Chinese Miners on the Palmer  
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Gold was discovered on the Palmer River in the far north of Queensland in 1872, by William Hann, but it was not until payable quantities were found by James Venture Mulligan in the following year, did a rush follow. This remote river in Cape York Peninsula yielded over a million ounces of extremely fine, rich alluvial gold, most of it during the first heady years to 1876, its value maintaining a high value of £4 or more per ounce. The early reports sparked off a tremendous population movement into an area not previously settled by Europeans, with rush fever masking any doubts.

In three years from 1874 to 1877 the population of Palmer surged from 2,000 to 19,500. Enormous as this rise for the population was, it was overwhelmed by fact that by 1877 over 90 percent of the population was Chinese.

The Chinese influx occurred in two phases. Early in the rush, there was a steady arrival of Chinese from other parts of Australia, many of them old hands from northern gold fields, who by the end of 1874 numbered 1,500, almost 40% of the field’s population. Suddenly in 1875, a damburst of immigrants direct from China arrived, with the Chinese population on the Palmer swelling to 9,000 during July 1875. Early in 1876, Warden Philip Sellheim was advised that the Hopkee (Coalition) Company was planning to run a monthly service between Cooktown and Hong Kong. The first Hopkee vessel steamed into Cooktown on March 14 just as news of the discovery of payable gold on the Hodgkinson was filtering through. The Hodgkinson rush caused the Palmer to be largely abandoned by Europeans. A little over a year later there were approximately 18,000 Chinese on the Palmer, thereby overwhelming in number the European miners and gold field administration.

While the Chinese were familiar and contentious figures on many Australian mining fields, never before had they achieved such com-
Remains of the Comet mining plant, part of the Palmer Heritage. John Hay
plete or sudden dominance, and their presence not only impinged on the conduct of affairs on the Palmer, but also on colonial policy-making in both Brisbane and London. Their influx was one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of immigration on the Australian continent, although the evidence stemming from it is slight, comprising only two first-hand accounts by participants, and a farrago of unsympathetic statements by Europeans. Even at the time, their impact on both Queensland legislation and folklore was recognized. As J. M. Macrossan told the Legislative Assembly: “There would never have been a Chinese question in Queensland had it not been for the discovery of the Palmer River Goldfield”.

The majority of Chinese were from south Kwangtung province, speaking either Sze-Yap or Sam-Yap dialects. Most were from agricultural communities: farmers, gardeners, labourers, butchers, and a few scholars. Impoverished farmers, such as Taam Sze Pui, were easily tempted by emigration agents who described the Palmer as a place where gold was “inexhaustible and free to all”. Queensland after 1873 offered an added incentive insofar as there was no longer an export duty on gold. The Chinese came mostly in kinship groups; only a few came individually, or as contract labourers. They relied on kin for mutual aid which at a more formal level mutual aid took the form of either social guilds or voluntary groups which extracted a levy for benevolent purposes. The objectives of one guild operating in Cooktown in 1875, included:
1. to secure passages to and from the gold fields;
2. to build clubhouses;
3. to pay the passages of members to China, when unable to work through sickness or accident;
4. to bury the dead;
5. to purchase mining property; and
6. to pay the expenses of lawsuits.

In groups and generally in single file, the new-chum Chinese miners made the journey to the Palmer on foot, their equipment and provisions strung on poles or shovels across their shoulders.

Taam Sze Pui’s first trip to the Palmer was very long and harrowing. The party was in constant fear of an attack by Aborigines, to quote Taam’s memoirs: “The fear of such a fate kept one and all together and no one dare tarry behind to rest or to regain his breath”. Experiencing almost unbearable heat, they eventually arrived on the field exhausted and completely out of provisions. Lacking also the necessary knowledge to carry out mining, Taam Sze Pui’s party had to turn to a more experienced compatriot, Kwok Lung, who instructed them how to make a living. Indeed, Taam gave several instances where kinship support was forthcoming. When illness beset the party, one Chan Poon came to their aid. Then when the cost
of treating Taam’s father exceeded their savings, a relative mortgaged the family house and remitted the amount (£32) through Man Chuen’s pearl shop in Canton, which was passed onto Man Chuen On in Cooktown to be collected.’

