *author* and wants explanations of how authors are produced, or constructed. However, Grossberg (1988) reiterates Gee's (1992) argument by asserting that:

> ... ideological positions are never merely passively occupied; they are taken up, lived in different ways, to different degrees, with differing investments and intensities. Our agency, our active relation to the world, is always more than that of a knowing (ideological) subject. (Grossberg, 1988: 35)

While admitting that many of our perceptions of the world are derived indirectly as argued by Giroux (1994), Lovejoy (1989) and Wolff (1981), it seems feasible to counter argue, as do Gee (1992) and Grossberg (1988), that we actually have to absorb an ideology and, while we may do this through exposure to indirect perceptions in that they are constructed from inferences about the real world, we cannot understand these inferences unless we have already acquired prerequisite knowledge sufficient for us to then embark upon learning more about the ideology that was inferred.

However, it is possible that many people are content to remain constructed in Wolff's (1981) sense by indirect perceptions in which *only* the third step of inference according to Peirce (1978b) is adopted. This third step is that of *judgement* whereby the processes of colligation followed by contemplation has been accomplished by someone else, and thus the conclusion reached is available for an individual to adopt. It is feasible to suggest that this is an easy way *to be absorbed* into the ideology rather than *to absorb* the ideology and begs the question of how this might happen?

Perhaps, part of the answer lies in the personification of the word that carries the authority of judgement that Reddy (1981) regards as undermining the crucial human ability to reconstruct thought patterns on the basis of word signals because the signals already contain the ready-made ideas. As indicated in Section 2.2, Reddy (1981) condemns the prolific usage of conduit metaphors that involve the assertion that figurative language transfers human thoughts and feelings. The implication, he argues, is that the conduit metaphor influences thinking by objectifying meaning so that ideas slip out of human brains to be transferred and stored for someone else to unpack.

In support of this argument Leed (1908: 50-57) pinpoints the medieval concept of "lordship over the self" as the beginning of the autonomy of individuals as an instrument of "social control" that evolved into consolidation of the "old" tradition in print providing a "highly ramified set of trails into the past" thus amassing a cultural tradition purporting to have an aura of permanence. The metaphor of *trails* highlights the prevalence of the

conduit metaphor that Lakoff (1987) suggests is the principal metaphor for communication emanating from our sense to convey image schemata from one domain to a corresponding structure in another domain that involves category chaining. Thus we might argue that, as living beings, we are systems within systems constantly moving in time and space and metaphors that aptly reflect our life forces are integral to our links with the environment. But, if we rely on the trails of the past, does this imply reason-giving understanding of what we amass in results, solutions and answers without having any real notion of how they came to be? Or, are these trails simply a form of *primed predicates,* as discussed in Section 3.4, that allow members of a Discourse to get their meanings *free?* Might acquisition of *free* knowledge further suggest that promoters and purchasers of the art object (person or thing) also get the meanings *free,* where, in some instances, the meanings take on the sense of making do with something when the real thing is not available that Gee (1992: 118) refers to as "mushfake"? Thus we might argue that indirect perception is a type of *mushfake* which can be so convincing that the boundaries between what we perceive and what we are told to perceive become blurred.

Further force is given to the argument of conveying information by Paivio (1981: 163) who suggests that the "imagery system presumably constructs synchronously organized, integrated informational structures, analogous to the continuous, structural layout of the perceptual world", and Lovejoy (1989: 37) talks of the movie camera as having created an entirely new dimension for photography through which the audience is "controlled by constant sequenced changes of images moving in time," that are designed to dominate thinking processes and affect emotions. Further implications in Lovejoy's (1989) suggestion that computers begin to make decisions and generate productions even the artist cannot anticipate are frightening in the way in which, according to Josephson (1996), we let our electronic machines do more of our paradigmatic thinking and remembering.

However, Baudrillard (1980) and Pollock (1996) point out that we all pander to the myth that information is presented as being generative of communication, and thus we become

fascinated and confused by the *staging* of communication in which we struggle to establish ourselves as conscious, autonomous beings while at the same time submissive, obedient and conforming objects. Similar concerns are expressed by Zipes (1980), whose observations of mass media transformation of folklore highlight serious questions about the loss of the *folk* aspect as the culture industry mediates and interprets according to marketability and, Giroux (1994: 101), stresses that we need to understand how practices of production, circulation, and reception are "deeply enmeshed in the commodified character of the image".

Thus it can be argued that the conflict between being consciously active beings or submissive, obedient performers has deep implications for artists. Also, it can be argued that the common usage of conduit metaphors now developing into *the* mode of technological talk promises results without effort. It is arguable that a repercussion of indirectly relying on inanimate objects to fulfil our dreams may lead to further suppression of our human will to engage in such activities as drawing and painting that involve time, effort, labour and love from a personal perspective.

3.6 Labour or Love?

Lovejoy (1989: 23) suggests that the application energy of mechanical means alters our physical environment in removing "tedious labour". For example, Lovejoy (1989: 152), draws attention to the complex technique used by Burson to create computer-generated information "portraits" that are literally a far stretch from the truth. A series of individual photographic portraits are scanned, stacked, stretched, warped and averaged to produce the hybrid prototypal image of a face that could be any one normal person. But the image is a likeness of what does not exist - it is an artwork of simulacra that would be almost impossible to produce by hand. There is much validity in Lovejoy's (1989) observation about the labour involved in making artworks, but her statement that electronic tools have a "hidden point of view, far more complex than that which is built into a brush, a printing press or a camera" makes me wonder where people actually fit into this scheme of things. As an artist I am happy to play around with different tools. I use brushes, cameras and computers and I am very aware of the way in which a certain tool can be used to make things easier.

As we saw previously in Section 3.5, the importance of play in generating new viewpoints and the ability to cope with and enjoy ambiguity is vital to artistic experience. In my own work I am now playing with computer images so that I can find out more about these new tools because the *process of using a different technique on something familiar to suggest other ways of thinking about making artworks is important.* However, I do find the work tedious, time consuming, frustrating and yet, at the same time, challenging, exciting and rewarding.

I also find it tedious to sit for hours in the blazing sun while painting with watercolours, and thus I take cameras with me on field trips so that I can record visual data in the most convenient way. I also use cameras for recording visual data that might involve a variety of different techniques of using the machine so that I can magnify some sections of the landscape, crop out other sections or collect a series of related aspects. In fact, the variety

of visual segments I can gather is endless. I have noticed how I have developed a different way of looking at the landscape that ranges from *scanning* the total vision to *focussing* on details that previously I may have missed. As an artist, one can agree with Sless (1981: 95-99) that use of the camera allows one to "develop a different way of seeing from ordinary perception". I find that I use synecdochical and metaphorical projections that have evolved from familiarity with looking through a viewfinder so that the landscape takes on new meaning. In this way the machine facilitates my own artistic practice whereby I can build up a data base for future reference.

However, I am conscious of the "purposeful controlling agent behind every photograph" that Sless (1981: 95) highlights, and, when reviewing photographs at a later time in the studio, I am also conscious of what Dufrenne (1980) calls the "tinkering", that leads into:

> ... the loving battle with a resisting material, friendship with the tool that extends the body, a flirtation with the obstacle, a game of chance in which one never establishes enough control to eliminate all surprise. (Dufrenne, 1980: 167)

From an artist's perspective, Dufrenne's metaphor of "loving battle" is apt because it combines a pleasure-effort sense of direction that Gordon (1961) considers essential to the workaday routine of making the familiar strange. In a way I am searching for the *best story* that Gee (1992: 104) considers is the job of the brain's "interpreter" that "efficiently computes decisions, moods, and actions with hundreds of speedy and encapsulated modules" so that the way in which I choose to foreground or background certain aspects of the image in the painting might identify me as a member of the Art Discourse. In Solso's (1994: 147) terms, this might be considered as "thinking art" in looking for "thematic patterns" within an artistic playground. Or, in terms of an art critic such as Roberts (1994: 13), I might demonstrate "how the production of meaning for the artist is also a post hoc affair" in that the meaning of the artwork might evolve in the process of making, or upon completion.

Thus it can be argued that artistic practices may be combined into a labour of love in which machines can be used to assist in the transformation of visual date gathered from

both direct perception and indirect perception. However, while we can agree that Discourses do exert influence and that the culture industry is maintained and controlled in the environment outside our heads, it also can be argued that each individual does have a special something inside the head that allows one to claim experiential transformation of visual data as personal. This something, that Johnson (1987: 139) calls "imagination" and Gee (1992: 99) calls the "interpreter", uses the "cognitive tools in the head" to select from complex configurations of associations learned through acquisition to explain behaviour to others and to self. Is it possible to identify important components from the complex configurations of associations? and how can we explain our actions? Do we really want to explain our actions? Might not efforts to explain artistic behaviour deny the specialness of what we do have inside our heads?

The topic of imagination and all that it encompasses continues to be debated as various schools of thought align themselves with either Plato's notion of *divine ecstasy* or Aristotle's emphasis on *instinctive mimesis* as a process of becoming whatever we are. Two other key figures who appear to confirm the different approaches that assign the imaginative process to either God or an individual, are Blake and Coleridge. I mention these poets because my love of literature plays a very important part as *whispers of immortality* in my artwork that keep nudging me towards ways of thinking, ways of connecting stories and myths into visual/verbal dialogue. The poets of the Romantic period in particular, exert significant presence because of their obsession with the imaginative capacity to reach beyond the norm and flirt with the ineffable while somehow trying to escape from our cumbersome humanity.

In stressing divine imagination, Blake (1979: 368) waged war against the importance of sensory perception advocated by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hartley and Hume in writing:

> This Life's dim Windows of the Soul
> Distorts the Heavens from Pole to Pole,
> And leads you to Believe a Lie
> When you see with, not thro, the Eye.
> (*Everlasting Gospel. 1818 101-104*)

On the other hand Coleridge (1959), while affirming the supremacy of God, proclaimed that the human mind, as an agent of reason made in the image of the Divine Mind, was partly an architect of its own knowledge based on the reciprocal organic partnership between worldly perception and the faculty of the mind. The name given to this mediating faculty was imagination.

An important distinction that can be made between Blake and Coleridge, lies in Blake's insistence that humans act through an intuitive wisdom with which they are born, and thus are (or are not) endowed with possible divine ecstasy, whereas Coleridge stresses the organic process, stimulated by emotions, that involves three steps of which the first two are involuntary, while the third is related to the exercise of conscious will in struggling to idealise and unify the balance of forces. Within these steps, Coleridge (1962) acknowledges outcomes of "predetermined research" as having "too peculiar a point of view" that, through the process of "fancy", receive materials ready-made from associations. This appears to be the first step, one we can argue, which is similar to the idea of networks of associations drawn from established norms of a Discourse. Secondly, once the norms are understood, everyone, in using "primary imagination", can form links between sensation, perception and thought. It seems to me that Gee's (1992) "interpreter", the modules that interpret expectations, actions, decisions and emotions through language to construct "folk theories", performs the job that Coleridge assigns to "primary imagination".

However, beyond these involuntary attributes lies Coleridge's "secondary imagination", a process related to the exercise of conscious will through which data are dissolved, diffused and dissipated so that a fresh view or a re-creation is possible. We can argue that this process correlates with Johnson's (1987: 168-170) view of imagination as "a pervasive structuring activity by means of which we achieve coherent, patterned, unified representations" upon which "conceptualization and propositional judgment depend".

However, we can detect a crucial difference between Coleridge's "secondary imagination" and Johnson's notion of imagination that lies in the data source fuelling the imaginative capacity. While Johnson (1987) follows the empiricist tendency in nominating biological bodily functioning as the primary data source, he stops short of saying that it is a person's God-like capacity that allows one to generate the data. Coleridge (1969: 118), on the other hand, goes further in fusing the biological and spiritual, or what he calls the objective (nature) and the subjective (self), in the individual as source of data in being a "modification of the higher consciousness" - the "I AM" that rests as a "middle quality" between nature and self.

Thus, we can postulate that Coleridge's notion of "I AM" has given rise to the Modernist concentration on the individual as source of meaning. If we consider the way in which Coleridge's (1962: 119) idea of "Kantian 'counteraction' of forces" may have suggested a possibility for artists to concentrate on the "modification of the higher consciousness" and, if we allow a similar influence from Blake's idea of intuitive wisdom, we might have a fusion of the biological and spiritual miraged into the creator "I", while the finite "AM", and the repercussions of being and bodily baggage, were forgotten.

For example, Coleridge exclaims that "in our life alone does Nature live:", and this union:

>   ... gives in dower
> A new Earth and new Heaven,
> Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud -
> Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud -
> We in ourselves rejoice!   (*Dejection: An Ode.* V.68-72)

while Blake extols "enjoyments of Genius" (*A Memorable Fancy*) by insisting:

> Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained:
>   (*The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.* Plate 5.)

Hence we have powerful reasons for both rejoicing in our birth of selves while also recognising the totally imaginative knowledge attainable only through art that Blake refers to as "sweet Science"(*Ninth The Ninth Being The Last Judgment*, Plate 139, 10.).

I draw attention to these two important literary figures because it is possible that, given

the emphasis on the written word prevalent in Western ways of thinking, many attitudes towards making visual images have intimations of the literary tradition. We can argue that the imaginative capacity may be considered as either innate according to Blake, or an act of conscious will according to Coleridge. In accepting such an argument, we might understand those who view art as a *magic* Platonian-Blakean concept, or those who view art as Aristotlean-Coleridgean *self-expression*, depending on which line of thought they espouse. In both cases we can see that the notion of God is central - either as an external dictator, or as incarnation within an individual.

While admitting that viewpoints concerning Plato, Aristotle, Blake and Coleridge are many and varied, we can entertain the possibility for re-thinking the way in which their ideas concerning imagination have informed our Western ways of thinking. Perhaps, over time, many people have *absorbed* the ideas of Plato and Blake as advocating the making of art as *inspired*, to such a degree that ordinary people have been excluded. In like manner, it is possible that the influence of Aristotle and Coleridge has played an important part in stimulating individuals to *express* themselves to such a degree that results of that expression do not always demonstrate awareness of persons living within a greater ecology, but tend to accentuate separation of individuals from the wider environment as the term *individual* implies.

These thoughts raise a host of questions regarding art as a loving battle in which the concept of imagination plays a pivotal role in personal experience. If we agree that no two people possess the same cognitive ability or the same motivation, let alone have access to similar opportunities, how can we explain the fact that many people are able to read and write with some degree of competency without aspiring to be inspired authors, while, conversely, many people regard an inability to make images as their normal lack of magic? If survival in our imaged world does necessitate development of informed competency in making and understanding images, might this mean that visual expression will replace conventional and learned habits of reading and writing? Does this mean that we might learn to make art in similar ways as learning to write? But, if using computers

is replacing using a pen, a pencil or a paintbrush and, if software programmes, spell checks and grammar checks provide already made data banks of possibilities and/or results, does not this obviate any need to exert labour and love in our experiences of reading and writing? With increasingly accessible electronic images, will the accumulation of such images actually erase reading and writing along with the effort once entailed in learning these skills? Stripped of a basic understanding and appreciation of the loving battle one enters into when making personal meaningful marks on a surface that requires time, effort and practice, will vicarious gratification suffice?

Or is it possible to develop our imaginative capacity so that through association, through emotional involvement, through interested pleasure and through curiosity about subject matter, we might start to wonder how artistic effects are achieved so that we too might *participate in controlling and enriching* our survival? Will there be opposition from those who consider artmaking as the guarded preserve of only a select few who, by nature, divineness or political luck, are separated out as artists? Is it necessary for a person actually to make artworks to experience art?

It can be argued that veins of individualism and socialisation influence our tendency to act in ways that might demonstrate degrees of personal gratification or personal experience. This raises another question of how an artist might, at one and the same time, be visionary and singular within mainstream culture where mass-media reality now offers virtual individual identities for anyone? How can artists find some meaningful intention buried within these new and ambiguous artforms? Does self-determination for to-day's artist lie in experimenting with the different possibilities opened up by changing conditions outside of the art world, and if these changes applaud quick results and sensationalism, how can artists continue with playful rehearsals? Where might artists find spiritual space in a commodified environment?

We can suggest that our game appears to be essentially one of identifying the disparate modes of awareness that might, or might not, stimulate sensational degrees of effort or

resistance that cause us to think anew about something and, in expressing the beliefs emanating from our thoughts, we play with the qualitatively elusive differences between kinds of perceptual consciousness. How we play this experiential game, it is argued, is a matter of both labour and love that involves mental tinkering with tools inside the head to embellish and enrich our stories so that our survival is comfortable.

We can recall that, in Section 1.6, the probability of my own intervention from time to time was suggested owing to the nature of this research in dealing with personal experience. As researcher and artist I am working on two fronts simultaneously and thus it is impossible to divorce myself entirely from the influence of readings on my own thinking. Hence, in Chapter Four, my own thoughts and artworks come under investigation as we move closer to probing ways in which making art can be seen as personal experience. Because the notion of personal experience does involve some understanding of the way in which one's body and mind work, we do need a test case. However, in this research only one test case is appropriate, myself. Thus Chapters Four and Five serve as links between things outside and inside my head which direct my own process of survival.

CHAPTER FOUR: BODY & MIND IN MOTION

4.1 Playing Around with Tools in the Head.

If, as animals, our basic instincts are primarily those of survival and, if the way in which the body functions is crucial to our survival, how can we make our survival an enjoyable process and, what ways and means will we find for doing this? As argued in Section 3.4, Schelling (1986: 182) contends that the things that either make us happy or unhappy occur in the mind, where, through the process of becoming engaged in something we endeavour to escape boredom, "the tedium of consciousness, of one's own company" through various forms of entertainment that facilitate a few hours of forgetfulness. In other words we want to assume another mind that will make our body feel good because our own mind is not doing a good job. How can this be if we all have much the same tools in the head? Is there something wrong with our tools, or is there something wrong with the way in which we *use* our tools?

According to Solso (1994), the brain is the nucleus of the emotions, giving life feeling; it is the centre of thinking, providing associations for rational thought; and it is the centre of visual perception, the ability to see, feel and experience art. Located in the head, the brain is part of the body and, thus we can argue that bodily involvement is crucial to recognising the way in which the mind works. This involves some understanding of the chemistry of the total body as demonstrated by Salomon (1979), Culler (1981), Arnheim (1986), Churchland (1983), Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987) and Gee (1992).

Churchland (1983), Gee (1992) and Solso (1994) propose that clusters of neurons in the brain can each be activated to different degrees, depending upon how greatly they are stimulated by other neurons that send signals to particular clusters of neurons. Gee (1992) suggests that we can identify three basic clusters of neurons that are triggered by firstly, input sensors (sight, touch, smell, taste, sound) that clamour for the attention of the second cluster comprising the *interpreter* modules that sift expectations, decisions,

emotions and actions through language, to the third cluster of output sensors that manifest the result of the input sensors moderated by the interpreter.

Figure 4.1.1 suggests possible traffic routes that neurons might follow in the brain according to ideas proposed by Gee (1992). The notion of percolation, as demonstrated visually by the ascending arrows, seems appropriate because it suggests the on-going flow of data that modifies the output of each person, and thus a vertical egg motif is used as a model for the brain to suggest the reciprocal interplay of physical and mental forces that cause us to act. (The origins of this visual configuration and subsequent modifications, are explained in Chapter Five where the working relationship between my mind and body orchestrates my own process of making images).

| Figure 4.1.1 Possible Traffic Flow of Neurons in the Brain. |

It appears that clusters of neurons are activated firstly by direct sensory perception which then causes these neurons, secondly, to demand the attention of interpreter modules that sift information to the third cluster of output modules that result in action/thought of some sort. However, things are never as simple as they appear owing

to the variety of senses we perceive. How do we determine whether sight, touch, smell, taste or sound is the most important? Is it the job of the interpreter modules to direct the traffic signals?

As previously noted in Section 3.4, strong arguments (Elster, 1998: Ainslie, 1986: Schelling, 1986; Davidson 1986: Rorty, 1986) highlight the human proclivity to present actions and beliefs in the most favourable way in an effort to satisfy self or outcompete to the extent that, perhaps, we become so successful in self-deception that we avoid the risk of betraying our ulterior motives even to ourselves. In stronger terms, Grossberg (1988) claims that we construct fake identities as a way of designing self and, in less provocative terms, Salomon (1979) posits the notion of *recoding* in our efforts to overcome dissonance, while Sless (1981) and Dissanayake (1992) draw our attention to *transformation* in the process of copying from original models.

What seems apparent from the above observations is the fact that humans do want to *tell the best story* and, while Gee (1992) and Grossberg (1998) highlight the deceit often involved in the telling, Dissanayake (1992, p.12) argues along the lines of *recoding* and *transformation* proposed by Salomon (1979) and Sless (1981). She stresses that bondedness, group harmony, interdependence, and cooperation are more attractive than deception, competitiveness and strife and, her analogy that "flies are more attracted to honey than to vinegar" situates her firmly in the sociobiologist camp. She reasons that the fact that something might be used in competitive display does not necessarily imply that the origin and selective value were solely for the purpose of competition, though self-interest and survival cannot be ruled out.

This raises a very interesting problem for us because Coombs (1979) suggests that one of the effects of competition is to make people who are competing more alike. If the goals and rules are similar it follows that the work or effort produced will be similar, and hence we are able to identify degrees of similarity that suggest prototypical behaviour. If this is the case we must be either involved in *telling the best story* to

outcompete through deceit and manipulation or, *making special* those various things that are important in the service of abiding human concerns. Thus we might ask: are deceit, self-absorption and self-deception inherent traits in the human species, or are we truthful, sharing and communal beings?

It can be argued that the difference lies in the type of motivation that stirs people to action, or in other words, the force of the input signals coming from the discourse of which one is a member. On the one hand, the signals may emphasise an external reward such as money, momentary fame or some fabulous prize. On the other hand, the signals may stress an inherent satisfaction and fulfilment in undertaking a challenging task. It is arguable that there is another important difference that affects our decision-making process and this concerns the rules of the game that are predetermined in competition but are unstated in searching for personal fulfilment. If, in playing the game, we get too far out of line according to the rules of the social group, does not the social group see to it that we have experiences that reset some weights so as to nudge our network closer to the target? If this is the case, the resetting may cause feelings of anxiety in stimulating akratic behaviour that Rorty (1986) attributes to powerful external forces that dominate a subject's behaviour. On the other hand we might remove ourselves from the conflict. For example, we can note avoidance of succumbing to external pressure in Rooney's response to Catalano's (1994) question:

> What made you choose art over music or literature? From all accounts you were just as interested in them.

I submit Rooney's response in full because any interpretation on my behalf would not do justice to his situation:

> Right from the time I began learning the piano - that was at 12 - I wanted to be a composer, and you can earn a living as a performer. But I didn't like my first experience of performing in public when I was forced to enter an eisteddfod. I didn't like the experience. I didn't like the attitudes of the other competitors. I couldn't stand all the mothers with hot-water bottles complaining that this particular eisteddfod didn't give money as a prize. (Catalano, 1994: 19)

We can argue that three powerful external forces were strong enough to change one person's whole career - force to enter a competition, attitudes of other competitors, and money.

On the other hand, it is possible that many people will follow the safe and accepted directions of the discourse, even when, for example, those directions encourage extra-ordinary behaviour as does the Art Discourse. However, this extra-ordinariness is considered safe within the Art Discourse as exemplified by the term *mainstream* (Lippard, 1996) that is used to identify those artists producing work within the guidelines of expected *avant garde* art behaviour. Lippard's (1996: 18) argument that "no group is so dependent on the status quo as the avant-garde (sic), which must have an establishment to attack, reverse, and return to for validation" sums up the rules of this social group. In contrast to Rooney's experience, it can be argued that conflict may be actually sought if one has a stake in that choice.

We can agree that our cluster of interpreter modules is kept very busy sifting through the sensory input data so that we might not perceive a discrepancy between our attitudes and our behaviour. Arnheim (1986), Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987) and Solso (1994) stress our search for bodily balance, pattern and harmony in which we seek to avoid dissonance in our daily lives and, other ways such as daydreaming and modes of vicarious experience, are highlighted by Schelling (1986), Elster (1986) and Josephson (1996). We can thus argue that what we sense and, in particular, what we see, plays a very important part in the way in which we respond to external stimuli.

But artists are very aware of the tricks the eye can play and this knowledge is used to create illusions of depth in paintings using linear perspective, to create simulated texture that looks so real one is tempted to touch what, in reality, is simply paint on a canvas, to evoke emotions simply by using colour, to manipulate a viewer's feelings of balance and stability through arranging motifs in certain ways on the picture plane, and to entice the viewer into some form of association with the image through subject matter. These are only a few of the ways through which we play with the phenomenal properties of perception, both our own and those of the viewer. Thus, arguments that stress what we see is actually more than what we look at seem perfectly valid. Equally valid are questions concerning interpretation that, according to Solso (1994), require

visual stimuli to be analysed, recognised and classified whereby the configurations of line, texture, colour, value, size and shape are processed by the mind and interpreted according to the baggage of values and associations we already have stored in our memory. Does this mean that each individual responds in a different and unique way to processing the data recorded by the eye as confirmed by Schwabsky (1997), Salomon (1979) and Arnheim (1986), and what are some of the ways in which configurations of design elements might assist or hinder our processing of what we see?

According to Paivio (1981), the use of realistic imagery assists comprehension of a written text in a dual-coding approach and Josephson (1996: 108) considers that "the comfortable familiarity of the conventional image" facilitates engagement with the subject matter "so as to have a vicarious experience". This is a debatable issue because it draws attention to the way in which an image might be considered an adjunct to facilitating meaning. This is not always the case. Salomon (1979) makes a distinction between notational (abstract) and non-notational (representational) symbol systems. He considers that notational symbol systems entail specific criteria for characterising the symbol system, for example, a musical score, whereas non-notational systems, such as paintings, allow ambiguity of meaning, and the degree of ambiguity depends on resemblance to, or depiction of, its referent. However, the referents may be internal images or conceptions, and thus understanding is often judged against one's knowledge of the concepts, previous experience and expectations, *not* against the real object. Solso, (1994) refers to this employment of internal concepts, or *hidden units*, as top-down processing in which visual association, visual memory and visual closure allow quick recognition of prototypal, idealised images.

Rather than aiding comprehension of a written text, it appears that realistic imagery may confuse understanding if Salomon's (1979) and Solso's (1994) argument is plausible. They argue that prototypal (non-notational) artworks offer more possibilities for inferences than do more abstract (notational) works and thus more

ambiguity exists in the former. We might argue that ambiguity stimulates curiosity in viewers and thus Josephson's (1996) contention that engagement of viewers is facilitated through use of realistic, conventional images, has credibility. However, engagement does not imply understanding.

Josephson's (1996) argument that engagement allows *vicarious experience* appears to be a generalisation that undermines the effort integral to experience and challenges beliefs held by Pirenne (1970), Salomon (1979), Rosenberg (1983), Arnheim (1986), Schwabsky (1997), Derrida (1992), and Solso (1994) that all texts are different and one must not try to measure them on the same scale and never to read them with the same eye. It can be argued that the notions of *vicarious experience* (Josephson, 1996), *syntax selling* (Hebdige, 1996) and *authentic inauthenticity* (Grossberg, 1988) highlight ways in which sameness is promoted as the norm whereby an interpretation of a lifestyle is presented for adoption without any effort required on behalf of a particular person.

While some patterns within certain written or visual texts might be recognised more easily than others, the real problem lies in the interpretive skills of the reader/viewer and, if these skills are not used, we can argue that no real experiential effort is exerted to think anew through differentiating between inferences. If we *do* accept that experience entails effort in thinking anew thus leading to greater understanding, it is arguable that we cannot rely on *comfortable familiarity* and realistic imagery to ensure understanding because of the range of inferences possible.

As an example, we might look at two of my paintings that depict various areas of the Mt. Moffatt region to see how one might allow more inferences than the other owing to the possibility that one image might suggest more *hidden units* than the other in evoking certain associations in singular persons. Perhaps the painting of *Dargonelly Waterhole* (Plate 1), allows the viewer to find many "hidden units" that Solso (1994: 258) argues might be activated by the brain filling in missing details. It appears

conventional in Josephson's sense (1996). The viewer might imagine camping at the site, bringing animals to water, swimming, walking and all sorts of associations based on experiences of similar places. Thus, this image may be considered more non-notational in that ambiguity of interpretation is possible.

Plate 1. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Dargonelly Waterhole.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm (Diptych)

However, in the second example, *Lethbridge's Creek No 2* (Plate 2), the image is more abstract, or notational, and thus does not offer the viewer as many opportunities to connect personal associations to the image, or to make as many inferences. In fact, Solso (1994) suggests that the more abstract the work the more freedom the viewer has in interpreting it because the input stimuli are less familiar and hence coalesce less canonically thus suggesting fewer schema. In other words, the possibility of ranging amongst personal associations is curtailed and the probability of accepting the work as an objective entity outside personal experience is enhanced. This being the case, we could argue that the more abstract the artwork, the less mental engagement is required because inferences are less.

Plate 2. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Lethbridge's Creek No 2.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm

However, this argument does not appear to support Salomon's (1979: 72) proposition that the closer the correspondence or congruity with the mode of preferred internal representation to the symbol system the easier it is for the individual to utilise the system, hence "*better* means mentally *easier*". This proposition appears to suggest that internal representations might equate with personal associations thus facilitating mental engagement, and it could be argued that the more possibility for personal association, the easier is the mental engagement. How then, can we resolve what appears to be a

mental engagement suggested by non-notational works. Does not less mental engagement imply mental ease? Yet the non-notational works appear to offer more inferences and thus more possible conflict. Should not non-notational works thus require more difficult mental engagement? Resolution of this paradox appears to lie in the way in which people use the tools in the head. It can be argued that mental engagement, easy or conflictual, does not ensure understanding, nor the same or similar interpretation.

While congruity with the mode of preferred internal representation may be "easier", Salomon (1979: 77) also points out that different symbol systems "vary as to the mental skills they require" for information extraction and processing. Whenever a symbol system contains too much novelty it may be rejected or, in some cases, may lead to dissonance as discussed by Solso (1994) in that we perceive a discrepancy between our attitudes and our behaviour. In trying to overcome the feeling of discord, we might console ourselves with explanations such as, dismissing the importance of the painting, suggesting that it means more than is literally depicted, or suggesting changes that would make it more acceptable and thus correspond more closely to our preferred internal representation. We could argue that these are methods of achieving mental ease that might account for ways in which some people seek enlightenment from some other familiar symbol system such as a written text as discussed in Section 2.2.

Nevertheless, it would be safe to say that all artists, aestheticians, art historians, art critics and art educators are aware of the power of artistic illusion. For artists, the interplay between the internal (cognitive) representation of reality and the external (physical) representation presents a problem that Lippard (1996) notes in posing the following question:

> ... how do we arrive at an art that makes sense and is available to more and more varied people whilst maintaining aesthetic integrity and regaining the power that art must have to provoke, please, and mean something? (Lippard, 1996: 11)

This question targets the dilemma of all artists who are faced with somehow reconciling the struggle between personal expression and community expectations in which

provocation is not always pleasing. But, if as Salomon (1979) contends, "*better* means mentally *easier*", what does this imply for artists? If we realise that less mental elaboration on behalf of the viewer is required for a *better* conclusion does this mean that our task of creating visual representations as symbol systems is influenced by the type of reception the works will receive? Does this mean that the type of *cerebral encyclopedia* we have in our heads influences and stimulates the firing of neurons to compete for supremacy that, according to Solso (1994), motivates a person to act in certain ways?

We can argue that what we *do have in our heads* consists of physical and psychological materials, and while we may be able to grasp the concrete aspects of the former, it is the complex network of associations comprising peculiar nonlinguistic modules of the mind that defies satisfactory definition. If these networks of associations are picked up as part of apprenticeships within social practices and, if habit is very influential and can be exercised relatively independently of motivation, does this mean that the type of internal or external rewards, sanctioned by the social group, may also determine whether or not our actions are recognised as meaningful in specific ways within the practices of specific social groups?

Figure 4.1.2, suggests a pictorial development on Figure 4.1.1, concerning the flow of neurons in the brain in which the notion of *rewards* is positioned before reaching the *interpreter* owing to the possibility that motivation for action may depend on what type of rewards/goals are habitually sanctioned by the Discourse.

Figure 4.1.2 The Influence of Discourses.

When we talk of habits, we are talking of what Gee (1992) refers to as "picking up" ways of behaving. For example, Arnheim (1986) draws attention to the way in which a hunter's world looks different from that of a botanist or poet. We could argue that three different discourses are involved and, because each discourse regulates the behaviour of its members according to significant and pertinent beliefs and actions, a hunter would probably look for animal tracks, a botanist for variations of flora but when we come to the poet verbal referents are less obvious. As Gordon (1961) points out, the artist ranges freely through the multiplicity of experience, selecting at will and by whim for, as Dissanayake (1992) and Van Gelder and Port (1996) indicate, significance of any stimulus is assessed according to whether neural firing is accelerated, decelerated, or remains level. From my own experience I know that I might visit a particular site and, on arrival, completely change my mind (neural firing decelerated) because the time of day is wrong or the place does not feel right. It is possible that a hunter would still look

for a beast and the botanist find plant samples because their discourses are more specific and the rules more straightforward. Gee's (1992) observation clarifies my suggestion:

> The only way to ensure that learners have the right experiences and focus on the relevant aspects of them is to apprentice them to the social practices of sociocultural groups in such a way as to ensure that they have certain experiences and have their attention focused in the right ways through interaction with "masters" acting out their mastery. (Gee, 1992: 48).

In this way our expectations, actions, decisions and emotions are strongly influenced by group members of the Discourse and, although I suggested that the artist and poet appeared to have virtual freedom, this is not entirely true. Solso (1994: 231-251) draws attention to the visual phenomenon of prototypes which are canonic representations of a given concept or class of things that best represent that concept of class. In other words, these are exemplars, master models or idealised impressions, that best represent salient and meaningful features of whatever is perceived. As Solso (1994) notes, the mind cannot store everything so it stores abstractions of stimuli against which similar patterns are judged. Similarly, Lakoff (1987) considers that prototypes often act as cognitive reference points of various sorts and form the basis for inferences.

Another phenomenon of the human mind that facilitates organisation of things is what Johnson (1987), Burge (1986), Van Gelder and Port (1986), and Clark (1998) refer to as recurring dynamic patterns of perceptual interactions and motor programmes that give coherence and structure to our experience. These structures, being grounded in bodily functions, require some sort of recognition and organisation if they are to be understood. Johnson (1987) allocates this pervasive structuring activity to the *imagination*, the capacity to find significant connections, to draw inferences, and to solve problems.

We can argue that the tasks of the *interpreter* (Gee, 1992) and of the *imagination* (Johnson, 1987), are very similar. However, a difference can be noted in deciding what is the influential force giving rise to the decision-making and ordering task in the first

place. According to Gee (1992), discourses play the most significant role, whereas Johnson (1987: 205) considers that human understanding "reveals our engagement in a physical environment" from whence emerge our basic embodied structures when needed for human rationalisation. It is arguable that the two notions are not exclusive of each other, but rather seem to highlight this or that side of the same coin being the organism-environment interaction or, in other words, the physical body-discourse relationship. Figure 4.1.3 is an attempt to show how stimuli might percolate into a person from the *coin* of Discourse/Physical Environment, with each generating forces that must be reconciled through some mode of behaviour.

Figure 4.1.3 Influential Bases: Discourses and Physical Environment.

Previously, in Section 3.5, I discussed Dufrenne's (1980) notion of *loving battle* with regard to artistic practice and I recall this metaphor now because the way in which I played with the following visual symbol did involve hours of tedious, yet loving struggle in positioning the various data in what might be appropriate locations in such a visual symbol. I am also very aware of how much my own physical environment influences my thinking and how I am balancing the visual forces on the page so that there is some sense of order that allows us to grasp the total symbol while also enticing us to follow the path of arrows that flows up the page (as neurons might flow through a person) through the social practices, through the struggle zone, through the networks, through the transformative interpreter/imagination to be released back to the *coin* of Discourses-Physical Environment to begin again.

The notion of pathways involves the use of a conduit metaphor, that, based on the physical act of carrying something from here to there or moving from one point to another, allows us, or an object, to reach a destination, and thus I use arrows to direct the percolation of forces fuelled by various stimuli that might come from discourses, or the physical environment, or both. In Section 3.3 we discussed perception theories that appear to be situated between sense-datum and adverbialist viewpoints. It seems feasible to question why we cannot consider reconciling the two approaches as suggested in Figure 4.1.3?

Our bodily involvement in following paths to move from one destination to another involves an understanding of orientation in space and directionality whilst also employing visual memory, visual association and awareness of figure/ground differentiation. Through practising these physical competencies throughout our life we become so oblivious to their complexity that we often overlook the wonder of how we understand a *line of thought* that relies on its very existence within our bodily abilities and we easily understand implied line in a drawing as a *path* the eye follows.

The notion of following paths has peculiar personal application to the way in which I gravitate to landscape painting in particular. Having spent most of my life in a rural

environment where tracking animals was normal routine, such as bringing the cows in for milking, mustering sheep and horse riding, the ability to see the ground and recognise signs was a necessary part of survival. One learnt to read the freshness of a hoofprint and hear the stillness of an animal hiding in the bush in a manner more profound than looking and listening which may explain ways in which, when painting, I move back and forth between scanning the landscape, for example *Dargonelly Waterhole* (Plate 1), and scrutinising details, for example, *Lethbridge's Creek No 2* (Plate 2). In fact this latter painting, *Lethbridge's Creek No 2* is a detail of a detail as we can see when looking at *Lethbridge's Creek No. 1* (Plate 6) that shows a wider perspectival view of the same section of the creek. However, if one were to visit this particular spot, it is possible that we might not recognise it as that in the image.

According to Salomon (1979) the notion of repetition is necessary for the neurons in the brain to form a pattern through regular firing and thus the similarity between one's stored mental schema of the referent is more important than similarity or dissimilarity to the real thing. Sless's (1981: 144) discussion of mathematical concepts and diagrams also highlights the "visual system's exceptional capacity for using pattern". Further force is given to this conjecture by Solso (1994) who argues that the brain classifies the neural messages from the eye into simple patterns which are then placed in their context for further processing. The concept of pattern implies regularity which, Van Gelder and Port (1996) strongly argue, is demonstrated in their model of geometric dynamic cognitive systems that evolve over time according to some rule. Emphasis is placed on the total state as one unfolding over time in which everything simultaneously affects everything else.

Does this mean that creativity is possible for everyone because stored image-schemata structures are already in the head awaiting connections, elaboration and extension through the use of imagination or interpreter modules? If this is so, these arguments open up areas for new debate about *personal expression* as an intuitive response that is strongly promoted by many artists, art educators and art critics, and *personal experience*

that involves sensory perception as the first step in a complex, simultaneous activation of neural signals and their analysis that compels us to think in a different way.

Might this mean that we can dismiss notions of *intuition, sixth sense* or *magic* from our concept of artistic behaviour? If we do reject these notions, can we explain how there appear to be some things that a person cannot learn whereas another person seems to accomplish the task with ease? Gardner (1993) talks of multiple intelligences that are the raw biological potentials within a person, and Gordon (1961), Petrie (1981), Arnheim (1986), Rosenblatt (1968) and Salomon (1979) discuss the way in which symbol systems vary as to the mental skills they require for information extraction and processing. Much is also made of practice that develops various skills to such an extent that Gee's (1992) *sixth sense* or Gordon's (1961) *good intuition* come into play. Thus, it can be suggested that some people do appear to be endowed with more raw biological potential in some areas than in others. If this is not the case how do we explain giftedness that Gagné (1993: 80) says "*is* superior natural abilities whichever way they will be developed"? Perhaps the answer lies in Vygotsky's (1971: 37) reference to Tolstoy's notion of "intoxication" whereby "small instants" transform something from being ordinary into something special. We can argue that this involves certain degrees of *feel* that come from the way in which stored schema are called upon to enrich raw potential and, it is this magic of making something special, that many people can exhibit in different areas to different degrees. However, giftedness is not to be confused with talent that, according to Gagné (1993), is a distinctly superior performance that is developed progressively through hours of practice in any field of activity.

No one can really tell us exactly how, when and why the schema emerge; we do not know why our minds have chosen to recommend a certain expectation or course of action. However, Van Gelder and Port (1996: 331) suggest that a system is dynamical in the sense that "changes are a function of the forces operating within it" and they offer some very basic facts for consideration as follows:

> ... that cognitive processes always unfold in real time; that their behaviors are pervaded by both continuities and discretenesses; that they are composed of

multiple subsystems which are simultaneously active and interacting; that their distinctive kinds of structure and complexity are not present from the very first moment, but emerge over time; that cognitive processes operate over many time scales, and events at different time scales interact; and that they are embedded in a real body and environment. (Van Gelder and Port, 1996: 340)

The problem remains for us to organise energies and forces that we encounter in an effort to arrive at understanding and meaningful interaction with things outside us. Within the dynamic system it is proposed that we evolve over time according to rules. If this is the case, what happens to our soul, that complex, undefinable, fluctuating *something* that, according to Peirce (1978) allows us to resolve contradictions, tension and instability through internalization of the structures of the social world? Or, if as Gordon (1961) and Gee (1992) contend, soul is achieved through practice and/or holding various positions in social space so that we perceive and appreciate the physical and social world more intensely, does this mean that we can somehow modify dynamical rules? How is it possible for linkage between a temporal system such as day to day living and an atemporal system such as using imaginative capacity? As proposed by Van Gelder and Port (1996), the relevant aspect of the cognitive system itself must be given a dynamical account that allows investigation into the interaction between the targeted aspect and the more central processes. In other words, we may be able to recognise relationships that emerge in a macroscopic order and complexity from microscopic behaviour through understanding that dynamical descriptions of the body and the environment unfold over time in which cognitive functions occur in the same time frame.

Thus, in attempting to understand the temporal functions of the body and environment, we need to recognise how the cognitive system is interactive with these temporal systems in controlling essentially temporal bodily movements such as reactions to sensory input that cause us to speak and move. In a continuing and repetitive process, dynamics is driven further inward through temporal input and output systems to the mind as motion. If this the case, whereby the mind acts in concert with body and environment, we can argue that the body is similarly in motion and thus, any

suggestions of *accidental embodiment* as proposed by Langer (1957), may be seen to deny the reciprocal relation of body and mind.

It is possible that Arnheim's (1986: 125) argument, that the first instrument to serve all wilful human activity is the human body because it allows us the "means of gaining tangible presence to the images conceived by the mind", is plausible. However, Arnheim's (1986) consideration that the body, "like every other tool, acting as an intermediary and translator, (it) has its own idiosyncrasies" leads us to believe that the body is secondary to the mind. We can question which is the dominant force. It can be argued that the important first step is that in which the images, conceived by the mind, primarily draw from the workings of the body in stimulating the cognitive tools in the head to allow us the means of gaining mental presence of bodily being through language. In this scenario the body is seen as an integral component in the on-going process of mind-body percolating flow. This raises the question of what means we employ to orchestrate an experiential-mental symphony of being.

4.2 Let's Talk Metaphorically.

In arguing that our total body is our primary tool closest to the world that surrounds it, we cannot ignore the total sensory system that collects the initial input data that we need to make selections from in deciding whether, for example, an artwork is a painting or sculpture, whether it is in front, above or behind us, and whether it hangs on a wall or stands in a garden. Having reached a conclusion we may then want to let someone else know about our findings and to do this we need some form of communication. Let us suppose, however, that we have no idea what an artwork is, but we find this *thing* interesting enough that it gains our attention.

While we may not know what an *artwork* is, we may nevertheless have had personal experience with collecting things, like bowerbirds, to adorn ourselves or our surroundings. Based on our personal experience we may perhaps term the artwork as a *collectable*, we may go out to find other people who have *collectables* and, we may then discover that this *thing* that caught our attention is called an *artwork*, but not only an artwork, it is a particular kind of artwork, it is a *sculpture* because it occupies three dimensional space. In fact, people do *collect* artworks and refer to important *collections* as those in which exemplary models are amassed. One has only to look at the array of art galleries throughout the world to recognise that art collections do play a very important role in amassing *collectable* objects.

It can be suggested that the term *collection* emanates from bodily functions of hunting and gathering that ensure survival, and, the more selective we are, the better we survive and thus our *collections* imply some sort of status symbol that, it can be further suggested, few people would align with the basic animal instinct to mark a territory as in *collecting* the terrain through displays of aggression, and the accumulation of herd subordinates as an army to ensure survival.

It is arguable that our input data, based on what we perceive, is sufficiently strong to motivate us to investigate the *thing* thus leading us to find a group of like-minded people comprising a club in which we might serve an apprenticeship that might allow us to understand more about the formal principles of, in this case, the Art Discourse. Scholes (1985: 97) considers that language is a means for talking about these things that have sufficient presence to "force language to accommodate them" which, in Johnson's (1987) terms, is seen as imposing a certain intentionality on signs or, as Lakoff (1987) suggests, allows us to form symbolic structures that correlate with preconceptual structures in everyday life.

An important aspect of using language according to Deely (1982: 111), lies in the way in which "post-linguistic structures", such as discourses, come into existence on the basis of language, and, once established and assimilated in a behavioural way in the society, "re-descend" into the sphere of simple perception and pre-linguistic experience accounted for in animal experience. In other words, our cognitive ability, and in particular our imaginative capacity, allows us to comprehend a network of unreal relations and associations that offer a substitute for the actual primary experience from whence they came, and this *de facto* identification in its turn acts as a primary experience. The crux of this argument may be referred back to the notions of *primed predicates* (Brewer: 1998) and *vicarious experience* (Josephson: 1996), where, in Section 3.4, we saw how second-hand experience might allow us to identify with another's action or way of thinking.

However, Josephson's (1996: 199) emphasis on the way in which the media "will become a body of vicarious experiences" through creating a shared culture of stories, highlights her contention that narrative thought is more primitive "than the rational thought promoted by Fine Art aesthetics" (1996: 114). To an artist, this argument metaphorically brings to mind a cauldron of rational aesthetics consumed by the Fine Art God who, like the ancient Celtic god Daghda, may find itself impotent to interact with emerging basic needs that, some argue, many people are re-discovering. While it can be agreed that much popular art, and advertising in particular, is used to persuade people into

believing that a dream of being other than they are is possible, it is debatable whether forms of association, made possible through story telling, position narrative thought as "primitive" while elevating aesthetic thought to the status of rational superiority.

On the contrary, if we look at Peirce's argument (1978a), we find that, more often than not, reasoning is determined by the conclusion (or excuse) that stems from satisfying unconscious instincts to explain behaviour, and thus reason appeals to sentiment. In other words, we *tell the best story* because our survival (status) is at stake, and this, in being a matter of vital importance, compels us to act upon our belief. On the other hand, if we are truly devoted to the experimental in which nothing is really important because we are not wedded to conclusions, we do not need beliefs (accepted propositions) such as a theory of aesthetics.

We can agree with Josephson's (1996: 114) argument that the "rational thought promoted by Fine Art aesthetics" explains certain behaviour. However, we can argue that such explanations of certain behaviour, appeal to our very *primitive need to survive* in a particular situation, whereas narration, story-telling and dreams offer realms of experimentation and fantasy in which nothing is important, nothing is invested, and thus nothing can be lost. It is untenable to call this way of thinking "primitive"; perhaps naive, perhaps escapist, and maybe sophisticated in ways in which the fabric of postmodern vision acknowledges "[W]e are such stuff As dreams are made on, ..." (Shakespeare, *The Tempest*. Act IV, Scene 1, 156-157) so that we might sleepwalk through life until the myths of the media become so familiar that we become conscious of self because of its absence.

Thus it can be argued that these media myths present new ways for finding ways of structuring art as personal experience. While we can agree with Josephson (1996: 209) that "another dark age", in which a small controlling literate *élite* resides, is probable, nevertheless, we can argue that the role of stories in which personal association is possible forms the springboard for making the strange so familiar that we will then find

ways yet again to make it strange through using metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery based on personal associations.

If personal association springs from physical experience, does this mean that perception is always bodily even though what we perceive may be cognitively separated? In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we investigated theories of perception and the environmental context. In Section 3.3, it was argued that both direct and indirect stimuli activate the imaginative tools in the head to various degrees depending on the force of the stimulus. In Section 3.4, we probed models of mental processes employed by people in coping with, and responding to, input data from the environment that involves strategies of accepting *primed predicates*, immersion in *vicarious experience* and delusion through *self-deception* and *akrasia*. Emerging arguments, that seek to explain behaviour from a computational viewpoint, (Churchland, 1996: Van Gelder and Port, 1996), highlight the changing nature of the debate in which the role of the singular person cannot be satisfactorily identified. However, it can be argued that perception is always bodily and cognitive processes cannot come into being without a head which is part of the body. Our interest now turns to ways in which our embodiment affects ways in which we might get ideas from inside the head to the outside.

