A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MEASURES INCORPORATED BY RWANDAN GACACA AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

JUDITH HERRMANN*

I INTRODUCTION

During the 1994 Rwandan genocide approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed, resulting in mass arrests and extensive criminal prosecution overwhelming an already devastated justice sector.¹ To speed up genocide trials and reduce prison population the government launched approximately 11,000 local community courts, referred to as gacaca.² These gacaca courts were meant to deal with ‘less serious’ genocide related crimes,³ combining prosecution with national unity and reconciliation.⁴

Gacaca is often referred to as Rwanda’s answer to demands of transitional justice.⁵ Waldorf describes gacaca as ‘the most ambitious transitional justice measure ever attempted’.⁶ Nevertheless, he argues that it almost exclusively focuses on accountability for the 1994 genocide, whilst neglecting other instruments of transitional justice.⁷ The International Center of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) holds that in order to be effective, transitional justice needs to include several measures that complement one another.⁸ This is supported by Boraine and Valentine who introduce a ‘holistic approach to transitional jus-

---

² Ibid 20.
⁶ Waldorf, above n 1, 4.
⁷ Ibid 16.
A Critical Analysis of the Transitional Justice Measures Incorporated by Rwandan gacaca and their Effectiveness

II Transitional Justice

Boraine and Valentine acknowledge that the term transitional justice is not easily defined.\textsuperscript{10} Bickford suggests understanding the term as ‘justice during transition’, rather than a form of altered justice.\textsuperscript{11} He defines it as “a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful future”.\textsuperscript{12} It is thus assumed that transitional justice consists of a combination of certain instruments and processes with the aim of achieving a range of goals relating to democracy, justice and peace. The following evaluation of gacaca as a transitional justice project will distinguish between measures and objectives of transitional justice.

Similar to Bickford’s definition of the objectives of transitional justice, the ICTJ describes the purpose of a holistic approach to transitional justice as ‘the recognition of victims and the promotion of peace, reconciliation and democracy’.\textsuperscript{13} These objectives will serve as a guideline for the analysis of gacaca’s achievements.

Clark explains how within a holistic approach to transitional justice multiple political, social, and legal institutions work together and complement each other, contributing ‘more effectively to the reconstruction of the entire society than a single institution’.\textsuperscript{14} The ICTJ further claims that a holistic approach requires the consideration of ‘the full range of factors that may have contributed to abuse’ including sensitivity to gender issues in personal, family, and social

\textsuperscript{9} Alex Boraine and Sue Valentine, ‘Defining Transitional Justice: Tolerance in the search for justice and peace’ in Alex Boraine and Sue Valentine (eds), Transitional Justice and Human Security (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006).
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} ICTJ, above n 8.
\textsuperscript{14} Clark, above n 5, 765.
relations. This will also be considered when analysing the effectiveness of gacaca.

Boraine and Valentine explain how countries undergoing transition need to combine judicial measures to re-establish the rule of law with the rebuilding of societies to enhance reconciliation. They determine accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, reparations, and institutional reform as the five key pillars of a holistic approach.

This essay will assess which of these five initiatives are taken into account by the gacaca court system and will then analyse in how far gacaca manages to achieve the purpose of transitional justice as defined by ICTJ (see above).

III Gacaca Courts

A. Background

Following the end of the 1994 genocide, tens of thousands of suspects were arrested and accused of participating in the atrocities. Crimes were divided into four categories. Category 1 suspects including mass murders, rapists and persons who helped plan and execute the genocide were initially allocated to Rwanda’s conventional courts. Category 2-4 included people

- whose criminal acts or participation caused death (category 2)
- who were guilty of other serious assault (category 3)
- who committed an offense against someone’s property (category 4).

The presumed leadership accused of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law was prosecuted by the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTR was dealing with a vanishingly

---

15 ICTJ, above n 8.
16 Boraine and Valentine, above n 9.
17 Ibid.
18 See ICTJ, above n 8.
21 Haskell, above n 18.
22 For a more detailed description of the categories see appendix 1.
23 Amstutz, above n 3, 552.
A Critical Analysis of the Transitional Justice Measures
Incorporated by Rwandan gacaca and their Effectiveness

small number of accused, about 70, while Rwanda’s national courts were left with a myriad of genocide suspects.24 By 1998 Rwanda’s prisons, designed for about 12,000 detainees, were bursting with around 130,000 suspects.25 As Rwanda’s national courts had only managed to try around 1300 suspects between 1996 and 1998, it was estimated that genocide trials would continue for about 200 years if dealt with at the same pace by the conventional courts.26