THE CHINESE MINING COMMUNITY

The Chinese miners worked with determination and intelligence. Because systematic working of large areas, and communal pooling of earnings, served to insulate the Chinese from the notoriously irregular returns, which made alluvial mining so unpredictable a livelihood for individual European miners, a large group of Chinese diggers working co-operatively and living frugally could be assured of a long period of production in almost any part of Palmer. It also afforded them the luxury of more leisurely prospecting, which in turn often led to rewarding finds. Their methods, described as the “safest and surest”, were characterised by co-operation, thoroughness and physical mobility. Individual Chinese could work towards securing “a fair share”, permitting them “to resist more strongly a run of ill-luck than the Europeans”.

When beset by a bad return, the poorer miners would then rely on “the most fortunate of their countrymen for support”, with subscriptions sometimes being collected and relief kitchens being set up. Of mining methods, co-operative cradling was preferred, with two digging, two carrying washdirt, and the remainder bagging gold. At night, blowing and weighing would conclude the daily routine. The whole area of the claim was scoured, and reworked three to four times, unless a more profitable find was located. European observers dismissed the success of this patient and logical approach as “luck”. One newspaper correspondent noted:

The Chinese are everywhere ... and as by their system of work, they take everything “on the face”, instead of only working the most likely spots, as is the case of Europeans, their perseverance is naturally rewarded — in an essentially patchy diggings — with an occasional lucky find. There is an impression on the field that at least three fourths of the gold falls to the lot of Chinamen.

However, these systematic methods only served to intensify the resentment among European miners of the Chinese presence on the field.

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There were several early attempts in mid-1874 to “excite the miners to violent resistance” against the Chinese working the Left Hand Branch and beaches downstream from German Bar to Palmerville. However Howard St George reported that “the miners have taken no notice of the illegal councils of these men, and the goldfield continues in its usual peaceful state ...”.

When the rush to the Normanby River petered out about March 1875, Europeans returned
to Sandy Creek, and again tried to jostle the Chinese out. A sign was nailed to a tree at Sandy Creek, with the warning: "Any Chinaman found higher up this creek will be instantly seized and hanged until he is dead."" Sellheim reported two "collisions" between two different parties, but commented at the time that he did not expect any further trouble as long as he was "successful in keeping the two interests separate." Nevertheless, he sensed a dangerous level of antagonism on the part of European miners by mid 1875:

... the very strong feeling that exists here against the Chinese, and the intensity of which is increasing daily at the same rate as this class of population is flocking-in. I am only too sensible to the fact, that any day some trifling event may fan the smouldering fire into a blaze, and in such a case the want of an experienced officer in charge of Police would be felt very much."

By mid-March 1876, most of the Palmer proper was in the hands of Chinese: the primary concentration of European miners had moved to the vicinity of Fine Gold Creek and the Little Mitchell River. Reviewing the situation on the Palmer Sellheim suggested that a new gold field be established in order to supervise the European population, now distant from Maytown:

The portion nearest to Edwtown is very nearly worked out, as far as Europeans are concerned, and before long will be entirely in the hands of the Chinese. The white population is daily drawing out farther towards Mitchell Waters, and when you consider it may be necessary to divide the present P.R.G. into separate Fields, I would have the liberty to point out to you that Fine Gold Creek, or the Little Mitchell will be more convenient as a central position for the camp of the Warden of the new G.F."

A new gold field was eventually established, not on Fine Gold Creek, but on the Hodgkinson, to which almost all of the European alluvial miners had moved within the month.

**GOVERNMENT DEALINGS WITH THE CHINESE**

By far the most pressing problem facing the gold field administration was the collection of payments for miners' rights. Sellheim came under a great deal of pressure from Under Secretary Lukin to "use every exertion" to keep revenue collection in proportion to the incoming Chinese population, 8,000 by May 1876. In conveying this instruction to an Assistant Warden, Sellheim patiently explained:

I have therefore to ask you to be good enough to use all time that can possibly be spared from other duties, in looking up the Chinese, and particularly in the more distant camps from Oakey Creek.