For example, Rosenberg (1983) draws attention to the possibility of two observers viewing a visual scene that would furnish experiences to each that shared numbers of identical components as well as numbers that differed by a negligible or unimportant amount. Or perhaps, similarities might be due to the internal states of the individuals. However, the important point in this example is, that it is not the actual experience of perceiving (a pre-linguistic structure) that may be compared, but the telling (post-linguistic structure) about the experience and, *it is in the physical experience of telling* that we search our network of unreal relations and associations to find the best substitute, the best story that, in being the *event* of the moment, is a primary experience. In trying to talk about, describe or explain what we have inside the head, it can be argued that we resort to the use of figurative language which allows us to tell the best story. The

question now must be asked - how de we determine what elements of verbal and visual language will enrich, embellish our best story?

Gordon (1961), Rumelhart (1981), Paivio (1981), Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) consider that metaphor is natural and widespread in our speech and that nonliteral speech may be the very basis for competency in using language because it derives from analogy based on experiential situations. They argue that the processes involved in comprehension of nonfigurative language are no less dependent on knowledge of the world than those involved in figurative language. Beyond primary concepts relating to our physical location in time and space, we can get such metaphorical expressions as "a stable of artists", "outside the law", "chasing rainbows", "spinning yarns" and many others that various literary critics might argue are simply words, not necessarily graphic images or any additional arbitrary, vague and imprecise meanings brought by the reader.

We can agree that we cannot picture these concepts in a literal sense, however, Paivio (1981: 150) argues that metaphor highlights semantic creativity through which we can create and understand novel linguistic combinations that may be literal nonsense. Nevertheless, this is only possible if we have some prior understanding of the significance of the metaphor. For example, in talking of Romanesque buildings, Gowans (1981: 332) draws attention to the function of a building as a "visual metaphor of virtuous Roman republican society restored and rejuvenated by an established Christian church", and the later Gothic church as a metaphor for "transforming the world into heaven-on-earth". But we have no way of understanding the significance of the metaphor unless we understand the social context of the Romanesque and Gothic times and the religious practices permeating the community. Other interesting visual metaphors highlighted by Gowans (1981: 333-357) include the way in which the design of automobiles in the 1930s was conceived as a "hollow rolling sculpture", "the spirit of the age" and finally a humanised machine; furniture design expressed gradations of authority with the arm chair as the most authoritative (kinship to the throne), and television soap operas became the "domestic idyll".

These metaphorical examples refer to combinations of object attributes that, in juxtaposition, highlight the intrinsic quality of the individual things which exist in their own right. However, the qualities are accentuated through opposition. For example, we might suggest that the notion of solid stone as a delicate tendril window frame encasing sparkling jewels of stained glass in Gothic cathedrals combines two very disparate materials that the metaphor "heaven-on-earth" echoes in its combination of disparate concepts. By this I mean that the real nature of stone material suggests mass, weight and solidity that is contradicted in Gothic architecture whereby it is used to suggest delicacy, lightness and an ethereal quality thus evoking a sense of the spiritual within the earthly form, a *heaven-on-earth*.

Thus we can agree with Vygotsky's (1971) premise that art requires a special emotional thinking that asserts the dominance of material over artistic form because it is only in *how* things are combined that any artistic form is possible. In arguing for the psychology of art, Vygotsky (1971: 248) considers that art is an "indispensable discharge of nervous energy and a complex method of finding an equilibrium between our organism and the environment in critical instances of our behaviour".

It can be argued that making art has always been an integral part of enhancing survival and, as a consequence, is a basic way of drawing attention to various concerns of the body through making one aspect stand out from other more mundane aspects. Both Dissanayake (1992) and Gowans (1981) investigate the ways in which people throughout time have endeavoured to draw attention to things that have significance to their functioning in a society and thus their survival. Whether it be to use a visual sign to stand for something else, or to tell stories, or to beautify some artefact, or to deliberately persuade someone to embrace an ideology, demonstrates the human proclivity to differentiate important things from the not so important things.

From an artist's perspective, Clark's (1998) argument that visual strategies can be used as inner surrogates in the absence of direct environmental control, highlights the important

function the mind in the body performs in allowing us to play around with possible *may-bes*, and it can be argued that these *may-bes* are grounded in personal experience. However, postmodern, technological society seems to constantly question the validity of what we think, and our challenge is now to steer our personal *ship of state* through the digital alphabet that, Lovejoy (1989: 207) claims, may disrupt our sense of reality gained from direct experience where, instead, our "tele-selves become our real selves" and we lose our private selves in publicity. Her observation that we "turn on the telly to see if it's raining" is alarming in its actuality. Equally alarming is Josehpson's (1996: 219) notion that we may create the ultimate post-modern computer imitation "idol" to serve our need for expert advice and satisfy our sense of spiritual loss.

In Section 4.1, we discussed the notions of *vicarious experience, comfortable familiarity* and *hidden units* when looking at the way in which we play around with the tools in the head. If we now look at these same notions from a perspective of playing around with embodiment, we can see how important metaphorical projections are to the physical experience of telling our best story. Josephson's (1996: 111) main argument seems to arise from her contention that the use of conventional images, for example the work of Norman Rockwell, is a ploy to encourage viewers to "image themselves relating" to what is depicted in the image so that everyone feels good as they "walk through a simulated experience" that panders to people "who think dominantly through narration". We can accept her argument, that "[T]he mental response to television, movies, and other Popular Art is passive. It is like absorbing daydreams produced by someone else", only if all people remain passive.

However, on the other hand, Solso (1994: 258), in talking about the work of the same artist (Rockwell), takes a completely different point of view. Rather than concentrating on the way in which the image may be *used* to elicit a response, he looks at the way in which a person *uses* the image to employ "hidden units" of association that allow them to associate with the image. This procedure was noted in Section 4.1, and again we might

highlight the struggle between being passive or active beings that can be seen as the crux of the matter.

We can agree with Josephson (1996) that advertising is a powerful medium, and that persons employed in what Marshall (1997: 596) terms "busno-power", are intent on manipulating persons into being "autonomous choosers and consumers" who may confront a range of choices already determined from outside and, in this way, the choice is really a non-event in that the chooser has no option but to acquiesce to covert manipulation. However, Solso's (1994: 258) discussion of "hidden units" stored in the mind, suggests that these schema allow us to infer beyond surface things such as television screens and, while Johnson (1987: 87) argues that our metaphorical projections move from the bodily sense to the mental, epistemic or logical domains which is a natural progression, we can suggest that the world we now live in is quite unnatural and thus we may find that we move from the mental domains back to the bodily sense. In other words our world is becoming so hyperreal through the powerful and influential use of technological machines that we appear to be losing contact with our actual bodily senses and the challenge, according to Clark (1998), is to take our external scaffolding seriously. His argument, regarding the task of visual strategies for controlling behaviour, opens up areas of debate regarding the way in which we use linguistic rehearsal to enable us to attend to details of our own thoughts.

It can be argued that, in seeking the best mode of expression, we search our vocabulary for appropriate signs that are relevant, accessible and meaning-giving to the person involved in the experience and thus we use metaphorical projections emanating from our bodily functions. But, if much of our bodily involvement is being displaced by machines and the media, is it necessary to re-discover it, or will our evolving technological environment demand new forms of *machine-ment?* It can be suggested that, in times when there was a scarcity of machines, these were highly prized objects of curiosity, prestige and power. Is it not possible that in our world where machines are now so

readily available that our natural instincts and bodily skills may become a scarcity and thus unique and highly prized as once was the machine?

Dissanayake (1992: 137) draws attention to the way in which twentieth-century Western artists "have typically been concerned with making art more natural (using ordinary materials from daily life or depicting humble, trivial, or vulgar subjects) and showing that the natural, when regarded aesthetically, is really art". She goes further to deride the practice of "claiming that the trivial and simple is equal to the demanding and complex" which she sees as a present day unprecedented concern when, formerly, art's *raison d'être* lay in its specialness and difference from life. This notion is supported by Wheale (1995: 56) who considers that the natural is another category of commodity in postmodernity, "interesting only because of its increasing scarcity value".

We can argue that *making art more natural* may be an intuitive move to reclaim our actual sense of connectedness to our bodies and the world around us. The plural and radical nature of current art practice may be interpreted as that in which artists draw ideas about technique, subject matter and materials from the supermarket of the world in such a way that the norms of our own society are questioned. Chong Weng-Ho (1994: 11-14), in talking of artworks in Kuala Lumpur, says the "ghost" of alien cultures, "northern" colours, different physiognomies, physiques and beliefs haunt the work of young artists who incorporate neo-Pop, conceptual installations and lots of collage into artworks. He refers to this as a basic and profound problem for Malaysia's three racial groups, "all of whom own old art traditions", while at the same time all of whom have been seduced by Western culture that even in the "bending and borrowing" does not fit, but instead inhibits any new heritage.

In like fashion Australian artists borrow extensively from European and Asian cultures, and Delaruelle (1993: 4) notes a sense of loss and semiotic confusion in the work of many artists. We could almost be amongst the lost souls of the post-revolutionary

reaction and the dying Romantic Movement denying its myth of the perfectibility of humankind, where the artist stood:

> ... a stranger in this breathing world,
> (Byron, 1814, Lara, XVIII. 3)

It can be argued that this strangeness needs to be made familiar and, by *re-descending* into the sphere of simple perception and pre-linguistic experience advocated by Deely (1982), we might understand how a person is embedded in a community, a culture and an historical context that reflects on the present, rather than commodifies our past.

In my own process of making artworks, metaphors of tracks, pathways, trails and maps are embedded in stories and memories that keep percolating inside my mind and the richness of the brew depends on the place, atmosphere and time of my bodily situation. Similarly, when working with students, as discussed in Section 1.4, I rely heavily on my ability to offer and encourage metaphorical suggestions through which students might link personal associations to not only their own artwork, but also to the work of other artists. This *does* involve story-telling; it *does* involve interested pleasure; it *does* stimulate thoughts about self; and it *does* allow people to project themselves into the art. It does all the things that Josephson (1996: 112) accuses Popular Art of doing in relegating art to "emotional engagement, and narrative thought" as distinct from the rational, objective, detached thinking of Fine Art. Her contention that the "thinking stimulated by art made for popular taste is not about ideas, history, aesthetics, or art" might be seen as having nothing to do with art, but a lot to do with the *institution* of art and the *institution* of advertising which, as discussed in Section 3.4 forms part of the context in which we make art. We can argue that with the invention of the camera, artists found another tool to play with as some artists are now finding that computers, film and television may be similarly played with as tools to use in imitating something, telling stories, beautifying things and persuading people. Might it not be that *emotional engagement, and narrative thought* are fundamental to these processes? Is it possible that such methods, in relying on narrative thought and association, might provide a means of relocating art as personal experience in its proper ecological niche?

The following visual representation, Figure 4.2.1, suggests a visual representation of how we might see body and mind as an orchestration of the unstable components in the playground of environment in which a person determines how information is foregrounded or backgrounded at the time of telling depending on what happens in the *struggle zone*. If the meaning of something lies in the potential it has be to interpreted, we can argue that linguistic and visual encoding allow people to play memory games that emanate from the way in which one is compelled to think at a particular time, and thus methods of encoding are changing and fluid depending on bodily experiences. In attempting to depict the reciprocal percolation of bodily experiences and mental representations as an organic fountain of forces and, in giving linguistic expression to this idea, I employ metaphor. In using such words as *orchestration, playground* and *fountain of forces* I want to capture a sense of Dufrenne's (1980) *loving battle* as discussed in Section 3.6. What other words might we use to suggest such an idea so that another person might imagine what is meant? What other means could we use to articulate the ineffable? It can be argued that metaphoric projection is fundamental to making connections between what goes on in the body and how we use the tools in the head to conduct the game of embodiment which, as we shall see in Chapter Six of this research, entails an investigation into my own experience of making art.

From a visual perspective, such metaphors as *orchestration, playground* and *fountain of forces* evoke mental images of energetic teamwork that, while it may not always be predictable, implies a cyclic pattern of ebb and flow as suggested through the use of oval motifs and arrows in Figure 4.2.1.

Imaginative Capacity Ability to organise mental representations into meaningful, coherent unities.

Person talks & acts in certain ways

Scientific Principles
FOLK THEORIES

INTERPRETER

Formal Learning & Acquisition: From Naive to Sophisticated Knowledge

Constructing Folk Theories: Modules that interpret expectations, actions decisions, emotions through language.

Complex Configurations of Associations learned through Acquisition

Networks: Cognitive Tools in the head

Corpus Collosum

NEURONS

Struggle Zone: Reacts/responds to strength of signals

Sensory Input Units Forcible Modification of Ways of Thinking.

SOCIAL PRACTICES

Environment Beyond The Head: Family, Friends; Meaning, Memory, Social Practices and all those "Things" including clubs, work, hobbies, education, law, religion and everything else.

Primary Discourses: Theme of Personal Persona

MEANING AND MEMORY

SECONDARY DISCOURSES Apprentice new members; help form "folk theories"; regulate.

BODILY EXPERIENCES

Figure 4.2.1 Interconnectedness of Body, Mind and Environment.

4.3 Getting Personal.

This section forms a link between ideas from the literature and my own thinking and doing. As mentioned previously in Sections 2.1, 3.1 and 3.6, as self researcher-artist, I am both the hunter and the hunted and, also as an artist-teacher I am subjective and objective, and so we might try to understand how the two of me has different viewpoints from time to time. At times I am not aware of a viewpoint when acting on the *spur of the moment* so to speak. Some might call this a spontaneous or intuitive action, done without thinking. However, I am beginning to wonder whether normal people can act without thinking. Until now I had not contemplated the implications of the phrase, *spur of the moment*, but now, in thinking about it in this context, I realise its possible basis. I mentioned horse riding in Section 4.2 and, if we think about the act of applying spurs to the side of the horse to urge on, direct and control its movements, we must also realise how immediate this action must be because, often, one's survival depends on the exact, instantaneous application of the spur. Too early or too late can spell disaster. One does not, one cannot, take the time to think things through because this would be a waste of time. Past experiences, and in my case various accidents, have already established a way of thinking and responding in my mind and thus I act without inventing the thinking necessary in this sort of situation because the thought and action are meshed into one.

At other times I am engaged in thinking through something in my head whilst listening to whispers from the past and, in an effort to clarify concepts and recognise my own motivation for doing things, I tend to draw diagrams so that I might see my ideas developing. In a way, this is like watching one's own interpreter doing the interpreting, somewhat like doing preliminary sketches so that the various forces of an argument might be positioned as one positions motifs on a page and, in the arranging, we can see more clearly the metaphorical weight of various elements before going ahead with the final work. Because I am not wired with electronic gadgets that can plot the immediacy of my neural firing while working, I can only tell about *has-beens* but, in the telling I am

thinking anew and, in searching my network of associations, I recall various elements to make my story *best* at that moment in time.

For example, in thinking about our capacity to imagine things I wonder how things get inside a singular person in the first place so that they might actually experience something as a consequence of who and what they are. Is it that associations based on previous actions and thinking play a vital part in directing the traffic of the mind? In my own case the notion of a ripple effect like those caused when, as children, we threw stones into a dam, beckoned me to think of ideas in a similar fashion. But beyond the action, I remember the context.

Usually when mustering, we stopped to have lunch at the dam and my father would draw us maps on the ground with a stick to plot our course for a day's mustering and thus memories of the ripples and the dirt map coalesce into my preliminary sketch, (Figure 4.3.1), of how our mind might work. The text within and around the circles shows my debate with myself which represents my argument with ideas from the literature that cause me to take the time and effort to become more familiar with how we might think about the process of perception.

Copy of first rough diagram:
- no memories, meanings or beliefs without social practices (Gee)
- meaning and words or actions being recognised by specific s. groups
---> is the study of social practices
- meaning of ... is <u>potential</u> it has to be interpreted
- social community provides experiences through apprenticing
* - soul is an internalization of the structures of the social world

Secondary Discourses

Interpreter - modules that interpret expectations,

decisions   emotions

Primary Discourses

Networks

Scientific Principles ◄──►**Tools**◄── Social Practices

Folk Theories

Family, Kin groups

and actions through language

Churches,   gangs.
school etc - traditions passed
down.

Interpreter --> forms "folk theories" about the domain these associations cover
(e.g. memory, reading, judging, classifying, speaking)

World of Fancy ┌ complex configuration of associations learned through acquisition

Tools ---> **Neurons - react/respond to strength of sent signals** *Element of struggle*

Consciousness   = *forcible modification of our ways of thinking*
is quality of
feeling   Social practices provide experience through apprenticing
(Primary Discourses) *(world of fact)*

experience consists in sense perception

Secondary Discourses
(Inserts in italics taken from Peirce. 1978:169-174)

Figure 4.3.1 Original Thought Process in Attempting to Visualise Concept of Discourses.

However, the pictorial configuration of circles does not portray the notion I have in my head of things layering one on top of the other, like veils of watercolour that I use to enrich a particular motif in a painting. The circles in the diagram seem to give the effect of result, rather than a sense of on-going glimpses of how we might see things in a fountain. Nevertheless, the diagram was a beginning. From it came many hours of tinkering with sketches in my mind about the notion of personal experience and what it had to do with making artworks.

From as long as I can remember I have drawn and painted and been vitally interested in stories. In retrospect I now realise that this passion stemmed from an environment in which my father drew maps and pictures for us as children and told the most wonderful stories each night before going to bed. The stories and pictures were not from books, but emanated from our surroundings, our lifestyle and our need to survive on the land and, as such, formed the vital primary discourse into which I was enculturated.

Various secondary discourses have played, and continue to play, significant roles in stimulating my behaviour, beliefs and attitudes and, over the years, motherhood, academic achievement and teaching have played major roles. These roles demanded a movement away from self as the pivotal focus in similar fashion to the way in which the land had always made us aware of our own insignificance in the face of drought, bush fires and floods. And yet, survival of the individual requires what Peirce (1978a: 33) calls an "inward power" that forms an alliance between ideas in the mind and the laws of nature.

The more I thought about these concepts, as played with in Chapter Three, I began to visualise a type of percolation effect alluded to in the lower section of my original diagram, Figure 4.3.1. Thus I started to re-configure the influences and effects on a singular person because I do feel a need to locate myself within the pathway of incoming and outgoing forces that motivate my actions. I spent many hours playing with visual configurations in an effort to link thoughts and actions and hence my tinkering becomes a

cacophonous argument as Figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 represent. However, if we are delving into personal experience, the notions of playing around with ideas and evidence of the struggle are vital ingredients in searching for some schema or pattern that might lead to clarification as most of the time I am aware of the clutter in my mind that takes time for me to sift through. I mention this now because it may give some insight into the way in which I work in my studio when painting where my physical environment gets equally cluttered with tables positioned around me, sketches, photographs and slides dumped in untidy piles, dozens of small 35 ml plastic slide containers filled with varying degrees of diluted pigment, numerous containers of water, six or seven brushes in use almost simultaneously, sponges, tissue paper and coffee to hand, and music playing. Without this clutter, I could not work because each object; like each word, is a friendly tool that helps me play with ideas. But for me the playing must be a solo game.

I remember once I was working on a large acrylic triptych of three separate canvases totally three metres in length arranged on easels. In this way I could walk along the beach image as it emerged beneath my hands. My son entered the studio and sat quietly in the big old armchair snuggled in a corner, and watched with silent eyes. He made no noise and, as I had my back to the door, I did not see nor hear his entry but I felt his presence and I became aware of such a strong tension rising inside me I was forced to stop working as the doors to my soul closed. This continues to happen if another presence invades my playground while I am painting. Many eyes may watch a demonstration, but the loving battle with my own images must be a solo affair. I cannot explain this, but I do know that the effort to find new ways of visually telling my story does take concentrated single-minded energy that needs its own space.

Figure 4.3.2 shows the evolving process of visualising concepts from my on-going dialogue with the literature where the notion of percolation in the mind is becoming clearer. I now use a metaphorical egg motif to suggest the two hemispheres of the brain which contain the cognitive tools that receive data from Primary Discourses, and Memory and Meaning embedded in Secondary Discourses that, through Social Practices, cause

our neurons in the brain to fire. The arrows show the organic movement of life forces circulating through the Interpreter and Scientific Principles to the Singular Person who, through some action, causes some flow of modified data back to whence it originated.

Connectionism - is _no_ divide between theory and practice.

Left H   Right H

Person talks & acts in certain ways

Person determines how
information is
foregrounded or
backgrounded at time of
telling - episodes are in
the telling, in linguistic
encoding = tool to play
memory games

Morality consists in the
folkore of right conduct -
leads to conservatism
(Peirce p.21)

Hidden units mediate
between world &
mental/physical action

non-verbal
processes,
attention, pattern
discrimination, line
orientation, sound

serve as correcting device

Singular Person

Scientific Principles

FOLK THEORIES

INTERPRETER

**Cognitive Tools
in the Head**
*Configurations of
associations learned
through acquisition*

Corpus Collosum

NEURONS

Sensory Input Units

**SOCIAL
PRACTICES**

Primary Discourses

One has to produce
another text, a translation
of first text and its cues
into a "language" to give
meaning to the first text
---> and into another text
etc. etc.

- crucial elements are
these interpretive
practices and how we
acquire them. (Gee p.14)
(Bloom also)

- react/respond to strength
of signals = element of
struggle

language and
general cognitive
functions

MEMORY & MEANING
- how something is recognised as
meaningful in specific ways within
practices of specific social groups -->
if you are a member you get the
meanings 'free'

SECONDARY DISCOURSES
Serves to apprentice new members; helps form
"folk theories"

Figure 4.3.2 Evolving Process of 'Visualising' Concepts from the Literature.

The following figure, Figure 4.3.3, suggests a further process of visualising a connection between the thoughts of Peirce (1880s) and Gee (1992). Again my written notes within the visual representation allow me to debate and clarify issues in a type of on going visual/verbal monologue.

Soul is an internalization of the structures of the social world.
Consciousness is qualities of feelings.
Experience consists in sense perception. It is the special field of experience to acquaint us with events, with changes of perception that entail effort.

Person:
talks & acts in
certain ways

Scientific Principles
FOLK THEORIES

LEFT HEMISPHERE controls *RIGHT* side of the body - LANGUAGE and general COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS

RIGHT HEMISPHERE controls *LEFT* side of the body - NON-VERBAL process attention, pattern and sound discrimination.

INTERPRETER

Complex Configurations of Associations learned through Acquisition

Modules that interpret expectations, actions decisions, emotions through language. Specialises in constructing "folk theories".

Cognitive Tools in the head

Sensory Input Units = forcible modification of ways of thinking.

NEURONS

React/respond to strength of signals = element of struggle

SOCIAL PRACTICES

PRIMARY DISCOURSES

MEANING AND MEMORY (how something is recognised as meaningful in specific ways within practices of specific social groups. If you are a member of a Discourse, meanings are "free").

SECONDARY DISCOURSES
Serve to apprentice new members; help form "folk theories"; regulate.

The meaning of something is the the *potential* it has to be interpreted.

A person determines how information is foregrounded or backgrounded at the time of telling. Episodes are in the telling, in the linguistic encoding that allows people to play memory games.

One has to produce *another text, a translation* of the first text and its cues, into a "language" to give meaning to the first text. This text then has to pass through the same procedure to another text which then becomes a "first" text, translated to another text and so on. The crucial elements are these interpretive practices and how we acquire them.

Figure 4.3.3 The Process Of Visualising A Connection Between The Thoughts Of Peirce (1978) And Gee (1992)

A further modification of my visual/verbal debate traces the way in which I developed the notion of personal experience from the perspectives of both artist and viewer whereby production, interpretation and translation of artistic works follow different flowpaths as proposed in Figure 4.3.4.

Figure 4.3.4 Visualisation of Processes of Artistic Interpretation and Translation

I find that, in playing with these visual configurations, I am starting to recognise the interplay of wider environmental influences performing in concert with the primary laws of nature, and how making art is a process of making special in the sense of seeking out something that is physically, sensuously and emotionally satisfying and pleasurable to humans. In doing this I am aware of the need to control various forces through

comprehension of, and negotiation with, my environment and, this way of thinking, and my teaching practices, makes me more aware of differences between the ways in which many artists work. For many, art is seen as self-expression, while for others art is primarily a means of personal experience. From my point of view, I tend towards the latter whereby I become involved in events that might change my perception of things in forcing me to become immersed to a degree that the power of the event modifies my behaviour.

I use the word *modify* because the change evolves over time. It is as though the forces in my experience play a game of thrust and parry in my head, and like an eagle circling its prey, the *something* in my head waits for the moment of collision between the forces that causes the change. I do not think change has to be radically different though it may appear so at times. My work takes new directions through methods of transforming and weathering the sensory input signals and, in many cases, I will re-work an image by layering new ideas upon those already existing. This process has evolved from my study of literature and languages in which new forms emerge beside, around and within older traditions and, in like manner, my use of watercolours has made me aware of the power of floating veils of colour one upon the other to form illusory depths in the painting. This process may become clearer as I talk my way through my work.

PART THREE: DEVISING RULES

CHAPTER FIVE: PACKING FOR ACTION.

5.1: The External Context: A Survival Kit.

It can be argued that a crisis now exists in coming to grips with a world of artificial images which threaten to replace the commitment, passion and effort integral to making meaningful artworks. If this is the case, we might suggest three possibilities for identifying who we are.

Firstly, there is the passive and somewhat confused consumer seeking instant gratification, secondly, the thinking, intelligent, yet highly constrained person, and thirdly the decision-making agent. Much of the literature suggests that the first state is predominant in our society with the second causing interest amongst some researchers who seek to counter a growing loss of agency amongst artists within our society. However, the third state, in which emphasis is taken off end results and placed on personal volition offers an area for investigation that has particular interest to artists because, it can be argued, the commodification of images (and all associated trappings of the culture industry) sacrifices the integrity and vision that is the life-blood of artistic experience.

I argue that experience is a very singular thing and consequently that it is the similarity of interpretation and inference that allows like-minded people to converge as a group even when they embody temporary moods and personalities that can be appropriated by anyone and worn as a different, new self. This raises the question of locating identity and reality amongst the proliferation of individualities parading on multiple and fragmented surfaces of our multicultural society. It also raises the question of how a singular person might experience old and new artforms with some degree of personal relevance and commitment when art has been so radically transformed whereby we seek reassurance, advice and the meaning of life within a scenario as passive consumers.

However, meaning might lie in the collective biological capacities of our physical and social experiences as living beings in which two basic structures in preconceptual experience appear to be stable. Firstly, there are basic-level categories defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception dealing with figure/ground differentiation, shape recognition and part-whole structures, our capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich mental images. Secondly, there are image schema that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience that are directly meaningful (the basic-level and image-schematic concepts) and are directly tied to structural aspects of experience thus denoting meaningfulness as *internal* to human beings.

Arguments from the literature suggest that meaning is outside the head, and something is only recognised as meaningful in specific ways within the practices of specific social groups of which we are a member. From this perspective all knowledge is mediated by a highly constrained understanding that results from adaptive and transformative interaction of an organism with its environment. Within this scenario people are able to function as thinking, intelligent beings within certain bounds.

However, it appears that coding elements that deviate from one's anticipatory schemata require skills of translation thus situating us in relation to them and demanding interaction with them whereby we are compelled to think otherwise than we have been thinking. The field of experience acquaints us with events that lead to changes of perception that require a degree of effort in resolving such changes. In other words, the person experiencing the event is faced with the consequence of resolving the conflict between brute reactions of effort and resistance, and thus volition (or willing) is brought into play. At this crucial moment a person may be overwhelmed by a sense of powerlessness attributed to the externality of the force of perception in which meaning lies outside the person, or, a person may oppose the force by thinking anew and thus might offer some resistance to the force.

The conflict of decision making demands some sort of reaction, passive or active. A person's desire in seeking to attach experience to what can be recognised as meaning, determines conduct that forms the connecting bond linking the predominant state of feeling to consciousness of effort and resistance. Thus, experience provides modification to a person's way of thinking. It has some effect that entails a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance. How we interact with things outside us depends on which image schema, (the recurring patterns derived from bodily functions), we employ in structuring particular experiences to give order and connectedness to our perceptions and conceptions. Within this scenario a person is located within an on-going conflictual situation that demands some sort of conscious resolution by a decision-making agent.

The following questions might serve as a check list as we organise our survival kit in preparing for entry into the game of telling our best story that may range between illusion and reality whereby we, as active agents, make the rules.

- How do we recognise the coding elements we use in determining which is the dominant source of input data, and what role does our survival tendency play in affecting the way in which we use the tools in our head to interpret these data thus situating us as passive consumers, intelligently constrained persons, or decision-making agents?

- How can we claim experience as personal in a world of artefact that is increasingly dominated by sites of social management, technological machines and a cash culture?

These questions beg some attention because we do need to gauge the opposition in our game. Heywood (1997: 195) points out that the "teaching and practice of art have traditionally been closely related" but difficulties have arisen between practice and theory in which the latter has become "hostile to art, viciously reductive, intellectually shallow and purblind to the moral character of its own constructions". On the other hand, Pollock (1996: 54) argues that "the collision of two professions - artist and teacher; the collision

of two ideologies - individualism and socialisation" are at the root of a structural contradiction in which professional teachers, not involved with fine arts traditions, find the freedom of the self-creating artist advocated in art schools quite horrifying.

Thus, the question of the relationships between discourses is significant and, in particular, so are the relationships that exist somewhat uneasily within the affiliations of the Art Discourse that include teaching art in the school system, teaching art in the university sector, and making and exhibiting art as a singular person.

While much has been written and said about the separate areas, Gee (1992) argues that discourses must be acquired through enculturation into the social practices through apprenticeship and performance. However, it is possible that *marginal* people, those who have exposure to another language that requires effort in translation, or who belong to a range of other discourses, have insights that more mainstream members do not have.

These considerations lead me to suggest a way in which, as one belonging to a range of discourses, I might use my own background studies in literature, language and art history, and my experience of making artworks and of teaching others in both the school and university systems to become personally involved in art, as a means for investigating the broad issue of art as personal experience within a specific situation. Thus my survival kit comprises a mass of collateral associations that might aid me in juxtaposing familiar and strange things into a new means of personal experience.

5.2   The Research Design: Visual/Verbal Mapping.

As an artist and an art educator I wonder how singular persons might experience artworks that are normally considered apart from everyday living, for example displayed in a gallery, in ways that foster an internal sense of reality drawn from personal associations moulded from concrete bodily experience. How could members of a gallery audience use my images in a similar way to the way in which students access my ideas and thus tap into my images for their individual purposes? But because the viewer and I do not have the opportunity to speak to each other in the same way students and I talk together, we would need some other connecting link.

Gordon (1961) found that work with a Synectics group (a group of diverse individuals operating in a problem-solving and creative milieu) relied heavily on the need for each participant to verbalise thoughts and play around with metaphors as fruitful mechanisms in making the familiar strange and making the strange familiar. Complementary to verbalisation of thoughts, Gee (1992) highlights the way in which episodes of *personal memory, historical memory* and *mythic memory* are differentiated by a matter of degree depending on the way they are encoded in the telling or the imagining.

From my point of view, in considering how best to provide a means for viewers to experience artworks, both these observations are important through suggesting that history or myth might act as a stimulus in evoking deeper personal associations with images, and thus encourage viewers to sense artworks as part of their personal experience. Although images may depict metonymic aspects of a story, and vice versa, the richness of possible association lies in the variety of metaphors that may be presented within a polysemic visual/verbal map of meaning that could offer various paths of entry for personal experience. In this way Johnson's (1987) theory of *embodiment*, Lakoff's (1987) notion of *experiential realism*, and Peirce's (1978) concept of *thirdness* offer possible frameworks for restructuring art as personal experience within the overarching totality of human experience.

Shulman (1986) sees the possibility of exciting new developments arising from the mix of methods such as personal diaries with surveys, and other such combinations, while current work in the field of art education embraces philosophical inquiry (McRorie, 1996); a transdisciplinary approach that interrogates both core assumptions and peripheral interests (Sullivan 1996); heuristic inquiry which focuses on sensory responses which are intense and deeply personal (Emery, 1996), and autobiography as an approach to research of artistic practice (Hawke, 1996).

These approaches highlight current research methodologies that offer many sites for investigation. I note that philosophical inquiry may exist beside autobiography, thus confirming a postmodernist approach that does not under-estimate the expanding power of representations, texts, and images in shaping the relationship between the self and society. Thus, philosophical inquiry, autobiography, and heuristic sensorial inquiry offer ways of combining investigation into theories of meaning, personal artistic practice, and art as personal experience. This sort of inquiry may counter arguments, for example those posited by Wolff (1981) and Pollock (1996), for a social theory of art that attacks key ideas and beliefs of many artists while also negating the primacy of a person's imaginative capacity to think for themselves. Further, conflict within the Art Discourse itself demands investigation so that making art, appreciating art, and experiencing art might be more accessible to ordinary people.

Fielding (1996) stresses that qualitative research is concerned with giving meaning and understanding to a subject of interest and, observations of emerging changes in viewer attitudes from regarding art as superficial to making art as personal experience, are noted by Sullivan (1994: 5) who considers that personal association "allows us to identify links with themes and issues that are part of our cultural heritage, and to consider new ways of thinking about the future". Owing to a burgeoning concern about art as an industry noted in the literature, it can be argued that some suggestion for restructuring art as personal experience is timely.

By encouraging viewers to *experience* an exhibition of artworks in similar fashion to the way in which students use my ideas, it may be possible to provide a physical context for making

everyday feelings, folk theories and learning about art, strange, and making strange and artificial images familiar. The theoretical framework suggests such a possibility and directs this proposal in the following ways.

- Using my own artistic practice as a means of identifying a cultural theme and issue emanating from personal interest and association.
- Developing and refining the topic as an accessible body of work for a wide audience.
- Linking a relevant, historical story to a body of images as an exhibition in a public gallery.
- Involving members of the public through incorporation of familiar objects through loaned personal artefacts associated with the story.
- Providing a variety of means for personal association through incorporating drawn and painted images depicting aspects of the story, the characters involved, the time and the location.
- Provision of computer generated scanned images for manipulation by viewers.
- Inclusion of written and recorded versions of the story.
- Availability of a questionnaire designed to target viewer responses and gauge degrees of personal engagement, personal association and personal involvement in experiencing the exhibition.

A story that involves the outback would be relevant to many people living in Queensland because it might evoke memories of past experiences in a State that is basically rural. One such story involves the cattle duffing exploits of the Kenniff brothers who roamed the Mt. Moffatt region in western Queensland at the turn of the century and, because there is a strong history of bush heroes in Australia who have been mythologised and set in memory through stories and images, (for example, the stories of Lawson and the *Ned Kelly* images of Nolan), the story of the Kenniff brothers seems appropriate.

Because the notion of forming links supposes an on-going process, my approach involves movement through the interwoven stages of the research in which I interject and reflect on ideas from the literature that rebound as echoes in suggesting new approaches to work *en train*.

There is nothing new or novel about this practice - it is simply the way in which many artists work in layering idea upon idea until the final form emerges from the mixture of materials and concepts.

The context is fluid and changing as awareness of the centrality of artistic experience within the Australian search for identity allows reflection on personal art teaching practices in which verbal and visual metaphoric projections suggest ways of linking networks of associations within and across groups of people.

CHAPTER SIX: EMBODIED IN STORIES.

6.1 Walk in the Wilderness: The Mount Moffatt Region.

My walk in the wilderness of Mt. Moffatt began some years ago, and thus it is important to recount many of my experiences in order to explain the way in which my process of making art has evolved into my current work.

The Mt. Moffatt region is located in western Queensland and covers an enormous expanse of mountainous country comprising rich grazing valleys bordered by ridges, deep gorges and creeks containing waterholes and caves. My introduction to the region was via the more well known Carnarvon Gorge National Park which is easily accessible on the eastern side of the Carnarvon range of mountains that forms what many call the "Roof of Queensland". At the time I was teaching art in Roma at the College of the South West and used to escape for camping weekends to Carnarvon where the lush green creeks and stunning ochre cliff faces offered rich material for landscape painting. Little by little I heard about the more remote Mt. Moffatt region and thus I made my first trip out of curiosity to the place that was later to become an obsession.

On first visiting Mt. Moffatt National Park I went through the usual procedure of ringing through to the Ranger to inquire about the state of the roads and what gear it was necessary to take. I was told that a four wheel drive vehicle was essential and that nothing, other than water, was available in the Park. This meant that I had to take sufficient fuel and food for the duration of my stay. I was also advised that the Ranger himself would be away thus leaving me to my own devices. Having being brought up on a large property in western New South Wales I was no stranger to distance and empty spaces so I packed the Pajero with tent, jerry cans of fuel, boxes of dry food and my drawing and photographic equipment. As a watercolourist I find it nearly impossible to paint in the open air where wind blows containers of water over, the sun dries the paper too quickly, the ants and flies bite at the most inappropriate time, and the glare from rocks and water blind me to the true colours of the landscape. Because of

these very real physical problems I record when I am in the field rather than actually make the final paintings. I tend to use the countryside as one uses a library so that I can gather as much data as possible for later sifting through in the studio.

En route to the Park I took the precaution of stopping at "Womblebank" to let the owners know who I was and to expect me back in a couple of days. This property is centrally located within the heart of the area I was visiting as the following map shows although the southern area, my port of entry, Roma, is not shown:

Figure 6.1.1 Map from Injune Caravan Park. (Diary, 1997, p. 78)

On arrival in the Park I was glad to have taken this precaution as I had thousands of hectares to myself with only a small map to guide me around the significant sites that are remotely scattered throughout the region as shown in Figure 6.1.2.

Figure 6.1.2 Tourist Map of Mt. Moffatt National Park. (Diary, 1997, p.68)

My first impression was one of contrast between my own fragile smallness in such an overpowering wilderness. The country was very different from that of Carnarvon on the eastern side of the same mountain range where concentrated lushness seems to defy the summer dryness and heat. In Mt. Moffatt the opposite seems to be the case with the massive sandstone pillars embracing and absorbing the sun and reflecting the heat like a scorching veil that floated across the land. I felt uneasy as I drove around to find my bearings and make camp. I knew that it would take some time to feel at home in Mt. Moffatt and when I finally made camp at the Top Shelter I simply sat, listened and looked as one does with a strange animal.

Two days later I left the Park with many slides and colour prints, but no drawings. However, I had read the newspaper clipping in the Information Hut, situated near the Ranger's house, that told of the Kenniff Brothers and their duffing exploits, the murder of a police constable and a station manager, the court case and subsequent hanging of one of the brothers. While I was interested in the story, that had not been my reason for going to Mt. Moffatt - I had thought to paint the landscape as a sympathetic friend who would welcome me as had been the case with Kakadu, the Flinders Ranges and Carnarvon Gorge. In contrast, Mt. Moffatt remained aloof and almost untouchable.

Over the next few years I made several trips back to Mt. Moffatt and little by little I began to feel more familiar in the landscape until one Easter I sat happily amongst the rocks and started drawing as shown in the following sketch from my diary.

Figure 6.1.3 Sketch of Tree Below 'Other' Cave. (Diary, 1997, p.97)

It was as though the *beast* had finally accepted me, but I also had taken the time to find out much more about its nature and hidden secrets.

Amongst these secrets was the story of the Kenniff Brothers that acted as a catalyst in drawing me into further research about the region. I sought out people who had associations with the region and, in particular, who could tell me more about the two brothers who had used the Mt. Moffatt area as a haven for cattle duffing. This took a long time as little had been written and verbal stories were as varied as a mosaic; thus a couple of years passed in which little progress was made and the Mt. Moffatt region simply simmered in my mind.

For some unknown reason initially I had found it difficult to paint and draw the Mt. Moffatt landscape. I had not felt at home in the area. I can only suppose that this was because other regions I had visited and painted were already well documented and thus were an integral part of human involvement, whereas Mt. Moffatt was remote and relatively unknown. I had needed to find a pattern, some link between humanity and the environment so that I could enter into the landscape. I had needed an introduction. This introduction came in the form of maps and the story of the Kenniff brothers because both located and linked people to the landscape and hence offered me a route of entry.

It was during this time that I attended a conference in Tasmania and discovered the ruins of Port Arthur which stirred my love of Australian history. On returning to Toowoomba, the history of our forebears again presented itself in the rich collection of data at the Jondaryan Woolshed west of Toowoomba. The two places married in my mind with the poetry of Peter Porter and Thomas Sterne Eliot serving as ministers to the union of images, history and stories. At the time I was not aware of how important this detour would be to opening a new direction into the Mt. Moffatt work that had seemed to elude me up until after my exhibition, "Whispers of Immortality", shown in Toowoomba in September, 1993. It became clear to me then that I needed to venture

beneath the surface of the landscape, to probe the ways in which the land and people had united and struggled as two powerful forces vying for survival.

I made another trip to the Mt. Moffatt region in early 1994 and, on returning to Toowoomba, spoke with Norma Wilmoth who had grown up in the region. I taped our conversation as Norma rummaged through her memories of her mother riding with Albert Dahlke's sister, of Pat and Jimmy Kenniff visiting homesteads in the district, of Jim's black horse called "Starlight" whose hoof was used by their neighbours as a paperweight and whose hide served as a floor rug after his death. These somewhat disjointed fragments of memories allowed me to conjure up images in my mind that linked the land and people as the poetry of Porter and Eliot had linked Port Arthur and the Jondaryan Woolshed.

During these years I continued teaching at the University of Southern Queensland in the Faculty of Education and I found it extremely difficult to juggle my time between making art and teaching others about the value of learning through art. My concentration and growing passion had to be 'tamed' as my glimpse of the wilderness was shuttered by conformity. Of all aspects this has been, and remains, the most difficult for me to come to grips with because I am working in isolation as an artist in an environment in which art making is less than fully understood. The perceived low status value of art in schools is well documented, but equally alarming is the documented low status value of faculty in education within universities (Lanier and Little, 1986). However, a third dislocation - not yet acknowledged - is the disdain in which some staff from visual arts hold staff from art education. Yet, I am one art educator who maintains a strong exhibition record - one of the few - and for this reason I am especially sensitive to this dislocation. While I could not paint physically during semesters, I could write and, in 1996 I started keeping a diary into which I made notes, sketched and felt my way into the story and landscape through playing around with information about the people who had first lived in the district. Thus my tinkering with ideas began.

6.2 Tinkering with a Story: Moving into the Field.

This, and the following sections will be a loving battle for me to write because the mind/brain probably has no single story, and hence what I write is a yarn spun from many ideas and, like the story I am tracking, may never totally be captured. Previously in Section 4.3, I referred to myself as both the hunter and the hunted and, in Section 4.1, I mentioned memories of tracking animals. No doubt these memories, together with extensive travel, living in countries other than Australia and teaching have, in many ways, contributed to a sense of *otherness*. Thus I see myself as a marginal person, not alienated, but as an artist outside the mainstream Art Discourse because of the milieu of teaching in which I work and, this gives me a certain sense of distance that nudges me towards boundaries and edges beyond artmaking so that I might see what is on the other side. My experience of seeing various other things suggests new ways of thinking about my own art practice which then becomes a type of lens through which other people might see and think anew. My interest in the connecting bond between a positive qualitative possibility and actuality, and the question of what makes us decide to do something, leads me to grapple with the concept of experience which involves other concepts of *interpreter* (Gee 1992), *imagination* (Johnson 1987) and *soul* (Peirce 1978a).

In Section 5.2, I suggested that the story of the Kenniff Brothers might be an appropriate and relevant story that could form a connecting bond between images and personal association. This story is one that is based on facts but the recoding exists mainly in three reliable texts based on newspaper articles and police records, Cameron (1963), Heap (1969) and Good (1996), one questionable text, Newsome (1996), and a mass of verbal opinion, Wilmoth (1994), Lethbridge (1997), Vincent (1997), Hartley (1997), Enever (1997), Sokoll (1997), and Stanford (1997).

What is known of the story lends itself to fantastic interpretations because the actual final details have never fully been confirmed or documented. In a summary I offer the following as an indication of the story with more detailed versions attached (Appendix

A). While this summary may seem a little excessive, it is important that we are acquainted with the atmosphere of the times so that we might understand the intrigue, ambiguity and reality of the situation.

On the 12th January, 1903, a thirty seven year old man was hanged at Boggo Road Gaol for murder. His name was Patrick Kenniff. His younger brother, Jimmy, was discharged from prison on November 11th, 1914 and died in northern Queensland in 1940. Both brothers had stood trial for the ghoulish murders of Constable George Doyle, and Albert Christian Dahlke, that took place in Lethbridge's Pocket in the Mt. Moffatt area of central western Queensland on Easter Sunday, March 30th 1902.

Within twelve years of their arrival in Queensland, the Kenniff brothers had gained a reputation as scalpers, capable stockmen and crack shots. They set up camp near a permanent waterhole on the Carnarvon Creek on "Ralph" block where they kept 'open camp' for 'gully-raking' mates. The country had areas of open black soil flats, hills and sandy ridges that made it ideal for poddy-dodging that was a popular practice amongst some working class people. An outlaw code of ethics developed that cloaked stealing cleanskins in terms of 'duffing', 'gully-raking', 'moonlighting' and 'poddy-dodging', and this practice favoured a type of desperado mateship that grew throughout the countryside.

With the death of Tyson in 1898 leaving a vast empire of unbranded cattle, horses and 1266 square miles of unattended countryside, the 'duffing' business grew rapidly. This year was a crucial one for the Kenniffs in which stealing and selling horses and cattle, robbery and further stints in gaol caused great concern for the landowners.

At this time, Charles Pearson Tom, manager of "Mt. Moffatt" station, suggested cancellation of the Kenniff lease on the 'duffer's haven' "Ralph" block in the hopes of ridding the district of this menace, and Albert Dahlke was appointed as manager of "Carnarvon" and "Babiloora" to restore order to these properties. Deprived of property, and burning with resentment, Jimmy and his father set up camp in Lethbridge's Pocket at the top end of "Meteor Downs". This area is a kidney shaped valley four kilometres long with ridges, deep, rough, gorges, and a creek containing waterholes and caves.

At the time the district was in the grips of a terrible drought, police and landholders were utterly fed up with the raids on stock and property, levels of fear rose across the parched properties as the brothers and their cronies roamed' the Ranges carrying firearms on a campaign of crime and intimidation culminating in the theft of a bay pony mare belonging to George William Hunt. Warrants were issued for their arrest. Constable Doyle headed the search patrol, but, as he was unfamiliar with the Lethbridge Pocket area he accepted Dahlke's offer of assistance. An Aboriginal tracker, Sam Johnson was the third member of the patrol. Plans were made for a simple surprise raid on the Kenniff camp in the next couple of days.

On Thursday, March 27th, 1902, Albert Dahlke, wearing a faded, old, black serge coat and his mother's present of glass-headed pins in his lapel, rode his favourite saddle mare "Boadicea" to the "Ralph" police station. Doyle, carrying the only firearm, road his police horse "George", and Sam Johnson rode "Tommy Dodd". The next morning the party set off to spend that night at "Mt. Moffatt" with Charlie Tom. On the Saturday morning, Doyle, Dahlke and Johnson went with Charlie Tom to inspect fresh horse tracks before going on to "Marlong Plain" where they made camp.

The following morning, Easter Sunday, as Doyle, Dahlke and Johnson were heading into "Lethbridge's Pocket" they were surprised by Pat, Jimmy and young brother Tom unsuspectingly riding up a gully towards them. The brothers discarded the two pack horses and split in two directions with Doyle and Dahlke chasing Jimmy whom they caught in three hundred metres and, on Sam Johnson's arrival, sent him back to the pack horse to get the handcuffs.

When dismounting, Sam Johnson heard a shot fired, then another shot and then three more in quick succession. Frightened, Johnson remounted and, leading the pack horse, saw Pat and Jimmy galloping towards him. He let the pack horse go, turned, and fled nineteen kilometres to the mustering camp at the Pump Hole where he alerted James Burke. Burke accompanied Johnson back to "Lethbridge's Pocket" and found Doyle's empty pack bags, two pairs of hobbles, one billycan, a small swag, and "Boadicea" with saddle stained with fresh blood.

When Burke went back to the spot of the shooting he found that the pack bags and other things had vanished, but signs of three small fires remained. In the ashes he found clotted blood, and at the foot of a tree two pairs of spurs he recognised as belonging to Doyle and Dahlke. Later, they found Doyle's surcingle, two bullet marks and, further towards 'Old Kenniff's' campsite, Doyle's horse "George" standing miserably with saddle and bridle still on, but missing the saddlecloth and off stirrup iron.

Pack bags were thrown over the saddle and in the revolver pouch was Doyle's .442 Webley with one spent cartridge. Doyle's pipe was in the saddle pouch and the gruesome contents of the pack bags revealed charcoal, burnt bone, two buttons, a couple of teeth, an armlet metal clasp and two unusual pins. These, the nauseating smell, and fat and flesh between rock cracks where the bodies had been burnt, were the only remains of Constable Doyle and the young manager Albert Dahlke.

During the next two months the largest manhunt in Queensland history began with forty police combing the Ranges for Pat and Jimmy Kenniff. Warrants for their arrest were issued, a reward of £1000 offered, and calico posters tacked up throughout the district.

The Kenniffs were again on the run. At least four raids were made on various properties and, on Sunday, June 22nd, John Eaton reported a bag of wheat stolen from a shed on his farm six kilometres south of Mitchell near Bottle Tree Gate on the St. George Road.