Responding to the enormous administrative and judicial challenge, Rwanda’s government chose gacaca to try category 2-4 accused.27 In 2002 gacaca courts started as a pilot project, and in July 2006, trials began throughout the country.28 As gacaca moved at a much faster pace than the conventional courts, most of the remaining “category 1” cases including at least 8000 rape and sexual violence cases, were transferred to gacaca in 2008.29 On the 18th June 2012, one decade after its launch, the gacaca jurisdiction was formally closed, having tried more than 1.9 million suspects during its ten years of existence.30

B. Characteristics and Objectives of gacaca

When gacaca was launched as a pilot project in 2002 Vice-President Kagame introduced five core objectives of gacaca:31

- Reveal the truth
- Accelerate genocide trials
- Eradicate the culture of impunity
- Reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity
- Prove that Rwandans has the capacity to resolve their own problems

The name gacaca means grass and refers to the place where dispute resolution

---

24 Ibid.
25 Haskell, above n 19.
27 Haskell, above n 19.
31 Paul Kagame, as cited in Haskell, above n 19.
traditionally took place.\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Gacaca} was meant to join ‘local conflict resolution traditions with a modern punitive legal system’.\textsuperscript{33} The Rwandan government chose \textit{gacaca} as it was thought to be “quick and informal”.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, \textit{gacaca}’s participatory and communal structure – \textit{gacaca} courts depend on participation of local populations as judges, witnesses, parties and representatives – was thought to enable both the delivery of justice and the promotion of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{35}

Wojkowska acknowledges that the community courts adopted some of the core aims of the traditional \textit{gacaca}.\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, she mentions that according to some observers the modern proceedings are significantly different from the former customary courts.\textsuperscript{37} Traditional \textit{gacaca} was used for minor civil disputes such as property and inheritance relations, while modern \textit{gacaca} has been dealing with the prosecution of lower-level genocide suspects.\textsuperscript{38} In the past \textit{gacaca} judges were community elders, whereas genocide \textit{gacaca} judges were comparatively young elected community members.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, genocide \textit{gacaca} represented a hierarchical state-directed initiative applying codified rather than customary law.\textsuperscript{40}

Choosing \textit{gacaca} to process the majority of genocide suspects, the Rwandan government had to make a number of compromises, especially regarding the rights of the accused, qualifications of \textit{gacaca} staff and applicable legal standards.\textsuperscript{41} It was believed that the transparency of the process and the participation of the community would legitimise the process and protect the rights of all participants.\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{C. Gacaca and the five Key Pillars of a Holistic Approach}

(a) Accountability

\textsuperscript{32} Waldorf, above n 1, 34 n 131.
\textsuperscript{33} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} See Wells, above n 26.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Waldorf, above n 1.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Wojkowska, above n 36.
\textsuperscript{41} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
Rwandan genocide survivors have emphasised the need for punishment of *genocidaires* for their crimes.\(^{43}\) This is supported by Boraine and Valentine who argue that it is of central importance to punish those who violated the law ‘as far as possible’.\(^{44}\)

Rwanda has demonstrated a commitment to hold accountable everyone suspected of having contributed to the genocide, deriving from the understanding that there is a legal duty to prosecute.\(^{45}\) Legal prosecution has the main objective of punishing those who have committed human rights violations and deterring future perpetrators.\(^{46}\) According to Bickford the creation of ad hoc tribunals enhanced jurisprudence in transitional justice and achieved some visible victories for accountability.\(^{47}\)

Since its launch in 2002 over 1.9 million cases have been processed under *gacaca* jurisdiction.\(^{48}\) In comparison, the conventional courts only tried 222 cases between January 2005 and March 2008.\(^{49}\) Genocide trials held by the ICTR have proceeded even more slowly – since its creation in 1994 72 cases have been completed of which ten resulted in acquittal and 17 are on appeal.\(^{50}\) One case is still in progress.\(^{51}\)

(b) Truth Recovery

The Rwandan government rejected the idea of a truth commission.\(^{52}\) The participatory nature of *gacaca*, allowing Tutsis and Hutus to speak in public to either support an accusation or to defend an accused, was supposed to enable the uncovering of the truth.\(^{53}\) Amstutz explains how truth telling was further

---

\(^{43}\) Clark, above n 5.  
\(^{44}\) Boraine and Valentine, above n 9, 95.  
\(^{46}\) Clark, above n 5.  
\(^{47}\) Bickford, above n 11.  
\(^{49}\) Haskell, above n 19.  
\(^{51}\) Ibid.  
\(^{53}\) Amstutz, above n 3.
fostered by plea bargaining. Plea bargaining was a unique approach of *gacaca* aiming at encouraging offenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences. In *gacaca*, most perpetrators confessing to their crimes were eligible to serve half their sentence doing community service. A confession had to comprise a complete and detailed description of the offences that the accused committed, including information about accomplices and any other relevant fact.