A year later, when the Chinese numbered between 16,000 and 17,000, Lukin was still urging that even more time be spent collecting revenue, adding that this was to be done "without undue violence."
It was up to the individual warden how he interpreted this instruction.

The gold field staff found it difficult to keep pace with the rapid increase in the Chinese population, especially the years 1876-1877. Some of the newcomers evaded payment of miners' rights, but in this respect, Sellheim opined, the Chinese "don't differ vastly from the Europeans." Admittedly, the language barrier was a problem, although translations of the *Gold Fields Act* were displayed periodically. More serious, however, was the existence of a blatant breach in the issue of miners' rights to Chinese which remained undetected for several months and no doubt contributed to Chinese resistance to and distrust of the revenue collection system. At the height of the Chinese immigration, Sellheim was appalled to discover that Assistant Warden W. R. O. Hill had issued mere slips of paper to Chinese instead of prescribed forms for miners' rights, and strongly reprimanded the Assistant Warden for the carelessness of his action. The gross irregularity of this practice led to serious confrontations between other gold field staff and Chinese, the latter believing they were legally licensed.

Faced with official pressure to improve revenue collection, some wardens began to rely more and more on Aboriginal trackers to collect revenue from Chinese. W. R. O. Hill admitted to using his trackers to "run them down", in addition to recruiting Native Police to join the field party. Former Sub-Inspector Alexander Douglas was later to confirm that his detachment was used to "draft" out Chinese. How widespread this use of terror tactics is unknown, however neither Hill nor Douglas was condemned for their actions, although Native Police were not sanctioned to carry out gold field duty. When agents for Sun Yee Lee complained to the Colonial Secretary that Chinese had been assaulted by Native Troopers collecting revenue, the matter was dismissed on the grounds that "no native police [were] employed under the Gold Fields Wardens in collecting fees or in any other way."

More conspicuous in his treatment of Chinese was Thomas Coward. He carried out Lukin's instruction to an extreme degree, and was "universally hated by the Chinese". His conduct became so oppressive that it was eventually the subject of two government inquiries, in early 1876 and late 1877. In the first inquiry, specific cases of assault, unlawful imprisonment, excessive fining, and obvious neglect of Chinese under Coward's supervision were cited.

However, it was Coward's ill-treatment of Europeans which assisted in bringing about a second inquiry, the following year. European businessmen complained to the inquiry that "the Chinamen take their custom to other places, or, in fact, shift to other portions of the goldfield". This time Coward was found unsuitable for the post of Warden, and dismissed.
The decision was by no means unanimous, for Thomas McIlwraith was later to praise Coward as “the only Warden who did his duty in collecting revenue from the Chinese.”

The removal of Coward nonetheless highlights a measure of support from some sections of the European community for Chinese businessmen, no doubt due to the commercial interests they represented. Because of their wealth, Europeans tended to confer upon them a greater degree of respect and status than they did on the Chinese miner. Quong Nam Chong, the owner of one of the largest businesses on the Palmer, is a case in point, for he amassed an average of £400-500 a week. Tam Sie, who arrived on the field in 1875, had £15,000 in cash and £500 in assets by the time he left the Palmer four years later. Chinese had early maximised their financial security with a monopoly over coin; they even set up their own bank. When European banks were later established, the Chinese divided their custom between the two main branches, the storekeepers preferring the Queensland National and the butchers the Bank of New South Wales. The Q.N. considered its Chinese customers “perfectly safe” and up to 1882, readily gave advances to them. The value of these customers was evident in the suspension of an acting manager for indiscreetly inducing a Chinese storekeeper to remove his account.