The police, led by Constable Tasker, followed the wheat track and, sneaking up the ridge where the Kenniffs were camped found a pyjama-clad Pat stood looking over the brow of the hill. The brothers fled on foot, a policeman shot the two mares, Pat tripped and fell, was captured and handcuffed. Jimmy surrendered.

After one of the most public trials in Brisbane that lasted six days a verdict of 'guilty' was handed down by the State's Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith. Both Pat and Jimmy pleaded innocent, and two points were referred to the Supreme Court. Firstly, there was no evidence before the jury of Constable Doyle's death, and secondly, there was no evidence that the prisoners, James and Patrick Kenniff had acted in concert in committing the murder of George Doyle.

The Judges Griffith, Cooper, Chubb and Real agreed to the first point, but could not agree that Jimmy acted in concert in committing the murder. Jimmy's sentence was commuted to imprisonment with hard labour, and Patrick was condemned to hang.

At 8 am on Monday, January 12th, 1903, Patrick Kenniff was hanged and later buried in South Brisbane Cemetery. (Knight-Mudie, 1998)

As we can see, the facts lend themselves to a real *whodunit* story which actually took place. To this day, no one really knows exactly what happened that day in Lethbridge's Pocket but, from an artist's point of view, the content offers a rich source of *may-bes* that might be visually recoded so that possibilities for re-thinking reality might be posed. However, because the story is non-fiction, there are certain facts that do not change - two men had a record of cattle duffing and horse stealing, three men went in pursuit of those two men, two men were killed, one man was convicted of murder and hanged, and one

man was finally released from gaol. There was no actual eye witness to the murder and thus past and immediate collateral evidence and data played a very important role in the way in which the event was then interpreted and continues to be interpreted.

My way of thinking at this time stemmed from continuing investigation into folklore, myths and legends and the way in which images may be used to complement and embellish the verbal and written telling or, as unique objects, to signify the ineffable. In this way I pondered the dilemma of retelling fact while considering that the *fact* is only such because of a viewpoint and thus presentation of that viewpoint would involve my personal experience of what I heard and saw in a particular place at a particular time. Nevertheless, we can agree that there is a great difference between representational and abstract images, as there is also difference between non-fiction and fiction with regard to texts. Concerning the story of the Kenniff brothers, my dilemma increased because of the many gaps in the story that continue to be filled with fictitious embellishment which, nevertheless, contribute to the richness of the story and the possibility for many and varied associations thus suggesting avenues for on-going and problematic re-thinking.

My intention of investigating how singular persons make reasoned connections when making and/or viewing artworks as a means of personal experience, guides my play with ideas about how this might be possible. Originally, my concentration was on the act of interpretation, or as I now realise, the result of the experience, not the actual experience itself. Notes from my diary (1996), record a discussion I had over coffee with a mature aged student. She had expressed an interest about aspects of my research into mythology and stories that might enrich awareness of people and place. We talked about memory and fairy stories and she mentioned how her three year old son picks up on the violent aspects of the video production of *Cinderella*, yet is seemingly unable to recognise the "romance" which she herself associates with the fable. I referred her to the work of Jordan (1993) and discussion about how the teller of myths and folklore evokes an atmosphere in which certain concepts of the story remain innate but perceptions change because of the context of the telling and adaptations to suit the prevailing norms. In like

way, an image is an innate object, but has the possibility of connoting different associations within individuals because each person projects/envisages a personal atmosphere of *symbolic relations* upon the object thus creating its meaning for them. An example I use in my diary is that of a cave:

> - e.g. a cave is a cave. However on a sunny day the cave can look inviting; on a cold wet day the cave can look threatening. The cave has not changed but the atmosphere has and so the perception of the cave varies. (Diary, 1996: 17)

Reflection upon the way in which the video of *Cinderella* had directed the young boy's interpretation led me to thinking how I might use the story of the Kenniff brothers as a way of establishing an atmosphere for viewing the images:

> Like the *Cinderella* video Maryann spoke of in relation to her son's reaction, the story of the Kenniff brothers may be given alternative perspectives so that viewers arrive at the images with an established 'atmosphere' that may, or may not, affect their negotiation with the images. (Diary, 1996: 17-19)

Thus, if I offered two different versions of the story, I could gauge to some degree the effect that each might have on individual interpretations. At the time I was thinking of using the stories as introduction to the images and, to enlarge the scope of the study, to separate out the art and non-art participants in order to gauge the influence of the stories on art or non-art viewers' reception of the images. Thus I pondered the following questions:

1. What is the degree of difference in reconfiguring the images between non-art viewers depending on which perspective of the story they have read?
2. What is the degree of difference in reconfiguring the images between art viewers depending on which perspective of the story they have read?
3. What is the degree of difference in reconfiguring the images between non-art and art viewers depending on which perspective of the story they have read? (Diary, 1996: 19)

I also considered the possibility that viewers would be "asked to view the images on display and then to re-configure each image using variations in colour and size that they feel are more appropriate to their interpretation of the story" (Diary, 1996: 21) by using the computer data bank of images to be provided. In this:

> The degree of emotive/objective responses may be indicated through the variation of colour/size adaptations that may indicate the effect that belief/attitude has on perception. (Diary, 1996: 21)

My reasoning for this, as pondered in my diary, is as follows:

> Why use only colour and size? Elements of texture, value, shape, line, space and time are constant in themselves but colour and size offer the possibilities of modification. A rough texture remains rough but may appear more rough through change in colour or size. Value is a degree of dark/light and so is an integral aspect of colour that may be modified. A shape can appear to be other than it is depending on colour and size, e.g. a background colour can accentuate or diminish identification of a space; so too can size. Line, space and time can similarly be affected through use of colour and size.
> - it is proposed that colour and size play an important, if not the most important part, in psychological reading of images. (Diary, 1996: 21)

This would mean that the stories had to be read before viewing the images as it was intended that viewers could then use the computer data bank of images as a means of adapting the images to suit their perception of the story.

It appears to me that the way in which something is presented is crucial and, with the increasing use of images in television and film, the question of conflict between the actual verbal or written content of a story and the power of the imaged content raises the issue of dominant forces in perception. Another issue raised is that of timing and location and thus we might question whether the young boy's response to the story of *Cinderella* might have been different if the fable had been read to him by his mother as a bedtime story? In such a reading, it is possible that aspects important to the reader, for example the romance, might have been stressed while violent aspects may have been elided. This possibility raises yet another issue. In the telling and re-telling, reading and re-reading of stories we have the possibility of a special type of dialogue with another person, or an equally special type of monologue with self. On the one hand, we have opportunities to interject and to question and, on the other hand, we have opportunities to make skeleton sketches in the mind that we can play around with as a cognitive game. Thus, through active engagement, perceptions about the story might evolve and change over time and place.

While we can argue that a story is always packaged to some degree, we can suggest that a video is more tightly wrapped and thus allows less possibility for our active engagement and more possibility for our passive consumption. Of course, this will depend on the

anticipatory schema one has in one's head and, if one views a video or film after having had many opportunities for reading or listening to the story, it is possible that previous responses to the story, through dialogue or imaginative monologue, may conflict to some degree with the video or film interpretation.

Thus I pondered the implications of providing two versions of a story that might already be well known to some people from the district in which the actual plot of the story took place. This being the case, the question of whether or not anticipatory schema influences the way in which people respond to a different or similar version of the story within a context of representational images and three dimensional artefacts, could be posed. On the other hand, for viewers unaware of the story, the question of whether or not either version of the story might influence responses to the overall exhibition, could also be posed.

Further toying with ideas is recorded in my diary amongst notes taken about the Kenniff brothers as I sought out every source I could find that offered new insight into their story. In June 1996, a colleague (and sister of Constable Robert Good), introduced me to Good who had been stationed at Oakey in 1976 where he discovered a box of police records that lay stacked in a room. The records related to the Kenniff brothers and contained letters, warrants for arrest, details of the court hearing and many photographs. Good himself had become obsessed with the story and was in the process of finding an avenue for publication of the manuscript he had been working on for some years. I was fortunate to spend some hours with Good going through the records and pouring over the old photographs with great excitement. I left carrying a bundle of photographs Good kindly lent me for my use. I had no idea at the time of how, when or where the images might be used, but I was vitally interested in the historical content of the story and thus the images were crucial visual elements from this perspective and, upon reflection, might suggest possibilities to me. Thus they were put aside as I continued investigation into the context of the story.

My reading of Walsh (1983) gave me an overview of the Mt. Moffatt National Park with only passing mention of the exploits of the Kenniff brothers. Nevertheless, the descriptions of landforms, flora and fauna stimulated me to do pen and ink sketches (Figures 6.2.1 & 6.2.2) amongst notes in my diary as a means of becoming familiar with the overall context in which the story was located.

Figure 6.2.1 Lethbridge's Pocket: Cremation Rock. (Diary, 1997: 56)

Figure 6.2.2   Rear Entrance to Kenniff's Cave. (Diary, 1997: 2)

Further investigation into myths and legends (Jordan, 1993) alerted me to notions of shamanism and concepts of animism that recalled memories of my first trip to the Mt. Moffatt National Park in which I had felt the presence of the wilderness as "a strange animal" as noted in Section 6.1. Using contour drawings and more detailed drawings based on representations from the article by Heap (1969) and descriptions in Cameron's (1963) paper, I made sketches of James and Patrick Kenniff. I find contour drawing especially helpful because one does not look at the page while drawing but concentrates strongly on the object, and thus the evolving drawing takes on a life force of its own, an

animate being, oblivious to its form as correct or otherwise. It is as though the mind and drawing are one and the essence of the object materialises in the marks on the page as the pen flows in a continuous line that captures the spirit rather than the physicality of the object. At times the finished drawing can be quite a surprise because what comes from the force of mental concentration does not always correlate with what one actually sees. I think we can note this in Figure 6.2.3 that shows two images of Jimmy and two images of Patrick.


Figure 6.2.3 Sketches of James and Patrick Kenniff. (Diary, 1997: 11)

In the top two images I firstly use a contour drawing as an outline which I then blocked in with hatching to build up the form of the faces. In the bottom two images, contour line only is used and, in noting the expression on the faces, I am aware of the youthful arrogance, the tilt of the head, the larrikin, haughty eyes and the fullness of the lips in the contour drawing of Jimmy that are not evident in the more studied drawing where a surly determination seems more evident. Likewise, the contour drawing of Patrick shows a leaner face, again tilting of the head but eyes that seem older and more haunted than in the top drawing where a cold determination seems evident. These likenesses owe much to my reading about the personalities of the two brothers and, while I was aware of the characteristics I have discussed, I cannot explain why I drew both heads on an angle to the right of the page or why certain attributes, missing in the studied drawings, flow freely in the contour drawings. It is possible that these are spur of the moment emanations from a sixth sense that, during hours of reading and thinking about the story, have developed into something so familiar that I no longer notice it.

One thing of which I am very aware is my need to include diagrams, maps, snippets of photos and written notes within and amongst sketches. Figure 6.2.4 shows photocopied segments from photos I had taken of artefacts housed in the Miles Historical Village where memorabilia from the turn of the century suggested the type of saddles, bridles, holsters, drays and merchandise that were used. In amassing this visual data on the page I also mingle fragments of the story to link the type of objects found on various properties in the district with the several raids carried out by the Kenniff brothers.

In this way I am suggesting my interpretation of what might have happened and, in thinking about my own process of becoming familiar with the story, I realise that mine is only one way of experiencing a coalescence of ideas, and thus the intention of providing at least two versions of the story seems valid. Equally valid seems the idea of making the images representational so that my own interpretation might not be perceived as too dominant as Figure 6.2.4. demonstrates.

Figure 6.2.4 Sketch of Saddles. (Diary, 1997: 12)

Admittedly, an artist can never reject the responsibility of authorship; we do determine what aspects to include in the image and we do arrange those aspects as we can see in the following sketch in which I have centred the holsters between a photograph of the Cremation Rock and an extract from Walsh (1983) telling of the murder. These sketches,

however, are my personal tinkering with ideas, not finished images. They merely serve to show my way of thinking myself into the story.


Figure 6.2.5. Sketch of Holsters. (Diary, 1997: 4)

However, there is a subtle difference between orchestration and performance whereby the former implies an arrangement of various elements while the latter implies more subjective immersion as a soloist. For an artist this can give rise to a paradoxical situation in which we might be the soloist, as in making the images, before becoming the conductor, as in exhibiting the images, or we might be the soloist in devising the images but the conductor in their making because elements within the work reflect external issues, or we might remain the soloist throughout in that the images are a very personal means of expression. Much depends on the intention of the artist and this does give us relative freedom to play with our focus and, from my point of view, I enjoy playing with a focus on things outside us so I might understand how these things affect us on the inside. Thus I felt a great need to go back into the field to find out more about the things outside my head and plans were made to re-visit Mt. Moffatt during the Easter break.

My preliminary reading, note-taking, photos from earlier visits and sketches had given me some sense of the wilderness and I could feel a closer affinity with the story of the Kenniffs as a living legend. Fortunately, I have relations living in Roma and I telephoned my niece, Sally Rigg, to ask if she could link people to any of the family names connected to the story. My past experience of living in country areas motivated this type of contact because there is nothing more reliable than the *bush telegraph*, metaphorically known in Australia as the *grapevine* which has roots deep into the history of such places. Fruit borne of this initial contact came in provision of the names of two people I might ring. Firstly, was Brenda Vincent who grew up on Mt. Moffatt Station before it was sold as a national park and, secondly was King Lethbridge, whose family name links back to Lethbridge's Pocket in which the alleged murder took place. I rang both people, Brenda on a property outside Injune and King on a property south-west of Roma, and arranged to make contact during my planned field trip. Naturally, both parties were interested in the reason for my phone call and, as I outlined the nature of my research, I could sense growing interest from each person as I spoke with them and, each then proffered vital information. On the one hand, Brenda told me about pack saddles from Mt. Moffatt that were lying in her shed and about memories she was willing to share with me. Of equal

importance, she gave me names of other people I could contact who were living in the exact location - Gavin and Kerry Enever, the Ranger and his wife at Mt. Moffatt, Chris Stanford who lives in Roma and knows the district well, and Tom and Sandra Hartley who live on "Cooper Murra" but also now own "Cyrstalbook", one of the properties often raided by the Kenniffs. On the other hand, King offered to let me look at a document given by his great-uncle to his father, R. C. Lethbridge and thence to him.

As the Easter break drew near, I made several telephone calls to organise convenient dates and times for visiting Brenda at "Ardrossan" and the Lethbridges at "Normanby" and, by Monday, March 31, 1997 I was ready to leave Toowoomba with an informal and very flexible itinerary planned. Owing to the fact that these two properties are some three hours drive apart, and in opposite directions from Roma, I decided to drive anti clockwise from Roma thus visiting "Normanby" en route to Mt. Moffatt, and "Ardrossan" on the way home. This trip was to take anything up to five days depending on the weather which, at that time of year could result in massive storms making the dirt roads between Mitchell, Mt. Moffatt and Injune impassable. Because I planned to travel some six hundred kilometres on the first day, my planned time of arrival at "Normanby" was sometime after lunch with the only provision being that I would then arrive in time for dinner at "Cooper Murra" and an overnight stay with Tom and Sandra Hartley whose property was on the Forest Vale Road north of Mitchell. In an earlier telephone conversation with Sandra, she had offered this kind hospitality and, in another previous telephone conversation with Kerry and Gavin Enever I had been offered the use of The Barracks, a small self-contained out building at Mt. Moffatt, for the duration of my proposed short stay.

While these telephone calls were very informal, I felt that this was a very necessary part of the process of picking up relevant and incidental information. As an outsider, I am aware of the norms of such rural communities and I knew, from my own experience of living in the country, that the best way in which I could absorb some of the atmosphere of the people and place was, in a manner of speaking, to be passed from one to the other.

Thus from Brenda I was passed to Kerry and Gavin Enever, and from Sandra and Tom I was passed onto Barbara and Bob Sokoll now living at "ForestVale" Station, a property that played a key part as a stop-over for coaches passing between Mitchell and Mt. Moffatt and as another target for raids by the Kenniffs. Details of this passing are outlined in my diary, but the important point is the way in which I was acquiring an understanding of the context of the story and the context of the images I was already working on in my studio in Toowoomba.

As I mentioned earlier, my reason for calling at "Normanby" was to look at a document King's father had given him recounting what had happened in Lethbridge's Pocket on the day of the murder, March 30, 1902. A secondary reason lay in the route I would take, some thirty kilometres of winding road that passes "Mt. Abundance", the property "where up to ten men per night would sleep overnight on their way to 'land grab' the government leases in the 1850s" (Diary, 1997: 89). Actually being on location allowed me to become intensely aware of the colours and vegetation that, in contrast to former times, was lush and alive thus hinting at the struggle that would have taken place over pastures for either legitimate or *moonlighted* stock, pastures that varied seasonally from brittle and drought-stricken to succulent and plentiful. These noted changes in landscape assisted me in understanding more fully the differing viewpoints regarding the exploits of the Kenniff brothers. Thus my perception of the country was changing as I viewed the rolling pastures and imagined myself in either of two situations - that of an established landholder or, that of one freshly coming upon such abundance from a poverty stricken Irish immigrant background.

On arrival at "Normanby", the Lethbridges were waiting with hot tea and home made biscuits and, after the normal formalities, I was offered the document to read. On reading this version of the story I was amazed to note details that conflicted with research I had done to date and it seemed rather uncanny to be reading this document exactly ninety five years after the event. I suggested that the document might be appropriate to include in the exhibition, but King stressed that his father had cautioned him that the document was

"never to be let out of his sight", so from memory I made notes in my diary later that evening at "Cooper Murra":

> I am confused as to exactly who the "I" refers to in parts. For example, after relating what was purported to have happened, the writer then goes on to give another version of Sam Johnson's story using the pronoun "I" together with the second person, Sam Johnson, so it appears that "I" could refer to S.J. while also appearing to be the writer - was the writer also there? The main discrepancy relates to the murder recounted by Jimmy Kenniff to the writer (?). Jimmy did not have a gun, so he picked up a rock and smashed Doyle on the forehead who fell dazed to the ground. Jimmy shouted to Pat "Shoot the b's....shoot the b's ....". When Pat would not, Jimmy grabbed his gun and put bullets into both Doyle and Dahlke, killing Dahlke, but Doyle had crawled under a log and pleaded for his life before Jimmy finished him off.
> Another discrepancy - according to this document Doyle's gun was left back on the pack horse.
> What story is true? (Diary, 1997: 90)

For my purposes it does not really matter, but what is important is the way in which information is foregrounded or backgrounded at the time of the telling because this demonstrates that episodes are in the telling, or in other words, in the games people play when involved in the personal experience of linguistic encoding. An anecdote from my own experience at the time confirms the disparity that may exist between the spoken word, the intended meaning and the message.

Before leaving Roma, I had telephoned Sandra at "Cooper Murra" to get directions about how to find their property so that I could continue on from "Normanby". As noted in my diary:

> Sandra's phone directions "end of the bitumen" had not indicated that the bitumen out of Mitchell went for 92 kilometres!! For the first time in my life I was praying for a dirt road as I kept driving into the night and watched my fuel gauge getting low - a long way back to Mitchell for fuel! Am carrying a jerry can but it only contains 10 litres. Passed "ForestVale" on the way and arrived last night around 7.30 pm. Sandra had the evening meal waiting. (Diary, 1997: 90-91)

In my own personal experience of living in the country, bitumen was a rarity and seldom went beyond twenty kilometres outside towns in remote areas. I had applied my knowledge to a new situation, but one that I thought might be similar, and had found no

match. I had been informed, but had not been aware of the subtle transformations that can occur when a message is sent.

In this way the spoken word remains an enigma, and it appears that analysis will not solve such a riddle. From my point of view, playing around with words does appear to invigorate language and, by implication, re-invigorates perception as well as the way conceptions are formed and, because I was in the district to look, listen and learn, I concentrated on these aspects so that my awareness might be heightened and my perception modified through enrichment.

Consequently, I went to the stockyards the following morning and watched the boys saddle up for a day's mustering. I took photos as they posed for shots of everyday occurrences that, by the click of a camera, might become history, and I realised then how important it is for each person to have some claim to fame, some feeling of being involved in the story. I also realised how important it was that I be accepted into the community as a friend who was there to tell *their* story and, it was in this aspect that my own background experience of living in the country formed a link.

Figure 6.2.6 Preparing for Mustering at "Cooper Murra". 1997.

This link was extended as I left "Cooper Murra" to retrack to "ForestVale" that morning. In reiterating the notion of being passed on, I recall mention of Sandra passing me on to the Sokolls now managing "Forest Vale". Before arriving at "Cooper Murra" the previous night, I had been startled as I drove past the entry of "Forest Vale" with name clearly illuminated by the headlights of my vehicle. I remember an immense feeling of *may-be* sweeping over me as I realised that, here I was in the middle of outback Queensland, low on fuel, well into darkness, heading for a property not mentioned in the story and yet passing one that figured so significantly. I had mentioned this to Sandra over breakfast and, within minutes a telephone call was made and thus I was sent back to "Forest Vale". Again I sensed being both the hunter and the hunted at one and the same time. Not only was I collecting data about the place and people, but the people also were vitally interested in my presence in the area, what I was doing and how it might affect them. A note from my diary exemplifies the initial strangeness entailed in becoming familiar with a situation:

Arrived at "Forest Vale" 9.14 am. Went through my reasons for being in the district and both Barb and Bob really warmed to the idea of the exhibition. So far everyone I have talked to is keen and helpful, and in this way of being 'passed on' has really helped me get "inside" the attitudes and history of the area. (Sandra had rung Barb to OK my visit). At first Barb had come out to 'deal' with me, but soon Bob joined in as we started looking at, and talking about, the old remnants of the original building. I took photos, stayed for a cuppa and then Bob drove me down to the airport area to point out the "apple trees" under which the cattle drove 'shadowed' by police would have occurred. Enormous spreading trees - can imagine the eerie atmosphere on a dark night. (Diary, 1997: 93)

Figures 6.2.7 & 6.2.8   Above, original "Forestvale".
Left, Apple Trees, "Forestvale".

I could sense the story becoming alive to me and, as I walked through the remnants of the original homestead, I recalled walking through similar remnants of my grandparent's house on our property in western New South Wales where, as a child, my brother, cousins and I would play bushranger games. On the verandah of the old house, half hidden by a creeper and guarded by a clutter of machinery, I noticed a wooden meat safe with gauze windows and, on inquiring about it, Bob responded that it had been there for as long as he knew, as also had been a tiny tin tea/sugar container, and an oil container he then produced from one of the various boxes stacked in a back room. I asked if I might borrow these for the exhibition. Happily Bob agreed and immediately started uncovering other such wonderful things as an old, rusted biscuit tin with barely visible label, a set of salt and pepper shakers, a minute butter maker, the likes of which I had never seen before, and a cast iron water kettle with tap which was identical to one I had seen in the prison ruins at Port Arthur.

Such enthusiasm and keenness to help allowed me to feel accepted within the community and, by extension, within the landscape owing to my introduction to the terrain through the people which, I think, stemmed from my own past associations of a similar lifestyle and my willingness to be absorbed into a strange people-context owing to already established awareness of the natural environment, albeit in a different location. In a way that may seem paradoxical, I was coming to know the other through the other.

From "Forest Vale" I continued north to "Crystalbrook" where I stopped to take photographs of this rambling old homestead and refuel, on Tom's insistence, from the diesel tank behind the sheds. Also, with permission, I wandered through the unlocked house amidst the chattels of the manager's family and I admit to an awareness of profound respect as I walked from room to room and realised how easily I could abuse this trust. This experience enabled me to imagine the horror one might feel on returning home to find bags of flour, saddles and other such items missing in an area so remote and naturally potentially hostile that community cohesion and trust were essential to survival.

As I took photographs of the verandahs, doorways and external structure I noted that nearly every room opened to the exterior thus giving a sense of open form from a design point of view and, the roofed alley way connecting the bedrooms to the living area and kitchen, suggested a separation of day from night as the working routine itself would have been divided.

Figure 6.2.9   Above: View of "Crystalbrook", 1997
Figure 6.2.10   Below: Alleyway from kitchen to bedrooms, "Crystalbrook", 1997

In this way I was visually reading a lifestyle, enhanced by my own personal associations and past experience of such places. Standing in the tack room I could image the sort of harness that once must have hung on walls as the following sketch shows.

Figure 6.2.11 Sketch of Harness. (Diary, 1997: 13)

After some hours I continued on to Mt. Moffatt where, during my stay, I hoped to find "another cave not far from Cremation Rock", (Diary, 1997: 97) that Tom Hartley had told me about and which, he suggested, was used by hunters and trappers. By the time I arrived at "Mt. Moffatt" later that evening I was happy to accept the hospitality of Gavin and Kerry Enever as Rangers and hosts of the Park and join in the conversation over wine and dinner. Of course, there was much talk about the story of the Kenniff brothers, but neither Gavin nor his visiting colleague, Chris Stanford, could contribute any vital new information. However, Chris offered me a copy of a slim, newly published version of the Kenniff story by Newsome (1996) to read during my stay.

In reading this volume I was struck by the writing style - almost novelistic advocacy for the duffers and certainly a very personal viewpoint on behalf of the author as I noted:

> Have found the above story 'interesting', but have a problem with the lack of verifiable evidence and the flavour of self-promotion that comes through in the writing style. However, this brings me back to 'folklore' and the way in which stories change in the telling. Newsome is certainly telling, as he saw and believes, based on his own exposure to other 'tellings' and coloured by his own beliefs. (Diary, 1997: 101)

However, this version of the story raises some very curious questions that I had not encountered previously. For example, Newsome (1996) mentions a man, Tom Clancy, who was in Lethbridge's Pocket at the time of the shooting but whose name was not brought up at the court hearing. Apparently hob nail booted footprints were found in Lethbridge's Pocket - to whom did these belong? Who carried the bodies to Incineration/Cremation Rock some two and a half kilometres from the actual murder site?

Further, Newsome (1996) questions why the Kenniffs would want to steal a pony mare when their interest was in good race horses and, as to their "truculent, disrespectful and arrogant" attitude, the author opines that "snobbocracy" was the cause for "belittlement" of Australian men who refused to salute their "betters" (1996: 83-84). These are legitimate questions and, if it is true that many sympathisers hung photos of the Kenniffs in their sitting rooms beside that of the Crucifixion, this suggests an equally valid

interpretation of the story from the point of view of the battlers and gives weight to my notion of presenting two versions of the story. As we can see in the following figure, Figure 6.2.7, the Incineration Site, also known as Cremation Rock, is well up the creek from the site of the shootings.

Figure 6.2.12   Sketch Map of Lethbridge's Pocket.   (Diary, 1997: 54)

In the following two days I spent time re-visiting sites I had first encountered nearly a decade ago as mentioned in Section 6.1, and I was amazed at the number of tourists who were happily camped on the banks of the Dargonelly Waterhole as the following photograph shows in contrast my painting of the same area based on memories and personal associations (Plate 8).

Figure 6.2.13 Dargonelly Waterhole Campers, Easter 1997.

I remembered the rogue bull that had threatened my tent and I wondered if any of these visitors had really experienced this place in its vastness, alienation, wonder and solitary atmosphere and, as I watched people talking together, walking from tent to tent, from car to truck, and children playing in the waterhole, a series of visual flashbacks from my previous visits to Carnarvon Gorge coalesced in my mind juxtaposed with my memories of this particular place. At the time I felt only a sense of shock which rebounded later when, down the track at Marlong Arch, I was intensely aware of a similar number of tourists and, several kilometres away beyond Lethbridge's Pocket, more tourists were tracking back and forth to Kenniff's Cave. Again I remembered my first stay alone in the Park and getting lost finding my way into Lethbridge's Pocket and thence locating the Incineration Site, both of which now are clearly accessible as the following photographs show.

Figure 6.2.14 Entering Lethbridge's Pocket, 1997.

Figure 6.2.15 Incineration Site, Lethbridge's Pocket, 1997

The impact of this experience does effect, to some degree, a change of direction that my images take as we shall see in the following section.

... when I got to the fork past "Warong" the road looked O.K. so I headed east in the hopes of calling in at "Merivale" and "Westgrove" - two properties that had figured strongly in the Kenniff 'moonlighting' days. (Diary, 1997: 103)

Previous attempts to telephone the owners had been unsuccessful, but my desire to locate the properties within my mental map was strong enough that I felt compelled at least to drive past these two significant places. In this way I was tracking the Kenniffs, albeit from a great distance in time and an equally great distance from view. Other considerations of course, were the actual road distance I was travelling, the knowledge that I may not have another opportunity to make such a trip and the question of whether or not I could tolerate such a void area in my overall design.

Figure 6.2.17 View of "Westgrove" from the Road.

Thus I followed the road past "Merivale" and "Westgrove" and arrived at "Ardrossan" by 1.30 pm. to spend the afternoon with Brenda talking about her childhood memories of growing up at "Mt. Moffatt" and, in looking through photo albums and memorabilia including pack saddles, pack bags, quart pots, oil jars and butter churn, I was making preliminary sketches in my mind of creating "a sepia drawing of this image [pack horses ready for a day's work] and display the actual pack bags nearby in the gallery" (Diary, 1997: 103). On my suggesting this to Brenda, she happily agreed and offered to lend any artefacts I might choose for the exhibition which I could return and pick up closer to the date planned. Thus I left carrying one photo album, a commitment from Brenda to lend artefacts and a deep sense of a very different viewpoint from that of six days ago.

At 10 p.m. I arrived in Toowoomba knowing that my work would take a new direction, as yet unformed, but, now in my mind the story of the Kenniff brothers connected with the present day owners of properties that had featured strongly in the days of *moonlighting*. The commitment by the Sokolls and Barbara Vincent to contribute authentic objects that lay in sheds covered by ninety five years of dust offered a further connection of present with past, while simultaneously allowing some sense of ownership of the exhibition to these people and thus a possibility of experiencing art in a new way.

During my sojourn in Mt. Moffatt, paintings of the landscape had been left as they were, some scattered on tables, others stacked in folders. It was as though I had momentarily stepped outside to gather necessary new data, to distance myself mentally and physically and to re-group the scattered fragments of the story.

6.3 Dialogue with Images: Rethinking Photos and Sketches.

As just mentioned, work *en train* awaited my return from Mt. Moffatt. Thus we shall have to re-track to pick up the threads of the yarn in order to understand my motivation in creating the images. In reflecting on the photographs I had taken over the years, the work of Peirce (1880s), Gee (1992), Johnson (1987) and Solso (1994) opened new insights into the way in which personal experience modifies behaviour, how episodes are not in physical happenings of the world but are in the telling, that imagination is a pervasive structuring activity central to human rationality and that seeing is initiated by sensory objects. Hence I started using the mind to see beyond the photographs.

In particular, maps of the district and the story of the Kenniff Brothers took on a new significance. In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, I alluded to this growing significance and, especially now after having re-visited the site, I spent hours studying the various maps and matching photographs to particular sections so that I could envisage the total landscape as I plotted property locations and traced routes the Kenniff brothers may have taken at various times as the following sketch shows.


Figure 6.3.1 Sketch of District. (Diary, 1997: 51)

I began to think of Mt. Moffatt as the heart of a great organism where a vital event in our history had taken place and, in this way the story became the focus of my work. It gave me a *raison d'être* for getting to know the area, and offered a pattern for telling about special things that have happened to people. During the time I reflected on the photographs I was actually undergoing a change, and forming new patterns through playing with things that I had thought irrelevant.

As mentioned earlier in section 6.1, I did a series of paintings dealing with Port Arthur and the Jondaryan Woolshed in 1993; both areas and their history are well documented and familiar. Yet it had taken seemingly unrelated things, the poetry of Porter and Eliot, for me to link the two areas. I was unaware at the time that I was staging a "dress rehearsal" for my approach to the Mt. Moffatt region. I realised that my strategy had been to make something already familiar into a new and ambiguous relationship; thus the more I studied my photographs of Mt. Moffatt, the more I realised that here was a strange and ambiguous place that I wished to make familiar, not only to myself, but to the community as a whole. The problem was how to do this? Firstly, I had to immerse myself in making images so that the whole character of the landscape occupied my total physical and mental being as an extension of self rather than a separate entity. Secondly, I had to stimulate personal curiosity and associations within viewers.

At the time I was working on images of the creekbed and rock areas in which the climax of the story, the murder of Constable Doyle and Station Manager, Albert Dahlke had taken place. I had thought to make a backdrop of images for two versions of the Kenniff story, and I envisaged the images as a representational context within which viewers could read or listen to either story using a walkman. Thus my objective was to create very true to life images which, if transferred to computer imagery, might allow greater viewer manipulation using the software programme, Adobe Photoshop. For this reason, I selected subject matter that lent itself to reasonably simple adaptations of colour, value and size.

As a watercolourist I normally do little preliminary pencil drawing, preferring to map in areas and simple outlines with washes before applying layer upon layer of colour to build up the form. But, with the idea of creating an atmosphere and including scanned images for manipulation by viewers using computers, I thought of experimenting with colour, value and size as these elements seemed most suitable in suggesting adaptations for playing around with on the computer. At all times I kept reflecting on the way in which stories and play are essential ingredients for rehearsing survival strategies throughout life that involve moving from the familiar to the strange, from the simple to the complex, and thus I applied this approach to my own work.

An area of key significance to the Kenniff story is the creek below Kenniff Cave at Mt. Moffatt. This is situated in a deep gully with massive granite and sandstone rocks guarding crystal clear pools of water and, owing to my own fascination with rock forms and water reflections, I selected several photographs and slides from my data bank and studied the value range of greys, blues and greens.

One particular aspect of the creek showed rocks protruding across the foreground depicting a variety of greys with a repetition of these values in the background while the middle section comprised grey-green water in which reflections echoed the rock forms. The play of value posed a challenge as I found in using only pencil and, rather than creating a powerful and striking contrast, the resultant drawing, Plate 3, has a quiet, understated stillness.

| Plate 3. | Karen Knight-Mudie *Pencil Sketch of Rock Pool, Lethbridge's Creek* Pencil on Stonehenge. |

Because I was not totally satisfied with the image and because the atmosphere I had intended was to be one of intrigue and strength, I reverted to the use of watercolour so that I could gauge the differing effect able to be achieved through using a medium with which I am familiar. I did, however, decide to move closer into the image so that the size of the rocks dominated and the play of reflections might become more mysterious and confusing as can be seen in the following image, Plate 4.

Plate 4.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Lethbridge Creek Waterhole.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm.

Having worked with basically the same image I am very aware of the vast difference in

atmosphere created by firstly, using an unfamiliar medium and hence not fully

appreciating its capacity and, secondly, using a familiar medium and recognising its

capacity. Bearing this in mind, I went back to drawing media and selected compressed charcoal and conte for my next attempt at creating an atmosphere of strength, mystery and power. Again I searched through my visual data bank of photos and selected a segment of Marlong Arch in which the sandstone is riddled with veins of ochre values, cracks and holes and, having realised the impact of size, I cropped a central fragment for enlargement in my next drawing, Plate 5.

Plate 5.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Fragment of Marlong Arch.*
Compressed Charcoal and Conte on Stonehenge.

As we can see, the contrast is powerful and the enlargement of what is only a fragment of a massive rock formation does suggest an ominous presence of ambiguity and intrigue. The image is representational as intended but, by concentrating on the elements of size

and value, I have exaggerated these and thus changed the character of the image.

I then started work on paintings of a rock area in the Lethbridge Creek as shown in the next two images, Plates 6 and 7.

Plate 6 .   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Lethbridge's Creek No. 1*.
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm.

Again, my concentration of size, colour and value range of the greys and ochres evident in the ancient sandstone formations interspersed with solidified lava flow and basalt is evident in the preceding image, Plate 6. I have zoomed in on a particular section of the creek area and, in isolating rocks that are actually quite small in relationship to the surrounding background rocks, I focus attention on the shape of the objects and the value range of the colours.

Until now, I had not thought deeply about why I tend to do this but, as I reflect on the series of landscape paintings I have done over the years, I am becoming aware of my need to scrutinise the landscape and how I select a particular location and move closer and closer thus developing repetitive images as though one is tracking a particular element of the landscape. I am beginning to realise that this harks back to childhood skills of reading hoofprints and noticing details, such as broken grass and the amount of loose earth covering a track that would alert us to a time factor and, as a consequence, locate us in space. By this I mean that if the weather was fine and still, one would know that a hoofmark covered by dust implied that this animal had passed this way some time ago and thus was not in the immediate location.

Time again plays a very important, and yet different, role in other of my past and immediate experiences. For example, in taking a horse to water, one has to wait for the horse to drink and, in the waiting, one tends to look at incidental things such as the way in which the clouds are forming, the position of rocks, ant trails and all sorts of peripheral things. At the time, one is not always intensely aware of these things but, over time and through repetitive routine, one absorbs the pattern of things and thus when the pattern is broken, one becomes very alert. In this way our survival instincts, nourished by pattern, come to our rescue as we try to re-establish a sequential, developmental way of feeling at one with a situation.

Thus, in looking at the following image, Plate 7, we can see the way in which I move closer into the image so that details become more obvious and concentration of size and

location of particular elements, such as colour changes, shape, size and the direction of cracks become the focus of attention.

| Plate 7 . | Karen Knight-Mudie. *Lethbridge's Creek No 2.* |
| | Watercolour on Arches 640 gm. |

The development of my sense of focus and connection can be seen in the following image, Plate 8, where I use a diptych to exemplify the natural way in which we turn the head in scanning the landscape and the way in which we link things together in the mind.

| Plate 8. | Karen Knight-Mudie. *Dargonelly Waterhole.* |
| | Watercolour on Arches 640 gm. (Diptych) |

Naturally, we cannot see all things simultaneously and yet we attempt to link episodes in a sequential arrangement of elements. The way in which many artists attempt to overcome this deficiency in our physical apparatus is to use forms of multiple perspective, panoramas and time sequences as in cartoons, films and television and, my approach might be seen as a panorama.

When viewing this particular aspect of the landscape, it is impossible for one to see the totality of the waterhole from the viewpoint I have taken. One has to move around to get the whole picture and one tends to focus on this or that particular aspect of shadow that attracts attention. As we can see in this combined image, there are equal forces of value in the pockets of shadow in the rock crevices to almost centre left and slightly higher

centre right of the separate images that vie for attention and so our eye tracking moves back and forth as one would do when scanning the landscape for signs of animals. In this way I am simulating the way in which a person might scan the landscape while looking for details.

In recalling my previous discussion of the video, *Cinderella*, in Section 6.2, I draw attention to stressing the important role of presentation. In like manner, when planning an exhibition, the space of the gallery plays a crucial role and thus it is essential to consider the height of walls, the position of doorways, light direction and all extraneous things that might affect the presentation of the work as intended. Thus, an awareness of space and size allows one to link two dimensional works to a three dimensional context. In this sense, an artist is also an architect, curator and conductor if one is planning all aspects of an exhibition. In the following section, I shall deal in detail with these aspects of the exhibition, but it is important that I now draw attention to the fact that the works were intended to be hung in a public gallery and thus consideration of this context did influence the way in which I approached making the images.

By mid December, 1996, I had completed the images as discussed above and, in my mind I was hypothetically arranging the works in one of the smaller rooms of the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery as had been verbally agreed some months previous. However, my work and ideas suddenly floundered at this time when, after visiting the gallery, I was informed that the space I had requested was not available, but the large foyer Atrium Gallery could be used instead. This changed many of my intentions and ideas. In a matter of moments the envisaged space had grown from approximately ten square metres to a long narrow area of some twenty four metres with a breadth of approximately six metres at the entrance, tapering to approximately two metres at the rear. Ceiling heights ranged from four and a half metres to five and a half metres. Within this space there are eight doorways, entry reception counter, stairwell, one lift, one long narrow window, one alcove leading into the main gallery and one glassed alcove at the rear of the space.

I did not have time to stop and think but continued working on the watercolours of the creek area as I mentally searched for a solution and new direction. At the time I was reading the work of Gordon (1961) that deals with the creative capacity, and I noted the four basic interrelated psychological states he considers universal and recurring. Firstly, there is the detachment/ involvement stage of feeling removed from the problem before getting very close, secondly, there is a deferment stage that halts premature solutions, thirdly, a period of speculation allows the mind to run freely, and finally, a feeling that the thing has a mind of its own that Gordon terms the autonomy of the object.

In my own mind I sensed that the decision about the gallery space represented a type of *deferment* and that the new space might offer new possibilities. My diary entry of January 1, (1997: 65) records my worry about the space of the Atrium being "so long with enormous wall spaces", but, having just moved into my own house that I had designed and physically assisted in building, I recalled similar space problems one faces in playing with dimensions, positive and negative spaces, size and proportion. In the house design process, I had started with floor plans that had evolved into small models, thence into bigger models until the actual building became the final and permanent model in which ceilings reach to over five metres and beams and poles intersect the space in supporting the loft area. Thus, in relating my own experience to this new design problem posed by the exhibition space, I realised that the size of the Atrium Gallery could be used to great advantage in creating visual impact. The problem of exactly how this might be done remained unsolved until I reflected on the photos lent to me by Good.

The photos were basically small, old, faded and sepia toned representations of the Kenniff brothers, Constable George Doyle, Albert Dahlke, Joe Ryan, Charles Tom and views of "Forest Vale", "Carnarvon Homestead", Mitchell Horse Races and various aspects of the surrounding district. I laid the pictures out like a deck of cards and began sorting them into some order, firstly into people followed by places and then into a time line of events. Time passed as I looked at the photos and thought about the story and I began to imagine walking through history and, at that instant, the Atrium space took on a

new perspective. The space suggested a type of pathway, because you have to actually move along the corridor which appears narrow because of the towering walls on either side and I began to imagine it as a history walk. However, the problem of scale remained a worry as I realized how large the works would need to be to fill such a space which had now become a dominant and integral design element in the overall exhibition. Previously space was conventional, now it was very unconventional.

When painting I normally use an imperial size Arches or Saunders heavy watercolour paper, which, when float mounted and framed, is one metre by seventy five centimetres. While it was possible to conceive of the images as diptychs, triptychs and even quartets as was often my method of working, I was very conscious of the remaining negative space around the images, and particularly above the images if I used this formatting. However, visual images of billboards, murals, Byzantine mosaics, Chinese scrolls, Michelangelo's Sistine ceiling, works by Rembrandt, Rubens, Courbet, Nolan, Imants Tillers, Boyd, Hodgkinson and many others played through my mind as I began to speculate about using other media and techniques hitherto strange to me.

Recently, at an opening of student work in the Arts Faculty, I had been impressed with the size of the works done by one student using a heavy brown drawing paper. On ringing art suppliers in Brisbane I was told that this type of drawing paper comes in rolls of fifty metres having a width of one metre, twenty centimetres. I immediately ordered a roll of this paper which was delivered the following day and, tearing off a portion of the paper I started experimenting by playing with combinations of media such as conte, pastels, oil sticks and liquid texta in the same way in which I encourage students to discover various properties of new media. I discarded the soft pastels as the colours and texture were too soft for the toughness of the paper and did not give the impact I wanted, so I concentrated on using the liquid texta, compressed conte and oil sticks. The hard edge and power of the liquid texta suggested possibilities of strength and permanence, while the conte and oil sticks flowed and smudged over the paper with ease. I started to sense a new direction for the work - the paper was light enough, yet tough enough to

hang as great scrolls in the gallery, and the conte and oil sticks were powerful enough to suit the size of the drawings.

Being familiar with organic forms and having often done demonstration work on rolls of butcher's paper showing the use of various instruments for acrylic painting techniques such as using rollers, cut cardboard, tooth brushes, cotton wool, cut outs, crushed paper, spatter work, sponges and the like, I approached the brown paper in a similar way. However, the strangeness lay in drawing and, cutting a length of some two metres, I firstly placed the paper on four tables pushed together and began an imaginary landscape drawing. However, I found it physically difficult to reach across the width of the tables and thus put the paper on the floor. Because the drawing was experimental I felt excited in having complete freedom in flirting with strangeness and, having never used the powerful liquid texta in my own work, I began with these. I started with a tree form and, as I was blocking in a shadow area using purple and black I felt uneasy about the starkness and hard edge effect of the liquid texta so, putting this aside I took up a stick of sepia conte and continued. The medium flowed across the page and, as I made powerful sweeping contour marks depicting landforms and rocks I was able to smudge and mix in other earth toned colours and then superimpose crisp areas of grass, sharp outlines and rich shadows using oil sticks and compressed charcoal. On looking at the developing form of the work I realized that the natural colour of the paper lent itself to the earthiness of the landscape and reminded me of old photographs.

Going back to the old photographs I again laid them out on the table and started arranging them like a story and, within minutes, the context of the exhibition became clear in my mind. The space did lend itself to a history walk, the colour of the paper suggested the earth, the conte and oil sticks flowed over the paper like flora, fauna and people moving through time. Moreover, the size could be manipulated to enhance the importance of the story and reflect the vastness of the region and, as I sat concentrating on the photos I stared visualizing them as enormous drawings, somewhat like old faded billboards that

could actually fill the space of the gallery with such presence that one would be amongst them almost like part of the crowd at the horse races or court hearing.

From this idea I began to visualize a coach rumbling across the countryside and, using a photocopier, I then enlarged various sections of images from Wannan (1970) and started tearing the photocopies, positioning and pasting them into the landscape and then drawing into them to seal them into the image. This meant that I was down on hands and knees and it was not long before my glasses were fogged up from perspiration and my back was aching so badly that I had to stop. I walked away in tears of frustration and fatigue. I felt completely out of my depth, abandoned by my body, and angry that I did not have the facilities and equipment for work of this scale.

In situations like this I feel it is very important to do two things - move away from the problem, and sleep. I did both, and the following day I arranged a row of chairs and stools as scaffolding along the wall and, using a packet of Blutack, secured the paper to the wall and finished the drawing. On studying the overall impact of this drawing I considered that the combination of media gave a somewhat disjointed atmosphere to the work as a whole, but the important part was in identifying those particular areas that did work and, in particular, the way in which I was able to drag and smudge the conte that allowed the colour to float across the base paper giving a ghostly and faded effect which I was able to define in parts using strong contour lines and building up form through hatching and blocking in areas of the sepia tones. I decided to use this technique for large scale interpretations of the main characters and key sites of the story and, as noted in my diary:

> In the main I intend to work using a horizontal format so that the image-story unfolds, like a track leading viewers through the gallery space so that they can walk the story, listen to the story and participate in manipulating the painted images in response to the story. (Diary, 1996: 66)

Throughout the month of December I worked steadily on the drawings using my new knowledge of the medium and newly mastered skills from the experimental drawing. In

thinking about my methodology I realise that I used knowledge of my house design and painting demonstration skills to apply to the scale problem and, in thus overcoming the problem of scale, I felt confident to tackle the new problem of drawing media which, with practice, became familiar.

Because I was working from very small photographs I used a technique of grid enlargement and, as mentioned previously regarding earlier watercolours of Lethbridge's Creek area, I exaggerated certain details, deleted others and combined characters as pairs in one drawing depending on the effect I wanted. For example, I wanted the judges to appear as though they were conferring and hence each person in each pair faces to the centre of the image and thus, while gazing at us, the viewers, they also appear to be aware of each other.

By January 1, 1997 I had completed eight drawings: the four judges, (Real and Chubb as a pair, and Cooper and Griffith as the other pair), Patrick and James Kenniff, Doyle and Dahlke, Cremation Rock, Forest Vale Homestead, the Horse Races at Mitchell and my experimental landscape. The latter is not included in the list of plates owing to the fact that I later tore it up as we shall shortly see.

The following plates show the images as listed above. Of course the sequence changes in arranging them in the gallery context but, for the moment my intent is to draw attention to the pattern developing in which I use basically the same technique so that value gradations and size are the dominant visual elements that unify the images as a series, not separate pictures. In this way they might be considered as a visual story line.

Plate 9.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Judges Real and Chubb.*
             Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm.

Plate 10.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Judges Cooper and Griffith.*
             Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm.

Plate 11. Karen Knight-Mudie *Patrick and James Kenniff.*
Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm

Plate 12. Karen Knight-Mudie *George Doyle and Albert Dahlke.*
Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm.

Plate 13.   Karen Knight-Mudie *Cremation Rock*.
Conte on Brown Paper. 114 x 240 cm.

Plate 14. Karen Knight-Mudie *Forest Vale Homestead.*
Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm.

Plate 15. Karen Knight-Mudie *Horse Races at Mitchell c. 1898*
Conte on Brown Paper. 240 x 114 cm.