(c) Reconciliation

Broad local participation in *gacaca* was meant to promote reconciliation by empowering communities to solve their problems themselves, in a manner consistent with Rwandan tradition. Wells describes how *gacaca* was supposed to restore the social fabric of villages destroyed during the genocide by “bringing people together and making them responsible for the achievement of justice in their communities”.

Genocide accused were tried by *gacaca* courts located in the community where they allegedly committed the crimes to enhance reconciliation amongst victims and perpetrators. *Gacaca* was meant to provide a platform for both Tutsis and Hutus to speak publicly with the objective of unearthing the truth and creating a shared account of the events to foster reconciliation. By granting leniency to those who admitted guilt and expressed remorse, the concept of plea bargaining was meant to foster reconciliation between survivors and suspects. One popular form of punishment during *gacaca* was community service instead of imprisonment with the aim to restore perpetrators and reintegrate them into the community. This again was meant to support the overall reconciliation process.

(d) Reparations

Waldorf argues that the *gacaca* court system has provided limited reparations

---

54 Ibid 552.
55 Schabas, above n 45, 7.
56 Waldorf, above n 1. See appendix 2 for the Gacaca Sentencing Scheme.
57 Schabas, above n 45, 7.
58 Wells, above n 26.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Amstutz, above n 3, 548.
62 Ibid.
63 See ibid 556.
64 Ibid.
to genocide survivors.\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Gacaca} offered symbolic reparations: in order to benefit from reduced sentences, those who pleaded guilty had to reveal the whereabouts of their victims’ remains before they were eligible for reduced sentences.\textsuperscript{66} Some of the most local-level \textit{gacaca} courts awarded restitution to genocide survivors for their loss of property.\textsuperscript{67} If convicted perpetrators were unable to reimburse victims for stolen or destroyed property, some were required to work off their debts through unpaid labour.\textsuperscript{68} Haskell claims that \textit{gacaca} did not provide any monetary compensation for survivors who lost relatives during the genocide or who were injured or raped.\textsuperscript{69} This is supported by Schurr, legal advisor of the human rights organisation REDRESS, who talks about ‘the lack of compensation for moral and bodily damage for survivors of genocide’.\textsuperscript{70} According to the human rights organisations Survivors Fund (SURF) and REDRESS, “thousands of compensation and/or restitution awards” were granted by \textit{gacaca} courts.\textsuperscript{71} However, it seems that many of them have not been enforced yet and it is unclear how they will be handled following the closure of the \textit{gacaca} jurisdiction.

(e) Institutional Reform

Waldorf explains that institutional reform was not a main concern of the Rwandan post-genocide government as most of those associated with the former Hutu government had left the country towards the end of the genocide.\textsuperscript{72} However, \textit{gacaca}’s approach to institutional transformation might be revealed in the participatory nature and local ownership of \textit{gacaca}, as well as the integration of Rwanda’s traditional dispute resolution system.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{IV Achievements of Gacaca in the Light of a Holistic Approach to Traditional Justice}

According to Waldorf \textit{gacaca} was generally supposed to accomplish a number of ambitious goals: unearth the truth, punish \textit{genocidaires} and reconcile com-

\textsuperscript{65} Waldorf, above n 52, 4.
\textsuperscript{66} Waldorf, above n 1.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{70} Schurr as cited in Survivors Fund (SURF) & REDRESS, above n 30.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Waldorf, above n 1, 16.
munities. He holds that gacaca so far has not lived up to the expectations placed upon it, although he acknowledges that ‘the Rwandan government has accomplished the extraordinary feat of providing security and rebuilding the country’ There is consensus that gacaca managed to reduce prison population and process cases much faster than the conventional court system. Furthermore it led to the release of some of those who had been falsely accused, which has supported the re-building of Rwanda and its society. That said, opinions seem to differ as to whether gacaca was able to eradicate the pre-existing culture of impunity and if it will play a role in deterring future violence.

