Corniaux, Christian L.F., and Ghodosi, Hossein (2013) An information-theoretically secure threshold distributed oblivious transfer protocol. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (7839) pp. 184-201. From: 15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 28-30 November 2012, Seoul, Korea.

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Abstract

The unconditionally secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer (DOT) protocol presented by Blundo, D'Arco, De Santis, and Stinson at SAC 2002 allows a receiver to contact k servers and obtain one out of n secrets held by a sender.

Once the protocol has been executed, the sender does not know which secret was selected by the receiver and the receiver knows nothing of the secrets she did not choose. In addition, the receiver’s privacy is guaranteed against a coalition of k − 1 servers and similarly, the sender's security is guaranteed against a coalition of k−1 servers. However, after the receiver has obtained a secret, she is able to learn all secrets by corrupting one server only. In addition, an external mechanism is required to prevent the receiver from contacting more than k servers.

The one-round DOT protocol we propose is information-theoretically secure, allows the receiver to contact k servers or more, and guarantees the sender's security, even if the receiver corrupts k − 1 servers after having obtained a secret.

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