Having finished these drawings, I was physically exhausted from standing on stools and drawing in an upright position for up to eight hours most days during the last four weeks; my mind was numb and, in needing a change, I reverted to painting as noted in my diary:

> In the last couple of days I have been working on the paintings and have decided to add some text to the rock paintings. Am using Arches 640 gm paper, W & N watercolours and will either use screenprinting or monoprinting (photocopy transferred by turps) to superimpose some geological information about the place over areas of the image. This idea goes back to the notion of using text/image as reciprocal partners - reference back to my studies of Porter (poet) and Boyd (artist) working together on the series of Jonah, Narcissus and Lady and the Unicorn. While both Porter and Boyd worked independently in their own medium, I'll combine the text and image as a 'system of signs', reference Culler, Johnson, Lakoff and others researched in Ch. 2.
>
> The particular diptych, subject matter rocks from Meteor Creek area below Kenniff Cave, has been giving me a few problems. Last night I spent a lot to time browsing through Warner's (1987) guide to the National Parks of the sandstone belt (Warner, Charles. *Exploring Queensland's Central Highlands*. Yanderra NSW: C. Warner). This book is a practical guide to camping and bushwalking in the areas, masses of information about geology of the belt, rock types, scenery, weather, plants, animals, people, use of land, practicalities of getting there, camping etc. and hazards, so I found some useful descriptions re rock formations. At first I thought of superimposing some of the Kenniff story across the lower shadow area of the image to relieve the monologue of greys, pinks, yellows of the rocks but decided this would inject sentiment into the image so have now decided to continue the objectivity of monologue with factual information such as commentary re rock types à la Warner.

Value range of greys →

Whole creek area is surrounded/covered with grey basalt boulders and sandstone rocks - overhanging trees create an array of eerie shadows.

Deep shadow across logs, rocks, pebbles - create effect of depth using superimposed text, entice viewer to 'enter' the image to make sense of it.

(Diary, 1997: 66)

The above extract shows my reversion to ideas I had been working with before beginning the drawings and, in linking back to the natural environment, I was also thinking of linking the story into the actual landscape as the diary diagram suggests for developing the Meteor Creek rocks image.

After many hours of playing with this notion of linking the text to the image I discarded the whole idea for the following reasons. Firstly, in putting any words into the image I would have to decide exactly which words and, secondly, if labelling an image does affect the way in which it is viewed, I reasoned that the insertion of text would have an equally, if not greater, influence on the viewer.

If we look closely at the image, in amongst the rocks in the middle left of the right section of the diptych, we can discern a skull. It is not obvious and I did not intend it but, when I recognised it, I got quite a shock and immediately started thinking about the saddle bag stuffed with grisly remains, the teeth, the dried blood and other remnants of the murder victims and I thought to write something to this effect. Of course, in this way I would lead the viewer to think along similar lines to my own thus posing conflict with the aims of this research to re-structure art as personal experience. In applying text to the image I would be packaging my own experience (my recognition of the skull and subsequent associations) to a certain degree hence curtailing the possibility that another person might make a similar discovery, or another discovery of their own volition, I had not noticed. Because the impact of the skull had been so strong in my mind, I found it hard to dislodge and, for this reason, the diptych remains unfinished as the following image, Plate 16, shows.

Plate 16. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Grey Rocks from Meteor Creek Area.* Unfinished Diptych on Arches 640 gm.

However, the idea led back to my numerous personal photographs and slides taken on various camping trips to Mt. Moffatt and Carnarvon when I was teaching at the College of the South West in Roma. In wishing to create a total sense of the area, not only the hideout areas, but also aspects of expansiveness and the clarity of light, I found several shots of the Marlong Plain:

> ... that I tacked together as a long vista, hectares of rolling green grass with a backdrop of clustered trees as a distant 'fence' courting mountains in the far distance. Sliprail stockyards off the access road bore memories of penned cattle and horses. Made a series of OHTs from the photographs and projected these across the wall. In this way I could gauge the impact of scale some 4-5 metres long. Immediately rang Sue at the Gallery to request floor plan and dimensions of Atrium space and walls; she is sending me this information. Am thinking of using colour for the Marlong Plain vista still on the brown drawing paper so that the 'history walk' of sepia images evolves into the present and existing landscape. Played around with crayons, pastels and oil sticks - latter have a wonderful lushness and strength apt for Marlong Plain. (Diary ,1997: 69)

Having already completed the seven large sepia toned drawings based on historical photographs, Plates 9 - 15, a problem remained in linking the historical data to the present day data so that the watercolour images of the landscape might form on-going chapters emanating from the central plot of the story.

In playing with a slide projector and varying the size of the projected images of Marlong Plain, I started to see how I might tack a series of vistas together as an extended panorama and, as one scans the image from right to left, from the old broken stockyards to the lush green of the plain, it might be possible to stimulate a mental time movement through introducing colour as both a psychological and real introduction to the painted images.

4·20m × 1·13m.

Oil stick — Conté

Personal photograph.

Figure 6.3.2 Location Map, Concertina Photograph, Marlong Plain. (Diary 1997: 68)

As noted in my diary (Diary, 1997: 69) I requested a floor plan of the gallery space. Until now I had been arranging the layout of the images in my head, but the way in which I was conceptualising the Marlong Plain had grown to such dimensions that I needed confirmation that it could work in the space. On picking up the floor plan, I noted that the intended wall space was over five metres long, sufficient to take the size of the drawing I envisaged and, content in my mind, I cut a section of the paper to over four metres, tacked it up on the wall and began work. Starting from the right of the image I worked with the conte with which, by that time, I was very familiar. However, other than the experimental drawing, I had not used the oil sticks in any ensuing work. Again I moved from the familiar to the strange, applying previous experience to a new situation and I found that, having used my hands and fingers so constantly in the sepia drawings, it was simple to use the same techniques with the oil sticks. In fact the greasy texture of the medium created a glowing effect that seemed to bring the work alive as I moved further to the left of the image. Unfortunately, this effect is lost in the reduced size of the following image, Plate 17.

Plate 17.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Marlong Plain.*
Conte & Oil Stick on Brown Paper 440 x 114 cm.

As we can see, the image unfolds like a great scroll and, because the subject matter, the landscape, represents a factual visual record of the place, I have added handwritten text along the bottom of the image that tells about the type of vegetation in a matter-of-fact way. This contrasts with my decision to avoid using text in the image of rocks I spoke of previously. In both cases the subject matter is factual - on one hand, a plain, on the other, rocks. Why then did I discard one and yet do exactly the opposite with the other? As I explained earlier, the skull had appeared in the painting. Thus we can ask why there are no skulls in this drawing?

Only now am I starting to grapple with a possible answer, one I suggest and, in the suggesting, I am not clear myself. In fact as I write this I am struggling with *may bes*. Nevertheless, I shall track my line of thought.

As a watercolourist I have become so familiar with the medium that I often allow the water and pigment to do the imaging for me. By this I mean that I have a certain anticipatory trust as one can predict, more or less, how an intimate friend might respond to certain stimulus, and so I will pool water across the page, take a loaded brush of pigment and lightly touch areas of the water so that it and pigment merge and flow across the page. Three things are very important - the amount of water, the load of pigment and the degree of touch. A deficiency in any one kills the magic. Many times this magic produces small creatures in my work and, amongst these I have often found a skull. In like manner, if we recall my discussion of contour drawing in Section 6.2, I drew attention to the way in which various characteristics appear that, in a more studied approach, are simply not there. I can only suggest that when using watercolours and contour drawing I delegate the doing to the tools in my head while the external me stands aside and watches. On the other hand, in working with media less familiar, the resultant image, as with *Marlong Plain*, appears less spontaneous and more externally directed.

A similar awareness of recounting external factors can be seen in my treatment of the following drawings of *"Carnarvon" Homestead*, (Plate 18), and *Hunter & Co. Store at Yuleba*, (Plate 19). The drawing of the "Carnarvon" Homestead depicts the original homestead in its historic authenticity and, it was the robbery of the Yuleba store that served to divert police attention thus enabling Pat and Jimmy to load stolen horses onto the train without the inconvenience of a police stock inspection as the written text in the image explains. In both drawings I am recounting facts and thus it is possible that, in working with historic factual subject matter, my own process of interpretation is guided more strongly.

The above image is a representation of a place that did exist but, because my knowledge of its exact role in the story is limited, I present it as a silent witness that may, or may not, stir memories for some people. On the other hand, in the following image, (Plate 19), *Hunter & Co. Store at Yuleba*, I use two images to suggest the sort of activities that would have taken place both outside and inside the building and, because of the key role this shop did play in the overall story of the Kenniff Brothers, I draw on my knowledge of this to create the image according to a more personal interpretation on my behalf. Thus I take several quotations, so to speak, and link them together as a unified whole that offers a greater range of possibilities for viewer association owing to the richer selection of data presented. This also allows ambiguity in interpretation owing to the variety of subject matter.

Plate 19. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Hunter & Co. Store at Yuleba.*
Conte on Brown Paper. 114 x 240 cm.

After completing these large drawings, I organized to have the images created thus far
recorded on colour print and slide film as is my normal practice in the same way I keep
records of written papers. Again I felt my energy levels getting very low and I was
beginning to consider the work as more labour than love. However, after the

photographic session, I went back to re-work a 'shadow' rock image I had started before Christmas. At that time the texture of the rock was proving to be a challenge owing to the incredible veins running across the surface that required a lot of 'bleeding' technique and, to achieve this textural effect I needed considerable time and patience. But I had been impatient to commence the drawings and the rock image was put aside.

As mentioned above, the exact degree of saturation of the paper is crucial to the end result as is my own feeling of being at one with the work. During December my mind had been too occupied with the change of direction. The large scale drawings had preoccupied another part of me and, while I found them exciting and a new challenge, they had entailed considerable struggle, so returning to the rocks was like *going home*, returning to a *comfort zone*. This particular area in the creekbed below Kenniff Cave has special significance for me because at the time of my initial visit I had been totally alone in the Mt. Moffatt National Park, and, as mentioned previously in Section 6.1, the enormity of the place was overwhelming. After having read of the Kenniff Brothers in the Information Hut, out of curiosity I had spent several hours scrambling through the bush trying to find the notorious cave with no signs (now prolifically protruding upon the landscape) to guide me, until I literally stumbled on a rock at the very entrance. I was amazed at the size of the cave, but of more interest to me at that time, was the creek below where the sunlight played with reflections off the water and rocks and where I sat alone and marvelled. Again I cannot explain exactly how one knows when the time is right but I sensed that I needed to play with the magic of water and pigment once more as exemplified in the following image, Plate 20.

Plate 20.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Below Kenniff Cave.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm.

However, I sensed myself becoming so absorbed in tinkering with familiar techniques

that I was losing sight of the wider picture that, we can recall, emphasized the important

part maps and tracks played with regard to location and time as discussed in Section

6.2. However, at this stage I was preparing for my field trip and thus this reference to

maps has its origin in much earlier trips into the wilderness of Section 6.1. My diary

note explains this:

> I remembered the drive to Mt. Moffatt from Injune and calling into
> "Womblebank" to tell them I was alone and would be camping in the
> Park area. The view over the plains to rolling hills was stunning even in
> a dry season and one could imagine the body of grass after good rain. At
> the time I had no idea of the Kenniff story, or the location of the key
> properties, but I now realize that "Womblebank" is right in the middle of
> Kenniff country, surrounded by "Forestvale" to the SW, "Crystalbrook"
> NW, "Merivale" NE and "Westgrove" NEE and is typical of the country
> ideal for grazing cattle and horses. (Diary, 1997: 73)

Searching once more through my photographs I found several images of the view from in front of the "Womblebank" homestead and, because this property is pivotally located, tracks and roads radiate from it, and to it, in all directions. The notions of tracking, time, space and movement collided in my mind with opposing notions of enclosure, centrality and stillness, the former evoked by the expansiveness of the landscape, the latter by the seclusion of the homestead. Thus, the following image, Plate 21, exemplifies a marriage of opposites with tracks of the district superimposed upon the blue/green hazy far distant hills of the top section while, across the bottom of the page, I have detailed the front view of the homestead in pen and ink.

Plate 21. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Womblebank Homestead.*
Watercolour on Fabriano.

In reality a view such as this is not possible from one viewpoint because, to see both the landscape and the homestead, we would have to physically turn around and, in using multiple perspective in this subtle way, only those people who really know the exact location would realize this dislocation. In this way I am playing with reality, and in

using a very representational approach, the game of delusion is even greater as is our sense of space, location and time in countryside such as this when we think a track will take us north when in fact we could be going south.

This image started another train of thought as I reflected on maps and symbols. The more I thought about the way people interpret things the more I realized that any mark on paper, whether it be a blob or a picture, evokes something for someone, somewhere. It all depends on their past associations and, on looking at the maps I had gathered during my visits to Carnarvon and Mt. Moffatt, I started thinking about their significance regarding the way in which people orient themselves in physical space while also connecting themselves mentally to a network of relations between people, place and events.

In particular this sense of orientation in space is exemplified by one map I had picked up from the Rangeway Service Station, Injune, on my first visit to Mt. Moffatt some years ago and now pasted into my diary which:

> ... was simply a set of instructions, or rather 'pointers', on how to get from one place to another and, when originally in Injune, it simply acted as a guide to get me out of Injune and headed in the direction of Mt. Moffatt. By chance I happened to take the road via "Womblebank". However, now some years later, the map has taken on a much richer significance and I have added the various property names/sites that conjure up associations with the story of the Kenniff brothers. The map now is no longer a 'pointer' but rather a complex symbol that evokes memories, associations and a network of relations between place, people, happenings and my own experiences of the area. How is that something that is relatively objective in nature and intent becomes subjective? How have I arrived to this stage that the map is more than a map? (Diary, 1997: 16)

Figure 6.3.3 Map from Rangeway Service Station. (Diary, 1997: 16)

As my diary entry shows, maps had become integral to my image making:

My drawings and paintings are like the map - based on photographic records, statements of what was/is - certain "innocence" of the artworks as objects. I cannot disassociate myself from them because I selected the content so therefore my own personal values exist/persist in the works, but how obvious will my values be to viewers?

The map has changed for me because of what I have come to know about the area - through actual physical experience of driving on the roads, walking across the country, listening to the sounds of the bush and the stories of the people, taking photographs, drawing, painting, and reading - not just to accumulate information but to admit me to experiences not my own. I think this is the most exciting way, demanding, challenging and often brutally truthful way of going beyond self to find self. If the map has changed for me through a perceptual awareness (sensory experience) that allows me to imagine beyond the literal configuration of the marks on paper, what sort of sensory experiences are possible for viewers so that my images will change for them from being factual 'innocent' objects to springboards of memories, associations and awareness of other aspects that transform the objects from being other/remote and objective to personal and subjective? In other words how can viewers feel akin to the images? How can an emotive response be elicited? (Diary, 1997: 16)

This diary entry was made on February 6th and, although we have already re-visited Mt. Moffatt in the previous section, I think that any effort to write in multiple perspective for the purpose of this research would create enormous confusion and thus I have separated tracking the story from my visual search. However, the two have been interwoven throughout my on-going work and my growing awareness of maps, links and connections stimulated my backtracking to Mt. Moffatt to find possible answers to questions that arose in making some of the images. In particular, the long drawing of *Marlong Plain* (Plate 17) challenged me to link the historical data to the present day in a visual form. Having read about the Kenniffs, I now wanted to link words to people and places, to fill in some of the gaps that existed in my mind and to find ways of opening new roads into my work for actual people to experience.

6.4 Exploring Connections: Stories and Technology.

My desire to find a way of allowing viewers some sort of physical association with my images so that they might feel part of the exhibition, motivated deeper thinking into the concept of personal experience. My own work to date was alerting me to new viewpoints regarding the concept of ownership, not in the sense of domination, but in the sense of feeling a part of the whole process of belonging within various events, the re-telling of which thence enable singular persons to personally experience some facet of those events.

Because the story of the Kenniff brothers, and the maps I used on my trips to the Mt. Moffatt area, offered me access to the landscape through associations accumulated over time, I considered that these might also serve as 'ports of entry' for viewers. In this way, people from all walks of life including various ages, skills and knowledge about artworks, might use personal associations from past experience to feel familiar with the exhibition, or, lacking past associations, might use inherent curiosity to following the trail of images and story in finding our more about the exhibition in an effort to feel more familiar with the event.

On the one hand we have personal associations and, on the other, we have curiosity. Both are inherent traits of humanity and both imply different starting points for experiencing something, and thus my challenge is to reconcile the two through providing some means of orchestrating a variety of stimuli so that various personal experiences might be possible. In tracking the story of the Kenniff brothers, I am using the age old traditions of oral and written recounting of deeds performed by famous or infamous people through which association is possible, while, on the other hand, the possibilities suggested by maps and machines suggest ways in which curiosity might be stimulated.

An anecdote from my experience might illuminate ways in which it is possible to make a connection between the familiar and the not so familiar, between association and

curiosity about the unknown. We can recall my shock, Section 6.2, at seeing so many tourists climbing around and upon Marlong Arch. My original experience of the place a decade ago, had been one of eerie quiet and enormity of rocks that had instilled in me a sense of timelessness which now seemed invaded by the scrambling figures of the tourists. To my mind the silent beast was being tamed and invaded to a certain degree and, in wanting to save my memory of the 'beast', I selected a view of the rock in which the background exists in only small pockets of sky and the rock occupies the majority of the picture plane. This of course is not the total rock, simply a portion of it and, if we read it as an entity in itself, we see big, but if we read it as a portion of a rock, we imagine bigger. Again the concept of size plays an integral role in affecting our perception or things.

As we saw previously (Plate 7), I have a habit of concentrating on details and this habit appears to have developed from my past experiences of concentrating on details as a necessary adjunct to survival. I stress that this sense of survival does not necessarily entail domination and hence Plate 22, may be seen as my intuitive response to these very deep formative physical forces that have motivated me to capture something, not in the sense of curtailing it, but in the sense of preserving it and being part of it.

However, this particular image of Marlong Arch, did not offer me my usual love affair with rocks. On the contrary, I struggled through the whole affair and even now I do not feel totally at peace with this image. I did intend to crop the view so that the rocks dominate, and I did intend to suggest a pathway through the central portion of the image occupied by the connecting bulks of the two rock forms that surround the vision of open space beyond. But what I did not intend, is the foreboding and intimidating atmosphere that I feel the image exudes. But, as I have previously discussed, the appearance of skulls and other whimsical animals in my works appear to refute my overt intention. If I, who am so close to my experience cannot explain it, how might another presume to do just this?

Why does this image appear to deny the access I intended? Is it lack of skill on my behalf? Or is it because various forces within my background of associations oppose a less familiar set of forces? In other words, did I really want to leave the rock free rather than trying to save it?

| Plate 22. | Karen Knight-Mudie. *Marlong Arch.* |
| | Watercolour on Arches 640 gm. |

But neither the tourists nor my intentions alter the fact that the arch, to this stage at least, survives the impact of many feet and salvation through artistic representation. Thus, from my perspective, the Mt. Moffatt region and the story of the Kenniff brothers retain innate attributes while the context of our telling, like that of *Cinderella*, constantly changes.

In painting the image of Marlong Arch, I was involved on a deeply personal level and I am aware of my struggle with old and new associations. On the other hand, in the image of *Womblebank Homestead* (Plate 21), other people are implied through the forty four gallon drum, the stand, and the image of the house, thus crowding my own personal associations aside while introducing associations emanating from other people. The inclusion of the superimposed map widens the scope of association for those who know the area, and for those unfamiliar with the area, the map has the possibility of stimulating curiosity about the area. Owing to the way in which the fine lines simply trace possible routes in the distance and, the homestead grounded across the foreground implies habitation, the image beckons viewers to enter and explore. It is possible that we want to meet the people living in the house and ask directions as I did on first passing "Womblebank". In this way my associations are neither as singular nor as deeply personal as those pertaining to Marlong Arch and, instead, invite others to join in tracing my own mental and physical voyages to the area while allowing other discoveries.

However, maps had played a significant part as exemplified in my diary extract in Section 6.3 and, I draw attention to the way in which I suggested that they "admit me to experiences not my own" (Diary, 1997: 16). This idea grew into the notion of making a enormous floor map with images superimposed upon the groundscape so that people might metaphorically walk in the countryside while physically walking upon an artwork. In such a way I might entice people to consider art as more than offering objects to contemplate, but as a way of experiencing life.

If I were to use something so familiar as a map, now so easily accessible and ordinary as fuel at the local garage, and put it in a new context, I might dislocate previous and habitual association and create curiosity. In this way I began to think about the process through which maps appear to have lost much of the deeper significance of locating people within the landscape. On the contrary, it seems that maps have lost their anchoring effect and now simply guide many people across the land. It is this familiarity that I wanted to challenge so that modification of previously accepted notions might become a step towards seeing things in a new and strange way. Thus I decided to put an artwork on the floor in the form of a map that might entice people into seeing artworks and maps in a new way according to our norms, but in a very ancient way according to the original norms of images and maps.

A word that kept recurring in my mind was *inhabit*. It comes closest to what I mean by personal experience because it implies *dwelling within*. However, in considering the possibility of *inhabiting* the landscape, once again size became a dominant element. In my own thinking I was developing a greater awareness of the element of size and, because the word *inhabit* suggests the notion of *dwelling within* that takes us beyond the hypothetical to actual reality, it is this sense of belonging that I want to evoke and, to do this in a real sense would mean using size in proportion to human dimensions. Whether *dwelling within* is either mental or physical it is an instant of being at one with something that must occasion some intense awareness and, in thinking of the role of maps, I was thinking beyond imaginative projections to physical presence that might enrich imaginative projections.

In wrestling with this notion, I sketched configurations of maps in my mind as I began to re-play my own experiences of holding a map in one hand, looking at the countryside around me and trying to locate myself in the terrain by looking at the map. This is something that many people do when in a new environment or, when giving directions to someone, and thus a map is a symbol that may be used as a metaphorical anchor. Once more I began playing around with the concepts of size and space and, in making

an overhead transparency of a map of the district, I projected this onto the wall. Figure 6.4.1 shows the map used for this.

Figure 6.4.1 Map of Central Western Queensland. (Diary, 1997: 38)

However, in blowing up the image, I realised that I needed height as well as width and this would mean putting two lengths of the strong brown paper one above the other thus

giving me a surface of some three metres square - the size of a small room.

Hence I began to argue with myself that, if *dwelling within* is a state of both mental and physical oneness, it could be possible to stimulate the possibility of this state by actually walking upon a map of this size so that one might locate oneself within the symbol itself. Further force could be given to the ideas of location and anchoring by drawing key sites upon the map so that my tracking of the story might become visual and, by putting the visual map on the floor viewers could metaphorically walk the story upon the terrain and might stop within the images to ponder their personal relationship to the symbolic terrain, as well as connecting sites from the map to various images hanging on the walls. I referred back to my diary to where I had plotted key properties as a means of locating these sites in my mind as the following sketch shows.

Figure 6.4.2 Sketch of the Mt. Moffatt District Properties. (Diary, 1997: 26)

While this sketch only indicates some of the properties it enabled me to envisage other properties within the wider context and imagine the people and dwellings within the landscape. Again my method of collaging visual snippets of data into the image suggested a way in which I could incorporate the factual historic data from the old photographs on the large map I envisaged.

I used two three metre lengths of the strong brown paper in making the visual map and located the towns, roads and the sites of the moonlighting and murder using ink and liquid texta. Within this map I then superimposed images of various homesteads and the specific site pertaining to the story of the Kenniff brothers using brush and ink wash so the map grew into an artwork that was both aesthetic and functional, but a problem remained - how to make the artwork durable enough to withstand the anticipated traffic of many feet walking upon it. I thought about coating the work with various resins but dismissed this idea when I considered the durability of laminated works and, after several telephone calls, I found I was able to take the work to Brisbane to have it laminated using a pebble coating suitable for foot wear.

Presentation of works is a normal consideration for all artists and hence the presentation of this visual map did involve some tinkering with new ideas because of the space it was to occupy, the use it was to be put to, and the aesthetic appeal it had to maintain. Another consideration was that of safety because, if the visual map was to be walked upon, this meant that the surface had to be matte and secure. These thoughts naturally preoccupied me for some time and guided my decision to use a commercial laminating company where trained staff could handle work of this size as the following Plate 23 shows.

The next image, Plate 24, shows a detail of the large visual map that recalls the idea of local newspapers featuring "Bushranging for the Week" (Buxton, 1980) as well as hinting at the way in which calico posters were displayed throughout the district at the time of the murders allegedly committed by the Kenniff brothers. In this way the floor map idea complements the large drawings that can be considered as giant news items, somewhat de facto posters or scrolls, that could hang with simple wooden bars that might imply their on-going permanent aspect as in the possible act of rolling up a newspaper for future reference.

Plate 24. Karen Knight-Mudie., *Moonlighting Map of the Kenniff Brothers' Country.* Pen and ink, collage, conte and liquid texta on brown paper. (Detail)

Little by little I could feel the images and story becoming woven together and, in working with the idea of the map as a symbol of location, I started to ponder the way in which we also use the television and computer as a means of locating self. By this I mean everyday habitual ways in which we do turn on the television to find out what is going on in the world, what the weather is like outside, or to become knowledgeable about places we might like to visit. A growing body of research in the field of computer technology points to the way in which technology transforms society through questioning what we have come to regard as art.

In grappling with the various arguments that, on the one hand, suggest that the use of technology shifts the emphasis away from a loving battle with hand skills to the invention of new mechanical skills, to arguments that, on the other hand, stress the magical skills of the artist, I found myself caught within a conflictual situation.

As a watercolour artist, one who loves the affair of playing with the medium as I discussed previously, I am also curious about the possibility of playing with machines and it is this conflict between the *mechanically slick* and the *magically exceptional* that requires some thinking through. If I include the use of computer technology in the exhibition will this allow simple *slick* play with my images that might support implications that the mind and body are separate entities? Or, if I include the use of computer technology in the exhibition will this encourage people to acknowledge the *magical skills* of the image maker? Or, if I include computer technology in the exhibition will this encourage people to identify with the person who made the images? Or identify with the subject matter of the images through manipulating various images to inscribe themselves within the work? Or feel part of the exhibition? Or feel alienated by inclusion of computer images? I needed to investigate these questions in an effort to understand some of the factors that play an important part in allowing people to experience art as personal involvement and, for this reason, I felt that I must play around with the machine myself.

I was aware that sophisticated software programmes such as Adobe Photoshop offer an exciting range of possibilities for manipulating existing images or for producing images, but at this stage I had not used this sort of equipment and the challenge appeared intriguing for one who loves the texture of rough watercolour paper, the flow of pigment, and enjoys manipulation of brush and fingers across a wet page. Thus, my adventure into the world of computer images was a totally new experience, and my ideas went through various degrees of modification as I began to realise my own lack of technical skills, my lack of vocabulary, and my inadequate resources. I was entering the Discourse of Technology, and needed to serve an apprenticeship, or pick up some of

the *folk theory*, regarding computer use. In my situation, the latter seemed the most appropriate way of building upon what basic skills I did have, and so I started watching others work, asking questions and spending many hours playing on the computer.

With the assistance of staff in Media Services at the University, I scanned the 35 mm slides of the works and stored them on hard drive and disks. After purchasing extra memory for the Mackintosh computer, I had the programme, Adobe Photoshop, installed on the computer and set to work experimenting with the scanned images. I found the process a psychological challenge. On the one hand, I was playing with something completely alien to my normal way of making images, but I could appreciate the possibilities and soon became excited by the way in which I could manipulate the images. On the other hand, however, I became totally frustrated by lack of sufficient memory in the machine to enable it to function according to my commands. For example, I would spend some hours cutting various segments from one file to transport to another in an effort to extend the design possibilities of the original image. When satisfied I would attempt to either "save" or "print" only to be confronted with a message on the screen telling me that the "scratch disk was full". This meant that the work I had done could only be "deleted", or other files "deleted" to make room for the new command.

The problem was simple but the solution very expensive in that one has to purchase even more memory for the machine, and I found myself again in the situation of having to re-think my ideas in an effort to adjust to the equipment I had at hand. This was a real problem that would be common to many people. It was like buying an expensive racehorse and then finding that you had no funds to feed it. Thus, I had to consider ways in which I could get the best results from an expensive investment 'stabled' in a simple environment. This meant starting with simple commands before trying to do anything too experimental and the "Filter" commands offered basic possibilities.

Thus, I started playing with the "Filter" commands and found that I could produce the most fantastic changes to the images that varied texture, value, colour, line work and the total atmosphere of the original image. From a design point of view the effects were stunning and stimulating. But I wondered of what interest would this be to viewers? The "Filters" offer the possibility for *slick* manipulation of images without much mental exertion, and might simply stimulate sheer sense experience. However, it is not the result of behaviour that is interesting, but the impetus that animates the behaviour or activity. My main consideration lies with the impetus that animates behaviour, and whether viewers 'trash' my images, produce *slick* interpretations or create *exceptional* modifications, is of little concern to me. What is important is that people might have the opportunity to become personally involved in playing with images so that, through the playing, they might perceive art as a personal experience.

As I continued compiling examples of what could be done using the "Filters", I reflected on the major elements of the Kenniff story that comprised cattle duffing (described in wonderful terms such as "moonlighting", "poddy dodging", "gully raking"), burglary, murder, court hearing and execution of one brother by hanging. It seemed to me that I was actually "duffing" my own images! In a manner of speaking I was picking up 'beasts' and faking the brand. Metaphorically I was "moonlighting" and enjoying seeing the same image emerge from the printer covered by a new and different 'skin' as we can see in the following image where I have taken a portion of the map image and transformed it using the Photocopy Filter of the Photoshop programme.

6.5 The Exhibition: Forming Links.

During the time spent *moonlighting* my images I became very aware of how easily the whole atmosphere of an image could be changed and how one could cut segments from one image and transport them to another. In the following image, Plate 26, I have used the charcoal drawing, *Fragment of Marlong Arch*, and superimposed the key characters of the story upon the image thus giving a ghostly appearance of people within the rock formation. In this I am basically playing around with the effects possible through using the computer programme and, in thinking about people actually in the landscape, I found that the final effect then poses endless possibilities for creating atmospheric effects that might enrich the story.

Plate 26. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Fragment of Marlong Arch with Figures*
Computer Manipulation using Photoshop.

In the second image, Plate 27, I have cut out spaces in the original image, *Lethbridge's Creek No. 2*, thus leaving void areas that I have then filled with the circular cut face motifs transported from the drawn images of *Constable Doyle & Albert Dahlke* and *Patrick and Jim Kenniff*. Again, I stress that these are forms of playing and simply serve as examples of how I arranged some *may bes* because I was curious about the mechanical functions of the computer and how I could use these functions in tinkering with ideas that, if I was to draw and paint each scenario I imagined, would take many more hours.

Plate 27.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Lethbridge's Creek No. 2*,
             Superimposed Figures using Photoshop.

However, in this playing, I became very aware of the instant gratification that one can experience because one aspect of tedious labour is removed, but what we forget is that this playing does involve tedious labour of a different sort. While we may *see changes almost instantaneously* we must question *if that change is the one we intended.* If we do not engage in the questioning we can remain passive recipients of what the machine is programmed to give in response to a command that we might not understand, but if we engage in questioning what it was that we commanded to elicit such a response, we must be prepared for hours of tedious mental and physical labour. However it might be possible that we do not correlate our command with the response and, through ignorance, we unwittingly forfeit our control and accept the response without question.

After my experience of struggle with the computer, I am very aware of the way in which lack of technical knowledge and skills may easily leave one at the mercy of the mind behind the programme. Nevertheless, many people do have an awareness of this technical know-how and, in catering for this awareness, I thought that using the computer might be one way in which those people might respond to my images depending on their anticipatory schema, their personal association and their understanding of technology. In realizing my own emerging technical skills, I supposed that my preliminary experiments might act as encouragement to others at a similar stage of readiness and thus I prepared a folio of samples including descriptions of procedures and the command instructions I had used. In this folio are the two experiments noted above and, using the *Lethbridge's Creek No 2* image as a master copy, forty six manipulations of this image using the Filter commands comprise the folio of samples.

My experience of experimenting with my own images on the computer taught me to think in a completely new way. Previously, much of my playing around with ideas was done in my head. I would look at an image and imagine different layouts, modifications of colour and the possibility of using different techniques which would lead to physical manipulation of media and equipment using hand skills. However, in using the computer, I find that my imagining and doing become almost simultaneous and, because

the results are immediate, the amount of *what ifs* that I ask myself becomes a rapid succession of question/answer tinkering. In this way the tinkering can lead to a much greater range of possibilities that can be exhibited in a concrete form but the equal possibility of mindless repetition is also present. From my perspective, I found that playing with my own images was very rewarding because I was responsible for firstly, the creation of the original image and secondly, the *duffing* of my images according to the rules of my own game. On the other hand I became aware of how easily one could then *duff* images that belonged to another and thus, in the sense of *gully raking*, could metaphorically fake the brand of someone else's image and claim it as one's own.

This way of thinking led me back to the notion of stories and the way in which they evolve in the telling whereby singular persons take the essence of the story and, through interpretation and translation remake the story anew through their best telling. In relationship to images, the same possibility exists and, because an arrangement of words acts as a catalyst for one to become aware of something that stimulates further discovery through curiosity, I find that my own images, as visual ideas, nudge me towards other ways of seeing things. For example, my concentration on maps led to awareness of location and thus space and size became dominant elements in my work from whence came the metaphorical projection of connections to television and computers which, in turn, started a train of thinking about interpretation leading back again to context. I began to re-consider my initial experience of visiting the Carnarvon Gorge before I became aware of the Mt. Moffatt region. On my first visits the Carnarvon Gorge it had offered no connections to the Mt. Moffatt region, or the story of the Kenniff Brothers; however, as my interest in the Mt. Moffatt region developed and I became aware that only a mountain range separates the two areas, I also became aware that the Carnarvon Gorge had played an integral role in the *moonlighting* story.

Because of this new awareness I examined images I had previously painted of the Carnarvon Gorge. Like snippets of gossip they hinted at things, but I could not understand their significance and, pushing them aside, one fell off the table onto the

floor. It happened to land on the large experimental drawing of the Lethbridge Creek area which was already lying on the floor, and, as I looked at the painting resting on the drawing, I began to visualise a connection. The drawing suggested a type of infiltration into the pristine landscape depicted in the painting, just as the area in times past had been infiltrated by *duffers* and *moonlighters*. I remembered the great distances covered by the Kenniff brothers that ranged from Augathella in the west, to Rockhampton in the north east and Toowoomba in the south east and, I also mentally reviewed visual sketches of the varying landscapes I had traversed. The longer I looked at the experimental sepia drawing with collaged images, it suggested ways in which portions of this big drawing might be used to impose upon the clarity and brightness of the paintings as a means of linking the past to the present and echo the type of evolution connoted by the sepia and colour marriage of media used in the *Marlong Plain* drawing (Plate 17). This thinking led to my cutting, tearing and hand stitching segments of the drawing to form viewfinders into the painted landscapes so that my envisaged *walk in history* could suggest the rich overlay of past experiences of *moonlighting* that are integral to the whole area.

The following five Plates depict areas of Carnarvon Gorge in which we can see the lushness of the vegetation and clarity of light as originally painted in two of the images and thence the changes in atmosphere and content evoked by the addition of segments of the experimental landscape as windows through which one might enter the landscape. Again I am using techniques of multiple perspective that allow us to associate with the images from a variety of viewpoints.

Plate 28. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Carnarvon Creek Crossing.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm.

Plate 29. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Carnarvon Creek Crossing.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm with conte and charcoal torn border.

Plate 31. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Along Nature Trail.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm with conte and charcoal torn border.

Plate 32. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Somewhere in Hellhole.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm with conte and charcoal torn border.

Not only did my previous paintings of the Carnarvon Gorge offer new insights to me, but images from the *Jondaryan Woolshed* series also offered snapshots of the lifestyle of the times because the history of the woolshed and the exploits of the Kenniff Brothers were concurrent. In fact, the Toowoomba district played a prominent part in the story, and, in recalling the commitments made by Brenda Vincent and Barbara and Bob Sokoll to lend personal artifacts for the exhibition, discussed in Section 6.2, I started reflecting on special things and the way in which people have an emotional attachment to specific things because of their associations and personal relevance.

From my perspective, two images retained from my exhibition, *Whispers of Immortality*, had special significance to me. Firstly, *Memory Set In Bits*, is an image of a portion of an old dray that recalls childhood days spent on our property where sulkies and drays were common forms of transport used to take lunch and various equipment out to distant dams where the stockmen, my brothers and my father would be working. Collaged onto the dray is a crumbled copy of a page from my father's diary that symbolically links my personal associations and situates me within the image as we can see in the following image, Plate 33.

Plate 33. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Memory Set In Bits.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm.

Secondly, *Bustle in a Baking Tin*, Plate 34, shows a typical kitchen scene that might be found on many properties at the turn of the century in which a gauze meat chest, a gauze meat cover, a glass cruet set, odd cups and saucers and a wooden hutch all can be read as a visual text that tells us much about the lifestyle of the people and times. Again my own memories form a way of connecting me to this kitchen. For example, the gauze meat safe has peculiar relevance. While we had one such meat safe, we also had a cement floored room, fully enclosed with gauze, where the beast, killed of an evening, would be hung overnight to set before being cut and stored in kerosene refrigerators the next morning.

In a special way, this room was a sacred place where the ritual of preparing the meat followed steps of tradition and survival based on need. Always the beast was killed in the evening and always cut early the next morning for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid contamination by flies and, secondly, to allow the meat to cure during the coolness of the night where day time temperatures reached unbearable heat. Thus the ritual was determined by nature. To interfere with this ritual meant disruption of survival and the consequences could be disastrous. Hence, for one growing up in an Australian country environment, the gauze meat safe and gauze meat cover, are symbols of survival.

The following image, Plate 34, depicts these symbols and further personal connection is evidenced by another copy of a page from my father's diary that shows a shopping list for such things as flour, matches and salt that necessitated a trip to town, a day's journey, to purchase things that one could not produce on the property.

Plate 34.   Karen Knight-Mudie. *Bustle in a Baking Tin.*
Watercolour on Arches 640 gm

The more I thought about my own associations that I capture in images, the more I thought about the way in which three dimensional artifacts serve the same, or similar, connections to a way of life for those people who possess such artifacts. Thus I began to consider ways in which the three varieties of butter churns, the oil jar, the tin tea and sugar container, the caste iron kettle and other objects lent by people from the Mt. Moffatt region could be displayed beside the paintings, *Memory Set In Bits* and *Bustle in a Baking Tin,* as an orchestration of many different associations brought together through the story of *moonlighting* that has peculiar relevance to various singular persons.

In Section 6.2, when tinkering with the story of the Kenniff Brothers, I discussed my notion of making a sepia drawing based on the photograph lent by Brenda Vincent of the pack horses ready for work at Mt. Moffatt Station. We can also recall that an actual pack saddle had been committed for loan in the exhibition and how I envisaged this three dimensional object as complementing a drawing. Thus Plate 35, can be seen as my final fusion of memories, memorabilia and personal associations that a story, such as that of the Kenniff Brothers, might facilitate. The actual pack saddle can be displayed beneath the drawing of the very horses, and the pack bags of the era, in which the grisly remains of the burnt bodies were found, can be displayed beneath the images of the actual people.

Plate 35. Karen Knight-Mudie. *Mt. Moffatt Station Packhorses.*
Conte drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm

In looking at ways of restructuring art as personal experience and, in deciding to mount an exhibition of artworks in a regional gallery, the challenge of providing avenues through which singular persons might sense some form of personal involvement with artworks is greater because of the normally held view that works in such places are set apart from viewers (often by signs and ropes) thus creating both a physical and psychological barrier. However, by introducing Australian works to the public through the gallery system, two important roles might be highlighted; firstly, as a collection of appropriate examples and, secondly, the educative function of those examples which is monitored by trained curatorial staff. However, this practice of selecting art and setting it apart from everyday life is commonly referred to as the establishment of *high art* which may be challenged from my own approach to making art, by suggesting the possibility that art can be seen to have a much wider function than objective contemplation as the following section investigates.

6.6 Exhibiting Trails: Mapping Across Domains.

We can agree that, in a Western society, we do have art sanctioned to be aesthetically contemplated where artworks in an art gallery are nominated as special and where ritual does exist in the way in which people enter a gallery and go through certain procedures such as leaving bags at the counter before moving through the gallery, or joining a guided tour. However, we also have many different forms of art outside the gallery system such as community murals and park sculptures to be physically and mentally experienced in the sense of people feeling that they have made some contribution to the artwork and that their effort is important. The question remains of how people differentiate between the variety of artforms within the Discourse of Art when, in some instances, they might rely on those involved in the institution of art to tell them what is and what is not art. It is possible that a person might feel a sense of dissonance that arises out of confusion between their own ability to discern what is meaningful to them and what other people say should be meaningful with regard to particular artworks.

One problem is reconciling this possible confusion so that neither one interpretation excludes the other. In thinking through ways of doing this, I considered that different aspects of artworks offer contrasting ways of looking at the artform that could lead to reflection, deeper understanding and further inquiry into the Discourse of Art. This raises the question of whether or not people might actually experience artworks in the sense of thinking otherwise than previously that entails some exertion, or whether people simply go through the ritual of visiting a gallery because it appears to be a fashionable past-time or a form of vicarious experience. In a recent conversation with a staff member at the Queensland Art Gallery I was told that viewer perusal time for paintings has dropped from an average of twelve seconds to an average of seven seconds per painting. Further, various arguments highlight the influence of advertising in which an average thirty two second commercial might include up to fifteen visual flashes thus suggesting that two seconds is indicative of the average person's concentration span.

In relating this information to my new experience of working with computers I recall my own excitement as I saw the immediacy of the new *skins* emerge on images during preliminary play with the Filter commands of the Adobe Photoshop software programme. In this way, my own changes in perceptual awareness now allow me to consider reasons for this diminution in viewer time from an entirely different perspective than suggested by some arguments put forth by Solso (1994) and Sless (1981).

On the one hand, we have the view that eye movements of trained viewers are more sweeping than those of untrained viewers who tend to concentrate on representational and semantic use of visual elements within the picture to find some sort of objective reality. On the other hand, we have the argument that a glance is just a glance, and that the amount of information available to the eye depends on how long an image is scanned. If the first view is correct, the average seven second scanning suggests that many people are trained viewers whereas, if the second view is correct, the average seven second scanning suggests that many people look at images in a superficial way that might suggest a correlation to the way in which advertising, in relying heavily on images, is used to grab the attention of viewers who now appear to expect the same immediacy of all images.

In relating these two arguments to my own experience of playing with my images using the computer, we can recall the concern raised in Section 6.4 of differentiating between the *mechanically slick* and the *magically exceptional* <u>because</u> of the immediacy of possible changes in the images facilitated by using the machine. Admittedly, it took me longer than two seconds to change my images but, as I became more practiced, I became aware that sometimes I was actually waiting for the machine to process my command.

However, I do not feel this same sense of anticipation when watching a quick succession of television commercials because I am neither interested in nor curious about the content. However, I am now far more critical and observant of the methodology used by many advertising companies and some artists in generating a kaleidoscope of images within a very short time span.

If, as some suggest, encroachment by advertising into the world of Fine Art and *vice versa* is now occurring, this could imply that a sparser and more action-orientated type of viewing is evolving. Such an implication might underpin reasons for shorter perusal time of images and might highlight concerns raised by arguments concerning the immediacy of vicarious experience which cannot be ignored. However, it may be that this type of vicarious viewing is not necessarily a cause for alarm, but may contribute to recognition of a vacuum waiting to be filled.

This paradox underpins my thinking that relevance, avenues for personal involvement, some awareness of internal perceptual interactions, and some understanding of the human visual system are necessary if one is to propose ways for people to experience artworks in the sense of personal involvement that generates new ways of thinking. In other words formal learning can facilitate nothing unless the acquisition process, whereby persons "pick up" information in Gee's (1992) sense through association, has already begun.

These considerations motivate my own involvement in mounting an exhibition of paintings, drawings, three dimensional artefacts and computer images in such a way that my personal experience might act as an example and present various avenues for others to participate in making the works a personal experience from their individual points of view. This does not require formal instruction, but rather an environment in which people may "pick up" certain aspects of relevance or interest. By using a story as a thematic structure, it may be possible to provide a rich context of perceptual interactions and metaphorical projections that may be subconsciously activated in viewers.

In pondering these possibilities, key questions concerning areas of suggested incompatibility between relationships within art discourses, the collision of professions and ideologies within the Art Discourse generating conflict between ideals of individualism and socialization and, notions of personal experience, might be posed. It is feasible to suggest that meaningfulness is internal to singular persons and thus both

viewpoints regarding whether a sweeping glance denotes training or lack of training might be reconciled. On the one hand it might be possible that someone, for example myself as a watercolourist, is sufficiently adept in recognizing various techniques, that a glance is sufficient to *access the whole story*, whereas, on the other hand, a glance for the neophyte may be indicative of untrained awareness but might lead to a desire to find out more about the object or phenomenon. For this reason it is important that my exhibition offers various levels for *glancing* so that various degrees of personal experience might be stimulated.

Thus, my idea of a *walk in history* as the pivotal concept for arranging the images and artefacts is designed to serve as a means of allowing members of the audience to bring their own associations to bear on the works, while people unfamiliar with the story and context will be able to be *in* the history through *duffing* my images using the computer as part of their personal experience. If the exhibition is relevant or interesting enough to motivate a person to make links between the familiar and the unfamiliar, to compel someone to think otherwise than he or she has been thinking, the possibility of manipulating my images might act as a catalyst in generating further interest to engage someone in new discoveries.

In Section 6.5, I examined the way in which some of my previous images serve as snippets of gossip hinting at things of which I had not been aware and, in this way I regard my paintings as chapters in the on going story that involves a whole complex network of relations. Thus it is possible that other elements may flow in and out of the visual story as various *chapters,* contributed by singular persons to enrich the essence of the story that retains its basic reality grounded in actions that did take place.

In considering that my exhibition of images is only one possible interpretation, it may, nonetheless, provide a springboard for others to re-think their own snippets of gossip that, in collision with my visual fragments, might lead to a realisation that art can be a means of experiencing new ways of thinking. In this way people might find a point of

reference in my images to map into aspects of the exhibition and, for those who have no interest in the actual historical aspect of the large drawings and loaned artefacts, the computer imagery could offer a very different conduit.

This way of thinking evolved through various stages. Firstly, I was aware of the context of the exhibition and thus the physical dimensions and floor plan of the Atrium Gallery were vital considerations. The following figure from my diary shows the way in which I posed questions to myself while contemplating the available gallery space some nine months prior to the actual exhibition. In struggling with the concept of personal experience, and how this might be facilitated in a public gallery space, I was searching for factors that precipitate the convergence of a viewer's perceptions and associations to generate some sort of special meaning in remaking existing images. This meant attempting to identify various linguistic and visual codes and interpretive assumptions that work in the synthesizing process so that links of interpretation and understanding between viewers and artworks in a gallery situation might be actualised. In considering that a story could be a conduit for stimulating these links, I questioned whether it might be possible to discern certain embodied structures of understanding that recur as patterns of interaction between an organism with its environment. These questions form the body of my cogitation as shown in Figure 6.6.1 and underpinned development of the types of statements and questions designed as appropriate evaluation instruments to gauge viewer participation and degrees of personal experience.

The Atrium

119cm
97cm
Ceiling height: 310cm
217cm
572cm
196cm
68cm
Ceiling over 550cm
310cm
223cm
196cm
Ceiling height: 430cm
240cm
680cm
Ceiling over 550cm
920cm
523cm
55cm
140cm
325cm
Ceiling height: 430cm

[handwritten notes]

Aims: • Find factors that make a viewer's perception + associations converge in producing his/her own special meaning in remaking existing image.

• Identify various language + visual codes + interpretative consumption that work in synthesising process.

• How to re-establish links communications between audience + artworks in gallery context.

• Suggest possible encoding processes + written (or spoken?) text/story as conduits for understanding.

• Discern certain embodied structures of understanding that recur as patterns in interaction of an organism with its environment

Can we determine recurring patterns or schema in the way in which the images are manipulated that allow us to identify structures of understanding that are basic to members of a particular community?

In pondering these questions, I then started visualising the images in some sort of syntactical arrangement so that there would be a sense of continuity and cohesion as a visual story unfolding in space. Owing to the actual layout of the gallery space I was faced with certain restrictions and it seemed to me that the big 920 cm wall on the right hand side as one enters the gallery suggested an appropriate space on which to arrange the court hearing - the victims, the accused and the judges.

In being central, wide and very tall this wall dominates the Atrium space and I imagined the four large drawings of *Justice Pope Cooper & Sir Samuel Griffith* (Plate 10), *Constable Doyle & Albert Dahlke* (Plate 12), *Patrick & James Kenniff* (Plate 11) and *Justice Real & Justice Chubb* (Plate 9) hanging as a great horizontal centrepiece around which contextual images might be placed. Also, because the long wall on the left hand side at the end of the gallery space poses difficulties for viewing owing to the narrowness of the corridor and relatively shallow ceiling height, I visualised this wall occupied by the long *Marlong Plain* drawing (Plate 17) so that viewers would have to walk along the image and thus scrutinise it as if they were taking actual steps in the landscape. From a distance the vista could only be seen from an angle and, as is often the case when one catches a glimpse of something in the landscape, one moves closer to investigate and, in so doing, concentrates on particular aspects. In this way, the drawing of *Marlong Plain* might entice people into focussed and concentrated engagement.