As mentioned above, ICTJ identifies the recognition of victims and the promotion of peace, democracy and reconciliation as the main purpose of transitional justice. The following part of this article will discuss how effectively gacaca has achieved these objectives.

A. Peace

To foster peace and security, Lambourne suggests the incorporation of both retributive and restorative justice into accountability mechanisms. Although the Rwandan government considered retributive justice as crucial to end the culture of impunity, which according to them led to the 1994 genocide, gacaca was introduced with the explicit objective of combining retributive and restorative elements. Amstutz describes how gacaca pursued restorative justice both through its process and its outcomes. He explains how the active engagement of the community through negotiation and collaboration during gacaca hearings and the concept of plea bargaining resembled restorative processes. Community service and compensation as punishment further highlight gacaca’s pursuit of restorative justice. Others hold that modern gacaca

74 Waldorf, above n 52, 20.
75 Waldorf, above n 1, 15.
76 Haskell, above n 19.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 ICTJ, above n 8.
80 Lambourne, above n 74.
82 Lambourne, above n 74, 39.
83 Amstutz, above n 3, 556-7.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
lost its restorative character, resembling a formal, retributive legal system.86

B. Democracy

The community based nature and local ownership of gacaca suggests that the Rwandan government was trying to promote community participation and empowerment, which are concepts closely related to democracy.87 Haskell argues that gacaca’s participatory concept was compromised by the prevailing political climate in Rwanda and restrictions on free speech.88 The Rwandan government launched a campaign against “divisionism” and ‘genocide ideology’ which had ‘a chilling effect on Rwandans’ ability and willingness to express themselves’.89 Haskell explains how many felt unable to speak freely about their genocide experience and refrained from publicly defending genocide suspects in fear of being accused of perjury or complicity.90 Lambourne criticises Rwanda’s lack of democratisation and the perception of victor’s justice deriving from the official designation that in gacaca genocide survivors were always Tutsis while all perpetrators were Hutus.91

C. Reconciliation

Opinions amongst survivors and perpetrators differ largely regarding gacaca’s impact on reconciliation. Some survivors mentioned that following gacaca they were able again to greet their neighbours who had been involved in the events of 1994.92 Others regarded these encounters as superficial and found tensions and distrust between victims and perpetrators to remain.93 Haskell acknowledges that gacaca ‘may have placed Rwandans on the path to reconciliation, at least superficially,’ but argues that 17 years after the genocide Rwandan communities were still characterized by distrust between the two main ethnic groups and that gacaca has reinforced ethnic division.94 Schabas suggests that a focus on legal prosecution may have hampered reconciliation

86 See, eg, Lambourne, above n 74.
88 Haskell, above n 19.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Lambourne, above n 74, 44.
92 Haskell, above n 19.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
and closure. In contrast, Clark explains how gacaca courts achieved legal outcomes whilst fostering the restoration of fractured individual and communal relationships, which according to Lederach should be the focus of any reconciliation process.

D. Reconciliation and Forgiveness

According to Mellor, Bretheron and Firth reconciliation requires both an apology and forgiveness. Gacaca’s concept of plea bargaining was meant to encourage perpetrators to confess and to enable forgiveness. Amstutz explains how many Rwandan victims expressed willingness to forgive perpetrators who admitted culpability and expressed regret for their crimes. However, genocide survivors have criticised the lack of remorse on the part of the perpetrators, explaining that gacaca encouraged confessions primarily to reduce prison sentences. Lambourne further explains that the continuous denial of responsibility on the part of the perpetrators has caused difficulties for Rwanda’s reconciliation process. Some survivors stated that they felt forced to publicly forgive those who had wronged them although they were not yet ready to forgive. Clark explains that it will take many survivors a long time to overcome their feelings of distrust and resentment towards suspects, which is crucial to enable the rebuilding of relationships.