Thus we can see how these big drawings dictated, to some degree, the arrangement of more incidental fragments in the visual story as Figure 6.6.2 shows. It is worth pointing out that the challenge of arranging the images entailed much labour and, in this tinkering with contrary ideas, I did not contemplate using the computer. No doubt there are software programmes that facilitate this sort of arrangement when one is playing with elements of space, size, repetition and sequence. However, I felt that I was dealing with much more than arranging elements; I was dealing with personal associations that I did not want to delegate to a machine and, on my several visits to the gallery, I had to *feel* the space around me and play with patterns of arrangement in my mind as a very basic need

to pick up some sense of how the total exhibition might work. Hence, Figure 6.6.2 represents both labour and love in working with a new concept.


Figure 6.6.2 Visualizing the Layout of the Exhibition. (Diary, 1997: 72)

During the next couple of weeks I continued painting and drawing while the images and story became clearer in my mind as an orchestration of complementary elements to be displayed in the Atrium Gallery as the following flow chart shows (Figure 6.6.3).

Figure 6.6.3 Possible Flow Plan of Images. (Diary, 1997: 73)

As we can see, an oval arrow traces the proposed *walk in history* as we might follow the history drawings along the right hand walls of the Atrium gallery space, returning along the left hand side of the gallery. In my mind, I could visualise the watercolour paintings of the Mt. Moffatt region leading into the Carnarvon Gorge images. However, in Figure 6.6.4, we can note my initial concentration on the painted images because these, in being my personal interpretations of the landscape, entailed a much greater challenge in my story telling from the point of view of putting them in some sort of sequential pattern so that they might complement and enrich the actual story images based on historic data. Of course, this does not mean that anyone else is denied a personal choice of reading the images in any pattern they choose but, as author-artist, I am responsible for the composition and, like placing words in a text, the placement of my watercolours exemplifies my personal arrangement of chapters in the story.

In this way I am locating myself as a translator of the story while, at the same time, standing aside so that others might form their own view. The story and the landscape elicited a certain visual response from me as depicted in the images but, in the process of thinking of myself as a lens through which others might see new views, I concentrate on factual description. We can argue however, that my personal style impacts on the way in which I create and arrange the images and thus must influence the way in which viewers might approach the exhibition. Of course this is true; if it is not, I would not exist. Every mark I make has the possibility of suggesting ways of seeing something from another viewpoint and thus my deliberation in arranging my own interpretations of the landscape must involve some subjectivity on my behalf as can be seen in Figure 6.6.4 where I have listed the paintings, coded them with a letter of the alphabet and put either a horizontal or vertical rectangle beside each to denote their orientation and possible arrangement.

Figure 6.6.4 . Planning Layout for Watercolour Paintings. (Diary, 1997: 72)

I then played with arranging these little rectangular box symbols which guided me to the final arrangement which, while further playing on paper intervened, was finally resolved in the actual hanging of the works.

A further tinkering with ideas regarding the organisational layout of the overall exhibition can be seen in Figure 6.6.5 although even later notations can be seen on previous plans (Figure 6.6.3) which shows my way of re-thinking and re-working previous ideas in an associative and lateral way rather than following a strictly sequential linear development.


Figure 6.6.5 Planning Layout for Exhibition (Diary, 1997: 82)

The process of deliberating about the evaluation instrument led to two methods of collecting data from participants which might entail questions targeting responses to the 'history walk' and questions concerning responses to possible manipulation of the

scanned images. Also, my interest now focussed on the way in which the story and floor map might be woven into the total exhibition to facilitate viewer engagement in the exhibition as reflected in personal notes from my diary:

> What are the non-variables? Venue, images, artist.
> What are the variables? Story, background and values of viewers.
> What are the core elements of imagery? Elements of design ie. line, colour, shape, texture, size and value. Within each element is a variety of possibilities, degree of change that is directed by intent of the artist.
> What are the core elements of stories? Actual words and content, but again the method of selecting particular words to convey the content determines to some degree the audience response.
> The questions I ask must provide space for members of the audience to pinpoint their own degree of reaction, so therefore, a Lickert scale seems the most appropriate. Do not want to 'guide' too strongly, must retain a sense of enjoyment and ignite enough curiosity so that members of the audience will want to engage in the study, will want to display their opinions and thus expose how and why certain conclusions are reached.
> - Develop two levels of participation.
> 1. Series of questions (sheet) that each viewer may carry with them as they 'travel' through the exhibition and respond to each image by simply ticking a box (1-5) in response to question/s re each image.
> 2. Use of computer. Paintings are scanned and are able to be easily varied using degree of contrast ie. intensity change of colours from degree of darkness to lightness. (Diary, 1997: 83)

From these and previous deliberations (Section 6.2 and Figure 6.6.1), came my final decision to devise questions that targeted three basic areas rather than each individual image because the latter might dictate a viewing pattern rather than allowing viewers the freedom to wander at leisure. Thus the questionnaire designed to be left at the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery for the duration of the exhibition consisted of a total of twenty two statements and associated questions. Statements One to Fourteen were designed to probe various degrees of personal involvement and allowed degrees of responses from 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree', 'strongly disagree' to 'not applicable'. Questions Fifteen to Eighteen targeted thinking about the strength of personal sensations and provided a choice from five potential answers with space for voluntary comments. Questions Nineteen to Twenty-two encouraged personal reflections about attitudes to art and possible changes in perception as a result of experiencing the exhibition. Again there were five potential answers, a single choice, and space for voluntary comments. (Appendix B)

As noted in Section 6.2, I became aware of conflicting interpretations of the story of the Kenniff Brothers and, in thinking about these interpretations, I reflected on arguments

concepts is through analogy with concrete experiential situations using a dual-coding approach in which words can evoke image schemata and concrete events can evoke verbal descriptions. While image schemata are means of structuring particular experiences they may be aided by generation of imagery-like meanings in comprehending a text and, such translation of a symbol system depends on the cognitive development of the person, the nature of the symbol system and one's position in a particular discourse which influences expectations, actions, decisions and emotions. Thus, if two versions of the story were made available to viewers with the questionnaire attached to either version, it might be possible to note whether the language of the story did, or did not, influence the way in which respondents experienced the exhibition.

Such a possibility might allow one to gauge a person's desire to situate self within such a story through personal association whereby representations narrating a cultural legacy might suggest various horizons of possibility for reinscribing self within the aspects of text, history, images, three-dimensional objects and engagement with new technology.

Consideration of this possibility led to the design of two versions of the story, one emphasising concern of the landholders and authorities (Story A), the other sympathetic to the plight of the battlers (Story B), so that wider relevance and association might be suggested to viewers. (Appendix A) To facilitate access to the story accompanying the questionnaire, copies of the documents and a box for responses were to be located strategically on a stand underneath the first image, a long vertical drawing of *Cremation Rock* (Plate 13) hanging directly to the right of the floor map upon entry to the Gallery. Another pile of documents was to be placed upon the table beside the computer together with the folio of forty eight computer printout adaptations of one of the paintings, *Lethbridge's Creek No. 2* (Plate 7) which I prepared as inspirational and instructional material for viewers to reference if they so desired. Figure 6.6.6 shows a selection of these computer manipulated images.

1. Filter - Cross Hatching
   Stroke Length 10
   Sharpness 10
   Strength 2

2. Filter - Ink Outlines
   Stroke Length 4
   Dark Intensity 20
   Light Intensity 10

3. Filter - Distort
   Wave/Triangle
   Number of Generators 5
   Wavelength Min 10 Max 120
   Amplitude Min 5 Max 35

4. Filter - Sketch
   Chalk & Charcoal
   Charcoal 10
   Chalk 10
   Stroke 3

5. Filter - Sketch
   Stylize
   Find Edges

6. Filter - Sketch
   Stylize/Glowing Edges
   Width 3
   Brightness 7
   Smoothness 5

7. Filter - Sketch
   Solarize

8. Filter - Sketch
   Stylize - Tiles
   Number 10
   Maximum Offset 10%
   Foreground Colour Darkened

9. Filter - Texture
   Patchwork
   Squares 4
   Relief 8

Figure 6.6.6 Sample of Computer Generated Images.

However, if people are as basically conservative as suggested in the literature, (for example, Gordon, 1961), it can be emotionally traumatic to abandon the security of conventions. One such convention is the normal expected orientation of gallery viewers to refrain from touching anything on display in a gallery and to rely on instructions in the form of signs or verbal directions if other behaviour is desired or allowed. This consideration alerted me to the problem of how to allow people to engage in more active participation when habitual passive viewing appears to be the normal expected behaviour in an art gallery. In particular, such norms might be more strongly followed by viewers visiting a regional gallery in a conservative country town owing to a possible respect for, and cultivation of, traditions which might not have the same currency in larger cities.

Thus, I decided to provide four walkmans and headphones with a two minute recording briefly outlining the story and its connection to the images, and directing viewers to the documented versions of the story and questionnaire. I spent one full day recording the relevant material and filling four tapes on both sides so that anyone could pick up the walkman and immediately hear the recorded messages. I delivered the walkmans to the Gallery and my request that these be offered to viewers was happily agreed to by the manager. The transcript of the recorded message is attached. (Appendix C)

However, the presentation of this strategy might prove problematic in that volunteer staff, potentially unaware of my intentions in planning the exhibition, attend the information desk. Although permanent gallery staff were fully aware of my objective in mounting the exhibition, it would be unrealistic to expect members of the general community, who serve as volunteer staff, to understand such an objective or consider any implications arising from the exhibition. Any attempt on my behalf to prime volunteer gallery attendants about the objective of the exhibition might undermine my intention to present the exhibition in a normal everyday context and, while full utilisation of all elements of the exhibition might be ideal, such utilisation would be unrealistic and beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, such a potential problem might offer the opportunity to become more aware of the idiosyncratic nature of personal experience through

recognising serendipity as an integral aspect of personal experience and devising means to accommodate such accidental discoveries along the way. Some awareness of the idiosyncratic nature of personal experience motivated me to present the exhibition in a reasonably conventional way with only subtle degrees of strangeness that, while having the possibility of causing some confusion, might be accepted more readily because of the overall normality of the total exhibition. Thus, I produced catalogues and a list of artworks (Appendix D) to be displayed on the counter as well as copies to be stored under the counter.

Further, we can recall my own reliance on maps as discussed in Section 6.3, and my growing awareness of the ambiguous relationship between notational and non-notational symbol systems discussed in Section 4.1. If a map could become a complex symbol of *location within the landscape* for me, I reasoned that it might be possible to stimulate a similar relationship for viewers by the way in which I presented the large visual floor map. Taping the map to the floor only a few metres from the main entrance and stretching it between the entrance counter and the right hand wall was deliberately designed to create only a very narrow path for traffic between the map and the wall. In this way people might be challenged to walk on the map and metaphorically become part of the landscape; in so doing, people would be tempted to think anew about other possible functions of an artwork and a map.

In deliberating further on the idiosyncratic nature of personal experience in relation to context, questions about the degree of movement a person is able to make from the familiar to the strange, and a person's ability to relate the normal to the extraordinary, played in my mind. As mentioned in Section 4.1, excessive novelty will lead to rejection, however, to achieve radical new approaches to old problems it is essential to take psychological chances and thus inclusion of computer imagery in the exhibition was designed to offer a new psychological challenge to many viewers.

However, playing with a computer had the potential to create a new relationship with and/or ownership of the artworks, or denote interest in manipulation of the images, or foster personal fulfilment through mastery of the machine. In considering these possibilities and recalling my own experiments and the movement made from the strange to the familiar as discussed in Section 6.4, I reasoned that performance requires practice through a type of apprenticeship before we become aware of abstract principles that underpin the ideology of a discourse. Integral to acquisition is the notion of play in coming to understand or master something and thus I decided to present the scanned images in a fashion conducive to play.

Firstly, by storing the images on a compact disc, any 'trashed' images could easily be replaced with no record of how the 'trashing' occurred. Secondly, the computer programme, Adobe Photoshop, is a very sophisticated programme that requires a lot of time and practice to master; yet, if a portfolio of examples and simple instructions are left beside the computer, these might guide people through the process of becoming familiar with a new and powerful tool. Thirdly, no provision for printing viewer 'adaptations' would be available owing to the enormous expense and the possibility of plagiarism. Freedom to play with the computer can be seen as a subtle way of introducing an alien tool into a conventional exhibition context because little effort would be required on the behalf of viewers and, by removing the possibility of failure, viewers might feel brave enough to try something new.

Although freedom to play is a crucial factor in making strange things familiar, the important step in moving from sensate gratification to personal experience lies in the amount of effort entailed in thinking anew. While the only person aware of this new thinking is the person doing the thinking, changes in behaviour may be noted and, for this reason, it might be possible to observe behaviour using a video to record the way in which various people approach both the map and the computer as the two most unconventional aspects of the arrangement of the exhibition.

Thus, in mounting the exhibition I attempt to provide degrees of accessibility that might allow people to respond ranging from a level of concreteness to more abstract awareness. My awareness of notational and non-notational symbol systems, noted in Section 4.1, alerts us to the way in which the former entails specific criteria in which both elements and referents need to be segregated such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between them, while non-notational systems such as pictures are *replete* in carrying information embodied in many dimensions depending on the resemblance to the depicted object. The greater the resemblance, the more dense is the symbol thus providing more possibilities for ambiguity in interpretation.

I find this notion worth consideration because a notational symbol system limits the possibilities of interpretations and, because choice is curtailed, the chance of failure is also lessened. In this way it is possible that the map and the three-dimensional artefacts may be considered as notational systems in that they offer less possibility for ambiguity in interpretation and thus require less mental deliberation, while the computer images offer a complex mix of the two systems depending on the technical skill of the person manipulating the images. For example, following the instructions may allow some degree of fascination with the changing images but might not entail personal interpretation. However, experimentation with the instructions could involve personal playing around that might lead to new and exciting ways of reading the images. In a similar way, the images superimposed on the map might suggest more complexity of interpretation for some people depending on their background experiences and associations evoked by the images. From this point of view both the map and the computer images offer degrees of strangeness in the possibility of serving as both notational and non-notational symbol systems and in being displaced from their normally accepted locations and functions.

On the other hand, the stories and large drawings appear non-notational in the possibility of suggesting degrees of relevance and association thus allowing many different interpretations. The paintings, however, appear to lie between the two systems and I

think that the variety of treatment ranging from depiction to description in Salomon's (1979) sense of imitation of referent to abstraction from referent might be too broad to allow them to be clustered together and, given that they are my own interpretations of landscape and other data, inevitably they demonstrate a degree of subjectivity.

In this way the exhibition might offer the possibility of mapping across domains through making the familiar strange and making the strange familiar according to the degree of personal involvement, awareness, associations and curiosity of each viewer. The objective of the exhibition is to allow people to wander on the map, to *travel* through the pictorial historical sites, through the visual metaphor of the court hearing, into the imaged landscapes of the Mt. Moffatt region, and into the now accessible holiday sites of the Carnarvon Gorge historically transformed by drawn mounts that invade the images as do tourists who now invade the actual sites. *En route*, there are two extremes of three dimensional physical contact that paradoxically are not what they seem- the artefacts are real objects to be *viewed* while the computer offers a screen to be *used*.

The exhibition poses some very important questions about one's understanding of personal experience regarding viewing artworks. By mounting an exhibition in a public gallery it is possible that a diverse range of people may participate voluntarily thus giving a valid sample of how members of the community in general experience artworks and this knowledge might subsequently be related to a broader view of art. In addition to the questionnaire and computer play, it is proposed that informal discussions, media coverage, gallery attendance and other incidental methods of communication will be used to assess personal responses to the exhibition.

The following list of items, promised for display in the exhibition, suggests the possibility that inclusion of people through bringing particular objects from the district into the exhibition space might allow the space to take on a different atmosphere thus contributing to a context in which various individuals might find personal relevance.

Such concrete relevance might enrich personal associations evoked by the stories and images.

> From Brenda Vincent, formerly of "Mt. Moffatt Station":
>
> 2 pack bags; 1 pack saddle; 1 bridle; 1 set of hobbles;
> 1 wooden butter churn; 1 glass butter churn;
> 1 cow bell; 2 photos of pack horses at "Mt. Moffatt".
>
> From Bob and Barbara Sokall of "Forest Vale":
>
> 1 Minute butter-maker; 1 set of salt & pepper shakers;
> 1 oil container; 1 tin tea and sugar container;
> 1 old tea/biscuit tin with label;
> 1 cast iron water kettle with tap;
> 1 wire netting meat safe (not included in the exhibition owing to size).

Such objects are symbols of the time, place and people who have associations with the actual subject matter of the exhibition, and thus play a crucial part in contributing to a context in which their owners, and by further association, family and friends, might experience an exhibition of artworks as personal experience through symbolic and metaphoric involvement.

Although orchestrating the exhibition as author and artist, I am also attempting to allow people free access to experience it as authors and artists themselves in considering Lakoff's (1987, Preface) question: "Do meaningful thought and reason essentially concern the nature of the organism doing the thinking - including the nature of its body, its interactions in its environment, its social character, and so on?" From my personal point of view and my personal experience, part of my own meaningful thoughts and interactions with my environment include my association with Frank Hodgkinson when painting as one of the *Artists in the Field* in Kakadu. Memories of sitting around the table at the Cooinda camp and swapping yarns about our day's activities, about the people and the place and what gear we would need for our next foray into the bush often played through my mind when in Mt. Moffatt. These associations and the broader implications of allowing ordinary people to meet an extraordinary artist motivated me to invite Frank Hodgkinson to open the exhibition. Such a meeting might stimulate awareness that

making artworks involves making the familiar strange through the effort entailed in seeing the ordinary from an intense and passionate perspective.

On the other hand, my decision to invite the Vice Chancellor of the University of Southern Queensland to officiate and introduce one of Australia's leading artists to open the exhibition involves making the strange familiar. Beyond the normal formalities expected of such a person, it is possible that an engineer might have similar tendencies to see ordinary things in unusual ways and, by bringing together an artist and an engineer in a milieu in which artworks and technology are present, it might lessen gaps between some discourses that exist in our current postmodern lifestyle.

Thus I am mapping out the playground in which the exhibition is to take place and, by making the rules as fluid as possible, my own personal experience of making the images and organising the format of the exhibition becomes the instrument through which other persons might experience my artworks from their own idiosyncratic points of view. The following section examines my artistic game in play.

6.7   The Exhibition: The Game in Play.

The physical space occupied by the exhibition and the size of the works are impossible to reproduce on a page. Nevertheless, the human capacity to imagine such things is enormous and the following visual representation of the floor plan from the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery Atrium may test this capacity owing to the fact that nothing is presented to scale. In developing the notion of maps, I have placed images in the narrative sequence indicated by numerical coding. This can be seen as a thumbnail sketch that allows us to re-make the event or thing in our minds or, in other words, it might be seen as a symbolic map that allows us to make a mental voyage through the exhibition.

In looking at Figure 6.7.1 we must read it from bottom right to top right, thence from top left to bottom left if the sequence of the visual story is to be followed. This directional sequence was not deliberately planned on my behalf; rather, the actual physical structure of the Atrium Gallery space dictated the way in which I might present the images and, in order to make the most of the space from an artistic perspective, I used the dictates of actual space to direct the way in which I made and presented the images. While some might see this as placing restrictions on artistic creativity, I do not. On the contrary, it seems to me that the more problems, physical and mental, with which one is confronted, the more opportunity one has to exercise artistic invention. My solution, in this case, was to confer with the space to find out how the space and I might work together and, because this conference was between the space and myself, any idiosyncratic needs of people were overlooked. The space might be considered a check factor while I was the variable that had to adapt. Thus the beginning of the visual story commenced on the right hand wall as one entered the gallery.

In following the numerical numbering, it is possible to track the images in sequence but, while the three dimensional artefacts are recorded on video, these are not visually represented and hence the numbers in red indicate the positioning of these objects.

The Atrium

13. Bustle in a Baking Tin

12. Memory Set in Bits

14. Marlong Plain

15. Fragment, Marlong Arch

10. Store Yuleba

16. Waterhole Sketch

11. Wombleback

9. Mt. Moffatt Packhorses

17. Below Kenniff Cave

7. Carnarvon

18. Melove Ck Waterhole

8. Races Mitchell

6. Justice Cooper & Sir Griffith

19. Dargonelly Waterhole

20 & 21. Rocks 1 & 2

5. Pat & Jim Kenniff

4. Doyle & Dahlke

22. Marlong Arch

3. Justices Real & Chubb

23. Carnarvon Creek Crossing

24. Along Carnarvon Trail

2. Cremation Rock   26. Floor Map

25. Somewhere in Hellhole.

1. ForestVale Homestead

Three Dimensional Artefacts (red numbers):

|	
1.	Bridle, Hobbles and Cow Bell in Glass Display Cabinet.
2.	Old Tea/Biscuit Tin in Alcove.
3. & 4.	Pack Bags in Glass Display Cabinets.
5.	Pack Saddle on Wooden Sawbench.
6.	Cast Iron Water Kettle on Display Stand.
7.	Salt and Pepper Shakers, Oil Container in Glass Display Cabinet.
8.	Minute Butter Maker in Glass Display Cabinet.
9.	Glass Butter Churn in Glass Display Cabinet.
10.	Wooden Butter Churn in Glass Display Cabinet.
11.	Computer.

Figure 6.7.1 Thumbnail Plan of Exhibition.

The numbers showing the position of the paintings must be read within the Atrium space even though they are placed outside this space in order to allow my original arrows showing the narrative sequence to remain. Again the actual size of the page imposes certain restraints regarding how I am able to play around with the visual information I want to display.

Of all aspects, working with certain restraints has had the most profound influence on my way of thinking. Originally, when dreaming of using the Mt. Moffatt region and the story of the Kenniff Brothers as thematic content for developing a body of visual images, I thought to create a series of works dealing with the landscape and sites as I had done previously with the Kakadu, Flinders Ranges, Moreton Island, Carnarvon Gorge and Jondaryan/Port Arthur series. Admittedly, each series had provided certain limitations such as thematic matter and each had posed certain physical challenges such as location, while the mental challenge lay in finding ways of making the familiar new and exciting. In doing this I built on techniques already mastered and gradually moved to experimentation such as layering figures over the landscape in the Kakadu series; using techniques of zooming in on details in the Flinders Ranges series; using acrylics applied by hand on large canvases for the Moreton Island series; using print transfer methods to superimpose photographic figures into the landscape for the Carnarvon Gorge series; and using visual and linguistic references from art history and literature in the Jondaryan/Port Arthur series.

However, as noted in Section 6.1, the Mt. Moffatt area had seemed strange and aloof as I set about attempting to approach a new body of work in much the same way as previously by making field trips and gathering visual data. This was not entirely successful owing to my lack of familiarity with the area and, in searching for some connecting link, I came across the story of the Kenniff Brothers. However, as discussed in Section 6.2, the story became an obsession and, as such, developed into the driving force seeking images, somewhat like a metal detector seeking gold, while I seemed to lose control. My attempt to lock the story into images was unsuccessful as can be noted in Section 6.3, where, in Plate 16, the painting

remains unfinished. Rather than acting as an enrichment to the images, the story became the conduit through which I was to find new ways of using images. This meant that my capacity to imagine ways of representing visual data was stretched beyond interpreting to include translation. By this I mean that I was no longer working from visual to visual as previously when I would use my eyes in similar fashion to a camera and, as controlling agent, select, reject, distort and re-arrange aspects of the visual information. Admittedly, an awareness of history, stories and myths had filtered into my work, although such aspects had not been the starting point. The reverse can be noted in my approach to *Moonlighting in Moffatt* where the story acted as guide leading me translate these unseen data into a series of images and, while the images are still based on visual data gathered from site visits and old photographic records, my role in selecting, rejecting, distorting and re-arranging became that of translator.

In simple terms we might suggest that to interpret something means to explain it, whereas to translate something means to turn something from one language into another and, in using both linguistic and visual systems of language I have worked across symbolic domains in a new and demanding way. During this movement, I have become very aware of the role played by analogy in allowing me to transfer ideas from one domain to another and, to facilitate this transfer, I have been forced to experiment with techniques hitherto ignored, such as drawing.

This discovery led to a second influence on my thinking which involved the actual size of the works. Previously, my familiarity with imperial size watercolour paper and my command of watercolour techniques, had evolved into a sense of security that allowed me to anticipate and predict, to some degree, the way in which the works would take form. In thinking of myself as a watercolourist artist, I had concentrated on refining a particular skill that contributed to a sense of control over both myself and the subject matter as a happy marriage between idea and object. Previously, when exhibiting, I would create a series of works which then would be arranged by the gallery curator in the exhibition space. My concern had been with creating

the works and, while certain works, such as diptychs, triptychs and quartets, had to be presented as a unified whole, the sequence of complementary paintings could be arbitrary. In this way making the works and exhibiting the works were two separate components albeit closely related.

However, when planning the presentation of the exhibition, *Moonlighting in Moffatt*, Section 6.6, the actual hanging space of the gallery played an essential role in the way in which the paintings and drawings were created. Metaphorically speaking, the walls of the gallery space became canvases upon which I was working and, as such, were crucial design elements that I had to weave into the visual yarn. Thus my approach to making the works went through radical changes as I came to grips with surfaces and dimensions which challenged my normal way of thinking, which disturbed my comfort zone and forced me to invent new ways of expressing the pictorial data I had gathered.

As well as pictorial data, there were also colourful aspects of the story that varied in the telling and, given the intangible aspects of these yarns, I needed to find ways of linking these aspects to the visual representations. My solutions were to use combinations of visual, linguistic and mapping symbols that could be separate components, for example, the two versions of the story or, alternatively, intertwined, for example, the large floor map superimposed with images. However, in arriving at these solutions, my thinking process involved close examination of background associations which challenged me to rethink definitions of self because, in reflecting on past experiences, for example my deliberations about the function of maps (Section 6.3: Diary, 1997:16 & 91), I began to realise that beyond the actual map is the complex network of associations that "admit[s] me to experiences not my own".

In thus thinking I became aware of the interconnectedness of body, mind and environment as I became intensely aware of how my own physical presence in the landscape affected the way

in which I translated the environment and how things in the environment, such as maps I had picked up along the route and the story of the Kenniff Brothers discovered in the Information Hut at Mt. Moffatt, directed this translation. In this way, I can now understand the moulding influence of the environment and the way in which it has guided me to create artworks for this exhibition while simultaneously enabling me to confer with forces outside myself. Thus I have come to see myself as a component of the environment, rather than an individual outside it.

Further, the actual artworks themselves became part of the environment within which I worked and, like stories and maps, evoked memories and associations. For example, as noted in Section 6.5, former paintings from both the Carnarvon Gorge and Jondaryan/Port Arthur series suggested links with the current work. In this way the exhibition was becoming an orchestration and, rather than playing a single instrument, I was changing from being solo artist to artist-conductor. For me, this was a new role that demanded thinking and working across various symbolic modes which I found exhausting and, from time to time, retreated back to my comfort zone as exemplified by Plate 20, Section 6.3.

Nevertheless, this ebb and flow in my work allowed me to reflect more keenly on things in the environment and to note connections between past and present methods of locating oneself within the environment. In Section 6.4, I discuss the way in which the television and computer might be seen to share an affinity with a map as symbols of location and this observation led to experimentation with the computer. Again I found myself confronted with a strange medium and recognition of my own limitations and, again, I was forced to change my way of thinking. Previously, I had considered that the computer might offer people a quick, easy, slick way of manipulating images. However, by using my own images as master models, by spending hours of intense labour in learning how to manipulate the images using the Photoshop programme and, by coming to understand that the machine is only a tool

able to respond to commands, I am now happy to embrace this form of technology as a new tool from an artistic perspective.

This does not mean that I dismiss the possibility of slick and easy use of this tool. In fact I am now coming to recognise this possibility as an asset whereby, as artist, I am able to use the computer as a labour saving device which facilitates experimentation with conceptual material already realised in the original artwork. In this way, I am able to use the computer as an extension link in the chain of image making as I now use the camera as an extension link in amassing visual data. In both cases I remain the controlling agent using the machine and it is possible that the translation process of which I am becoming more aware, will be increased. For example, one can stack and layer images using the Photoshop software programme, one can rotate and distort images, cut and transport parts or whole images and one can animate images. No doubt the possibilities are far greater than these few examples suggest but the exciting prospect is the way in which something that I had thought so strange and alien to my process of making artworks may, in fact, enrich my process through challenging me to emulate various manipulated suggestions using painting, drawing and printmaking techniques. In other words, the computer image is not the end product; rather it may become another starting point as a photo or sketch so that, as a artist, I might interpret the image into yet another image using a different medium and technique or I might translate the image through incorporating sound and movement which are possibilities that, as yet, I have not explored.

Thus, in creating *Moonlighting in Moffatt* I have discovered many hitherto hidden aspects of my own thinking and, in probing my own thinking and doing as both artist and art educator, I have realised new directions that my work may take in the future. Foremost amongst these directions is the realisation that certain *external* limitations offer the most challenge. This appears an obvious deduction but, in probing this statement, I argue that the implications are far more profound. For example, as an artist, I enjoy the freedom to set my own challenge

because I am happy and confident that, firstly, I am able to set my objective and, secondly, achieve that objective. Thus I set limitations for myself. On the other hand, as an art educator, I know that, while wanting freedom to 'do their own thing', most students have no idea of what to do with this freedom but instead demand to be guided in their doing and hence need the parameters of limitations which, on request, I provide.

Thus it appears that freedom is an asset to the artist but an incomprehensible burden to the student. Why then have I found that some curtailment of my freedom has allowed me to develop new ways of thinking that were not possible while I was free? I think the answer lies in the way in which I have come to understand that I am part of the whole environmental complex. By focussing on a story I was forced to lift my gaze and thus become aware of higher and wider boundaries that hitherto I had not noticed. These boundaries encompass more than personal challenges which, in my own system of visual interpretation, I could push against and break through from time to time. However, these newly recognised boundaries are fluid and complex and, unlike those that I might set for myself or those I might set for students, are unreachable. In other words, these boundaries recede as one advances or, in crossing one boundary, others appear. For example, my exhibition is not an end point. Instead it has opened many doorways for further exploration as I find myself thinking about possibilities for retaining the central core of historic drawings and adding watercolour 'chapters' based on various properties, families and events so that, like spinning yarns around a camp fire, the story grows and changes in the telling. I also find myself thinking about computer technology and the way in which screen savers enable us to see sequentially programmed images and I ponder the possibility of using a visual story, such as *Moonlighting in Moffatt*, in this way or, I question how we might use the computer to teach about visual elements through manipulation of images as some of my own adaptations suggest.

Previously, my past experiences had given rise to certain beliefs about my process of creating artworks which acted as mental rehearsals for the way in which I might make future artworks. Thus one could say I was primed to a certain degree by various effects of the environment which, over time, had modified my way of thinking about my artworks.

However, in considering the effects of the environment, these must include artworks which, as objects in their own right, contain certain properties which have intensified my way of thinking. In this way my beliefs led to predictions while, at the same time, certain properties of objects, such as artworks already made and artworks envisioned, contributed to the quality of my experiences.

However, as noted in the points above, my approach to creating the total exhibition, *Moonlighting in Moffatt*, involved both profound changes to beliefs about my process of making artworks and changes to the quality of my experience in that I have been forced to think otherwise than previously. These changes may not be obvious to others. My works may still be regarded as representational from an external perspective and thus viewers may be unaware of the way in which I have battled with making the strange familiar through my own process of embodiment. Thus I argue that experience is personal and might not be noticed from an external perspective unless, as I have demonstrated, one is prepared to translate what happens to a singular person into a recognisable sign system, such as a written text, which others may comprehend. This of course does not mean that full understanding of another's experience is possible by others but it does mean that, in making aspects of experience accessible, it is possible that others might begin to think more deeply about their own experience and start to probe how and why one is compelled to change one's way of thinking.

Thus it might be possible to facilitate this process of inquiry through using the outcome of one's experience as an tool for others to use in finding out more about their own way of

thinking. In this way my own artmaking might act as a conduit for others to link past associations to present and hitherto unthought of contexts in similar fashion to the way in which the story of the Kenniff Brothers has acted as a conduit for me in making connections between background memories, previous approaches to making artworks and my present situation that is no longer the same.

In my process of change, the movement, while profound to me, may not appear radically different from an outside perspective and thus the end product might be sufficiently comfortable for most people to enjoy. Reception of the product, and by this I mean the exhibition, was very favourable. Often in a country town it is difficult to get newspaper coverage; however, a full page article was devoted to the exhibition in the local newspaper, *The Chronicle*, November 19, 1997, p. 18; an article appeared in *Branching Out, The Voice of the Queensland Arts Council*, June 1997, Inside Front Cover and p.7; Shan Veivers from the local television station, WIN TV contacted me for an interview on January 2, 1998; an article was included in the *USQ News*, 19 November, 1997, p.5; and an article appeared in the *Campus Review*, November 12-18, 1997, p.32. (Appendix E)

According to records supplied by the Manager of the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery, 2227 people visited the gallery during the period November 19, 1997 to January 4, 1998. These numbers were confirmed in a letter from the Gallery Manager with photocopies of comments noted in the Visitor's Book (Appendix F). The opening on Sunday afternoon, November 23, 1997, drew one of the largest crowds to any solo exhibition held at the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery during the year 1997 according to one member of staff. In these terms the exhibition can be considered successful and thus the product of my labour, love and play did communicate to many people.

The tension between love and labour, as I have found in creating this exhibition, is a vital ingredient in making the strange familiar because, if I did not love the labour of making

artworks, of experiencing the challenge of re-thinking my normal approach to making images, of finding ways to move between symbolic systems of communication, of recognising the integral role of analogy, and sensing the excitement of seeing *new skins* emerge on my own works through computer manipulation, I could not appreciate such *what ifs* that external constraints, such as the story, the gallery context and the computer now present for further exploration. Thus this experience has moved me from being an interpretive artist in a narrow sense to one who now is excited by the challenge of deeper and more complex translation.

From the point of view of an art educator, I am far more aware of the difficulties involved in translation because one cannot translate until one can explain something to oneself or, in other words, one needs to interpret something before translation is possible. On reflection, it might be that the processes of interpretation and translation are confused and, in stressing the new and innovative in student work, we overlook the necessary time needed to explain something to oneself before we can move between symbolic systems of understanding.

In reflecting on responses to the exhibition it might be possible to gain an overall picture of how people reacted to the exhibition that might give an indication of reasons for such reactions. In subsequently analysing responses we might speculate and thus uncover certain implications for restructuring art as personal experience.

PART FOUR: CHECKING THE SCOREBOARD

CHAPTER SEVEN: FLIRTING WITH REFLECTIONS.

7.1 Observations From The Players.

The exhibition, *Moonlighting in Moffatt*, was designed to use a story as a possible bridge between personal and community experience and to explore whether such a methodology might reveal ways in which metaphorical links and bridges, suggested through associations stimulated by visual, written and verbal representations of a particular story, allow singular persons to make reasoned connections between personal expression, discourse norms and universal concerns of feeling at home in the environment.

Over two thousand visitors viewed the exhibition. Yet, of these, only some eighty persons responded through the questionnaire. This may be expected, especially in a country town, since members of the general viewing public are accustomed to viewing artworks as a form of entertainment. If such is the case, we might hypothesise that many viewers are unaccustomed to identifying certain feelings facilitating sensory awareness and might not perceive any need to document, nor be aware of how to articulate, such feelings. Thus, a questionnaire designed to highlight some aspects of personal experience on behalf of members of the public viewing an exhibition mounted in a public gallery might, for a variety of reasons, simply be ignored. Nevertheless, viewer responses to the questionnaire offer a sample which serves as a small probe into personal experience from a perspective outside that of the artist.

During the first week of the exhibition I remained in the Gallery to observe the reactions of viewers, to answer questions and note whether people took the time to read the story (Appendix A) and respond to the questionnaire (Appendix B).

After some hours during the first two days of watching people wander around the exhibition in ones and twos unaware of the documents or their relationship to the images, I approached individuals to offer them copies of the story or offer the choice of *listening* to the shorter version of the story using a walkman. This personal touch was

well received but most took the documented story to "read later". I also noted the tendency for people to look at the computer with an image from the exhibition displayed on the screen without appearing to know what to do with it despite the folio with a welcoming note and instructions open on the table.

The walkmans were happily accepted by those to whom they were offered, and I noted that some people did return to a document stand and take a written version of the story with attached questionnaire which they then completed. Yet when I returned to the Gallery the following week to check progress and pick up completed forms from the box, I found the walkmans safely stored under the counter and people wandering around the exhibition as is normal. When I approached the new volunteer staff at the information counter and inquired about the walkmans, they appeared not to be fully cognizant of the fact that the machines should be *offered* to viewers. While I had taken care to leave verbal instructions with the permanent gallery staff and requested that such instructions be conveyed to any volunteer staff, no written instructions were left as I did not feel it appropriate to impose my intentions too strongly on the work norms of others. However, I did feel it appropriate that any assistance from gallery staff, volunteers or myself might be offered to viewers if the occasion arose. Such assistance might be in the form of conversation, explanation and verbal directions and, if such dialogue motivated viewers to complete the questionnaire, any viewer's decision remained voluntary. While some aspects of the exhibition were unusual, it was my intention that the overall gallery procedure remain reasonably normal and, as is the case from time to time, the artist might be present to respond to questions about the works. Hence my presence in the gallery for a short period of the total exhibition time was quite normal as were my responses to viewer queries.

Thus, I engaged in conversation with viewers, offered the use of the walkmans, provided copies of the story and questionnaire and let them know that they were free to play with the images on the computer if they wished. At all times I noted that viewer interest increased and people were keen to ask questions about the subject matter and

the techniques I had used in making the images while many were equally keen to tell me about their own experiences of living on the land. Few, however, displayed interest in using the computer though they would look at the image displayed on the screen, flip through the folio of samples and move on to study the images hanging on the walls.

As described in Section 6.6, the questionnaire consisted of three sections which targeted degrees of personal involvement experienced by viewers (Statements One to Fourteen); probed thinking about personal sensations (Questions Fifteen to Eighteen); and encouraged personal reflections about attitudes to art and possible changes to thinking after participating in the exhibition (Questions Nineteen to Twenty Two). All respondents were invited to indicate age, sex, occupation and art training in the space provided on the questionnaire if they so desired.

To facilitate viewing the *scoreboard* in an holistic manner, the responses to the statements and questions are clustered. Bar charts are used to display the responses thus allowing visualisation from a overall perspective and enabling one to scan responses quickly before focussing on certain aspects. Thus, Figures 7.1.1, 7.1.4 and 7.1.5 give overall impressions of responses to the exhibition within the above clusters while Figures 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 present specific data pertaining to Statements Six and Seven which, in dealing with provision of two versions of the story, form a detail within the first cluster of statements.

In the first cluster, fourteen statements targeted degrees of personal involvement as follows:

1. I enjoyed the exhibition.
2. The floor map helped me understand the context of the images.
3. I enjoyed walking on the floor map.
4. Reading the story helped me associate with the images.
5. The exhibition prompted me to think about events from my own background.
6. I feel sympathy for the Kenniff Brothers.
7. I believe that the authorities had cause for concern about the welfare of landholders.
8. I felt involved in the exhibition.
9. The placement of the images suggested a story to me.
10. The size of the images caught my attention.
11. The three dimensional artefacts made the exhibition more 'real'. [to me]
12. Playing with images on the computer was enjoyable.
13. My interest increased when using the computer.
14. My understanding of the time, people and place increased through participating in this exhibition.

Figure 7.1.1   Overall Personal Involvement Responses.

Figure 7.1.1 graphs the overall personal involvement responses and demonstrates clear evidence of personal involvement in terms of those statements (1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 14) which sampled respondents' direct experience of the exhibition - the "I - me" factor.   Where statements involve extrapolation from direct experience of the images as, for example, statements five and six, there is no clear response tendency. The computer element of the exhibition appears to have increased the level of personal involvement for those who accessed it but, on the other hand, there was a large number for whom the question was academic (statements 12 and 13) as they had not accessed the computer.

Within this cluster we are able to separate out specific factors which can be grouped to focus our view more clearly. For example, in Figure 7.1.1 we note that statements 1, 8, 13 and 14 allow viewers to express degrees of enjoyment, involvement, interest and understanding stimulated by participation in the exhibition.   Responses to these statements reveal that 96 per cent of respondents enjoyed the exhibition; 74.3 per cent felt involved in the exhibition; 58.3 per cent of those who accessed the computer admitted to increased interest through using the computer;   and 87.6 per cent of respondents gained greater understanding of the time, people and place. In the main, negative responses came from primary school children whom, it might be argued, may have limited knowledge of the western area of Queensland and hence little interest in the images.

Further, we can note that the possibility for specific physical engagement on behalf of

viewers was positively received. Responses to statements 3, 4 and 12 show that, in response to Statement Three, over 82 per cent of respondents did enjoy walking on the floor map; in response to Statement Four, 93.5 per cent positive responses indicated that reading the story was helpful in making connections to the images; and in response to Statement Twelve, 82.7 per cent of viewers who accessed the computer enjoyed playing with the stored images. However, responses indicate that 56 per cent of total respondents found the computer *not applicable*. Thus, it can be suggested that the computer was accessed by only a few people who responded the questionnaire and, for those, enjoyment and interest increased. However, some people did engage in playing with the computer at the opening of the exhibition as recorded on video and, on my regular visits to the gallery, I always found a new modification to one of my images on the screen. Nevertheless, some viewers, who entered the gallery alone, in pairs or small groups, actively avoided the computer by deviating from their track of viewing the images to swerve around the computer while others bent over to look at the screen and then walked away without attempting any personal play with the computer.

Such responses, on the one hand, suggest that an ability or desire to engage in some form of bodily action may have facilitated tendencies towards enjoyment, involvement, interest and understanding of the exhibition while, on the other hand, an inability or lack of desire to engage in some form of bodily action, such as using the computer, might suggest lack of familiarity with or lack of interest in technological machines. Nevertheless, we can note positive responses by those who did engage in some form of active involvement within the milieu of the exhibition.

For example, when a group of primary children visited the Gallery, they rushed upon the map only to be cautioned off by their teacher. I had been requested by the Education Officer of the Art Gallery to talk to the children and naturally I invited them to walk and sit on the map while I told them the story of the exhibition. In delight they jumped, crawled and stamped their feet on the map oblivious to any particular gallery norms of

behaviour as they played their own games of sliding along the roads and metaphorically mounting the horses depicted in images on the map.

Conversely, of the 14 per cent of people who reported not enjoying walking on the floor map, 45.4 per cent of these negative responses indicated art training and 36.3 per cent did not include age, sex, occupation and art training while comments such as, "made me nervous" and "around" indicate reluctance by some people to walk on the floor map. Thus a difference between learned and intuitive behaviour can be noted which suggests that learned conventions may serve to curtail the possibility of accepting things placed out of the expected context.

From a different perspective, certain aspects of the exhibition can be seen as forces which influenced viewers and stimulated thought processes. For example, statements 2, 5, 9, 10 and 11 highlight factors which *helped, prompted, suggested, caught attention* and *made more 'real'* as noted in voluntary comments. (Appendix F.3)

Responses to Statement Two indicate that over 90 per cent of viewers found that the floor map aided understanding of the context of the images. Since the 5.3 per cent negative responses came only from primary school children, it might be argued that some children may have limited knowledge of the western area of Queensland and hence little interest in the actual sites of the artworks. Similarly, responses to Statement Five (53.4 per cent positive, 31.4 per cent negative), indicate that some people were able to make links between the exhibition and personal background events which suggests that, for some people, various elements of the exhibition contained similar components to some components in their background. Of the negative responses, 47.8 per cent were from Year Four primary school students, suggesting little ability to link personal background events to the exhibition.

With 79.4 per cent positive responses to Statement Nine, it appears that most viewers agreed that placement of the images did suggest a story line. However, I did observe

many viewers retracing steps and cris-crossing from one side of the gallery to the other and one viewer did comment to me that he felt strange going in the opposite direction to the norm. By this he meant viewing the images along the right hand wall as he entered the gallery, rather than commencing along the left hand wall on entry.

As we saw in Section 6.6 regarding placement of the images, the actual physical layout of the gallery space did dictate how the final layout of images evolved. At the time I did intend placing the images in a narrative sequence, although I did not consciously consider possible implications of any 'normal' direction. I now realise that this comment from one viewer has various implications. From my own experience of living in other countries where driving on the right hand side of the road is normal and my use of both hands when painting, I do not think about 'normal' directions as such. When painting I often turn a work upside down to achieve a certain wash effect and thus I adapt my sense of direction to the task at hand. Yet, for many, these adaptations would be unusual.

However, my own experience is not always complementary to, nor compatible with, that of other people and thus my observations of people wandering amongst the images suggests that my experience and expectations are indeed peculiar to me.

With 89.3 per cent positive responses to Statement Ten, it appears that size was efficacious in gaining attention in this instance. The element of large size may also affect one's sense of orientation in space as noted by one viewer who felt transported "to the area being depicted". For others, evidenced by 89.5 per cent positive responses to Statement Eleven, it appears that many people found that the three dimensional objects offered accessible and recognisable visual stimuli suggesting that they may have facilitated a sense of physical reality within the exhibition.

Thus far we have reflected on twelve of the fourteen statements comprising the overview of personal involvement as depicted in Figure 7.1.1. The remaining two

statements, Statements Six and Seven, might be regarded as a minor probe into whether or not subtle variations in writing style affected the way in which one responded to a particular version of a story. Figure 7.1.2 indicates responses to Statement Six where the bar charts reveal that neither version of the story played a significant role.

Left: Story A   [5]   [10]   [9]   [11]   [2]
Right: Story B   [7]   [13]   [13]   [5]   [2]

Figure 7.1.2   Responses Showing Sympathy for the Kenniff Brothers.

Similarly, responses to Statement Seven, Figure 7.1.3 indicating belief that the authorities had cause for concern about the welfare of landholders, show little evidence of either version of the story playing a significant role in swaying opinion.

	SA	A	D	SD	NA	Total
7. I believe that the authorities had cause for concern about the welfare of landholders.	[23]	[41]	[8]	[4]	[ ]	76

Left: Story A   [16]   [20]   [2]   [ ]   [ ]
Right: Story B   [7]   [21]   [6]   [4]   [ ]

Figure 7.1.3   Responses Showing Concern for the Landholders.

Since no viewer would have known which version of the story they were to read, it may be that the story did affect some people because little is actually recorded of the Kenniff Brother's exploits and hence the story tends to be relatively unknown.

Thus far data taken from the scoreboard regarding Statements 1 to 14 are laid out as a reflection of the way in which respondents indicated personal involvement. Such indications pave the way for reflecting upon dominant sensations revealed in responses to the following cluster of questions, Questions 15 to 18. (See Figure 7.1.4) In this second cluster, (see Appendix B), questions probed dominant emotions when looking at the images, analysis of triggers for these emotions, indications of images perceived to be the most interesting, and comfort zones within the exhibition.

Figure 7.1.4   Overview of Personal Sensations Experienced.

Figure 7.1.4 shows that curiosity was the dominant emotion experienced by the majority of viewers; that the story played the dominant role in arousing feelings; that the pencil and charcoal drawings and big 'story' drawings elicited the most interest; and that the subject matter was the dominant factor in allowing most people to feel 'at home' in the exhibition.

The 71 per cent responses to Question Fifteen which nominate curiosity as the dominant emotion when looking at the images might reflect a strong desire on behalf of many people to find out more about something hitherto unknown. However, the additional terms, *sadness and historical and geographical interest*, written on the questionnaire by some viewers in response to this question, might indicate some influence of personal associations stimulated by awareness of the story.

Awareness of the story is revealed by responses to Question Sixteen which probed factors arousing feelings. One viewer suggested "story & drawings together" which indicates that such a combination was found interesting. Thus 69.8 per cent responses to this question indicate that the story and the large sepia drawings played the dominant role in arousing feelings. This might suggest arousal of curiosity stimulated by awareness of a link between the visual and verbal facilitated by the story whereby specific subject matter could be understood from two adjacent perspectives.

While children in the main responded that no dominant emotion was aroused when looking at the images, it can be noted that children nominated the three dimensional objects and the paintings as the most dominant factors in arousing feelings. This might suggest lack of relevance between subject matter of the images and their lifestyle or unfamiliarity with the term 'emotion', yet familiarity with the term 'feelings' stimulated by real objects and colourful paintings. Other responses indicating the paintings and three dimensional artefacts as dominant in arousing feelings came from a cross section of community members while only three children, a female banker, a female grazier and another person who had "been there" nominated the map.

In terms of interest, responses to Question Seventeen show that 57.6 per cent of people found the drawings the most interesting with the remaining 42.4 per cent nominating the paintings. The visual arrangement of the exhibition depicted in Figure 6.7.1, Section 6.7, shows that the large 'story' drawings depict actual people and places related to the story of the Kenniff Brothers. The treatment is realistic, the colour scheme is monochromatic, and the sizes are similar thus creating an echoic pattern which appears to have elicited considerable interest amongst many viewers. The pencil and charcoal drawings depicted creek and rock areas, different paper was used and the works were framed.

However, responses nominating either the big 'story' drawings or pencil and charcoal drawings as the most interesting are combined because it could be that viewers did not differentiate between the two. The question was designed to probe such differentiation but, in recognizing that discrepancies occurred in using linguistic terms to identify differences between subject matter, technique, medium and treatment (Question 19), it is possible that discrepancies also occurred in separating which were 'story' drawings from those which were pencil and charcoal drawings owing to the similarity of medium used in all drawings.

Such problems in differentiation between linguistic terms and visual content might be responsible for responses to the paintings in general. Responses suggest that, for 18.8 per cent of viewers, the "watercolours of creeks and rocks" were the most interesting, for 15.3 per cent of viewers the "watercolours of Carnarvon" were most interesting while lower percentage responses (8.2 per cent) indicate the watercolours of the kitchen and dray. While it is easy to identify the latter images owing to recognisable subject matter, it can be hypothesised that differentiation between the specific images of creeks and rocks and those of the Carnarvon region might be more difficult even though titles were supplied in both the catalogue and list of works. (Appendix D) Thus it is reasonable to suggest that viewers may neither have consulted the catalogue nor the list of works and, in recognising rocks and creeks in both sets of images, might have

guessed which were which. If such was the case, we might suggest that 34 per cent of viewers showed interest in images which were typical enough to be recognised yet sufficiently atypical to arouse curiousity, to allow more freedom in interpretation, and evoke inferences which are not widely shared.

It is hypothesised that interest in and inferences drawn from the "watercolours of creeks and rocks" might be more dependent on personal interpretations owing to the more unusual way in which the paintings show specific sections that are enlarged to the extent that cracks, rock veins and shadows are the subject matter which allowed me to play around with gradations of value, juxtapositioning of shapes and dramatic colour effects.

Further atypical manipulation on my behalf of a typical landscape can be seen in the "watercolours of Carnarvon". By putting a seemingly unrelated border around each work the landscapes become atypical and such transformation of the original image appears to have caused added interest for many viewers. For example, verbal comments by viewers at the opening and later during the week I remained in the gallery were motivated by the unusual combination of strongly drawn and collaged images on the brown paper framing the peaceful Carnarvon images. Written comments such as, "[I] liked the brown bark looking paper around the Carnarvon pictures and the range/combinations of colours", and others who preferred the "... combination of these with the charcoal drawings (around the border) on thick brown paper" demonstrate similar interest motivated by the atypical combination. (Appendix F.3) By combining, tearing and cutting in the borders, my desire to link the rough and tumble of duffing and the more rugged country of the western side of the range to the green and lush Carnarvon Gorge on the eastern side seems to have evoked similar associations in viewers who knew the countryside. Others were simply intrigued by the combination that gave the illusion of "great depth to the paintings".

It can be noted that recognisable subject matter (38.75 per cent responses to Question

18) appears to play a significant role in fostering a feeling of being 'at home' in the context of this exhibition. As we can see in Figure 7.1.4, the number of respondents who nominated recognisable subject matter as facilitating a feeling of 'at home' is greater than any other response.

Other aspects such as maps, three dimensional artefacts and regular placement of artworks reveal that concrete objects and some form of pattern were influential in making 52.5 per cent of respondents feel 'at home' in the exhibition. Yet, only primary school children (8.75 per cent) indicated feeling 'at home' with the aspect of computer imagery thus signalling familiarity and comfort in using technological tools.

However, at the official opening of the exhibition attended by approximately one hundred and thirty people, many young adults appeared more 'at home' playing with the computer than viewing the actual images and I found several messages left for me in files on the computer when I checked from time to time. For example, on one occasion I found the background of the *Forest Vale Homestead* image blurred and, on opening an inserted file I found the question, "Karen, how do you like my dust storm?" On another occasion I found that someone had left me advice about using the programme layers and every time I visited the gallery I also found an adaptation of one of my images displayed on the computer monitor. Unfortunately the lack of printer facilities means that there is no record of messages or adaptations but the fact that the computer was used in this fashion, and at times by people far more technically skilled than myself, suggests that maybe not all of those who did thus respond completed the questionnaire.

Finally, Questions 19 to 22 (Appendix B) probe personal reflections about attitudes to art and reveal changes in perception as a result of participating in the exhibition. Provision for voluntary comments was included in this section and a transcript of such comments can be found in Appendix F.3.

Figure 7.1.5 shows the overall responses to Questions 19 to 22.

Q.19 Dominant Image Appeal Factor

Appeal

Subject	26
Technique	25
Medium	19
Treatment	11
Other	

Q.20 Perceptions of The Role of Art - Change Dimensions

Thinking Change

Great deal	7
A lot	7
Moderate	25
Not much	13
Not at all	13

Q. 21 Opinions re The Role of Art

Previous Opinion

Others make	
Decoration	
Communication	27
Expression	21
Special	18

Q.22 Changes Dominant in Rethinking the Role of Art

Real life story
Memories/Ass
Computer
Combination

Other's make, Communication, Expression, Special, Total

Figure 7.1.5   Overview Showing Attitudes/Changes in Attitudes to Art.

Responses to these questions show that subject matter and technique were the most appealing; thinking about the role of art changed by a great deal to a moderate amount for many respondents; many respondents previously considered art as visual communication; many respondents who changed their opinion about art nominated images linked to a real-life story as the aspect responsible.

In looking through the responses to Question Nineteen, it appears that most people could not differentiate the subtle differences between *technique, medium* and *treatment* as in *technique* referring to method of application, *medium* referring to watercolour, pencil, charcoal, conte etc and *treatment* referring to realism, abstraction, symbolism etc. This is to be expected because the scientific principles of a discourse can only be understood and accepted after one has gone through the process of apprenticeship in acquiring the norms of a discourse before progressing to the more esoteric abstract principles that can only be learnt through formal teaching. Even then discrepancies occur.

The fact that one respondent nominated "watercolour" as a response to *technique* and other responses indicated "large panels and bush colours" and "striking presentation" as *technique* further reinforces my suspicion that art terms are incidental to experience.

Thus we might separate 'subject matter' as an entity from the four other responses and note that 31.7 per cent of responses indicate the importance of subject matter for many people. Such comments as: "Brought back memories of "horse & buggy" days as a child"; "Provides a (sic) historical look at an age and issues that is (sic) close to us", and "[T]he appeal is due to both a story unique to the area but also relevant and typical of Australian yarns, myths, traditions and pioneer experience as a whole" exemplify what others referred to as being able to "place artwork in the narrative" in which the ""story" pictures seemed to live as if they were a diary entry at the time". Of all questions this one elicited the most written comments from viewers, and further frankness and genuine enthusiasm of comments can be noted in Appendix F.3.

While many people expressed specific preferences, recurring sentiments demonstrated empathy for the history and people, variety of technique and media, recognisable subject matter and aspects of giving life to the pictures. These comments suggest that any object or event in this world can strike the human mind most profoundly if the

conditions are right and if we are able to grasp them within some scheme, network, or system of meaning structures.

Ways in which the primacy of sensory perception, if sufficiently strong, determines the way in which a person interprets a percept thus stimulating a review of previous knowledge are revealed in responses to Question 22. We can see that for those people who did modify their opinion about art (59.8 per cent of responses to Question 20), the story played a significant role while memories and associations evoked by the images contributed to changes in thinking by others about art. Such responses might suggest that focus on familiar things fosters new ways of seeing artworks. On the other hand, those responses indicating changed thinking occasioned by the combination of story, images, objects, computer or playing with another's images on the computer, might indicate an ability in linking the unfamiliar to the familiar on behalf of those people.

Before such modifications to ways of thinking about the role of art, the majority of responses to Question 21 show that art was regarded as visual communication, with art as personal expression and art as making something special closely aligned. Information regarding age and the amount of art involvement specified by the respondents might suggest important factors contributing to prior opinions about art.

Of the responses indicating *art as visual communication*, six came from primary school children, two from mature females with art training and the remaining nineteen responses from teachers, other professional people, one student, one retired female and four unidentified responses. These responses, in the main, reflect opinions from professional people outside the Discourse of High Art.

In contrast, responses indicating *art as personal expression* include opinions from mature persons with art training while also including primary school children, mature persons with no art training and two unidentified responses. Of the responses indicating

art as making something special , seventeen responses came from primary school children and one from a female grazier aged sixty.

These responses appear to indicate certain clusters whereby those who identified themselves as professional persons (including two mature females with art training) nominated *art as visual communication*, those who identified themselves as either having formal art training or informal art training nominated *art as personal expression* and only children and one person from the land nominated *art as making something special*. Responses from children are included in all clusters.

However, in examining voluntary comments we find opinions such as: "This particular exhibition is not only about personal expression but also about visual communication. Art can also be decorative"; "Art helps express an event or situation ..."; "Art can mean a lot of different things these days ..." and, "[I]t needs to communicate on a number of levels". Thus comments indicate a search for new ways of codifying rather than expressing an adamant opinion which can be seen in responses to Question Twenty Two whereby 62.8 per cent of respondents indicate various aspects of the exhibition that encouraged them to re-think their opinion of art.

Because Questions 21 and 22 allow us to note before/after responses, we can reflect on these responses in a comparison table of the two questions. In Table 7.1.6, one graph presents responses to Question 21; a second graph identifies responses to Question 22 indicating those who <u>did</u> re-think their opinion of art and shows the influential factors; a third graph identifies those who <u>did not</u> re-think their opinion of art and thus no change from previous allegiances; and the fourth graph is a reproduction of the same graph in Figure 7.1.5 in which those factors which influenced some respondents to re-think their opinion of art are indicated by the coloured bar charts.

Table 7.1.6 presents responses to Questions 21 and 22.

Q. 21 Previous Opinion

Q. 22 Re-thinking

Q. 22 Did Not Re-think

Q. 22 Factors Causing Re-thinking

Legend:
- Real life story
- Memories/Ass
- Computer
- Combination

Figure 7.1.6   Previous Opinion and Factors Leading to Re-thinking

The bottom graph in Figure 7.1.6 indicates that, for those people who did re-think their opinion of art, images linked to a real-life story played a significant role. These responses are identified by the red bar which features in all categories while being the sole aspect in the 'making special' category. This could suggest that a story might act

as a means of drawing attention to aspects of artworks that otherwise may have gone unnoticed.

It can also be noted that memories and associations, the blue bar, feature more strongly in the communication category which might indicate the role played by such memories and associations in facilitating the transmission of ideas.

In examining the voluntary comments attached to questions nineteen to twenty two (Appendix F.3), these appear to reinforce the fact that relevant subject matter and variety in presentation are important to many people. One person commented "... as far as I'm concerned there is something for everyone", and another noted that "[A]ll our senses were being invited to help us enjoy".

According to one fifty-four year old, female homemaker, "the exhibition has really allowed the ordinary person [to] enjoy, feel at home". Verbal comments to me from many people who attended the opening expressed a very similar sentiment; personal notes were left for me in the collection box for questionnaires offering further information about the Kenniff Brothers and, in particular, one note handed to me by a gallery staff member indicates that people who may never have entered an art gallery before did so on this occasion. The note comes from a bloke called PeeWee who, I am told, took over an hour to hand write the following brief information:

(Respondent's hand written note, 1997.)

Comments, such as those noted, emphasise the importance of bodily experience and personal involvement as an avenue for people from all walks of life to be involved in experiencing artworks in ways that range from spinning more yarns into the subject matter, the injection of ideas and opinions, participation through provision of personal memorabilia, to the actual computer manipulation of images in the exhibition. By selecting things that are valued as starting points so that viewers may bring their own experience to the artwork and ponder connections or make new discoveries, it might be possible to facilitate new ways of thinking about familiar things. By including unusual and atypical modifications that subtly challenge normal expectations of people viewing artworks, it also might be possible to stimulate new ways of thinking about hitherto strange things.

In offering various starting points to viewers for making connections and new discoveries, in providing avenues for personal involvement, and in suggesting ways of remaking self through touching the senses, the exhibition, *Moonlighting in Moffatt* appears to have drawn attention to the importance of what happens to each singular person which questions the notion of experience relating to the totality of human experience.

In his opening speech, Hodgkinson (1997) highlighted the inward search that every painter pursues in "struggling for means of expression, some way of stating all those beliefs and uncertainties that are the painter's essential character, his (sic) very being." Thus we can see that personal involvement is an essential ingredient that allows an artist to "remake", in Hodgkinson's (1997) terms of "myself I will remake", whereby the artist, not only recognises things, but *realises* them through poetry, song, prose and painting that touches the senses so that "an entire experience is inside us" as a single member of an audience.

From eighty seven unsolicited comments words such as *memories, empathy, at home* and *involvement* were used twenty five times, *enjoyment* was mentioned six times and

interest was mentioned twelve times. In reflecting on my own process of making the images, I too would use these words to communicate my almost total immersion in the subject matter and method of creating visual chapters of the story that, as we saw in Chapter Six, did involve much labour, love and playing around with ideas.

On the other hand, as a professional artist, I have held many solo exhibitions but this was the first time I have had the full responsibility of orchestrating the total exhibition in addition to making the artworks. The tasks of securing the venue, planning the layout, writing the catalogue, producing the invitations, organising publicity, preparing lists of works, hiring a special vehicle for transporting the three-dimensional works some nine hundred kilometres back and forth to owners, overseeing installation of the computer, deciding about catering for the opening and assisting with the hanging of the works, involved months of conferring with the appropriate people. On reflection I admit to many changes in my thinking and, managerial skills honed from many years of teaching, became a valuable asset. Previously, I had not thought deeply about the sort of things one does 'all in a day's work'. However, in continuing with normal work demands during the time of mounting the exhibition, I began to understand more fully the implications of personal experience in which effort and struggle are crucial elements if one does want to express something in a meaningful manner.

Hence, this artist, after having flirted with reflections about the process and the product, speculates about possible outcomes drawn from these scoreboard reflections in the following section.

7.2 Speculations From the Playground.

Before speculating or hypothesising further, it is important to recall the nature of this research as an exploration at a personal level into ways of establishing webs of affiliation within and across secondary groups within the Discourse of Art. In using my experience as one eclectic person having dual membership as artist and art educator, my processes of making, displaying and writing about personal artistic thinking and methodology might serve as a link between self as creator of one set of meanings and members of an audience as creators of other sets of meanings.

My original objective in designing the questionnaire was to facilitate voluntary participation and thus the questionnaire was not conventional in that single persons were not specifically targeted and invited to respond. The questionnaire existed for people to complete but, given the fact that for much of the exhibition time, no one other than myself drew attention to it, it is perhaps surprising that so many people did complete it. In retrospect if may have been preferable to be more interventionist in proffering the questionnaire and asking people to complete it.

As mentioned in Section 6.6, the questionnaire and attached story were placed in bundles at various positions around the exhibition so that people were free to pick up the document and do whatever they wanted with it. Whether or not they completed the questionnaire was at their discretion. Thus, we can only deal with the responses as offered which, in this case, is approximately four per cent of viewers. This is a very small number of responses which might lead us to question why this is so if comments in the Gallery Visitor's Book (Appendix F.2) and voluntary comments (Appendix F.3) indicate a more interactive response to the exhibition.

We might speculate that when one feels good about something one is at ease and might not feel a need to record such a feeling in depth whereas the converse might also apply.

Alternately, we might speculate that some might experience a resistance to filling in forms.

Responses to the questionnaire, Section 7.1, and unsolicited comments (Appendix F.3) suggest that singular persons interpret and infer certain things that may be similar, but are not the same. For example, several people commented on the way in which the images "... suggest[s] the Kennith brothers were just typical 'fellows' of the time"; "... images - seemed almost "real" for the time"; "... took one to the area being depicted"; "... one felt they (sic) were walking with those involved"; "[I]nteresting to see and feel history through art" and "... took one to the area being depicted". Thus we might speculate that experience is a very singular thing and it is the similarity of interpretation and inference that allows like-minded people to converge as a group. This does not imply exact shared experiences, but it does imply that there might be enough similar components of singular experiences that, because of the similarity, do allow some clustering of these similarities which might indicate the type of group affinity implicit in the examples above.

As noted in Section 7.1, a personal touch, such as engaging persons in conversation and offering some form of guidance, did motivate some persons to become more involved in the exhibition. For example, after such a conversation, some persons would then take considerable time examining the three-dimensional artefacts and two dimensional images by slowly moving between and amongst the objects and images, bending over objects and leaning closer to scrutinize paintings. Some consciously looked for the response materials and, finding them, took a copy of the questionnaire and attached story. Such an action however, did not necessarily imply that those persons did complete the questionnaire. However, many did walk back through the images with the document to which they referred from time to time. Others sat down to read the story and then reviewed the images.

We can speculate that such physical engagement is likely to be indicative of active mental engagement to varying degrees. For example, I am often aware of doing things but, metaphorically, my mind is 'a million miles away' as I think of things totally unrelated to what I am doing physically or, conversely, I might appear to be 'a million miles away' because I may be doing very little in the physical sense, such as sitting with my eyes closed, while my mind may be intensely active. Thus, because personal experience *is* personal, as yet we have no valid instrument that can designate what is, and what is not, personal experience.

Exhibition participants indicated that their understanding and enjoyment were enhanced by the floor map (90.6 per cent), reading the story (93.5 per cent), and through the personal events thus brought into immediate memory (53.4 per cent). The level of sympathy evoked for the Kenniff Brothers remained constant regardless of which story was read thus indicating that both stories elicited sympathy for the brothers. While the majority of respondents (84.1 per cent) indicated that the authorities did have cause for concern, it can be noted that such concern cannot be attributed to the influence of either story. Thus we can speculate that the subtle difference in writing style was not sufficient to influence opinions which, most likely, were already formulated. Involvement in the exhibition was reported by 74.3 per cent; the placement of images did suggest a story to 79.4 per cent of respondents; the size of the images caught the attention of 89.3 per cent of respondents; and the inclusion of three dimensional artefacts did make the exhibition seem more 'real' to 89.5 per cent of respondents. Playing on the computer was enjoyed by 82.7 per cent of respondents who actually accessed the computer while 58.3 per cent, again from only those who accessed the computer, admitted to an increase of interest through playing with the computer. Understanding of the time, people and place increased for 87.6 per cent of participants. These findings, while only broadly indicative given the small sample size, nevertheless give rise to a range of speculations and hypotheses:

- Data gathered from responses suggests that the combination of familiar things, in the form of stories and objects pertaining to real events, can enhance feelings of association. One might hypothesise that these associations evoke hidden units through activating nodes in a network of personal memory leading to changes of perception regarding how one responds to viewing artworks.

- Responses show that a majority of respondents found that the visual floor map did assist their understanding of the context of the images and most of these people did enjoy walking on the visual map. However, some respondents, who indicated formal art training, did not appear to enjoy walking on the visual floor map.

It seems reasonable to speculate that while the floor map did not provide a *physical* obstacle to people entering the Gallery, it did present a *psychological* obstacle to many people, especially to those with more formal art knowledge. The special laminated surface, and the positioning of the floor map, were not sufficient to counter expectations that objects in an Art Gallery are to be treated according to conventional norms.

- It appears that the people most reluctant to explore images in unusual contexts were those with formal art training or those who indicated some awareness of artistic conventions.

From this observation we might speculate that specialists may be the least able to abandon idealised conventions regarding the norms of the High Art Discourse of which they are members. Conversely, it appears that the natural inclination of children, in particular, is a willingness to explore things in unusual contexts.

- While provision of the story enabled many people to associate with the images, the provision of two different versions of the story did not appear to play a significant role in affecting the way in which those viewers who read the story associated with the people portrayed in the images.

  This may be because the stories lacked sufficient difference in folkloric colour and expression, or that some people were already familiar with the events described in the stories and had formed a firm opinion that may have restricted possible changes in perception. It is also possible that the visual information may have outweighed the verbal.

- It appears that the placement of the images facilitated the sense of narrative for many people. On the other hand, it was observed that many people wandered amongst the images from side to side of the gallery or re-tracked to examine certain images. While one viewer commented on the atypical direction in which the images were placed sequentially from right to left, it was informally noted that many other viewers did commence looking at the images immediately after passing the reception counter and thus commencing viewing at Plate 25 which, as shown in Figure 6.7.1, is the final image in the series.

  This might suggest either that viewers were unaware of the intended visual narrative of the images or it might suggest a conventional way of viewing artworks that are often placed as individual pictures which do not dictate any sequential viewing, or it might suggest simple contrariness.

- The impact of visual size on viewers is noted in responses thus indicating the way in which large scale images highlight the design principle of emphasis through grabbing attention.

Thus we can speculate that the design element of size plays an important function by influencing the way in which people pay attention to an artwork thus suggesting alignment (albeit unconscious on behalf of viewers) with the artistic concept of hieratic scaling. This might demonstrate a basic tendency of people not only to notice big things, but also to attribute some metaphorical worth or power to such things. We can further hypothesise that the element of size (large) may affect one's sense of orientation in space as noted by one viewer who felt transported "to the area being depicted".

- Responses indicate that the inclusion of computer technology gave rise to feelings of dissonance in many people that, in the main, were overcome through avoidance.

While we can only speculate as to reasons for such avoidance, this observation suggests that many people might avoid something depending on the degree of strangeness. If this is the case it could be that the strangeness lay in the context whereby a computer was included in an art exhibition which presented an atypical context. However, dissonance appears to be diminished when people approach something strange, or out of the normal context, in a crowd as was seen at the opening of the exhibition where some people played with the computer images. This might imply that, for some people, experimentation is less threatening when one is in a crowd where the atmosphere and other distractions might counter one's fear of failure amongst peers that often inhibits behaviour.

In presenting an exhibition of artworks in a public gallery space, it was not expected that all aspects of the exhibition would offer equal stimulus or force to all viewers. Some resistance or avoidance to using the computer could be expected owing to the probability of people regarding it as very different because of its contextual juxtaposition within a display of reasonably representational images. However, it was not expected that the floor map would cause the amount of initial dissonance exhibited by most viewers on entering the gallery.

Further, we might speculate whether or not greater knowledge of discourse norms might inhibit those with such knowledge from abandoning hard-won conventions while people with more permeable boundaries, or those belonging to more than one discourse, are more likely to devise their own personal rules in viewing artworks.

For example, in noting the effect the pictorial floor map had on some people, we can speculate that a bodily experience of pathways and containers played an important role in how some people approached the *image on the floor* and were obliged to re-establish their sense of orientation in space, and re-consider their understanding of visual constancy and visual association. It might be suggested that, in normal everyday movement of following a track, a road or a pathway it does keep us contained. Although we might not know exactly where we are going, the 'beaten pad' does keep us within certain boundaries and, if we stray too far beyond its boundaries, our first inclination is to check our bearings to ensure that a familiar sign will guide us back to the track, the symbol of our safety, security and survival. Thus it is possible that, if we find an obstacle on the track, we normally go around it. However, our recognition of something as an 'obstacle' may depend on what we believe to be an obstacle according to the meaning of 'obstacle' defined by our membership within a particular discourse.

There was nothing in the physical construction of the map to inhibit people from walking on it. On the contrary, care had been taken to laminate the artwork with a trafficable surface; it had been secured strongly to the floor with gaffer tape, and had been positioned so that people were virtually obliged to walk upon it. However, by taking something out of its normal context and re-positioning it, the familiar visual constancy of many people was challenged thus creating a situation which gave rise to visual dissonance.

Particular attention is drawn to the floor map because responses to the questionnaire indicate a positive response (82 per cent) regarding enjoyment aroused by walking on the map, and 90 per cent of responses indicate that the map assisted understanding of

the context of the images. Thus we can speculate that the initial mental dissonance experienced through the shock of finding something *physically out of place* was able to be resolved by the ease of physical re-orientation thus reducing the mental disorientation. By placing an artwork on the floor actually to be walked upon, it appears that this action challenged normal expectations that artworks in a gallery are to be viewed at a distance on the wall. However, while initially shocking to some degree, the placement of this artwork in the exhibition became accepted to the extent that people began to walk on the visual map to examine the images and location of towns.

We can further speculate that those people who were happy to play with the computer were those who were already familiar with the physical skills of using a keyboard and mouse, or who had a friend who was willing to demonstrate the physical skills, or who were in a group in which individual ineptitude did not stand out. Thus it appears that informal acquisition, such as watching a friend or experimenting in a group, precedes formal learning. It might be suggested that, in such an informal situation, meaningfulness is the singular intake from the communal meaning or, in other words, the way in which someone acquires certain beliefs and ways of behaving promoted within a particular discourse.

This may depend on the way in which each person overcomes inner psychological barriers and this, we can speculate, depends on the strength of the barrier determined by one's position in a discourse. For example, one respondent appears to identify certain belief systems in commenting:

> ... as far as I'm concerned there is something for everyone e.g.
> - computer for children and computer buffs,
> - the different mediums used especially the different paper used, paint and sketching
> - 3 dimensional for people interested in past
> - the story and paintings for those who find it had to assimilate matter unless picture and story are present.

Such a comment indicates that this person has identified certain discourses such as "computer buffs"; those who enjoy variety of media and technique; those who associate three dimensional artefacts with history; and those who require

complementary aspects of the visual and verbal to facilitate appreciation. Another comment, "Get some more computers" from a Year 4 student, indicates alignment with the "computer buffs" discourse (as suggested in the first comment), while several people demonstrate affinity with complementary aspects of the visual and verbal as exemplified in the following comments:

> The reading material threw light onto the events being depicted and one felt they were walking with those involved

> I felt involved because I was able to 'place' artwork in the narrative ...

> ... there is an added dimension of interest when the background story is known.

> I enjoyed the combination of story/maps/image as opposed to a single painting, (which may represent an aspect of the story but be seemingly disconnected from it), because they represented and taught you about the story and its times.

> The combination of art and story can arouse a much stronger, fuller reaction.

> The exhibition does show how art can be incorporated successfully into a story such as this has been done.

The above comments suggest the extent to which affinity with complementary aspects of the visual and verbal plays an important role in increasing interest and, if, as responses show, 87.6 per cent of participants agreed that understanding of the time, people and place increased through participating in this exhibition, we might investigate reasons why this was so.

It is probable that arousal of certain emotions and interest is facilitated when people feel some degree of unfamiliarity in an environment. Yet it is also probable that the ability to make connections with personal associations allows one to feel comfortable in a certain situation. Thus, we can suggest that a degree of tension is necessary if curiosity is to be aroused while, at the same time, offering possibilities for satisfying curiosity so that achievement of a balance between the known and the unknown allows one to feel at home in the environment.

Responses (71 per cent) show that curiosity prevails as the dominant emotion when people look at images. However, given the number of responses indicating the story (42.1 per cent) as playing a dominant role in arousing feelings, the drawings (57.6 per

cent) as the most interesting, and the importance of recognizable subject matter (38.75 per cent) in making one feel 'at home', we might suggest that the combination of images and stories facilitates connections between metaphorical linguistic units, visual association and visual memory in a dual-coding process which might be enlivened by initial curiosity.

Other responses show that inclusion of maps (21.25 per cent), inclusion of three-dimensional artefacts (16.25 per cent) and regular placement of artworks (15 per cent) played important roles in encouraging viewers to feel comfortable in the exhibition. It might be argued that acceptance of certain features of the exhibition, such as maps and regularity, demonstrate a preference for pattern on behalf of some people viewing an exhibition of artworks mounted in a public gallery while inclusion of three dimensional artefacts reinforces visual constancy and visual association for other viewers.

Moreover, the way in which people use the unfamiliar to interpret the familiar, such as art terms to explain why something is appealing, raises speculative issues in relation to interpretation and translation. We might speculate that, for something to be appealing, it must first arouse interest and, given the difficulty of rendering a sensation into a linguistic code, we need to go through the process of translation whereby the subjective is objectified. Thus it is possible that the nature of art terms used by viewers to explain what one perceives in an artwork may be incidental to what one actually senses. For example, one viewer commented:

> If you mean the different things like paint etc. used then I found it very
> interesting especially the watercolours of C.G. There is a depth produced
> by the borders that makes you look more closely.

It appears that this viewer's unfamiliarity with art terminology did not militate against the viewer's capacity to express a heightened awareness. Also, another viewer, in referring to the watercolour paintings commented: "great technique because oils are usually used to depict large Australian landscape ...". Again, differentiation between the terms "medium" and "technique" seems irrelevant to this viewer's enjoyment of the images.

Thus it appears that responses confirm the way in which familiar things enhance feelings of interest in and acceptance by viewers even though translation of the familiar involves using an unfamiliar linguistic code. This might suggest that the introduction to, and acceptance of unusual things, such as art terminology, artworks which transgress a normal context and introduction of computer technology, might be facilitated more easily in an environment where comfort is sufficiently reinforced while, at the same time, curiosity to re-think previous experiences is stimulated.

While such an environment might be close at hand and within personal reach, we cannot ignore the influence of social practices which might exist beyond immediate reach of singular persons but, nevertheless, might still affect one's perception of the adjacent environment. The way in which such external reality exerts certain constraints on a person's conceptual system suggests many different views of that reality depending on the biological make-up of a person, their position within a culture, and the way in which truth corresponds with the beliefs and experiences that are considered meaningful within the cultural group.

For example, external reality does exert certain constraints on various persons as we saw in the Section 7.1 where 59.8 per cent of respondents did admit to some modification to their thinking about the role of art. We can speculate that some external object or event stimulated *different* ways of thinking for these people and we cannot ignore factors that appear to have been influential in causing these changes. Amongst these factors it can be noted that 38.3 per cent of respondents who did re-think their opinion of art nominated *Images linked to a real life story* as responsible for such modification while another 15 per cent of viewers selected *Images that evoked memories/associations*.

If also we review Figure 7.1.5 (Section 7.1) which displays an overview of responses relating to issues about the role of art, it can be noted in the bottom graph (showing influences that affected those who did re-think their opinion of art) that the influence of

real-life stories does feature in each category thus suggesting a tendency that people utilise literary phenomena in interpreting and translating visual images. To assist visualisation of this information for closer examination, the following Figure 7.2.1, shows this bottom graph from Figure 7.1.5.

Figure 7.2.1 Influences Affecting Re-thinking Previous Opinion of Art.

Five possible roles of art are listed across the horizontal axis with the colour coded squares representing possible influences responsible for modification of thinking. If we examine the role played by memories and associations (blue bar) in modifying thinking, we can note that memories and associations <u>do not</u> feature in the category of *Art Is making something special* but do feature in the other categories. If memories and associations are not considered influential in modifying thinking about art as making something special, but awareness of a story (red bar) is influential in modifying such thinking, we can speculate that previous association made possible through memory is not necessary for something to be considered special while awareness of a story fosters such a sense of specialness.

This might suggest that, to experience something, to think anew about something, does require a linkage between the familiar and the strange although the familiar does not necessarily evoke memories and associations. In a case such as this, it could be that the familiar requires a competency, such as the skill in using and understanding language, to translate a hitherto strange symbol system, such as visual images, which, when perceived differently because of the complementary story, might occasion a more

powerful awareness of the unique and yet relational characteristics of the image. Hence, we might suggest that the story functions as a conduit through which people may make metaphoric connections from the familiar to the strange.

We might hypothesise that basic-level and image-schematic concepts are directly meaningful when linked to structural aspects of experience such as competency in language that stimulates a new way of thinking. Given that language is a system of meaning structures sanctioned by particular discourses, it is probable that any new way of thinking on behalf of singular persons will share aspects of communal meaning. However, if meaningfulness for one person requires making links between two hitherto unrelated systems of meaning, it is possible that coding elements that deviate from one's anticipatory schemata require skills of translation (in which one is not always proficient), thus leading to difficulties, errors, and variations of interpretation among individuals.

It appears that innate biological mechanisms may be triggered to intensify a physiological response, either positive or negative, thus demonstrating that an organism cares about different kinds of events in different ways. For example, one viewer noted: "Through the techniques used and the treatment of the pieces the viewer was forced to inquire more as opposed to simply viewing and moving on", and another commented: "All our senses were being invited to help us enjoy this truly magnificent exhibition". On the one hand, we have an emphasis on inquiry while, on the other, the emphasis is on enjoyment, yet both persons viewed the same artworks.

Further, on looking through all comments offered by viewers (Appendix F.3), 42.5 per cent specify experiencing sensations of personal interest and involvement through associations that were evoked because, as one viewer opines, "...one felt they were walking with those involved (in the story)", and another comment suggests, "[T]he "story" pictures seemed to live as if they were a diary entry at the time", and yet another viewer notes, "[T]he use of imagery that suggests the Kenniff brothers were just typical 'fellows' of the time helps build the feelings of empathy ...". Such responses, in

exposing a variety of ways in which persons care about something, highlight idiosyncratic aspects of personal experience.

Glimpses of personal experience voluntarily exposed through written responses by viewers within a public milieu might be seen to contribute in some small way to a wider understanding of artistic experience. We can speculate that such auxiliary data, while gathered in an unconventional way, might be indicative of a wider view of how others see art. As noted in Section 7.1, the exhibition was visited by over two thousand people and thus we might speculate that participant responses suggest generic influences within which we can identify personal determining agents such as associations with travel; enjoyment of the subject matter; interest in the medium and techniques used; memories of childhood; combination of narrative, maps and images; presentation; the historical context; and the educative aspect of the exhibition. If the collective positive response to the exhibition was possible because of personal involvement demonstrated by words such as "interesting" "memories", "real", "inviting" "curious" "encouraging" "appealing", "involved", "make connections", "brought the subject to life" so that "[T]his exhibition has really allowed the ordinary person (to) enjoy" and "[I]t makes me feel at home", we can further speculate that the exhibition offered people various ports of entry depending on their own relevant background experience.

It would be unrealistic to expect an overwhelming response in written form given the conditions outlined at the beginning of this section. Nevertheless, this small sample reveals aspects of viewer involvement in this exhibition from which various implications for my own art practice, art education and further research into art as personal experience arise.

7.3 Implications From The Scoreboard.

I have argued that experience is the compulsion to think otherwise than we have been thinking and, because experience cannot be other than personal, I have used my own process of making artworks as a means of investigating forces that have compelled me to think anew. However, it is possible that others might also indicate changes in thinking through some form of communication and thus responses to outcomes of my artistic experience might suggest different forces which, from viewer perspectives, contribute to singularly new ways of thinking about art.

From my perspective, forces such as conflict, love and labour have played dominant roles in my artistic experience, while it appears that, from viewer perspectives, relevance and enjoyment play significant roles in artistic experience. Depending on our degree of involvement in a situation, this might imply that, in our desire to make our life extraordinary, or enjoyable, or meaningful, or comfortable, or bearable, or a combination of all five, we are compelled to tell stories that allow us to feel some sense of fulfilment. Whether these stories are visual, verbal, gestured or mental, the way in which we tell them to ourselves, or to others, affects our survival.

However, it is possible that one is not always the author of one's story but rather the interpreter of another's story which implies that one might not be compelled to think anew which further implies that experience is not always necessary for survival. In other words, it is possible that one is influenced by the norms of a particular discourse and such norms may curtail experience.

On the basis of this research, two principles appear to be significant. Firstly, all input data affect the way in which we use our cognitive tools resulting in either comfort or agitation within the brain and, since neural agitation leading to a state of dissonance is normally avoided, we need to recognise that the way in which we link a wish to some

form of fulfilment involves either *wilfully acquiescing in*, or *wilfully opposing*, the force of neural signals.

Secondly, neural signals are stimulated and strengthened *through use* thus consolidating our recognition of prototypes, our store of image schemata, and our acceptance of folk theories. This implies that *only* if input data are sufficiently strong to challenge our accustomed store of associations, do we sense some shock that leads us to re-establish constancy within our network of associations.

Recognition of these two principles implies a need to understand that *actions are a consequence* of linking a wish to a possible result through the imperceptible sensational compulsion to change our way of thinking so that our being involves imparting a quality to reactions in the future that mould our behavioural tendency for fulfilment. This re-establishment is a personal experience, a new way of using the cognitive tools in the head that is unique to each person depending on her or his capacity to imagine.

In accepting these two principles, a major implication for artists and art educators lies in questioning how we organize and interpret the input data from both sensory stimulus and discourse influence. How do we reconcile possible conflict between what our body tells us and what our system of beliefs tells us? Can we identify ways of harmonizing the two sources of input data and can we identify when, where and which signals are stronger and, if so, why? Possible reasons may be suggested, some of which might indicate new avenues for further investigation in conceptualizing art as a personal experience.

Owing to the way in which I have re-arranged and questioned conventional research methodologies through my process of conversing with the literature from time to time, entering debates about how we use the tools in the head, weaving myself into stories, exposing my own thinking and working *en train*, and inviting others to use the product of my labour and love as a means for exploring their way of thinking about art, it seems reasonable to suggest that implications concern both myself and viewers. Hence, in

examining my responses and thence viewer responses within areas that appear significant, we can highlight some implications which might suggest further research for my own art practice and for art education. The former, while based on my personal experience, have the possibility of application to other artists. The latter, based on viewer responses, have the possibility of transference to any areas in which art might touch and influence members of the community.

7.3.1 Personal Implications:

During this research my work has moved me into a new artistic role and has enabled me to glimpse boundaries for further exploration suggested by external constraints as noted in Section 6.7.

Such boundaries might be pegged out within personal limitations of forces causing conflict and ways of resolving conflict that involve use of metaphorical associations; processes of making the familiar strange; recognition of the necessity of play; and understanding of the private, internal nature of experience leading to changes in perception and thence behaviour. Yet, beyond personal limitations lies the powerful boundary of discourse norms which, as this research suggests, pose the greatest challenge for restructuring art as personal experience.

If persons interpret and infer things based on their biological make-up and their position within a discourse, the implication is that art is embedded in personal behaviour and thus we may need to re-think the way in which art is defined. The way in which some forces may be amplified and others diminished depends on the power and strength of sensory input units influenced by the regulatory effect of a specific discourse in determining meaning while orchestrated by our imaginative capacity. Thus, in using the tools in the head, it is possible that experience depends on the biological flow of physical forces within us. This implies that the functioning of the body is central to what we perceive, and the simultaneous force of the perceptual experience activates the cognitive tools in the head that we use in various ways to make sense of the experience.

7.3.1.1 Forces Causing Conflict.

In discovering that external constraints actually pose greater challenges than previously self-imposed objectives, this realization has lead me to engage in a process of translating strange phenomena into something familiar. Such constraints, for example, an unfamiliar story, unexpected size of the gallery space, and untried technology have forced me to invent ways of connecting these disparate elements into a unified whole. In developing new ways of working, I also developed more complex ways of thinking about concepts of self whereby debates about the notion of autonomy took on a new significance. For example, implications of using the term *individual* alerted me to inferences of division and separation when, in fact, I was becoming more aware of myself as a component within the environment, not as an individual outside it. In moving beyond habitual acceptance of something to a state in which my senses were shocked to the degree that I was forced to grapple with connotations of terms such as *individual, autonomy* and *control*, I experienced conflict and struggle.

In reflecting on my own process of making artworks for the exhibition in Section 6.7, I became very aware of my work becoming an orchestration and my progression from being solo artist to becoming artist-conductor and, in this new role, I was forced to think and work across various symbolic modes. Naturally, I began with the familiar process of using photographs and sketches as one would use written reference material from a library and my experimentation with media and paper demonstrates my need to create harmony between the two while deliberation in placing the images in a sequential arrangement highlights my awareness of pattern. In such a way I could predict and control a unified relationship between what I wished to do and what I could do based on beliefs emanating from past experience. This implies that various effects of the environment, with which I was familiar, influenced my thinking about personal artworks and contributed to the quality of my experiences. In acting upon such mental rehearsals, I felt confident that I could interpret the visual score in my mind as a highly skilled soloist might interpret a musical score.

However, in working with different media and on different scales concurrently, I found that the normal everyday functions we perform in noting contrasts, remembering how something looks, recognizing something out of context, linking an object with another object or an idea, understanding balance, and recognizing where something is and its relative location, became unexpected challenges. For example, when hanging the images in the gallery, I was dismayed to find that the faces of Pat and Jim Kenniff were larger than those of Doyle and Dahlke. I had not intended this and I can, of course, offer several possible reasons (albeit retrospective) why this happened. Firstly, in the physical studio space I could only work on one image at a time; secondly, images were not worked on in sequence; thirdly, there was no way of hanging images together prior to the exhibition; fourth, while being careful to get dimensions of the gallery space and being cautious with paper size, I did not focus deliberately on the dimensions of the actual images on the paper and, finally, I was not totally familiar with the large scale of the drawings.

Further challenge was encountered when using maps as I found myself making connections between notational and non-notational pictorial systems which implied recoding the information rather than interpreting. Also, as noted in Section 6.7, working with certain restraints had the most profound impact on my way of thinking thus forcing me to seek ways of overcoming dissonance created by strange phenomena such as the enormity of the gallery walls and the limited memory of the computer. Meeting these challenges led me to extend my image making into spheres hitherto unexplored and, in this way, conceptual and physical challenges were intertwined and demanded both mental and bodily effort in moving beyond comfort zones of habitual familiarity to strange and unknown areas of finding links between the known and the unknown.

7.3.1.2 Ways Of Resolving Conflict.

The process of re-thinking my normal way of creating images did not happen in a vacuum. Rather the process evolved in the field where I found my physical situation initially strange and I was forced to find some correlations between the unknown and the

known. Reference to my diary entries and the process of making the images noted in Chapter Six highlights the unease I felt from time to time which I resolved only through searching background associations in an effort to find some sort of metaphorical link that might connect me, physically and mentally, to this strange situation. In this way my new context influenced higher order thinking and forced me to develop possible ways of transferring the familiar to new domains and tasks through a process of translation in which the narrative, analogy and my personal experience were meshed through playing around with metaphorical associations.

7.3.1.3 Metaphorical Associations.

As noted in Section 6.7 my previous approach to landscape painting went through a radical change as I became immersed in the story and thus my habitual mental and physical skills were questioned from an artistic perspective. No longer was I working from visual to visual as in interpreting my view of the landscape into a painting of the landscape. Rather the story challenged me translate the verbal into the pictorial and thus my images were transmuted into a previously unexplored symbolic partnership. Although it is possible to recognise the images as representational, only I, as artist, am aware of the way in which my familiar way of working has become new and exciting as I experimented with media hitherto strange and pushed my capacity to imagine connections between symbolic systems exemplified in combinations of media, juxtapositioning of two dimensional and three dimensional objects, incorporation of visual, verbal and written codes, and experimentation with technological tools. For example, reference in Section 6.4 to my process of manipulating personal images using the computer programme, Adobe Photoshop, as *duffing* my images and *faking the brand* highlights an unusual connection between cattle rustling, technology and personal association. In making these connections I employed metaphorical projections that enabled me to structure my experience based on personal memories and associations which facilitated links between familiar bodily experiences thence transposed into visual signs.

- The implication for my own artistic practice is that context is a more potent guide than internal forces. The impact of shifting and changing mental and physical spaces has forced me to become more aware of my physical orientation in the environment leading me to question concepts of self. Such questioning, in moving the focus from separation to integration, challenges me to investigate correlations between linguistic and visual metaphorical projections whereby one uses physical orientation as a basis for understanding abstract concepts. In other words, my own art practice must respond to, rather than dictate, the process of visual articulation of the landscape and events therein. In focusing on orchestrating novel and metaphorical connections between images and narrative, personal meaning becomes intentional in making such connections between systems of meaning. In particular, a boundary for further investigation is suggested by Australian folklore in which the richness of verbal and written data might be translated into on-going visual yarns which, as indicated by this exhibition, suggests that such folklore might act as a conduit for my own artmaking and, in turn, act as a conduit for others to link past associations to present and hitherto unthought of contexts. If the context for art making is changed, this implies that habitual notions of both art and the artist must be redefined

7.3.1.4 Imaginative Capacity.

In using various forms of analogy, such as using an artwork as a visual map and *faking brands* using computer modifications of images, I played around with an idea or thing from a fresh viewpoint, which implies that, in elaborating something beyond familiarity I searched for ways of distorting, inverting or transposing my normal viewpoint. Employment of such an analogy forced me to move beyond the habitual urge to analyze something into an acceptable pattern and thus some conflict was necessary in moving from the familiar to the strange. It is hypothesised that analogy is a natural and stimulating means of presenting more complex codes which generate more complex mental skills.

- If this is the case, the agitation of cognitive tools requires some extra force to direct and control such increased activity which implies utilization of a capacity sufficiently strong to tame the chaos of the mind. Such a capacity we might call imagination. However, this implies that imagination is a capacity. Such an implication challenges some assumptions that imagination is a gift and opens avenues for further research into effects on personal motivation and self confidence depending on whether imagination is viewed as a capacity and thus possible of cultivation, or whether imagination is viewed as a gift possessed only by certain persons, such as artists.

7.3.1.5 Necessity Of Play.

This research suggests that only imaginative capacities allow us to organize and form connections between phenomena in any rational way and this function stems from excitement of the senses that stimulates us to make outline sketches in the mind that we can examine, play around with, find significant connections between, draw inferences from and solve problems.

As noted in Chapter Four, playing around with tools in the head involved hours of labour and love as my thinking changed through probing conceptual challenges which influenced my approach to field trips, visual and verbal data gathering and the overall orchestration of the exhibition. For example, the landscape of the Mt. Moffatt region remained separate from me until I could find some connecting link. This link came in the form of stories previously unheard and meetings with local residents previously unknown.

Similarly, the computer, previously unused as an art tool, had seemed alien to my way of thinking and inappropriate for my way of working. However, as noted in Section 6.7, I discovered that, on reviewing my images, I could use them as a means of becoming more familiar with the mechanical functions of the machine so that the machine might serve as an extension link in the chain of image making. In this way I was compelled to find new ways of telling my visual story which involved using my imaginative capacity as a more

powerful tool which, unwittingly, I had been priming through previous experiences but, which, until now, I had not needed to use in such a way.

If tinkering with ideas or objects might allow someone to sense some degree of fulfilment, this suggests that play is important in arriving at a new way of thinking. As demonstrated in my own work, the time I spent playing, albeit labouriously, on the computer was crucial to becoming familiar with a strange tool and, in becoming aware of the technological impact on the way in which we can make images, I am now alerted to the changing conditions outside the artworld that imply that artistic integrity may need to be redefined. By this I mean that the impact of mass media images in advertising, television, film and computer games might contribute to our definition of art.

- The implication is that meaning may be thrust upon us as a technological imaged view of things, objectified and personified in inanimate machines while we, caught in the prism of language and artistic conventions, do not have the cultivated visual skills to read anew unless we play around with images, media, and technology. If possibilities exist for distortion of visual elements and principles to suggest ways in which normally static artworks may be translated using sound and movement, such possibilities have implications for further investigation on my behalf.

7.3.1.6 Singular Aspect Of Experience.

In vacillating between habitual and new ways of working I became intensely aware of both the labour and passion needed to continue with the images because I did need moments of magic when the watercolour flowed in contrast to the hours of physical struggle in executing the drawings. However, I did notice that, as I became more obsessed with the story and more skilful in using the drawing medium, I became less aware of the physical pain caused by constantly reaching above my shoulders to draw on such a large scale, and the anxiety of balancing on stools.

- The relationship between mental concentration and bodily discomfort suggests a correlation between acceleration of aesthetic sensibilities, mastery of skill and diminution of physical pain, which suggests an area worthy of further research into artistic practice in which some works appear to defy abilities required by normal work habits. If aesthetic fulfilment negates bodily discomfort, this implies that bodily discomfort might be a prerequisite for extraordinary performance.

On reflection, I can identify instances in which mental challenge was greater, for example, my period of floundering when I heard of the change in exhibition space (Section 6.3), while, at other times, my process of change was organic as I grew into thinking anew, for example my on-going dialogue with maps (Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). Thus my experiences varied depending on the degree of intensity and effort required to resolve a collision of forces and re-establish some sense of balance in my total being which only came through intensified awareness of links between personal artistic challenge and wider functions of artistic behaviour. For example, my developing knowledge of architectural design exemplified in building my house and, my reliance on maps as symbolic representations of relationships in surroundings, suggested possible solutions to idiosyncratic art problems. Recognition of such relationships implies that my artistic practice must question segregationist social conventions in which ways of knowing are separated.

- Such transference of knowledge and skills from the communal to the personal implies that any schisms within the Discourse of Art are superficial. If members of the Art Discourse maintain that artistic thinking is different and unique to such members, might not such a claim advocate cultivation of one form of intelligence while ignoring other ways in which persons understand their environment. If different forms of linguistic symbol systems are tolerated, might not similar tolerance be extended to visual symbol systems? Research into possible ways of reconciling different kinds of artistic demands appeased by different visual symbol systems emerging in our global community is needed.

Owing to the fact that personal experience is personal, it can be suggested that increased or decreased neural firing happens inside one's head, often not recognised or noticed by others. We can review (Section 6.4) my initial resistance to using the computer in my own work owing to the possibility of producing *mechanically slick* images. However, this knowledge is available only to those who read this documented research or to whom I have spoken. For others who may have flicked through my folio of computer manipulated images at the exhibition, there was evidence of my having used the computer but no evidence of the dilemmas in my thinking.