E. Reconciliation and Reparations

The lack of reparations for survivors who lost relatives during the genocide or who were injured or raped has enhanced bitterness on the part of the genocide survivors. This suggests that gacaca has not been able to provide sufficient

---

95 Schabas, above n 45, 3-4.  
96 Clark, above n 5.  
97 John Paul Lederach, Building peace : sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).  
99 Haskell, above n 19.  
100 Amstutz, above n 3, 559.  
101 Haskell, above n 19.  
102 Lambourne, above n 74, 41.  
103 Haskell, above n 19.  
104 Clark, above n 5.  
105 Haskell, above n 19.
recognition for victims. Lambourne argues that the lack of compensation left many survivors to live in poverty, and that Rwandans’ inability to meet basic needs significantly complicates reconciliation and peace.\textsuperscript{106} It seems that if material needs were met by compensations, people would be more able to reconcile.\textsuperscript{107} This is supported by Bloomfield who regards reparations as one main instrument of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{108} The lack of reparations also had a negative impact on the number of participants in \textit{gacaca} trials as there was little incentive for genocide survivors to attend.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{F. Reconciliation, Procedural Fairness and Human Rights}

Another reconciliation measure defined by Bloomfield is a ‘justice reform that is built on human rights principles, democratic practices, and international legal norms, and that promises fairness in the future’.\textsuperscript{110} Although accountability is one of the core achievements of \textit{gacaca}, it also appears to be one of the most criticised initiatives of Rwanda’s approach to transitional justice.

Perpetrators and external observers have criticised the shortcomings of \textit{gacaca} relating to procedural fairness and human rights.\textsuperscript{111} Ward argues that \textit{gacaca} was meant to try minor disputes and is not capable of dealing with genocide crimes in an appropriate manner.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, the standards of justice of the \textit{gacaca} courts differed largely from those of the international court system.\textsuperscript{113} According to Haskell the \textit{gacaca} courts were seriously flawed by any international standard and were unable to guarantee a fair trial for numerous reasons.\textsuperscript{114} One major argument against \textit{gacaca} is that suspects did not have legal support and were unable to prepare an adequate defence.\textsuperscript{115} Clark explains how the exclusion of lawyers was meant to have a positive impact on reconciliation by maximising ‘the community’s sense of ownership over the process’.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{106} Lambourne, above n 74, 42.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, citing a statement made by a Rwandan interviewee.
\textsuperscript{109} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{110} Bloomfield, above n 109, 12.
\textsuperscript{111} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{112} Ward, above n 4.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{115} Ward, above n 4. See also IRIN, above n 29.
\textsuperscript{116} Clark, above n 5, 796.
Most of the *gacaca* judges had insufficient formal training.\(^{117}\) They did not receive any compensation and some were reported to have been susceptible to bribery and manipulations of trials and verdicts.\(^{118}\) Although *gacaca* law required judges to be ‘Rwandans of integrity’ with ‘high morals and conduct’, critics often questioned their impartiality because judges came from the same community as the accused and were thus directly affected by the incidents.\(^ {119}\) In contrast, Clark regards the close ties of judges with their community as an important adoption from traditional *gacaca* legitimising the modern proceedings.\(^ {120}\)

According to Haskell only few survivors thought that the sentences delivered within the *gacaca* processes matched the crimes committed against them or their families.\(^ {121}\) Furthermore, *gacaca* was unable to provide adequate protection for witnesses, which prevented many speaking in public.\(^ {122}\) According to Ward, some witnesses were attacked and killed while others fled their homes in fear of violent reprisal.\(^ {123}\) The public nature of *gacaca* prevented many women from reporting and discussing cases of sexual violence in *gacaca*. This issue will be further discussed below.

The government’s argument ‘that popular involvement was ensuring fair trials’ was weakened by low levels of community participation.\(^ {124}\) Waldorf explains how genocide survivors were reluctant to incriminate their Hutu neighbours and discuss their traumatic experience in public as they feared retaliation and had low prospects of adequate compensation.\(^ {125}\)

At the same time Hutus were hesitant to participate and challenge false testimony because they feared to be accused either as perpetrators or bystanders.\(^ {126}\) Hutus were not given an opportunity to discuss their own losses and seek justice, as *gacaca* only focused on accountability for the 1994 genocide while neglecting war crimes committed by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces or revenge killings against Hutu civilians in 1994.\(^ {127}\) This one-sided approach

---

\(^ {117}\) Ward, above n 4.  
\(^ {118}\) See Haskell, above n 19. See also Sosnov, above n 20. See also Ward, above n 4.  
\(^ {119}\) See Sosnov, above n 20, 148.  
\(^ {120}\) Clark, above n 5.  
\(^ {121}\) Haskell, above n 19.  
\(^ {122}\) Ibid.  
\(^ {123}\) Ward, above n 4.  
\(^ {124}\) Haskell, above n 19.  
\(^ {125}\) Waldorf, above n 1, 21.  
\(^ {126}\) Ibid 20-1; Haskell, above n 19.  
\(^ {127}\) Waldorf, above n 1, 16.
to accountability caused great frustration and bitterness for many Hutus and further widened the gap between Hutus and Tutsis, impeding reconciliation.