As highlighted in Section 6.7, my process of thinking is demonstrated externally only if I am prepared to display some evidence of my experience through some mode of objectification via artistic or linguistic conventions. These conventions allow others to interpret or translate my experience which, of course, is no longer only my experience, but theirs through their processes of interpretation or translation. However, it is possible that persons, closely affiliated within discourse norms and conventions, might tend to think in similar fashion and thus presume to understand another member's way of thinking. Or, conversely, because someone is considered a member of a particular discourse, one might presume he or she is thinking in a certain fashion and thus deny the possibility that a particular person is thinking beyond the boundaries of normal discourse conventions. Or, one might think a member is transgressing the bounds of discourse conventions and thus attempt to correct what might be considered wayward thinking. Whatever the case, it can be suggested that no one, other than the person doing the thinking, can really interpret or translate such thoughts.

- This research demonstrates one artist's way of thinking and, in so doing, suggests a methodology which transgresses conventional research and questions discourse norms. In examining my own process of making sense of self in the environment, my sense of self changed as I recognised boundaries beyond self which include a peculiar set of artistic conventions which might impede personal experiential reality and inhibit transference skills. It is possible that other artists might experience similar changes

given the opportunity or given awareness of such changes while yet being unaware of avenues for disclosure. If such is the case, this research suggests a methodology that, in being primarily autobiographical, might allow further probing into art as personal experience.

7.3.2 Discourse Norms.

If one is comfortable in using various cognitive skills which, through practice and increased complexity, contribute to one's feeling of well-being, this implies that one acquires certain ways of thinking and behaving from which one forms habitual expectations. Hence, congruity with one's internal conception, image, or schema of a referent determines how easily one can process the information thus implying that the formal principles of the High Art Discourse are reinforced and contribute to fostering one's ongoing need to maintain or enhance a position within a specific group of people clearly regulated by the High Art Discourse. Thus, in recognising behavioural tendencies of human beings as a process of survival, this might imply that hard won opinions of acknowledged experts and those closely aligned with High Art Discourse norms might militate against experimentation and playing around with artistic processes in related discourses such as art education.

In returning to the key research question of whether or not links might be found between art as individual expression and art as a social construct, we can hypothesise that such links are possible if a shift in focus is demonstrated away from a self-focus-environment to one on self-within-the-environment. Using my own experience as an example, I admit to such a change in focus and, if meaningfulness is internal to myself as outlined in this research, this personal meaningfulness is a result of the varied and unusual relationships in which I found myself during this investigation into my own art practice. Within such systems of relations I have identified some of the forces that have compelled me to think otherwise than previously.

From an artistic perspective I argue that such forces are not mutually exclusive. Rather, awareness of these forces has influenced my artistic consciousness to such a degree that meaningful experience from my viewpoint must now embrace artistic articulation as an integrated behavioural process of making sense of self within the environment.

Given that I am only one person within the basic category of humans and, given that all people have generic primitives in their biological make-up, the implications of my experience must have implications for others. Thus links are possible between personal artistic experience and the wider community.

7.3.3 Implications Arising From Viewer Responses:

Viewer responses demonstrate that personal relevance, recognition of patterns, a sense of heightened inquiry and correlations between linguistic signs and visual symbols are necessary if artworks are to suggest links between the works and a viewer. Such links facilitate understanding by viewers beyond merely paying attention to an individual demonstration of idiosyncratic expression on behalf of the creator of the artwork.

7.3.3.1 *Personal Relevance.*

It can be suggested that relevance is a crucial factor in viewer experience of artworks because, in seeking connections between the artwork and self, one can be seen to have some stake in the connection. No doubt this affects the way one feels implying that a sense of survival informs our actions and, if this is the case, the need to resolve anxiety, ambiguity and conflict entails personal effort. However, if there is a discrepancy between the task and action, and the required effort considered too great, a person may avoid personal effort and reject the challenge of inquiry.

While I have no way of knowing how other people might use their capacity to imagine, it is possible to note the way in which various persons nominated different things that excited their senses and affected their way of experiencing the exhibition personally. For example, one viewer reflected that the exhibition "[B]rought back memories of 'horse &

buggy' days as a child" while another "... could make connections with my own life (via artefacts/maps/images)". Further comments highlighted capacities to "...feel history through art"; to "identify" with the subject matter; to feel "at home", and to "... arouse a much strong (sic), fuller reaction".

In contrast, no such personal relevance was reported with regard to viewing the computerized images. Yet it was informally noted and recorded on video at the opening of the exhibition that various people did spend time playing on the computer. Hence the data are not available to gain a clear sense of the computer's impact on people. For example, the viewer who left the 'dust storm' on the computer screen did not know whether I would, or would not, find such evidence of his or her experience. Other than a visual sign that this person had manipulated one of my images and appeared to have experienced some sense of gratification as the image and message implied, no one, other than the person who played on the machine and who left the message, has any real notion of what was actually experienced in the playing.

If such associations demonstrate relevance to the viewer as evidenced by comments to the actual images, why is it that no such recorded associations were evoked by the computerized images? Might this indicate that viewers are more comfortable with looking at displayed artworks than using a machine to access the images? Might the need to use physical skills in using a computer act as a distraction to some viewers? Might a computerized image be compared to a reproduction in a text and thus considered only as a substitute for the real thing? Investigation into these questions might expose a need to maintain and develop primary sensory experience alongside new technological advancements. Given that computers and television are now part of our everyday living and if these technological tools are now used to produce metaphorical 'maps' whereby one might be located in time and space depending on the data accessed by the viewer or user, might this mean that new perceptual patterns need to be developed? If the electrical circuitry of the computer acts much faster than the brain yet is much slower in manipulating complex problems, this raises the possibility that computerized images

might present a greater time dislocation than viewing images in a normal way owing to the mismatch between idiosyncratic human electrical circuitry and standard mechanical electrical circuitry.

- Implications for art education lie in investigating concepts of time required for processing visual information and exploring ways in which an orchestration of reciprocal physical sensory experience and personal associations might be extended to include technological tools in providing a richer context for viewing artworks. Questions relating to whether or not the use of such technology might hinder the mutual action between the sensory system and the neural network and deprive one of the physical and sensory basis for abstract understanding suggest fruitful avenues for further research. Research into such a problematic mismatch between personal and mechanical time is necessary owing to the increasing use of computers by both artists and students.

7.3.3.2 Recognition of Patterns.

Responses to similarity of treatment and the regular placement of the images demonstrate the way in which patterns facilitate ways of interpreting artworks in a context such as an exhibition. Admittedly, few viewers followed the sequential placement of the images as designed in my layout but many reported that they enjoyed the challenge of forming their own patterns of viewing which, it can be hypothesised, were facilitated by drawing on past associations, access to the story and interest in the three dimensional artefacts.

This implies that, in attempting to achieve unity and a state of equilibrium, we use an organizing capacity to determine the character of the ensuing whole which depends on how we identify particular aspects that we scrutinise in forming a judgement that involves using conscious will. For example some observations highlighted "an interesting 'connection'"; associations because "[T]he use of charcoal/scratched images - seemed almost 'real' for the time"; enjoyment of "... subject matter [that] can actually be understood" or "... easily enjoyed by all"; and preference for "the watercolour creek

works, particularly the combination of these with the charcoal drawings (around the border) on thick brown paper".

While it is agreed that the mind functions with incredible speed and makes rapid complex judgements, it is also agreed that the human visual system fatigues quickly. Nevertheless, it appears that a cognitive schema directs eye movements depending on the intention of the viewer which, on the one hand, might enable parsimonious selection of visual information or, on the other hand, provide random information. In either case the organizing capacity utilized to make sense of the visual information varies for each person.

- Given that all humans have biological primitives which provide a physical basis for abstract understanding and allow them to function in normal everyday stable situations, it can be suggested that the human need for stable organization underpins a below-conscious-everyday-occurrence that is taken for granted until a system of forces upsets this sense of stability. What are some of the ways in which art educators might utilize knowledge of visual composition principles in identifying which external forces might strengthen or inhibit one's sense of stability if patterns so recognised are, or are not, upset? Is it possible to apply an awareness of visual design to understanding the patterns formed between sensory and neural networking? Research into the mutual sensory and neural networking is needed to identify such patterns and such research might most fruitfully be done by those skilled in using patterns. The implication for art educators lies in the possibility of extending their heightened imaginative capacity to visualize connections between disparate elements to contexts beyond the art discourse.

7.3.3.3 Sense of Inquiry.

Responses indicate that enrichment might be facilitated when images demand stronger degrees of effort on behalf of viewers. For example, a comment such as "... the viewer was forced to inquire more as opposed to simply viewing and moving on" implies that, for this person, deliberate and focussed thinking was required. Other comments

highlighted such consciousness whereby phrases such as "helps build the feelings of empathy", "makes you look more closely", "evoked strong historical sense of time", "made it come 'alive'", "I like to understand", "taught you", "brought it to life" imply that these people also were obliged to move beyond interpreting the visual data through explanation to a more demanding process of recoding the imagery into some form of personal experience whereby effort was required to think beyond the surface of the images.

Yet we can recall the initial dissonance displayed by many viewers at the prospect of walking on an artwork which, over time, was resolved as evidenced by 82 per cent of responses indicating enjoyment gained from walking on the visual map. An implication to be drawn from such modified behaviour suggests that recontextualisation of images might provide enriched experience for viewers if viewers are able to make connections between a new task and familiar behaviour.

If various people are motivated to exercise varying degrees of perceptual effort in deciding what is meaningful to them, does this mean that either repetition or novelty plays the dominant role in determining which neurons are stimulated most in activating the cognitive tools thus giving rise to individual thought processes that, in the main, strive towards the most efficient mode of survival? On the one hand it might be that the familiar offers ease of initial interpretation by allowing people to feel comfortable which highlights the fact that a desire to solve problems and to experiment is not normal. On the other hand, this research suggests that curiosity plays a strong role in motivating persons to do something and that children, in particular, display a willingness to explore things in an unusual context.

- There may be a potential conflict between the valences of the known and unknown which, in the art discourse, poses a problem for further investigation. Is it possible that repetition and training might perpetuate norms according to discourse conventions and, if this is the case, how might we resolve dissonance between habituated comfort

zones and risk taking? Might such norms curtail capacities for experiencing things in unusual contexts albeit experimentation in making images is advocated? If a dislocation exists between making artworks and viewing artworks, might this mean that the language of art is idiosyncratic to the extent of being recognised as a system of dialects, and if such is the case, what are the possibilities for creating links between such dialects?

7.3.3.4 Narrative As Metaphorical Conduit.

Responses to the questionnaire suggest the influential role played by narrative in allowing people to experience artworks through cultivating personal association and memories as metaphorical links between past bodily association and a visual symbol. One comment draws attention to a heightened sense of involvement "... because I was able to 'place' artwork in the narrative" and another viewer opined: "[N]ot only did the writing draw you in but gave life/meaning to the picture". In this way metaphorical projections, such as walking back in time, feeling history through art, and pictures that live as if they were a diary entry at the time, were facilitated. Some viewer responses indicated changes in thinking occasioned by various codes within the exhibition which cultivated more complex mental skills such as linking hitherto unrelated ideas as demonstrated by those viewers who did re-think their previous opinion of the function of art as a result of participating in the exhibition.

Such responses point to ways in which we can grasp an unfamiliar idea or thing by linking the familiar to the strange through metaphorical association that allows us to feel at 'one' with the object or situation in that connections are made in the mind between a state of familiarity and a new experience. Further, such metaphorical association implies that artworks become an extension of who we are and, by bringing into focus our immediate situation and aspects of lived experiences, connect us to a wider social group in which our sense of identity is formulated.

For example, a subsequent letter from councillors of the Booringa Shire (Appendix F.4), asking if I might allow them to display the exhibition at Mitchell for the opening of a major artesian spa in April, 1998, suggests not only personal involvement of those who travelled to see the exhibition, but the possibility of wider community involvement resulting from a person's re-telling of his or her actual experience which may have stimulated an internal sense of reality and meaningfulness drawn from associations stimulated by the exhibition.

Another example of the way in which the exhibition stimulated new connections between the familiar and the strange can be seen in the song composed by the teacher who visited the exhibition with one group of students yet composed the song with a new group of students. (Appendix F.5) Through interpretation of the narrative and images using music, this song demonstrates how certain persons related to specific aspects of the exhibition which motivated another telling from a varied viewpoint thus extending a sense of lived experiences to others through a different medium.

Yet another example of this possibility for connection through imagery is demonstrated by a recent request from a member of the Injune community to provide works from *Moonlighting in Moffatt* for the opening of a new Community Centre in 1999. In this way, images may be seen as a symbolic link between people, places and time which, through the possibility of bodily and metaphoric connections, fosters a sense of familiarity with something that was once strange.

- It can be suggested that our environment is changing and whilst many biological needs are now appeased through an ability to purchase rather than an ability to produce, such purchase power does not appear sufficient for personal fulfilment. Such a void might be filled by a peculiar external force of vicarious experience that may require an equally potent internal force of personal experience so that one might control one's primitive need to feel good and make things special. It is possible that the positive response to *Moonlighting in Moffatt* confirms a return to such heroic fables as those of *Robin*

Hood, Zorro, and *Hercules* which might imply a biological need for people to find some spiritual fulfilment beyond the mundane appeasement of bodily needs. Such a change in our environment suggests an area for further research into the potential of using visual narrative as a means of linking singular persons to a wider social group through cultivating metaphorical projections within and across similar and dissimilar contexts.

7.3.3.5 *Linguistic Limitations.*

Viewer responses indicate the willingness with which people proffered opinions regarding such universal things as subject matter, technique, medium, treatment and other, thus implying an ability to respond to conventional, all-embracing possibilities. However, while art terms appear to be incidental to personal experience given the unreliability of the ways in which people describe how they use basic and reliable biological "primitives" such as recognition of lines, figure/ground, edges and contrasts in discerning subject matter, technique, medium, treatment or other, the use of communal linguistic terms appear to offer familiar ways of telling about internal experience as exemplified in the many unsolicited comments. For example, the use of generic terms such as "interesting", "memories", "real", "inviting" "curious" "encouraging" and "appealing", implies that such terms allow one to interpret recognizable aspects of what is perceived using generally accepted linguistic terms.

However, it might be possible that many people are not really aware of how biological "primitives" work because the functioning of the eye and mind is so quick that we take it for granted. In fact, we might imply that such basics are reliable factors owing to the way in which the human sensory system and the corresponding neural network has evolved and remained structurally unchanged for thousands of years while it is the interpretation of such basics that might cause problems for some people.

Further, the use of words such as "involved", "make connections", "felt", "seemed to live" and "feelings of empathy" suggest that a work of art writes itself on the perceiver's

body to the extent that one is at home with the work but, while such terms might imply a stronger response to a stimulus and a particular kind of experience, we have no way of identifying degrees of shock, effort or excitement integral to another's experience and thus we cannot confirm or deny if someone else has experienced something. It is possible that such linguistic terms are not adequate for the translation process required to express an artistic experience.

However, it might be possible that such linguistic terms suggest similar background experiences that allowed singular persons to make some sense of the exhibition and, the *way* in which each person made peculiar sense of the information is demonstrated by the use of more explicit phrases such as "... brought the subject to life" so that "[T]his exhibition has really allowed the ordinary person (to) enjoy" and "[I]t makes me feel at home". Such phrases might imply enhanced competency in using linguistic terms but do not necessarily imply enhanced awareness of artistic experience. It is possible that someone who stood quietly in front of an image may have sensed greater agitation or fulfilment within his or her total being than another talking and writing about the image.

Similarly it is possible that someone playing on the computer may have sensed great agitation or fulfilment but, lacking the skills or not wishing to use the skills of translation, remained silent. This might imply that playing around with someone else's images on a computer might be a means of acquiring some knowledge about the art discourse, or knowledge about how the computer works, or it might imply play for the sake of play.

- If conventional and familiar linguistic terms are more easily accessed to describe and interpret images albeit the terms lack exactness, this implies that sequencing and pattern are linguistic principles that facilitate links between visual and verbal content. If this is the case, investigation into an understanding of the way in which language functions in a sequential and coherent manner to the arrangement of concepts, and whether or not such learned conventions might be applied to the making of images has implications for developing transference skills in students. Further research into this

area might prove fruitful in that unrecognised links between basic visual and linguistic language functions may be discovered.

Thus, in concluding an examination of the tools used in playing with personal experience from an artist's perspective, external constraints, bodily awareness, translation possibilities suggested by technological advances, integration of self as a component within the environment, and on-going yarns woven with visual and verbal ingredients suggest new challenges. While, from the perspective of an art educator, forces that might upset the balance between physical and mental equilibrium, the increasing influence of vicarious experience, possible conflict between conforming to High Art norms and investigating the unknown beyond High Art norms, and investigation into transference skills between the visual and verbal suggest areas for further research if art as personal experience is to be probed more deeply.

It might be that any perceived schisms within the Art Discourse appear to lie in an inability to enjoy and appreciate each other's art which highlights different attitudes based on some form of idiosyncratic judgement that reinforces peculiar knowledge and, in doing so, confirms an objectivist body-mind separation and denies the possibility of art as personal experience. This implies that, for many people, art is an institution that requires a particular type of behaviour and a specific type of thinking sanctioned by members of the High Art Discourse. To re-structure art as personal experience implies playing with the different possibilities opened up by changing conditions outside the High Art Discourse and, based on my changed artistic experience and the way in which the product of such personal experience could thence be used by others in a manner of *moonlighting* whereby *my* images became *their* associations, this research suggests ways in which we might play with the qualitatively elusive differences between kinds of perceptual consciousness.

APPENDIX A: THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE KENNIFF

STORY

Story A: Written from the perspective of Authorities

The Kenniff Brothers: Moonlighting in Moffatt.

Story B: Written from the perspective of the Battlers.

Moonlighting in Moffatt: The Kenniff Brothers.

The Kenniff Brothers:
Moonlighting in Moffatt.

On the 12th January, 1903, a thirty seven year old man was hanged at Boggo Road Gaol for murder. His name was Patrick Kenniff. His younger brother, Jimmy, was discharged from prison in November, 1914 and died in northern Queensland in 1940. Both brothers had stood trial for the ghoulish murders of Constable George Doyle, and Albert Christian Dahlke, that took place in Lethbridge's Pocket in the Mt. Moffatt area of central western Queensland on Easter Sunday, March 30th 1902.

The Kenniff brothers had a history of 'duffing' and horse stealing in the Taree district of northern New South Wales where their parents, James and Mary, had reunited with the Irish clan of Kenniffs in 1863.

Five years later, 'Old Kenniff' and his sons headed into western Queensland where they leased "Borer Block", a useless cattle run north of Augathella, but situated on the Warrego River and surrounded by the big cattle stations "Hoganthulla", "Bogarella", "Nive Downs" and "Killarney". They registered their cattle brand U lateral K, 6, in preparation for business. Further north of "Borer Block" lay the vast cattle stations of "Babbiloora", "Carnarvon", and "Meteor Downs" that, by 1897, were owned by James Tyson who died in the following year without having made a will.

The Kenniff lease on "Borer Block" expired after a year, in which time they had accumulated around two hundred head of cattle and thirty horses that they then ran on "Ralph" block, a centrally located block bordering "Carnarvon" Station. From time to time foodstuff, clothing, saddlery, guns and horses were 'lifted' from various properties, and early the following year both Pat and Jimmy were arrested for horse stealing.

On the way to the Tambo lockup the party stopped for lunch at "Mount Playfair" homestead, and, when back on the road, one policeman stopped to relieve himself, the brothers seized the opportunity to escape. They left the stolen horses in a paddock back at "Mount Playfair" with a taunting note and the "police bracelets" (the handcuffs, removed by a mate) tied around the neck of one horse.

Again that same year, 1895, the brothers were caught for horse stealing, with Patrick serving three years at St. Helena Island and Jimmy serving two years.

Two years later both Pat and Jimmy Kenniff were back in the Ranges. They set up camp near a permanent waterhole on the Carnarvon Creek on "Ralph" block where they kept 'open camp' for 'gully-raking' mates. The country had areas of open black soil flats, hills and sandy ridges that made it ideal for poddy-dodging and hiding stock. An outlaw code developed that cloaked stealing cleanskins in terms of 'duffing', 'gully-raking', 'moonlighting' and 'poddy-dodging', and this practice favoured a type of desperado mateship that grew throughout the countryside. On the other hand 'duffing' was a worry to honest landowners who feared that "scoundrels" armed with guns were making their home in the ranges.

Within twelve years of their arrival in Queensland, the Kenniff brothers had gained a reputation as outlaws, scalpers, capable stockmen and crack shots. They were well known in the district that stretched from Tambo in the west, to Rockhampton in the north and Brisbane in the south. In particular, Jimmy was a frequent racegoer, an outstanding horse-breaker, and a young man who hated men of authority. He was given the nickname of "Kingpin" owing to his quarrelsome nature and use of foul punches.

With the death of Tyson in 1898 leaving a vast empire of unbranded cattle, horses and 1266 square miles of unattended countryside, the 'duffing' business grew rapidly. This year was a crucial one for the Kenniffs. By November, Pat, and a crony James Lawton, had forty horses they planned to sell at Toowoomba, and Jimmy had a herd of some one thousand cleanskins he could call his own. The plan to sell the horses at Toowoomba led to the robbery of Hunter and Company's general store at Yuleba. The robbery acted as a diversion and thus enabled Pat and his party to load the horses onto the train without the inconvenience of a police stock inspection. Instead, the unsuspecting police were busy at the site of the robbery.

An open cheque stolen from Hunter's store was used by Pat to purchase a suit in Toowoomba, and money from the sale of the horses was squandered at the Seurat races. Another mob of horses was then 'assembled' to provide a cash flow for the Kenniffs.

The police kept a watchful eye on all activities of the brothers and issued a warrant for the arrest of Jimmy after the alleged theft of a grey gelding. However, the Kenniffs were confident that with the help of a good lawyer they could get the charges dismissed, so they decided to sell enough cattle to cover the costs and give themselves up. With the help of cronies they mustered around four hundred and sixty fat cattle and started droving them to Roma for sale. They were stopped by police at Charleville who fined 'Old Kenniff' £20/15/4 for a faulty waybill. Jimmy had sensed the presence of police shadowing the drive and had left the group at "Forest Vale" where he had threatened one of the Lethbridge boys to "knock out [his] brains" with a stirrup iron if police were on the property.

Later in Roma he boasted of his triumphs to cronies thus increasing the embarrassment and determination of the police. Jimmy was captured a few days later on "Ralph" by a police party led by Constable Tighe, and a pre-trial hearing was set at the Charleville District Court. However, the grey gelding could not be found, so charges against Jimmy were dropped, and Pat, presuming that he would have similar success concerning the matter of the cheque, surrendered. Pat Kenniff was justly sentenced in Roma to three years imprisonment at St. Helena.

While Pat was serving his sentence and renewing criminal acquaintances, Jimmy was busy picking up cleanskins, confronting landholders and picking fights. At the same time, Charles Pearson Tom, manager of "Mt. Moffatt" station, was fed up with the constant flow of missing cattle and stolen goods in times that were dry and becoming financially difficult. He suggested cancellation of the Kenniff lease on the 'duffer's haven' "Ralph" in the hopes of ridding the district of this menace, and Albert Dahlke was appointed as manager of "Carnarvon" and "Babiloora" to restore order to these properties. The "Ralph" block was bought by the Collins family and Dahlke asked Jimmy to move off with his one thousand suspect head of cattle which Jimmy then sold to a Mr. Knowles for £1100.

Without property, and burning with resentment, Jimmy and his father set up camp in Lethbridge's Pocket at the top end of "Meteor Downs". This area is a kidney shaped valley four kilometres long with ridges, deep, rough, gorges, and a creek containing waterholes and caves.

In October, 1900, Jimmy and 'Old Kenniff' decided to cash in most of their horses, and, after mustering sixty seven head set off south selling horses along the way at Armidale and Tamworth. With the proceeds Jimmy decided to buy a string of good horses including a champion brown gelding, 'Darrimundi', and, by mid 1901 he had gambled and spent £1200 in a time when the average weekly

wage was £1/10/-. He and his father were left with a handful of racehorses and no option but to return to the wilds of Lethbridge's Pocket.

On October 31st, 1901, two well-bred mares disappeared from "Lansdowne" station, and the police, now established in a police station on the "Ralph" block, were suspicious that Jimmy was back in business. Pat was released from gaol in November, and was furious to find his father and brother broke and landless. In the next couple of months he and Jimmy rounded up thirty six horses from the Peawaddy and Meteor Creek areas and branded them with their obsolete brand. They were caught by a police patrol led by the new and very capable, Constable Doyle, and assisted by Charles Tom of "Mt. Moffatt". Jimmy escaped and later Pat was released because no one would identify the particular mare Doyle knew was stolen. The horses were returned to Pat who sold them immediately and, finding himself without a mount, stole a chestnut horse belonging to Constable Cleary for his return journey back to the Pocket.

By this time the district was in the grips of a terrible drought, and both the police and landholders were utterly fed up with raids on stock and property, and time and money wasted in drawn-out searches. Mounting levels of fear rose across the parched properties as the brothers and their cronies roamed the Ranges carrying Winchesters and revolvers on a campaign of crime and intimidation culminating in the theft of a bay pony mare belonging to George Hunt. Warrants were issued for their arrest. Constable Doyle headed the search patrol, but, as he was unfamiliar with the Lethbridge Pocket area he accepted Dahlke's offer of assistance. An Aboriginal tracker, Sam Johnson was the third member of the patrol. Plans were made for a simple surprise raid on the Kenniff camp in the next couple of days.

On Thursday, March 27th, 1902, Albert Dahlke, wearing a faded, old, black serge coat and glass-headed pins in his lapel, rode his favourite saddle mare "Boadicea" to the "Ralph" police station. The pins had been given to him by Mrs Collins of "Tamrookum", and his mother had used them to pin flowers on his coat when he left. Early the next morning the equipment was placed on the pack horse "Dandy Pat" for the trip to Mt. Moffatt station. Doyle, carrying the only firearm, road his police horse "George", and Sam Johnson rode "Tommy Dodd".

The party spent that night at "Mt Moffatt" with Charlie Tom before going onto "Marlong Plain" where they made camp.

The following morning, Easter Sunday, as they were heading into "Lethbridge's Pocket" the police party was surprised by Pat, Jimmy and young brother Tom unsuspectingly riding up a gully towards them. The brothers discarded the two pack horses and split in two directions - Jimmy east out of the gully across level ground, and Pat and Tom south up an incline. Doyle and Dahlke chased Jimmy whom they caught, and, on Sam Johnson's arrival, sent him back to the pack horse to get the handcuffs.

When dismounting, Sam Johnson heard a shot fired, then another shot and then three more in quick succession. Frightened, Johnson remounted and, leading the pack horse, saw Pat and Jimmy galloping towards him. He let the pack horse go, turned, and fled nineteen kilometres to the mustering camp at the Pump Hole where he alerted James Burke. Burke accompanied Johnson back to "Lethbridge's Pocket" and found Doyle's empty pack bags, two pairs of hobbles, one billycan, a small swag, and "Boadicea" with saddle stained with fresh blood.

James Burke returned to the Pump Hole, and Sam Johnson hurried to Mt Moffatt to raise the

alarm. Charlie Tom then rode over two hundred kilometres to Mitchell police changing horses at "Crystal Brook" and "Forest Vale" on the way.

When Burke went back to the spot of the shooting he found that the pack bags and other things had vanished, but signs of three small fires remained. In the ashes he found clotted blood, and at the foot of a tree two pairs of spurs he recognised as belonging to Doyle and Dahlke. Later, police found Doyle's surcingle, two bullet marks and, further towards 'Old Kenniff's' campsite, Doyle's horse "George" standing miserably with saddle and bridle still on, but missing the saddlecloth and off stirrup iron.

Pack bags were thrown over the saddle and in the revolver pouch was Doyle's .442 Webley with one spent cartridge. Doyle's pipe was in the saddle pouch and the gruesome contents of the pack bags revealed charcoal, burnt bone, two buttons, a couple of teeth, an armlet metal clasp and two unusual pins. These, the nauseating smell, and burnt fat and flesh in rock cracks were the only remains of Constable Doyle and
the young manager Albert Dahlke.

During the next two months the largest manhunt in Queensland history began with forty police combing the Ranges for Pat and Jimmy Kenniff. Warrants for their arrest were issued, a reward of £1000 offered, and calico posters tacked up throughout the district. The cost to the taxpayer was £4,601/2/2 including the reward.

After the event Pat and Jimmy stole three horses from "Merivale" and finally hid on James and Kate Boyce's property, "Hutton Vale", where they were sighted in May and the police alerted. The police plan was to split up and comb the property, and, if any member of the party spotted anything, to fire a shot as the signal for all to converge. However, the Kenniff brothers, unaware of the police presence, shot one of their starving horses

and the police party prematurely rushed in the direction of the shot to find two saddles, a bag full of cut grass, a pair of white blankets, a full water bag, some .38 calibre Winchester ammunition on the ground, a black gelding, grey mare and, one hundred metres away, the dead chestnut gelding lying on the ground. There was no sign of the Kenniffs. However a second camp was later found that showed signs of warm ashes, gear and foodstuffs, and horses being tied up for several weeks.

The Kenniffs were again on the run. In the next month they raided "Westgrove", a dray at Mitchell, a kitchen at Morven and a drover's camp to pick up supplies and horses. Another raid took place on Sunday, June 22nd, when John Eaton reported a bag of wheat stolen from a shed on his farm six kilometres south of Mitchell near Bottle Tree Gate on the St. George Road.

The police, led by Constable Tasker, followed the wheat track and planned a surprise morning raid by sneaking up the ridge where the Kenniffs were camped. The surprise was lost - a pyjama-clad Pat stood looking over the brow of the hill and yelled a warning to Jimmy. The brothers fled on foot, a policeman shot the two mares, Pat tripped and fell, was captured and handcuffed. Jimmy surrendered.

After one of the most public trials in Brisbane that lasted six days a verdict of 'guilty' was handed down by the State's Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith. However, on a point of law, Jimmy's sentence was commuted to imprisonment with hard labour, and Patrick was condemned to hang.

At 8 am on Monday, January 12th, 1903, Patrick Kenniff was hanged and later buried in South Brisbane Cemetery.

Moonlighting in Moffatt:
The Kenniff Brothers

On the 12th January, 1903, hundreds of people were outraged when an Irishman, Patrick Kenniff, was hanged at Boggo Road Gaol for suspected murder. His younger brother, Jimmy, was discharged from prison on November 11th, 1914 and died in northern Queensland in 1940. Both brothers had stood trial for the alleged murders of Constable George Doyle, and Albert Dahlke, that took place in Lethbridge's Pocket, Mt. Moffatt, on Easter Sunday, March 30th 1902. Many people thought the brothers were innocent victims of the British legal system.

In 1863, the Kenniff family, James Senior, his wife Mary, and their eight surviving children had reunited with the Irish clan of Kenniffs in the Taree district of northern New South Wales after trying to eke out a living in other parts of the state. The brothers, Patrick and young Jimmy, had soon gained a reputation as gutsy 'dare-devils' through incredible feats of riding as they participated in the current sports of 'poddy dodging' and outwitting police that were common amongst members of the working class. Oppression by authorities was not new to many Irish immigrants in the early days of Australia's history, and pinching the odd 'bull' had strong roots of bravery and fey fun in Irish mythology where cattle, horses and hounds demanded respect, caused wars and raids, and brought honour to their possessors.

But this honour was not to come to the Kenniffs in Taree. Instead, the brothers, Patrick and Jimmy, were hounded by police and finally they moved to Queensland in the summer of 1888 with their father, James Senior known as 'Old Kenniff'.

Five years later 'Old Kenniff', Patrick and Jimmy leased "Borer Block", a useless cattle run north of Augathella, but situated on the Warrego River and surrounded by big cattle stations. They registered their cattle brand U lateral K, 6, and settled as graziers in the district.

By this time the Kenniff brothers had gained a reputation as excellent stockmen and crack shots. They were well known in the district that stretched from Tambo in the west, to Rockhampton in the north and Brisbane in the south. In particular, Jimmy was a frequent racegoer, an outstanding horse-breaker, and a young man who, amongst others, despised men of authority.

By 1894 the Kenniffs has accumulated around two hundred head of cattle and thirty horses that they ran on "Ralph" block bordering "Carnarvon" Station. From time to time foodstuff, clothing, saddlery, guns and horses were 'lifted' from various properties, but for many this was all part of the game of survival, and, like any sport the 'fouls' were tolerated and often became the stuff of stories, such as the time Jimmy and Pat, arrested for horse stealing, gave the police back their "bracelets" on January 16th, 1895.

On the way to the Tambo lockup the party had stopped for a sumptuous lunch at "Mount Playfair" homestead and, when back on the road one policeman had stopped to relieve himself, the brothers took off back to "Mount Playfair" where they put the horses in a paddock with an attached note and the "police bracelets" (the handcuffs removed by a sympathetic blacksmith) tied around the neck of one horse!

Horses were a passion for the two brothers and the thrill of riding a good horse added to the fun of 'moonlighting', and success on the racetrack. The mountainous areas of Carnarvon and Mt. Moffatt were ideal for hiding and seeking cattle, and the surrounding lowland towns provided recreation, relief and support

for the many squatters who rushed to take up runs in the Maranoa and Warrego districts in 1895 when Queensland separated from New South Wales. From time to time up to ten land-hungry men would sleep on the floor of "Mount Abundance" station, ten kilometres from Roma.

But life was not easy for battlers surrounded by vast cattle empires run by magnates and managers. To the north lay the vast cattle stations of "Babbiloora", "Carnarvon", and "Meteor Downs" that, by the end of 1897, were owned by the millionaire James Tyson.

The dream of owning giant tracks of land such as the 400,000 acres of "Mount Abundance", the 589 square miles of "Westgrove" or the 1266 square miles of Tyson's empire led many to false hope, despair, and dispute with authorities. Many fell foul of the law and often sought refuge at a camp set up by Pat and Jimmy near a permanent waterhole on the Carnarvon Creek on "Ralph" block where the Kenniffs kept 'open camp' for visitors.

With the death of Tyson in 1898 leaving a derelict empire of unbranded cattle, horses and 1266 square miles of unattended countryside, the 'duffing' business grew rapidly. This year was a crucial one for the Kenniffs. By November, Pat, and a mate James Lawton, had forty horses they planned to sell at Toowoomba, and Jimmy had a herd of some one thousand cleanskins. The plan to sell the horses at Toowoomba led to the dashing robbery of Hunter and Company's general store at Yuleba that acted as a diversion and thus enabled Pat and his party to load the horses onto the train without the inconvenience of a police stock inspection. Instead, the police were busy at the site of the robbery.

With money in his pocket after the successful horse sale, Pat was able to buy clothes and relax at the Seurat races over Christmas. But times had changed, and the once respectable survival sport of 'duffing' or 'poddy-dodging' from land barons was being curtailed.

The police continued to hound the brothers and a warrant was taken out for the arrest of Jimmy for the alleged theft of a grey gelding. The charge against Jimmy had to be dropped owing to lack of evidence, but Pat was not so lucky. His confession to taking an open cheque from Hunter's store gained him imprisonment for three years.

While Pat was serving his sentence Jimmy was busy picking up cleanskins from the derelict Tyson estate. However, Charles Tom, manager of "Mt. Moffatt" station, urged authorities to cancel the Kenniff lease on the "Ralph" block, and Albert Dahlke was appointed manager of "Carnarvon" and 'Babiloora". Meetings between Jimmy and Dahlke were confrontational, like two young bulls fighting for territory, and the gulf between establishment and battler dreams widened. Jimmy was ordered off "Ralph" and thus forced to sell his one thousand head of cattle to a Mr. Knowles for £1100.

Without property, Jimmy and his father set up camp in Lethbridge's Pocket at the top end of "Meteor Downs". This area is a kidney shaped valley four kilometres long with ridges, deep, rough gorges, and a creek containing waterholes and caves.

In October, 1900 the drought conditions forced Jimmy and 'Old Kenniff' to sell most of their horses, and, after mustering sixty seven head, they set off south selling horses along the way at Armidale and Tamworth. With the proceeds of £1200, Jimmy, who had been educated to Grade Four, was in charge of the money. He decided to buy a string of good horses including a champion brown gelding, 'Darrimundi'. The horses, in lieu of land, were a

status symbol, and Jimmy was prepared to gamble all to regain land and respect in the district. But he lost everything, and he and his father were left with a handful of racehorses and no option but to return to Lethbridge's Pocket.

Pat was released from jail on November 12th, 1901, to find his father and brother broke and landless. In the next couple of months he and Jimmy rounded up thirty six roaming horses from the Peawaddy and Meteor Creek areas and branded them with their old brand. However, they were apprehended by a police patrol led by Constable Doyle and assisted by Charles Tom of "Mt. Moffatt". Jimmy got away while the patrol wasted six days driving the horses back to Mitchell where Pat was released because no one could identify the particular mare Doyle had nominated as stolen. The horses were returned to Pat who sold them immediately and, finding himself without a mount, evened the score by borrowing Constable Cleary's chestnut horse for his return journey to Lethbridge's Pocket.

Desperate and relentlessly pursued by authorities, the brothers went on a campaign of revenge culminating in the theft of a bay pony mare belonging to George William Hunt. Warrants were issued for their arrest. Constable Doyle, unfamiliar with the Lethbridge Pocket area, accepted Dahlke's offer of assistance to locate the Kenniff camp, and an Aboriginal tracker, Sam Johnson was included as the third member of the patrol. Plans were made for a simple surprise raid on the Kenniff camp in the next couple of days.

On Thursday, March 27th, 1902, Albert Dahlke, in managerial attire of black serge coat and glass-headed pins in his lapel, rode his favourite saddle mare "Boadicea" to the Ralph police station. Early the next morning all necessary equipment was placed on the pack horse "Dandy Pat". Doyle, armed with rifle, road his police horse "George", and Sam Johnson rode "Tommy Dodd". The party spent that night at "Mt Moffatt" with Charlie Tom before moving on to "Marlong Plain" where they made camp.

The following morning, Easter Sunday, as they were heading into "Lethbridge's Pocket" Doyle, Dahlke and Johnson were surprised by Pat, Jimmy and young brother Tom unsuspectingly riding up a gully towards them. The brothers discarded the two pack horses and split in two directions - Jimmy east out of the gully across level ground, and Pat and Tom south up an incline. Doyle and Dahlke chased Jimmy whom they caught in three hundred metres and, on Sam Johnson's arrival, sent him back to the pack horse to get the handcuffs. When dismounting, Sam Johnson heard a shot fired, then another shot and then three more in quick succession. Frightened, Johnson remounted and, leading the pack horse, saw Pat and Jimmy galloping towards him. He let the pack horse go, turned, and fled nineteen kilometres to the mustering camp at the Pump Hole where he alerted James Burke. Burke accompanied Johnson back to "Lethbridge's Pocket" and found Doyle's empty pack bags, two pairs of hobbles, one billycan and small swag, and "Boadicea" with saddle and quart pot cover stained with fresh blood.

James Burke returned to the Pump Hole, and Sam Johnson to Mt Moffatt, to raise the alarm. Charlie Tom then rode to Mitchell police changing horses at "Crystal Brook" and "Forest Vale" on the way. When Burke went back to the spot of the shooting he found that the pack bags and other things had vanished, and only evidence of three small fires remained. In the ashes he found clotted blood, and at the foot of a tree two pairs of spurs he recognised as

belonging to Doyle and Dahlke. Later, police found Doyle's surcingle, two bullet marks and, further towards 'Old Kenniff's' campsite, Doyle's horse "George" standing with saddle and bridle still on, but missing the saddlecloth and off stirrup iron. Pack bags containing charcoal, burnt bone, two buttons, a couple of teeth, an armlet metal clasp and two unusual pins were thrown over the saddle.

During the next two months the largest manhunt in Queensland history began with forty police combing the Ranges for Pat and Jim Kenniff. Warrants for their arrest were issued, a reward of £1000 blazoned on calico posters tacked up throughout the district.

After the event Pat and Jimmy took three horses from "Merivale" and then hid on James and Kate Boyce's property, "Hutton Vale". Police were amazed at the amount of sympathy extended to the brothers. They had ignored the feelings of despair and hardship that ran deep within the hearts of the battlers stemming from a five year drought and oppressive authority, and they were unaware of the extent of Irish clanship that linked mates together across the country.

After being sighted at "Hutton Vale" the Kenniffs were again on the run, facing drought ravaged land and freezing nights. They left behind home baked rations, a starving horse shot out of kindness, and a paper describing "Darrimundi" lying by the campfire as remnants of a dream.

In the next month they made desperate raids at "Westgrove", Mitchell and Morven to pick up supplies and horses. Feeding horses was impossible and on June 22nd, John Eaton reported a bag of wheat taken from his farm shed south of Mitchell near Bottle Tree Gate on the St. George Road.

The police followed the wheat track left from feeding horses, and planned a surprise morning raid on the ridge where the brothers were camped. The surprise was lost - a pyjama-clad Pat looking over the brow of the hill yelled a warning to Jimmy. The brothers fled on foot, a policeman shot the two mares, Pat tripped and fell, was captured and handcuffed. Jimmy surrendered on condition that his brother was not hurt.

After one of the most public trials in Brisbane that lasted six days a verdict of 'guilty' was handed down by the State's Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith. Both Pat and Jimmy pleaded innocent. Two points were referred to the Supreme Court. Firstly there was no evidence before the jury of Constable Doyle's death, and secondly there was no evidence that the prisoners, James and Patrick Kenniff had acted in concert in committing the murder of Albert Dahlke.

The Judges Griffith, Cooper, Chubb and Real agreed to the first point, but could not agree that Jimmy acted in concert in committing the murder. Jimmy's sentence was commuted to imprisonment with hard labour, and Patrick was condemned to hang.

A delay in the execution was requested by thousands of supporters throughout Queensland as they rallied to raise money for further legal action and appealed to the Governor, Sir Herbert Chermside, to intervene. The determination of the authorities however, denied further delay for the proposed Privy Council appeal to be organised.

At 8 am on Monday, January 12th, 1903, Patrick Kenniff, with rope around his neck, declared: "I have told you twice before that I am an innocent man. I am as innocent as the judge who sentenced me. I must thank the warders for their kindness towards me, and to my well-wishers I say goodbye. May God have mercy on my soul".

Pat was buried in South Brisbane Cemetery.

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPATION EVALUATION FORM QUESTIONNAIRE.

PARTICIPATION EVALUATION FORM

Throughout life we attempt to make some things special because they have some impact on us and thus cause us to change our opinions. This exhibition is designed so that you can participate and offer your personal associations, beliefs and memories to enrich a visual story.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1880s) considered that:

It is the compulsion, the absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than we have been thinking that constitutes experience.

This questionnaire is concerned with recording your personal experience of the exhibition.

All answers are anonymous so **do not put your name on the form**.

Please indicate

Age: **Sex:**   **Occupation:**   **Art Training:**

Please repond to the following s by placing a tick in the most appropriate box numbered from SA to NA

SA = Strongly Agree;   A = Agree;   SD = Strongly Disagree;   D = Disagree;   NA = Not Applicable.

	SA	A	SD	D	NA
1. I enjoyed the exhibition.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
2. The floor map helped me understand the context of the images.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
3. I enjoyed walking on the floor map.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
4. Reading the story helped me associate with the images.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
5. The exhibition prompted me to think about events from my own background.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
6. I feel sympathy for the Kenniff Brothers.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
7. believe that the authorities had cause for concern about the welfare of landholders.	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

8. I felt involved in the exhibition.　　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

9. The placement of the images
　　suggested a story to me.　　　　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

10. The size of the images caught me attention.　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

11. The three dimensional artefacts
　　made the exhibition more 'real'.　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

12. I enjoedy playing with images
　　on the computer.　　　　　　　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

13. My interest increased when
　　using the computer.　　　　　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

14. My understanding of the time, people
　　and place increased through participating
　　in this exhibition.　　　　　　　　　　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]

Please tick ONE response.

15. What was your most dominant emotion when looking at the images?
　　　　Sympathy　　[ ]
　　　　Anger　　　　[ ]
　　　　Curiosity　　[ ]
　　　　Humour　　　[ ]
　　　　Nothing　　　[ ]

16. What do you think played the most dominant part in arousing your feelings?
　　　　Story　　　　[ ]
　　　　Map　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Drawings　　[ ]
　　　　Paintings　　[ ]
　　　　3-D objects　[ ]

17. Which images did you find the most interesting?
　　　　Big 'story' drawings　　　　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Watercolours of kitchen & dray　　　[ ]
　　　　Pencil & charcoal drawings　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Watercolours of creek & rocks　　　[ ]
　　　　Watercolours of Carnarvon　　　　　[ ]

18. Which of the following aspects made you feel 'at home' in the exhibition?
　　　　Regular placement of artworks　　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Recognisable subject matter　　　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Inclusion of maps　　　　　　　　　　　[ ]
　　　　Inclusion of three-dimensional artefacts　[ ]
　　　　Inclusion of computer　　　　　　　　　[ ]

Please indicate your preference and give a short written response to the following questions.

19. Why did one image, or a group of images, appeal to you most?
    Subject matter   [ ]
    Technique   [ ]
    Medium   [ ]
    Treatment   [ ]
    Other   [ ]

    Comment:

20. Has your thinking about the role of art changed because of your involvement in this exibition?
    A great deal   [ ]
    A lot   [ ]
    A moderate amount [ ]
    Not much   [ ]
    Not at all   [ ]

    Comment:

21. Which of the following best described your opinion about art?
    Art is something other people make   [ ]
    Art is decoration   [ ]
    Art is visual communication   [ ]
    Art is personal expression   [ ]
    Art is making something special   [ ]

Comment:

22. Which aspect of this exhibition encouraged you to re-think your opinion of art?
    I did not re-thnk my opinion   [ ]

    Images linked to a real-life story   [ ]
    Images that evoked memories/associations   [ ]
    Playihg with someone else's images on a computer   [ ]
    Combination of story, images, objects, computer   [ ]

    Comment:

APPENDIX C: TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDED STORY ON

WALKMANS.

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDED STORY ON WALKMANS.

Welcome to Moonlighting in Moffatt.

Just on a hundred years ago an incredible story began in the Mt. Moffatt region of western Queensland. It concerns the duffing enterprises of two brothers, Pat and Jimmy Kenniff, the murder of a policeman, Constable George Doyle and a property manager, Albert Dahlke, the court hearing of the brothers and the subsequent hanging of Pat Kenniff.

While there are many details that remain unsure, we do know that conflict between the battler working class and the wealthy station owners was on-going, and this gave rise to a type of desperado mateship that fostered the sport of poddy dodging or "moonlighting", as picking up cleanskins was often called.

As time went on, the authorities took greater interest and attempted to curtail the activities of the Kenniff brothers in particular. Desperate and relentlessly pursued by authorities, the brothers went on a campaign of revenge culminating in the theft of a bay pony mare belonging to George William Hunt. Warrants were issued for their arrest. Constable Doyle, unfamiliar with the Lethbridge Pocket area, accepted Dahlke's offer of assistance to locate the Kenniff camp, and an Aboriginal tracker, Sam Johnson, was included as the third member of the patrol. Plans were made for a simple surprise raid on the Kenniff camp in the next couple of days.

On Easter Sunday, as Doyle, Dahlke and Johnson were heading into "Lethbridge's Pocket", they were surprised by Pat, Jimmy and young brother Tom unsuspectingly riding up a gully towards them. The brothers discarded the two pack horses and split in two directions - Jimmy east out of the gully over level ground, and Pat and Tom south up an incline. Doyle and Dahlke chased Jimmy whom they caught in three hundred metres and, on Sam Johnson's arrival, sent him back to the pack horses to get the handcuffs. When dismounting, Sam Johnson heard a shot fired, then another shot and then three more in quick succession. Frightened, Johnson remounted and, leading the pack horse, saw Pat and Jimmy galloping towards him. He let the pack horse go, turned, and fled nineteen kilometres to the mustering camp at the Pump Hole where he alerted James Burke. Burke accompanied Johnson back to "Lethbridge's Pocket" and found Doyle's empty pack bags, two pairs of hobbles, one billycan and small swag, and also Dahlke's mare with blood all over the saddle and the quart pot.

Later, when Burke went back to the spot of the shooting he found that the pack bags and other things had vanished, and only evidence of three small fires remained. In the ashes he

found clotted blood, and at the foot of a tree two pairs of spurs he recognised as belonging to Doyle and Dahlke.

During the next two months the largest manhunt in Queensland history began with forty police combing the Ranges for Pat and Jim Kenniff. Warrants for their arrest were issued, a reward of £1000 blazoned on calico posters tacked up throughout the district.

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After one of the most public trials in Brisbane that lasted six days, a verdict of 'guilty' was handed down by the State's Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith. Both Pat and Jimmy pleaded innocent. However, on a point of law, Jimmy's sentence was commuted to imprisonment with hard labour, and Patrick was condemned to hang.

At 8 am on Monday, January 12th, 1903, Patrick Kenniff, with rope around his neck, declared: "I have told you twice before that I am an innocent man. I am as innocent as the judge who sentenced me. I must thank the warders for their kindness towards me, and to my well-wishers I say goodbye. May God have mercy on my soul". Pat was buried in South Brisbane Cemetery.

This is the story that forms the 'bones' of my exhibition. A fuller version of the story is available for you to read - please take either a blue or green document from the pile on your right as you entered the gallery. I have designed the exhibition so that it unfolds like a story so you might like to walk through history following the large 'story drawings' along the right hand length of the foyer gallery to the far end before returning along the wall where the watercolours show places that I have visited over the years of my involvement in this story.

I'd like you to also become part of the story by taking the time to share your thoughts with me. Please fill out the questionnaire attached to the story (either blue or green) and leave it in the box provided on your right as you entered. I do hope you enjoy the exhibition. Thank you for participating.

APPENDIX D: EXHIBITION CATALOGUE

D1: LIST OF WORKS.

MOONLIGHTING IN MOFFATT

Works on paper by Karen Knight-Mudie

Creating The Context:

Throughout time myths and legends have conveyed profound truths about superhuman and human existence involving deities and ordinary human beings placed in an extraordinary setting. While myths in general deal with the immortal world, legends evolve from stories of everyday human exploits that grow taller in every telling, blending reality with figments of the imagination until the legend takes its place in the folklore of a community. Such has happened with the stories of Ned Kelly and his gang, Captain Thunderbolt and Yellow Long, and even the mighty horse, Phar Lap.

As Australians we have inherited many of our stories and beliefs from older cultures. We have mingled myths with larrikins, punters, mates, duffers and bushrangers in a 'swag' of stories in which the size, the loneliness, and the tremendous distances of the Australian outback have made our creative remembrances hotter, colder, dustier and more devastating than reality could ever be. Inspiration for our visual, oral and written national identity has come from the music-halls, convict ballads and campfire yarns that have allowed us to experience a living tradition that moves from past to present as ways of telling change with new technology.

Karen Knight-Mudie paints 'stories' of the Australian landscape with the earth, rocks and water assuming the main characters, while the people and places are evoked through references and allusions. Karen has made field trips to Kakadu, the Flinders Ranges, Moreton Island, Port Arthur, Carnarvon Gorge and the Jondaryan Woolshed, where glimpses of Australia's soul has been captured in each series. The lore of the land whispers through layer upon layer of watercolour as a site for legends to be born, and, at the beginning of this series, the story of Pat and Jimmy Kenniff trickled into the Moffatt images until it became the torrent.

"Moonlighting in Moffatt" is a product of many field trips, many stories, and much research that opened new directions for the images to move beyond the land, across the creekbeds and campsites to conversations, to the court records, and to the computer.

LIST OF WORKS

1. "Forest Vale" Homestead
   Conte drawing on brown paper 209 by 114cm
2. "Cremation Rock"
   Conte drawing on brown paper 114 by 255cm
3. Justice Pope Cooper & Sir Samuel Griffith
   Conte drawing on brown paper 251 by 114cm
4. Constable Doyle & Albert Dahlke
   Conte drawing on brown paper 220 by 114cm
5. Patrick and James Kenniff
   Conte drawing on brown paper 216 by 114cm
6. Justice Real & Justice Chubb
   Conte drawing on brown paper 228 by 114cm
7. "Carnarvon" Homestead
   Conte drawing on brown paper 203 by 114cm
8. Races at Mitchell circa 1898
   Conte drawing on brown paper 271 by 114cm
9. "Mt. Moffatt" Station Packhorses
   Conte drawing on brown paper 230 by 114cm
10. Hunter & Co. Store at Yuleba
    Conte drawing on brown paper 114 by 271cm
11. "Womblebank" Homestead
    Watercolour on Arches 77 by 57cm
12. Memory Set in Bits
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm
13. Bustle in a Baking Tin
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm

14. Marlong Plain
    Conte drawing on brown paper 440 by 114cm
15. Fragment of Marlong Arch
    Drawing on Stonehenge 57 by 77cm
16. Waterhole Sketch
    Drawing on Stonehenge 77 by 57cm
17. Meteor Creek Waterhole
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm
18. Lethbridge's Creek Rocks 1
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm
19. Lethbridge's Creek Rocks 2
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm
20. Below Kenniff Cave
    Watercolour on Arches 77 by 57cm
21. Dargonelly Water Hole (diptych)
    Watercolour on Arches 154 by 57cm
22. Marlong Arch
    Watercolour on Arches 57 by 77cm
23. Carnarvon Creek Crossing
    Watercolour on Arches 77 by 57cm
24. Along Carnarvon Trail
    Watercolour on Arches 77 by 57cm
25. Somewhere in Hellhole
    Watercolour on Fabriano 77 by 57cm

ARTIST'S STATEMENT: Woven into Legend

Many years ago in London at a live drawing class, a woman looked at my hands and said, "You'll go back to your roots". When I pressed for more information she looked fearful and walked away. At the time I was twenty-six, married with two small children, unscholarly and blissfully ignorant of the power of stories and folk theories that simmer in our minds throughout life.

Many years later I find myself in Toowoomba teaching at the University, with horses, cattle and dogs to greet me at home, and a four wheel drive to take me from Moreton to Mt. Moffatt, or wherever the land beckons. My teaching and image making has evolved from peripatetic and rather turbulent travels around the globe until finally I have come back to my "roots", somewhat wiser, more scholarly and very aware of the power of stories and folk theories that have permeated my whole life. The woman was right in her silence, for stories have to be lived before they can be told. But this exhibition is not my story, although I am part of it through the telling, as others will become part of it through listening and looking.

I am currently working on further study that involves this exhibition of drawings and paintings based on the story of the Kenniff Brothers. The topic has been percolating in my mind for several years since the time I was teaching at the College of the South West, Roma . At that time I was working on my Masters, and used to 'escape' some weekends to Carnarvon until I discovered Mt. Moffatt, and little by little I began to hear stories about Jim and Paddy Kenniff, about the 'moonlighting', the 'poddy dulfing' and other exploits of 'gully raking'. I became interested to the point of obsession and kept returning to Mt. Moffatt to photograph, draw and paint in the location where the voices of the past whispered more of their secrets.

Beyond the imagery and the subject matter that involves so much of Queensland's history, I have done extensive research into artistic and verbal experiences, and the way in which stories and images have formed an integral relationship in building Australia's cultural heritage. As a consequence of my research, this exhibition has developed links between traditional painting and drawing juxtaposed with computer imagery and artefacts so that people may actually experience the works through listening, walking, touching and manipulating aspects rather than simply viewing the works.

The exhibition space, the Atrium Foyer Gallery with its towering walls and long narrow space, lends itself to a 'history walk' through drawings of places including "Forest Vale", "Carnarvon Homestead", "Womblebank" and "Mitchell Horse Races 1898". Normally I work in watercolours, but, like the court hearing of the Kenniff Brothers, my work got bigger and longer to accommodate the historical sense and importance of the story in Queensland's history. In adapting to a larger

scale I have used conte, pastels and ink as drawing media so that I could cover the metres of strong brown paper reminiscent of newspaper photographs and wanted 'posters' that flooded the countryside in 1902. In linking the past to the present I have scanned the images thus making them accessible for viewer/participant manipulation on monitors as an added dimension for personal involvement during the first week of the exhibition. In a sense I am extending the concept of 'daily news' through restructuring art as part of personal everyday experience.

Participants (rather than 'viewers') have access to a taped story of the Kenniff Brothers, and juxtaposed amongst my images are pack saddles and other artefacts loaned by some of the wonderful people who are part of the history of the Mt. Moffatt district. I re-visited the site over the Easter period this year, and had the opportunity to talk with King and Liz Lethbridge at "Normanby", Tom and Sandra Hartley at "Cooper Murra", Bob and Barbara Sokoll at "Forest Vale" and Brenda Vincent at "Ardrossan" south of Injune. While at Mt Moffatt, Gavin and Kerry Enever insisted I stay in "The Barracks", a great little cottage with a chorus of kookaburras to greet me each morning.

Forest Vale Homestead, 1890's

To all of these generous people I extend my thanks for their cooperation and hospitality. Without their help I could not have traced some of the tracks that Paddy and Jimmy wove between Roma, Charleville, Mitchell and Springsure.

I could not have stopped for 'smoko' at "Forest Vale" and heard in my head the creaking wheels of sulkies as they stopped to get fresh horses in 1897 while I actually sat on the verandah in 1997. Nor could I have visited "Crystalbrook" and wandered through the cattle yards where I could almost smell the cattle driven by the Kenniff Gang to the waiting Mr. Knowles who paid eleven hundred pounds for the herd in January, 1900.

At Mt Moffatt, now a national park, I was free to wander along the bed of Lethbridges Creek to the Cremation Site where the bodies of Doyle and Dahlke were burnt. The air was crystal clear after recent rain, and sparkling green blankets of grass caressed the smooth grey granite rocks devoid of teeth, charred bones, buttons, glass-beaded pins and congealed blood. There was no sign of troop horse 'George' carrying the pack bags stuffed with human remains. Only memories are witness to the death of Constable George Doyle and Albert Christian Dahlke in March 1902.

Constable George Doyle & Albert Christian Dahlke

The story of the Kenniff Brothers is as bizarre as it is true. To this day no one really knows the full story of what happened that Easter Sunday, March 30, 1902, in Lethbridge's Pocket. We do know that Paddy and Jimmy were wanted for the theft of a bay pony mare, and that Constable Doyle accompanied by Albert Dahlke, manager of Carnarvon Station, and tracker, Sam Johnson set out in pursuit on March 25. We know that shots were fired and two men were killed, but we do not know exactly how this happened.

Cremation Rock

Police records that lay stacked in a room were uncovered by Constable Bob Good of Oakey in 1976. He then devoted some years to assembling the facts into his recent book, *Ketching the Kenniffs*, a copy of which he gave me together with access to original documents and photographs. These formed a valuable source of reference data for some of the images, and I am indebted to Bob for his generosity and assistance. While retaining the integrity of original photographs I have selected and interpreted aspects of these to establish authenticity of people and places in this visual story.

Patrick & James Kenniff

Races at Mitchell 1895

Another special person who shared personal memories with me is Norma Wilmoth of Toowoomba. Her parents had a property in the Roma district at the turn of the century, and were well aware of the Kenniffs' activities. In fact Norma's mother, Middi, was friends with the Dahlkes and shared a love of horses in an area where horses were vital to survival, recreation and status. Country racing played an important part on the social calendar where land barons and 'gully rakers' could punt shoulder to shoulder, trade horses and share news of the drought that had raged for six years.

This story is part of our living memory that offers imaginative interpretations each time it is told. My visual story is one such interpretation that might provide mental fodder for further conjecture. I have found as many questions as I have answers - questions about hob-nailed boot tracks, about a 'rope spinning drover' in the area, about Doyle's gun left on the pack horse, and about the wrong man being hung. These and other questions remain the life-blood of folklore, like the pack horses from Mt. Moffatt Station carrying provisions when Brenda Vincent, (who has kindly lent the pack saddles for this exhibition), was a girl growing up in the land of the 'moonlighters'.

Pack horses at Mt Moffatt Station

Karen Knight-Mudie

KAREN KNIGHT-MUDIE
"Kenammer",
Flagstone Creek Road,
TOOWOOMBA. 4350 Q.
Phone: H: 076 362244   W: 076 312824

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS:

1990	MEd	University of Canberra.
1991	MA (Qual.)	University of Queensland.
1983	BA	University of Queensland.
1980	Dip Teach Sec Art	BCAE (Three Year Diploma).

Current Studies -

1994	PhD	James Cook University.

EXHIBITIONS:

Permanent State Art Collections:
State Gallery, Northern Territory.
Bundaberg Council Collection, Qld.
Q.U.T. Collection, Kelvin Grove Campus.
Art Bank.
Attorney General's Department, Canberra.
Toowoomba City Council Mayoral Office.

Private Collections:
Stuartholme School Collection, Brisbane.
Toowoomba Grammar School.
London, Vila, Sydney, Brisbane, Canberra, Dallas Texas, New York and local.

Exhibitions: International
1976 - Solo, Port Vila, Vanuatu.
1977 - Joint, London.

Exhibitions: National and State Galleries
1986 - Joint, Darwin State Gallery.
1995 - Joint, Noosa Regional Gallery.

Exhibitions: Solo
1997 - Solo, Griffith University, Mt. Gravatt Campus.
1993 - Solo, USQ Arts Foyer, Toowoomba, Qld.
1993 - Solo, Kenilworth, Qld.
1993 - Solo, Downs Gallery, Toowoomba, Qld.
1993 - Solo, Jondaryan Woolshed, Qld.
1991 - Solo, Adelaide, S.A.
1991 - Solo, Toowoomba, Qld.
1989 - Solo, Adelaide, S.A.
1988 - Solo, Brisbane, Qld.
1987 - Solo, Brisbane, Qld.
1980 - Solo, Brisbane, Qld.
1980 - Solo, Montville, Qld.
1978 - Solo, Brisbane, Qld.

Exhibitions: Joint
1995 - Joint, Stuartholme School, Brisbane.
1995 - Toowoomba Grammar Art Exhibition.
1994 - Toowoomba Grammar Art Exhibition.
1993 - Joint, AIAE Conference Delegates' Exhibition, Melbourne, Vic.
1991 - Joint, Brisbane, Qld.
1991 - Joint, UCSQ Staff Exhibition, Toowoomba, Qld.
1990 - Joint, Kenilworth, Qld.
1990 - Joint, AIAE Conference Delegates' Exhibition, Adelaide, S.A.
1990 - Joint, UCSQ Staff Exhibition, Toowoomba, Qld.
1989 - Joint, UCSQ Staff Exhibition, Toowoomba, Qld.
1987 - Joint, Canberra, A.C.T.
1981 - Joint, Montville, Qld.

Awards -
1987 - Award, Bundaberg, Watercolour
1985 - Award, Bundaberg Council

Recommendations and Inclusions:
1989 - Inclusion, REMM Art Awards, Brisbane
1987 - Inclusion, Suncorp Awards, Brisbane
1985 - Highly Recommended, Stanthorpe (Open)
1985 - Inclusion, Gold Coast City Award
1985 - Inclusion, S.G.I.O. Awards, Brisbane
1985 - Highly Recommended, Bundaberg, (Watercolour)
1985 - Commended, Redcliffe, (Open)
1984 - Highly Recommended, Redcliffe, (Watercolour)
1984 - Highly Recommended, Redcliffe, (Drawing)
1981 - Highly Recommended, Redcliffe, (Watercolour)

Moonlighting in Moffatt

KAREN KNIGHT-MUDIE

List of Drawings and Paintings:

Title	Price	Title	Price
1. "Forest Vale" Homestead Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	14. Marlong Plain Conte Drawing on brown paper 440 x 114 cm	*nfs*
2. "Cremation Rock" Conte Drawing on brown paper 114 x 240 cm	*nfs*	15. Fragment of Marlong Arch Drawing on Stonehenge 57 x 77 cm	*sold*
3. Justice Pope Cooper & Sir Samuel Griffith Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	16. Waterhole Sketch Drawing on Stonehenge 77 x 57 cm	*$750*
4. Constable Doyle & Albert Dahlke Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	17. Meteor Creek Waterhole Watercolour on Arches 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*
5. Patrick and James Kenniff Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	18. Lethbridge's Creek Rocks 1 Watercolour on Arches 57 x 77 cm	*$1050*
6. Justice Real & Justice Chubb Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	19. Lethbridge's Creek Rocks 2 Watercolour on Arches 57 x 77 cm	*$1050*
7. "Carnarvon" Homestead Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	20. Marlong Arch Watercolour on Arches 57 x 77 cm	*$950*
8. Races at Mitchell circa 1898 Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	21. Dargonelly Water Hole *(diptych)* Watercolour on Arches 154 x 57 cm	*$1800*
9. "Mt. Moffatt" Station Packhorses Conte Drawing on brown paper 240 x 114 cm	*nfs*	22. Below Kenniff Cave Watercolour on Arches 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*
10. Hunter & Co. Store at Yuleba Conte Drawing on brown paper 114 x 240 cm	*nfs*	23. Carnarvon Creek Crossing Watercolour on Arches 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*
11. "Womblebank" Homestead Watercolour on Saunders 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*	24. Along Carnarvon Trail Watercolour on Arches 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*
12. Memory Set in Bits Watercolour on Arches 57 x 77 cm	*$1050*	25. Somewhere in Hellhole Watercolour on Fabriano 77 x 57 cm	*$1050*
13. Bustle in a Baking Tin Watercolour on Arches 57 x 77 cm	*$1050*		

All the works in this exhibition are the products of numerous field trips to the area known as the Carnarvon/Mt. Moffatt Ranges. The large drawings form the central core of the on-going story of the Kenniff Brothers, and as such may act as the focus for further "chapters" in the form of paintings concentrating on various properties that played a significant part in the story. The artist intends to concentrate on further works that highlight special human aspects of properties such as "Mt Moffatt", "Forest Vale", "Crystalbrook", "Westgrove", "Merivale", and "Mt. Abundance".

Moonlighting in Moffatt: Restructuring Art As Personal Experience. Karen Knight-Mudie 1999 ©

APPENDIX E: PUBLISHED REVIEWS.

TUESDAY *Magazine*

The art of being a desperado

People, Places, Perspectives

with **LIN BOYLE**

SO MUCH has been made of the brief period in America's history which identified the country's Wild West and the men who rode, fought and shot their way to infamy, to be given legendary status by later generations hungry for heroes.

Yet Australia has in its recent past men just as wild and daring, just as murderous and just as fascinating to look back on. Less than 100 years ago Patrick Kenniff was hanged for murder after Queensland's largest manhunt, when 40 police combed what is now Carnarvon National Park looking for the notorious Kenniff brothers.

Pat and his younger brother Jimmy, who was to die in northern Queensland in 1940, were outlaws who had scoured the ranges and surrounding properties for more than 20 years, duffing cattle, stealing horses and helping themselves to anything they found as they passed through the properties of long-suffering landowners.

They made themselves well known in an area that stretched from Tambo in the west to Rockhampton in the north and Brisbane in the south. Typical of their bravado was a plan to bring a herd of rustled horses to Toowoomba for sale. The robbery of the Yuleba general store was staged as a diversion, so the horses could be loaded onto the train for Toowoomba without being inspected by the police.

The brothers were in and out of prison but it did nothing to deter them from a life spent on the run, camping in wilderness areas, stealing as they travelled to avoid the police.

It was tales like these which inspired artist and USQ lecturer in education Karen Knight-Mudie to create an exhibition of works on paper telling the story of the Kenniff brothers and the story of the landscape which was a backdrop to their escapades.

Moonlighting in Moffat was born in Karen's mind when she taught at the College of the South West in Roma and spent weekends in the Carnarvons where she discovered Mount Moffat and, bit by bit, the story of the two men who had "moonlighted", "duffed", "gully raked", "poddy dodged" and, ultimately, shot two men who had been sent to track down and arrest them.

"It began as a preoccupation and then became an obsession really," Karen says.

"It would have to be almost because it's got to seep so deep inside that it drives you. I was initially fascinated by the idea of conflict between the authorities, the vastness of the place and the battlers, which would include the squattocracy.

"Finding out about the Kenniffs was like opening a closet and finding a secret, but I was also fascinated by the locale where this took place."

And so Karen's drawings and paintings include images of the area's stations taken

KAREN KNIGHT-MUDIE: Visitors to her exhibition about the notorious Kenniff brothers will walk over this huge map of the territory the men covered during the years they duffed cattle, stole horses and helped themselves, as they rode through properties.

from original photographs, sketches of the brothers, and paintings of the caves, canyons, creek beds and gullies where the Kenniffs made their temporary stockyards as they kept on the move.

"A pictorial memory — a history so people can associate with it and feel it," is how Karen describes it.

She points out the huge gulf which existed at that time between the many Irish settlers and the English "aristocracy".

"Everyone will bring their own background and belief to my images," she says.

The exhibition is intended to conduct the viewer through time, from the turn of one century to the present-day turn of the next. One painting, 4.5m long, will demonstrate the passage of time, moving from historic images in sepia into present-day imagery and landscape.

"It will finish off with two recreated images of the Carnarvons on the other, greener, eastern side of the range, to

remind people of the more often seen Carnarvon Gorge area," Karen says.

The exhibition will also include artifacts like the meat safe and pack saddle borrowed from Mount Moffat station which

'Finding out about the Kenniffs was like opening a closet and finding a secret, but I was also fascinated by the locale where this took place'

manager Albert Dahlke set out with aboriginal tracker Sam Johnson, in March, 1902 to arrest the two brothers for stealing a horse. They hoped to surprise them in their camp in Lethbridge Pocket.

But the police party were surprised by Pat, Jimmy and young brother Tom riding up a gully towards them. Jimmy was chased and arrested, the other two fled.

Sam was sent back to the packhorse to get the handcuffs.

come from both the time and the location of the Kenniff brothers' activities.

Karen will not, however, go further than acknowledging the saddle might be the one which featured in the double murder.

Constable George Doyle and young property

Sam heard shots, saw Pat and Jimmy galloping towards him and fled to a nearby mustering camp. He was accompanied back to the Pocket by James Burke where they found Doyle's empty pack bags and Dahlke's horse with fresh blood on its saddle.

Leaving to raise the alarm Burke returned to the scene to find the bags had vanished, but signs of three small fires remained with traces of clotted blood in the ashes.

Further searching revealed Doyle's horse with the pack bags containing burnt bone, a couple of teeth and other gruesome remains.

It took two months to capture the Kenniffs in their 4000 square-kilometre backyard, as Karen calls it, and bring them to trial. Pat was sentenced to hang, but Jimmy's sentence was commuted on a point of law to imprisonment with hard labour.

"It's bigger than me. I just happen to be the lens people can travel through. I hope the exhibition will be a personal experience for those who see it," Karen says.

Moonlighting in Moffat will run from tomorrow until January 4 in the atrium of Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery. It will be opened officially on Sunday, November 23, by artist and author Frank Hodgkinson.

in the spotlight....

In this second issue of Branching Out we visit the Carnarvon Gorge and Mount Moffatt with artist Karen Knight-Mudie, in REVIEW, on page 7. Karen takes us on a journey with the infamous Kenniff Brothers. Here we see Karen's diptych DARGONELLY WATER-HOLE (Water colour on Arches), one of the many paintings she has done of the area.

Our cover artist, Herb Mayer, explains the ideas and inspirations behind his work, on page 10. With Herb, we enter a world where wood and stone seem to move with the fluidity of water. Illustrated here is Herb's handcarved sculpture WHAT'S YOUR POINT (1997) made from rosewood timber, and white and black marble.

Dirranbandi Branch member and talented artist, Belinda Perkins, recently exhibited with a varied group of artists and craftspeople at the Pikedale Shearing Shed, Stanthorpe. One of her bird studies in watercolour can be seen here. Read about 'art in the woolshed' on page 6.

In October, Arts Council member from the Ipswich Branch, Lyn Marshall, is to hold her first major solo exhibition in Brisbane. Sponsored by the Bank of Queensland, her exhibits will include her newly explored medium of paper art and sculpture. Pictured here is REX, KING OF KINGS (sculptural paper) 1997. More of Lyn's intriguing work can be seen on page 15.

Moonlighting in Mt Moffatt

by Karen Knight-Mudie

I AM currently working on my PhD studies, which involve a major exhibition of drawings and paintings based on the story of the Kenniff Brothers.

The topic has been percolating in my mind for several years, since the time I was teaching at the College of the South West, Roma. At the time I was also working on my Masters, and used to escape some weekends to Carnarvon until I discovered Mt Moffatt. Little by little, I began to hear stories about Jim and Paddy Kenniff, about the 'moonlighting', the 'paddy duffing' and other exploits like 'gully raking'. I became interested to the point of obsession and kept returning to Mt Moffatt to photograph, draw and paint in the location where the spirit of the past whispered more of their secrets.

I have done extensive research into artistic and verbal communication, as a consequence of this research I intend to structure the exhibition so that people may actually experience it rather than simply view it.

The Atrium Foyer of the Toowoomba Regional Gallery will become a history walk through many places in the region. Participants will have access to a taped story of the Kenniff Brothers and juxtaposed among my own images will be pack saddles and other artefacts loaned by some of the wonderful people who are part of the history of the Mt Moffatt district.

I hope this exhibition will go beyond the imagery and the subject matter that matters so much of Queensland's history and the way in which stories and images have formed an integral part of Australia's cultural heritage.

Moonlighting in Mt Moffatt will be opened at Toowoomba Regional Gallery by Frank Hodgkinson in November. -

PADDY AND JAMES. Stone on bitumen paper, Karen Knight-Mudie

Bizarre or baRock

by Vicki Kovacs

THE day I get a new CD or book is like Christmas - the anticipation of the crisp aroma of new pages, or admiring the as yet unscratched casing. It was with this air of expectation that I received a copy of harpsichordist Elizabeth Anderson's new CD 'Bizarre or baRock' (released by Move Records).

'Ah ha,' I thought. 'My computer has a CD drive. I'll just slip this in while I work.'

Unfortunately, not only did I nearly hit the wall of the Arts Council, I wasn't getting much work done either. This is an album that demands attention.

'But didn't you say that they played the harpsichord?' I hear you ask. Yes, she does. And the result is amazing.

'Bizarre or baRock' follows the release of Australian-girl Anderson's highly acclaimed Goldberg Variations. The audience at the Nagoya Arts Centre in Japan applauded long and used for Anderson's third encore 'Wizard Palmer's Rism for Harpsichord'. Such encore items proved so popular that the suggestion was made to create a concert programme and CD of 20th century compositions.

'Bizarre or baRock' is an eclectic mix, to say the least. The twenty tracks on the album cover Bach to Ragtime, the before-mentioned Blues for Harpsichord to Scarlatti and Gershwin.

This CD doesn't have the clinical feel of many modern releases either classical or contemporary. Anderson is not afraid to include the occasional dropped note, lending the arrangements a human quality which is especially important in the jazz numbers. Donald Angle's Chocolate Banana leaves your heart racing.

Also of note, among the more recognisable numbers, is Mary Mageau's Wind and Shadow, in which the performer plays simultaneously on harpsichord and windchimes, in a style akin to Far Eastern music.

Whatever your taste in music, this disc should comfortably find a home in any collection. -

Moonlighting a total experience

WELL known USQ artist and educator, Karen Knight-Mudie, is looking forward to patrons manipulating many of the 25 original artworks in her latest exhibition, "Moonlighting in Moffatt". These acts of "keyboard vandalism or personal interpretation" are a vital aspect of using patterns of colour in the total learning process, she says.

Her exhibition will be officially opened on Sunday, 23 November at 3pm in the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery by one of Australia's best known artists Frank Hodgkinson. He will be introduced by USQ Vice-Chancellor Professor Peter Swannell.

The multi-media display which was hung today is based on the Kenniff Brothers' murderous exploits in the remote Carnarvon Ranges in Central Queensland at the turn of the century. As well as computer manipulation of the wall, patrons will participate in other ways. Ms Knight-Mudie will laminate her large-scale, hand-painted regional map and locate it on the floor at the art gallery entrance. Visitors, particularly children, can walk the trails of the Kenniffs as they flee the troopers across this rugged "Home of the Rivers" in central Queensland.

As a senior art educator she knows how powerful imagery can bring history to life, in this case using a combination of computers, crayon, brown paper and

Karen Knight-Mudie with her welcome walk-on map.

artifacts from the Kenniff chase including original spek, saddlery and the meat-safe they raided on a remote homestead.

"I'm keen to see the way people of all ages can overcome their fear of computers and use them to play with my images on screen. As an art educator I know how important recognition and interpretation of shapes and forms, first perceived as patterns of light, are to the development of cognitive skills.

"Many secondary and tertiary students regard computers as good for figures and words but don't realise how well they can be used as a creative force to produce challenging art works," she said.

"The tracking of the Kenniffs was reported in The Courier newspaper of the day and they became something of a cause celebre. Many of the descendants of the property holders of that day still live in the Maranoa and Comet regions and are expected to attend this exhibition.

Hi-tech spotlight on murderous duo

MARY-ELLEN RYAN
Brisbane

THE murderous exploits of bushranger brothers Jim and Paddy Kenniff in Central Queensland's remote Carnarvon Ranges in 1902 are the basis for Moonlighting in the Moffatt, an art show which combines traditional painting with computer images of the 25 original works.

University of Southern Queensland art educator Karen Knight-Mudie said she was keen to see how people overcome their fear of computers, using them to "play with" images on screen.

"As an art educator I know how important recognition and interpretation of shapes and forms, first perceived as patterns of light, are to the development of cognitive skills," Knight-Mudie said. "Many secondary and tertiary students regard computers as good for figures and words but don't realise how well they can be used as a creative force to produce challenging art."

The exhibition, at the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery, will run from November 19 to January 4.

Karen Knight-Mudie: Emphasises computing as part of the creative process

APPENDIX F. RESPONSES FROM THE PUBLIC.

F 1: Letter, Manager, Toowoomba Regional Gallery, 14 January 1998.

T O O W O O M B A   C I T Y   C O U N C I L
Business in Mind, Lifestyle at Heart

Refer: Ms D BAKER (07) 4688 6652   [DB:dg]

14 January 1998

KAREN KNIGHT-MUDIE
SENIOR LECTURER,
EXPRESSIVE ARTS,
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND 4350

Dear Karen

Re: *Moonlighting in Moffatt* Exhibition

Thank you for holding your recent exhibition *Moonlighting in Moffatt* at the Toowoomba Regional Art Gallery.

This exhibition generated great interest, following a very successful opening. You're planning and execution of your exhibition was impeccable, which will be reflective in your hard working endeavour to achieve your PHD.

A total of 2227 people visited the Gallery while your exhibition was showing. We have included the Chronicle advertisements and reviews, also comments from our visitors book for your perusal.

With regards to the Gallery acquiring one of your works, as you are on the Gallery Acquisitions Committee, it would be appropriate for you to present to the committee a Submission For Acquisition proposal, along with the selection of your work you feel would be most suitable for the Toowoomba City Collection.

Congratulations on *Moonlighting in Moffatt* and I wish you every success with your studies.

DIANE BAKER
MANAGER, ART GALLERY

Administration Building
153 Herries Street
Toowoomba Qld 4350

Address all communications to:
The Chief Executive Officer
P.O. Box 3021
Village Fair
Toowoomba Qld 4350

Telephone: (07) 4688 6611
Facsimile: (07) 4638 3830
DX 41103 Toowoomba

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
19 - 11 - 97		ENSUNE	
19 - 11 - 97		ENSUNE.	
19 - 11 - 97		Toowoomba	
19 - 11 - 97		Toowoomba	
19 - 11 - 97		Toowoomba	
" "		GEDDES TWRA	Great Energy Movement (SUE TAYLORS work)
		Allora Qld	
1 - 11 - 97		Haywards Heath, Sussex	
19 - 11 - 97		Chinington Toowoomba	
20. 11. 97		T.mba	Enjoyed Urban Edge.
20 - 11 - 97		Doherty St. T'comba	Excellent
20. 11. 97		Great Moonlight in Moffat exhil.
2. 11. 97		Ruth street, Toowoomba.	
23 - 11 - 97		'Coopermurra' Mitchell	
23. 11. 97		"Turarara" mitchell	
23 - 11 - 97		Toowoomba	

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
8/11/97		Lily St Everton Hills	Enjoyed the 'Urban Edge' particularly
9/11/97		Freylings Rd	Great
9/11/97		Maleny Qld.	Shatfield
11/11/97		Skyline Drive	Pam Wilson excellent. (Library).
12/11/97		1 Guittam Crt.	Excell. friendly service
13/11/97		WELLINGTON ST. BONDI	Unreally Real
13/11/97		University of Queensland	I was suprised that it was made by Moffatt
14-11-97		Auckland	Excellent —
19-11-97		MELBOURNE	YOU ARE VERY LUCKY TO HAVE THIS EXCELLENT FACILITY. PRESENTATION.
17.11.97		BRISBANE.	Congratulations to you All.
19.11.97		Brisbane	Most enjoyable Thankyou
19.11.97		Caboolture	Excellent!
19.11.97		Toowoomba	Urban connection am Here
19/11/97		Toowoomba	Very nice.
19/11/97		Toowoomba.	Well Organised
19.11.97		Inrums.	VERY REAL.

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
23.11.97		LINDSAY ST	GREAT EXHIBITION KAREN.
"		LINDSAY ST.	Great Score of Work. A Good yarn told by Pupil
"		*[illegible]*	Exe Clear
		Maple St	wonderful work..
23/11/97		KNOCKATOR CREST.	Shows Great Talent
27/11/97		*[illegible] St Clifton*	An Experience
27/11/97		Toowoomba	Enjoyable
25.11.97		Toowoomba	Great work Karen
5.11.97		USQ student from Shanghai China	excellent!
25.11.97		USQ student, Singapore	I enjoyed the exhibit
26.11.97		Hamburg, Germany	Great exhibition - unique in its way
27.11.97		Toowoomba	Very Interesting
27.11.97		Toowoomba.	
27.11.97		Toowoomba	very Interesting
27.11.97		QUILPIE	Great!
27.11.97		Quilpie	V. Nice!

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
28-11-97			
29:11:97		DIONYSIOUS	SPECTACULAR
30:11:97		Freylings Rd	Great
3-12-97		Ocean St Toowoomba	
4-12-97		South St TMBA	Fabuloos
4/12/97		Hanidleys Rd Ballard	Great
5/12/97		Hoad Court T'ba	Very interesting
5/12/97		BALMONY St TMBA	
6-12-97		Biggs Rd Withcott	I'll bring the rest next time
10.12.97		Minuno, Switerland	brillant!
10-12-97		Connor Stanthorpe	Excellent
10·12·97		Forest Hills Moray Field	
10-12-97		Harbour Rd Hamilton Q	
11·12·97		Mary St TWB	
11·12·97		DALLY ST TMBA	Karen Knight-Mudie please watch this space
11·12·97		FITZROY MELBOURNE	post modernism with a yes HAH! touché

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
27/12/97		Bris - Wendy!	Fantastic colours!
3..12.97		Willowvale QLD	Very good indeed
30-12-97		Warwick QLD	Very good.
30.12.97		CRAICS ST BUNDABA	very good.
30 DEC 97		Oakville ON CANADA	enjoyable
31/12/97		Toowoomba	"Taps into one's soul"
31/12/97		Houston Texas USA	
31-12-97		Mildura Vic.	very good -
1-1-98		m'namara St Tuba	excellent
1 - 1 - 98		Perth St Twba.	Great!
1/1/98		Brookside Tec Chch NZ	beautiful work.
1/1/98		GUNDIAH.	
2-1-98		Withcott QLD:	Excellent again.
2-1-98		Hervey Bay	Excellent again
2-1-98		Toronto, Canada	
2-1-98		SYDNEY OZ	
2.1.98		Melbourne	✓

Toowoomba Regional ART Gall

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
13·12·97		Gauntlet	unReal
17·12·97		Russell st Oakey	Amazing - Beautiful
18·12·97		"Ardrossan" Roma	Fantastic work, great displays. Well done Karen.
18·12·97		"Reedsdale" ROMA	A trip back in time. Great work Karen. See you again soon maybe?
18·12·97		Withcott	Loved the Steffanoni collection.
20·12·97		Torquay, England	Seeing some of Australia's interesting history was fascinating
24·12·97		Cullen Crt Toowoomba	Some were interesting.
24·12·97		Toowoomba	Impressive variety, layout. Well done.
24·12·97		Albury	Nice.
26·12·97		Kulpi & Injune	Well done.
26·12·97		"Wirrawee" Injune	Interesting.
26·12·97		Kittani Kulpi	Very good indeed
27·12·97		mildura Vic	outstanding art & beautiful!
27·12·97		Donaldson St. Curlewis N.S.W.	Beautiful display.
27·12·97		Georgina St Woody Pt. QLD	Well set out displays.

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
3/1/98		CANBERRA	Enjoyed Sophie
3/1/98		YELARBON.	Good.
3/1/98		YELARBON.	
4.I.98		Brisbane.	Well done
5.1.98		Melbourne	Sophie - Stunning / branch - lovely
7.1.98		Toowoomba	Sophie - wonderful students - great!
7-1-98		Toowoomba	Sophie, beautiful
7/1/98		Sydney	Sophie Vatterioni - Excellent
8-1-98		Yandina, Sunshine Cst	Interesting. Good library + other stuff!
8 JAN 98		Amberley	Interesting
8 Jan 98		Garmuindunrchi	very enjoyable
8 Jan 98		Melbourne	Congratulations Dominic
8.1.98		PO. Box 57, COTTON. Q.4342	wonderful. good luck.
8-1-98		NARRABRI NSW	PLEASENT
9.1.98		Stuart St. mba	Sophie!! Phillip!! all work!!!
9-1-98		Postmans Ridge	Different Sophie was interesting

DATE	NAME	ADDRESS	REMARKS
9-1-98		M.S. 104, Hastings Rd. Oakey	Excellent gallery
10-1-98		Dosse St. North Sydney	Very good
10-1-98		IKOMA MINAMIASHIGARA-SHI KANAGAWA -*PRE JAPAN	とても素晴しい。いた。家具が特に気上■
10/1/98		Highfields	excellent
			2.1.1.
10-1-98		N.S.W.	Excellent
10-1-98		n.1.w	Very interesting!
10.1.1.98		Crystal Waters Maleny	collection Wood-Dreaming Beautiful
10/1/98		REBWONGA ST. KINGSTHORPE	FOUND THE STOCKMAN EXHIBITION VERY INTERESTING
10/1/98		Indooroopilly Rd Taringa	Lovely old paintings
10/1/98		KADANGARO ASHgrove	Nice

Toowoomba Regional ART Gallery

F3: Comments From Viewers To Questions 19-22.

Comments to Question 19. *(original spelling retained)*

1. Very good indeed!

2. Once upon a time I was sympathetic towards "bushrangers" but really they were early day terrorists and if the Kenniffs didn't kill Doyle and Dahlke who did?

3. Story very interesting however too long for average visitor

4. Interesting! I have been touring from Townsville, Chartes Towers, Burleyvale, Springsure, Emerald seeking all that history and coincidence.

5. Fine exhibition, great subject.

6. I think it was a great exerbison especially the floor map

7. The use of imagery that suggests the Kennith brothers were just typical 'fellows' of the time helps build the feelings of empathy for them e.g. the stories, the town imagery, the landscapes and the equipment.

8. If you mean the different things like paint etc used then I found it very interesting especially the watercolours of C.G. There is a depth produced by the borders that makes you look more closely.

9. I enjoyed the large watercolour paintings for their variety of colour - particularly no. 21 beautiful colours - great technique because oils are usually used to depict large Australian landscape - it's good to see large w/c of landscapes.

10. Brought back memories of "horse & buggy" days as a child.

11. The use of charcoal/scratched images - seemed almost "real" for the time. It was an interesting 'connection' and I wondered if it was intended. Thank you for inviting me into 'your' artwork!

12. I liked the brown bark looking paper around the Carnarvon pictures and the range/combinations of colours.

13. Provides a historical look at an age and issues that is close to us. Gives a personal touch to art.

14. I was very curious when I was told the story.

15. The stories are really old and I like old stories.

16. Cool floor map.

17. I thought that the story was very interesting for me.

18. Good drawing.

19. Your pictures were fantastic to me. You are encouraging me to be an artist.
20. Get some more computers.

21. I think that the story was very most intresting.

22. I liked it.

23. It was very good.

24. I want more pitches.

25.I thought the colours suited the paintings.

26.I think what she used to paint or draw with was very apealing.

27.I found the large drawings of the people involved my preference. Congratulations.

28.Loved No 10 Hunter & Co Store - combination of print and drawing on a large scale appealed greatly, - use of black and brown conte on brown paper evoked strong historical sense of time and the "outback" of Aust.

29.Using the large panels and bush colours took one to the area being depicted. You were able to walk back in time. The map gave the viewer an idea of the vastness and expanse of the area covered. The reading material threw light onto the events being depicted and one felt they were walking with those involved. Thank you for sharing your talents.

30.Variety, different technique and medium treatment made it come 'alive'.

31.I felt involved because I was able to 'place' artwork in the narrative and that was very interesting because it was genuine and treated in a balanced and respectful way. It was an extremely interesting way to discover something of Qld. history and I could make connections with my own life (via artefacts/maps/images).

32.The appeal is due to both a story unique to the area but also relevant and typical of Australian yarns, myths, traditions and pioneer experience as a whole.

33.I preferred the watercolour creek works, particularly the combination of these with the charcoal drawings (around the border) on thick brown paper.

34.I like to understand what I am seeing. I enjoyed the variety of this. Interesting to see and feel history through art. A very clever and talented exhibition.

35.Because I have a natural interest in our history in particular of the pioneers and early settlement firstly of the Darling Downs and western areas of Queensland; as my great-grandfather and grandfather and grandmother and my father's family/brothers, sisters and relatives lived in the Mitchell district until the 1940s.

36.The colour used brought the subject to life.

37.Larger-than-life faces convey strong emotion effectively there is an added dimension of interest when the background story is known.

38.The images which I found most appealing were the watercolours, probable because I like landscapes (ie rivers, rocks and gorges etc) and I loved the use of colour in them.

39.I enjoyed the watercolour approach which works well for a number of subjects, particularly water holes and dray.

40.I enjoyed the combination of story/maps/image as opposed to a single painting, (which may represent an aspect of the story but be seemingly disconnected from it), because they represented and taught you about the story and its times. The "story" pictures seemed to live as if they were a diary entry at the time.

41.Impressed with watercolours - boldness.

42.Striking presentation brought it to life, very original presentation.

43.I can't count!!Oops!! (four ticks) The two "story drawings" were great. Not only did the writing draw you in but gave life/meaning to the picture. The colour and treatment of the long rectangular image (countryside) were great. I really liked both of these images.

Comments to Question 20.

1. I consider this an excellent way of teaching art and history to school children especially the inclusion of the computer and also the subject matter for boys.

2. Use of art to educate and communicate. It's a very educational exhibition and most interesting particularly because it covers a colourful part of Australian history. The added bonus is that there's some beautiful images to enjoy.

3. The combination of art and story can arouse a much strong, fuller reaction.

4. It was something I could identify with. It wasn't something I couldn't understand.

5. I have not painted a lot.

6. I do think the art display was good.

7. It makes me feel at home.

8. It made me get interested in art.

9. I don't like art that much.

10. I would like to try art.

11. I don't have one.

12. I do not think that my thinking about the role of art has changed.

13. This exhibition has really allowed the ordinary person enjoy; feel at home and relish the talents of today's artists.

14. The exhibition does show how art can be incorporated successfully into a story such as this has been done.

15. Art can tell the story. Either true or false.

16. I enjoy art where the subject matter can actually be understood, and where you can appreciate it simply by looking at it and recognising what the images represent. I think art should be something that can be easily enjoyed by all.

17. I am very uncertain about current trends which seem to place more concern on written theses than on images, but catalogues are fine.

18. Through the techniques used and the treatment of the pieces the viewer was forced to inquire more as opposed to simply viewing and moving on. Each work was saying/teaching more within the overall context of the K. brother's story.

19. A different way of telling the story.

Comments to Question 21:

1. This particular exhibition is not only about personal expression but also about visual communication. Art can also be decorative.

2. Can be used in many situations.

3. It needs to communicate on a number of levels. Well done.

4. I think art is very special.

5. I think art is great it is expressing your feelings.

6. I don't have one.

7. I think art is personal expression because people all have different feellings of art.

8. Others feelings, ideas, hopes, dreams and way of life are shared without being effected by distance, time or wealth.

9. Personally I feel that art is personal expression however in the context of this exhibition it is visual communication, as a 2 day visitor to this area (from Sydney) it gave me a strong feeling of history and country lifestyle.

10. Art helps express an event or situation and appears to be particularly well done in displaying this story.

11. Art is a process whereby the artist communicates understanding and emotion, and in objectifying this leaves it to the "viewer" to make of it what he or she will. The viewer relates to it on the basis of his or her experience including beliefs about the nature and purpose of art.

12. I like to quote: 'an artist is not a special kind of person, but every person is a special kind of artist'.

13. For which the artist should be concerned (communication)

14. Art can mean a lot of different things these days but to me, art tells a story in <u>any form about anything</u> from the personal opinion of the artist. *I love your work!*

Comments to Question 22.

1. Had I been more interested in the subject my reactions may have been different.

2. This is an excellent exhibition and as far as I'm concerned there is something for everyone e.g.- computer for children and computer buffs; - the different mediums used especially the different paper used, paint and sketching; - 3 dimensional for people interested in past; - the story and paintings for those who find it hard to assimilate matter unless picture and story are present.

3. Thoughtful, enjoyable... well delivered!

4. They looked real life.

5. I liked the story and the pictures of it.

6. I am interested in real life things.

7. All our senses were being invited to help us enjoy this truly magnificent exhibition.

8. Very original and refreshing!

9. The creek scenes brought back memories from my past.

10. A PURELY TECHNICAL COMMENT. The taped commentary would be more effective if, as well as the story, it allowed the viewer to hear a commentary on each of the pictures. Thank you for your efforts.

11. Brings all dimensions together.

F 4: Letter From Booringa Shire, 3 February, 1998.

BOORINGA SHIRE COUNCIL

REFERENCE NUMBER: Corres\knightmaddy.ltr **CIVIC CENTRE. CAMBRIDGE STREET**

ENQUIRIES TO: Kay Crosby

MITCHELL 4465

3 February, 1998.

Ms Karen Knight-Maddy,
PO Box 133,
DARLING HEIGHTS.....4350.

Dear Karen,

Congratulations on a wonderful exhibition of "Moonlighting Mt. Moffatt". Our two councillors whom attended the opening expressed the magnitude of the exhibition and how well you had expressed the era of the Kenniff Brothers.

On the 4 April, 1998, we are opening the artesian spa here in Mitchell. This is an initiative of the community and the Booringa Shire Council to assist with tourism development in the region. This would be a great opportunity to exhibit "Moonlighting Mt. Moffatt" in the shire hall. The artesian spa's entrance is part of the hall, therefore the visitors would not have to go any distance to experience their heritage culture you have captivated in your art works. The Booringa Shire will assist with transport from Toowoomba and return with your works.

Look forward to keeping in contact and having your exhibition here in Mitchell.

Yours faithfully,

Kay Crosby
Tourism Officer

F5: Copy Of Song Composed By Teacher And Children, 1998.

The Kenniff Brothers.

On 12 January, 1903 Patrick Kenniff was hanged at Boggo
Road Jail, Brisbane, for the murder of Constable George
Doyle and Station Manager, Albert Dahlke. His brother,
James was convicted of the same crime and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
The brothers had grown up in a family with a long history of   *Spoken.*
criminal offences. When they had outstayed their welcome in
northern New South Wales they moved to the Carnarvon
Range area of Queensland to continue their activities.

It was the outlaw game the Kenniff Brothers played
From an early age their choices had been made
As the Kenniff Brothers grew
Their father taught them all he knew
Be adulthood they were masters of their trade.   *Sung*
Horse stealing, double dealing
Policeman bluffing, cattle duffing,
Prison terms at St Helena was the price that they had paid.

The Kenniff Brothers were stealing stock once more
Angering land-owners and the Law
To put them to the test   *Sung*
There was a warrant for their arrest
A challenge, the Police could not ignore.

Constable George Doyle led the band,
Stations Manager Albert Dahlke lent a hand,
And an aborigine,   *Sung*
Sam Johnson, made the three,
Who rode towards more trouble then they'd planned.
Sam Johnson, the tracker, led the way,
Into Lethbridge's Pocket, Easter Day,   *Sung*
All at once the Kenniff Brothers
Were riding towards the others
James was apprehended while Patrick rode away.

Sam Johnson was sent a short way back,
For handcuffs from the horse's pack
He didn't hear a word   *Sung*
Five shots was all he heard
Then he galloped for this fife from the attack.

Burnt remains of Doyle and Dahlke were found
Stuffed in saddle bags and in ashes on the ground
The Kenniffs were at large,   *Sung*
Running from a murder charge,
On their heads was one thousand pound.

It was the outlaw game the Kenniff Brothers played,
From an early age their choices had been made,
As the Kenniff Brothers grew
Their father taught them all he knew,   *Sung*
By adulthood they were masters of their trade,
Horse stealing, double dealing,
Policeman-bluffing, cattle duffing,

And now a charge of murder had been laid.

For nearly three months the brothers evaded capture in the
biggest manhunt Queensland had seen. Eventually the were
caught and faced trial before Chief Justice, Sir Samuel
Griffith.   Arthur Hoey Davis was the Under Sheriff who
recorded the events of the trial.

Spoken

After six days of circumstantial evidence, during which the
brothers pleaded their innocence, the jury took only two
hours to bring down a verdict of guilty and both brothers
were sentenced to be hanged.

An appeal to the full bench of the Supreme Court failed and
finally the Executive Council of Government reduced James
Kenniff's sentence to life imprisonment.

Spoken

At 8.00 am on 12 January 1903 Arthur Hoey Davis gave the
signal for Patrick Kenniff to be hanged.

It was the outlaw game the Kenniff Brothers played,
The umpire ruled and the penalties were paid,
And the Kenniff Brothers' name
Veiled in sympathy and shame
In folklore of Queensland has stayed.

Sung

And the controversial fame
of the Kenniff Brothers' name
In the folklore of Queensland has stayed.

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