These procedural weaknesses of *gacaca* seem to have jeopardised peace and security in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{128} A significant number of those people being interviewed for the 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report voiced concerns about retaliatory actions and renewed violence, suggesting that current peace in Rwanda is perceived by many as fragile.\textsuperscript{129}

**G. Reconciliation and Truth Recovery**

Bloomfield regards truth recovery and healing as crucial components of reconciliation. Haskell acknowledges that at times *gacaca* supported the uncovering of the truth.\textsuperscript{130} He explains how the majority of people who participated in *gacaca* agree that they learned some valuable information about the events of 1994.\textsuperscript{131} Survivors especially appreciated finding out about the whereabouts of their loved ones so that they could find their remains and bury them in dignity.\textsuperscript{132}

Others raise criticism that not all of the truth has been revealed during *gacaca* due to partial confessions and false accusations or testimonies.\textsuperscript{133} Lambourne argues that many survivors are still unable to find out what happened to their loved ones.\textsuperscript{134} She further explains how a ‘real dialogue or engagement in gaining a sense of “social truth”’ is lacking.\textsuperscript{135} *Gacaca’s* truth-revealing potential was also limited by waning interest of the majority of the population to participate in the trials and by the silence of those who attended but refrained from speaking in public.\textsuperscript{136} Women were especially reluctant to raise their voices in the public arena, compromising the development of a shared or public truth around the 1994 atrocities.\textsuperscript{137} Lambourne concludes that for the above reasons genocide *gacaca* was failing to enhance healing or restorative truth, impeding reconciliation amongst the Rwandan society.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{128} Haskell, above n 19.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Lambourne, above n 74.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid 41.

\textsuperscript{136} Haskell, above n 19.

\textsuperscript{137} Wells, above n 26.

\textsuperscript{138} Lambourne, above n 74.
**H. Reconciliation and Co-existence**

According to the 2011 HRW report, more people considered *gacaca* to have increased tensions between Hutus and Tutsi than believed in its reconciliatory deals.\(^{139}\) Haskell concludes that reconciliation in Rwandan communities can be defined as co-existence rather than ‘genuine forgiveness that comes from the hearts of genocide victims’.\(^{140}\)

Bloomfield claims that the reconciliatory potential of co-existence should not be underestimated, as peaceful coexistence constitutes a start towards reconciliation.\(^{141}\) He explains how, for former enemies, fewer negative implications are related to the concept of coexistence than reconciliation, as co-existence does not require forgiveness, which may be particularly difficult after genocide.\(^{142}\) Borneman states that ‘the profound loss suffered in an ethnic cleansing ... is never fully recoupable’ exacerbating issues with forgiveness and the associated reconciliation.\(^{143}\) Coexistence may have the potential to create the necessary framework to allow forgiveness to develop at a later stage.\(^{144}\)

**V Gender Issues**

Experiences of Rwandan women, both during and since the genocide, seem to differ markedly from those of Rwandan men.\(^{145}\) Rombouts explains how women were not very involved in conceiving Rwanda’s transitional justice mechanisms.\(^{146}\)

Initially, rape and sexual violence were classified as crimes of category 1 and were dealt with by the national court, although women were theoretically allowed to raise their claims during *gacaca*.\(^{147}\) Due to shame, social stigmatisation, and psychological trauma Rwandan women were very reluctant to discuss their experiences during a public *gacaca* hearing.\(^{148}\) Thus the transfer of rape cases from conventional courts to *gacaca* in 2008 caused significant

\(^{139}\) Haskell, above n 19.

\(^{140}\) Ibid.

\(^{141}\) Bloomfield, above n 109, 13-6.

\(^{142}\) Ibid.


\(^{144}\) Bloomfield, above n 109, 13-16.

\(^{145}\) Wells, above n 26.


\(^{147}\) Ibid.

\(^{148}\) Ibid.
difficulties for victims of sexual violence, seriously compromising their privacy. The Rwandan government reacted by putting in place safeguards to enable confidentiality for rape victims, allowing them to report cases in private meetings with gacaca staff. However, even though testimonies of rape cases were recorded behind closed doors, victims still feared that their identities would be revealed to their community. Haskell describes how trials were often held near administrative offices or schools and women entering a room to report rape or sexual violence could easily be seen by third parties.

The genocide’s immense death toll among the men left many women as widows, often with few essential resources. At that time, Rwanda’s inheritance rules did not usually allow women to access their husband’s or father’s property. An inferior public position, and low levels of literacy and education also contributed to women’s vulnerability. This may have restrained female participation in gacaca as vulnerable women can be assumed to be susceptible to community pressures including forces against discussing ‘shameful’ violations in public or identifying oneself as a victim of sexual assault. This suggests that community courts were not the right platform to encourage women to report rape and other form of sexual violence, and were thus unable to provide justice to many women. According to Wells today many female survivors suffer primarily from a lack of financial and psychological support, suggesting that women have been impacted especially severely by the lack of reparations provided by the gacaca system.

It should be mentioned that until recently sexual violence was not regarded as a violation of international humanitarian legal norms and rape was not treated as a grave breach. By characterizing rape and sexual violence as a form of genocide and as a category 1 crime, the ICTR and Rwandan National Court

149 IRIN, above n 29.
150 Ibid.
151 Haskell, above n 19.
152 Ibid.
153 Rombouts, above n 147.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Wells, above n 26.
157 Ibid.
largely contributed to an alteration of gender violence under international law.\textsuperscript{159} Nevertheless, Franke argues that although the ICTR established that sexual violence could constitute a form of genocide, it has done little to follow it up in terms of prosecuting and – along with other process related shortcomings – has been largely criticised for not investigating rape and sexual violence.\textsuperscript{160}

Despite \textit{gacaca}'s shortcomings in regards to gender issues it shall be mentioned that in recent years Rwanda seems to have made significant progress advancing women’s rights and roles.\textsuperscript{161} According to Nyirasafali, national programme officer for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), ‘there used to be a lot of rapes, wife beating, male domination of women, boys sent to school and not girls [but] that has all changed, even in the countryside’.\textsuperscript{162} Boseley explains how Rwandan women now ‘have the right to own land and property’.\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{VI SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLEMENT \textit{GACACA} AS A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE}

Although accountability is one of the main achievements of \textit{gacaca}, it appears that an improvement in the procedural shortcomings would have enhanced the objectives of transitional justice. Haskell suggests that certain fundamental rights should have been better protected, such as the right of the accused to be informed of the charges in adequate time to prepare a defence or the right to have a lawyer.\textsuperscript{164} He also criticises the insufficient training of \textit{gacaca} court personnel and argues that ‘a stronger and more robust legal framework was needed to ensure judges’ impartiality and to insist upon reasoned and fact-based judgments’.\textsuperscript{165}

According to Lambourne transitional justice must incorporate the transformation of political institutions and socioeconomic distribution.\textsuperscript{166} Unfortunately, it is widely accepted that \textit{gacaca} was not very successful in enhancing ei-

\textsuperscript{159} Franke, above n 159, 816-7; Weitz, above n 159, 366.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.above n 159, 817-8.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid citing Nyirasafali.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Haskell, above n 19.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} Lambourne, above n 74, 47.
ther aspect, as Rwanda continued to face enormous political and economic challenges.\textsuperscript{167} To promote broad and active community participation and thus enable fairness of the process and truth recovery \textit{gacaca} should have been complemented by further political reform.

As explained above, \textit{gacaca} failed to provide adequate compensation for the loss of relatives or personal injury, although reparations have been identified as one critical element of transitional justice and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{168} Monetary assistance has been determined as particularly important for female genocide survivors, suggesting that it would have been crucial to complement \textit{gacaca} with an effective form of restitution. Waldorf argues that the Rwandan government had initially planned on establishing the Compensation Fund for Victims of the Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, but failed to do so.\textsuperscript{169} It shall be mentioned that according to Mary Kayitesi Blewitt, founder and former director of the UK registered charity SURF, Rwandan Government dedicates five percent of its budget for educational and healthcare needs of genocide survivors.\textsuperscript{170} However, Blewitt also emphasises that this money constitutes ‘the only other sustainable and significant funding for survivors’ besides SURF.\textsuperscript{171}

Wells argues that transitional justice needs to assist in eliminating the violence and discrimination women suffer in Rwandan society not only in conflict but also in peacetime.\textsuperscript{172} Although \textit{gacaca} made some effort to demonstrate sensitivity towards gender issues, a range of significant changes to \textit{gacaca} would have been crucial to enable women to achieve reconciliation. This could have included a better protection of privacy, the provision of financial and psychological support and institutional reforms to improve the general position of women in Rwandan society. As mentioned above, the position and rights of women in Rwanda seem to have changed significantly over the very last years, indicating that a number of institutional reforms have recently taken place. According to Boseley, in 2010 ‘women occupy some of the most important

\textsuperscript{167} Waldorf, above n 1, for example.
\textsuperscript{168} ICTJ, above n 8.
\textsuperscript{169} Waldorf, above n 1, 17.
\textsuperscript{171} SURF was first established in 1997 by Mary Kayitesi Blewitt, a British citizen of Rwandan origin. SURF focuses on the development and delivery of programmes relating to healthcare, house building, education entrepreneurship, etc. As SURF is not part of \textit{gacaca} it is not considered as one of its instruments and will thus not be discussed in more detail.
\textsuperscript{172} Wells, above n 26.
government ministries make up 56% of the country’s parliamentarians’.\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{VII Conclusion}

In the beginning of this essay a holistic approach to transitional justice is described in terms of its instruments and processes (five key pillars) and its purpose and objectives (as defined by ICTJ). It has been demonstrated that \textit{gacaca} incorporated initiatives relating to all five key pillars (accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, reparations and institutional reform) as determined by Boraine & Valentine. The main objectives of transitional justice have been defined as the recognition of victims and the promotion of peace, democracy and reconciliation. In-depth analysis suggests that \textit{gacaca} has at times achieved some of these goals. However, it appears that there were opportunities to complement \textit{gacaca} with additional measures in order to improve its purpose in terms of a holistic approach to transitional justice.

Considering the scale and brutality of the 1994 genocide, the task Rwanda’s government had to face was huge and involved an incredible number of perpetrators.\textsuperscript{174} Since 2002 nearly two million cases have been processed, preventing the collapse of Rwandan’s prisons and national court system and achieving Rwanda’s commitment to holding all perpetrators of the genocide accountable. Legal prosecution has been identified as an important means of transitional justice. However, the \textit{gacaca} court system has been criticised for a number of shortcomings and it appears that some improvements could have increased \textit{gacaca}’s validity and overall success.

There is also suggestion that an effective form of reparations for genocide survivors would have assisted in meeting their basic needs and would have demonstrated recognition of victims, ultimately assisting the peace and reconciliation process. A more comprehensive institutional reform would have been necessary to support both victims and perpetrators to overcome their concerns and to actively participate in \textit{gacaca}, enabling the recovery of truth and ultimately reconciliation. The \textit{gacaca} system has achieved a great deal of positive change in Rwandan society since the atrocities of 1994. But it appears that there were opportunities for improvement to assist Rwanda in moving towards a reconciled, more democratic society that is free from the often cited culture of impunity.\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{173} Boseley, above n 162.
\bibitem{174} Ward, above n 4, for example.
\bibitem{175} Sosnov, above n 20, 142, for example; Haskell, above n 19.
\end{thebibliography}
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Haskell, Leslie, ‘Justice Compromised - The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts’ Human Rights Watch, 2011


International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), What is Transitional Jus-
Lederach, John Paul, Building peace : sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)
Appendix 1

CHAPTER II – CATEGORIZATION

Article 2

Persons accused of offences set out in Article 1 of this organic law and committed during the period between 1 October 1990 and 1994 shall, on the basis of their acts of participation, be classified into one of the following categories:

Category 1:

a) persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the planners, organisers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of Genocide or of a crime against humanity.

b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the National, Prefectorial, Communal, Sector or Cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes.

c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed.

d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture or violence.

Category 2:

persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death;

Category 3:

persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person;

Category 4:

persons who committed offences against property.

## Appendix 2

**Gacaca Sentencing Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Judgment</th>
<th>Guilty with no confession</th>
<th>Guilty with confession during trial</th>
<th>Guilty with confession before trial</th>
<th>Minors (14 to 18 years) when offense committed[^1]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 [Sub-categories 1 &amp; 2] (judged at secteur level; appeals to secteur level)</td>
<td>25–30 year prison term</td>
<td>12–15 year prison term; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td>7–12 year prison term; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td>8–10 year prison term if guilty without confession; otherwise, half of adult sentence; possibility of commuting half to community service, except when no confession is made</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 [Sub-category 3] (judged at secteur level; appeals to secteur level)</td>
<td>5–7 year prison term; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td>3–5 year prison term; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td>1–3 year prison term; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td>Half of adult sentence; possibility of commuting half to community service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (judged at cellule level; appeals to secteur level)</td>
<td>Reparations for damage caused or equivalent community service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clarke, 2007.