THE ANTI-CHINESE AGITATION

Nevertheless, while only rarely did animosity against the Chinese find expression in violence, it was to become a powerful political force. The anti-Chinese debate was based prima facie on the familiar stereotypes of the Victorian gold fields. It was claimed that Chinese miners did not prospect, but merely took advantage of the absence of European miners from their diggings, and that by their impermanency and stolid self-sufficiency they impeded European industry in reefing. Worst of all, the Chinese were vilified as morally debased and carriers of disease, with a propensity for violent crime. However there were other businessmen who welcomed a stable laissez faire relationship with the Chinese, dreaming of Cooktown as an entrepot for Chinese and Indian trade, with its agricultural hinterland tilled by cheap Asian labour. Drawing their members from the Chamber of Commerce, the group’s most outspoken and influential voice was the editor of the Cooktown Herald, W. H. L. Bailey, who claimed that his newspaper was “an advocate for Chinese labor directed into a proper channel”. The pro-Chinese group defended the charges that the Chinese were undesirable immigrants, but did not oppose measures to restrict them from new gold fields. Yet when measures aimed at the Chinese threatened commercial interests by causing poverty among Chinese consumers, they were swiftly denounced.
The anti-Chinese agitation placed the government of Arthur Macalister in a quandary. Not only had the former Palmer ministry entered into negotiations to employ Chinese coolies on sugar plantations, but the Governor, William Cairns, was totally opposed to any form of discriminatory legislation. Also, there existed international treaties between Great Britain and China which, in fact, discouraged any attempt to prohibit Chinese immigration. An indirect attempt to do so by strictly enforcing the health regulations with regard to Chinese immigrants, was considered unrealistic by Dr Conradi, the Health Officer at Cooktown, for all overseas steamers were already “subjected to the closest examinations”. In May 1876, the Macalister Ministry was defeated by George Thorn. William Murphy was sworn in as member for the new electorate of Cook.

LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION

Under the guise of revenue raising, the Thorn administration moved quickly to amend existing legislation, placing further penalties on Chinese. Firstly, the duty on rice was increased from £2 to £7/6/8 per ton under the Customs Duties Act, despite criticism that the action was a “miserable contradiction” of the avowedly free-trade principles of the government.

A Chinese Oven, one of the items of heritage which the Palmer River Historic Preservation Society is seeking to save.

John Hay
Secondly, the government sought an amendment to the *Gold Fields Act* of 1874, proposing to raise miners’ rights for “aliens” (African and Asiatic) to £3, six times the amount paid by European miners. Alien businessmen would also be affected under this amendment, with business licences rising from £4 to £10. In Parliament, the more blatant aspects of the *Gold Fields Act* amendment bill provoked strident debate, especially clause 3 which provided that any Chinese (or any other Asian or African for that matter) was automatically an alien unless sufficient proof or naturalization was immediately forthcoming.37

As it eventuated, Governor Cairns gave assent to the *Customs Duties Act* of 1876, imposing a duty of one penny on each pound of imported rice, but deliberated over the amendment to the *Gold Fields Act*. Cairns informed the Earl of Carnarvon on 11 October that he had decided to reserve the bill on the grounds of its “extraordinary nature”.38 Within a month he received notice of his commission to South Australia; his replacement was Arthur Kennedy, Governor of Hong Kong.

By this stage the prospects for alluvial miners on the Palmer were fast diminishing. A total of 7,708 Chinese arrived on the field within the first five months of 1877, bringing the population to around 18,000 a number, in Sellheim’s opinion, “considerably in excess of the capabilities of the field in the dry season.”39 By the close of May, the average earnings of the Chinese miners was estimated at a mere 3 pennyweights. The increased rice tax was having its effect on the diet and health of the miners. Taam Sze Pui who arrived during this time was greatly disturbed by the distress of earlier arrivals:

Oh, what a disappointment when we learnt that the rumour was unfounded and we were mislead! Not only was gold difficult to find the climate was not suitable and was the cause of frequent attacks of illness. As we went about, there met our gaze the impoverished condition and the starved looks of our fellow countrymen who were either penniless or ill, and there reached our ears endless sighs of sorrow. Those who arriving for the first expressed no regret for being late, on the contrary, they were thinking of departing. Could we, who had just arrived, remain untouched at these sad tales?40

Disputes over claims, rare in the past, became more common, some leading to fighting. When the first of these occurred, Sellheim described it as “peculiar”, caused by the intrusion of “a mob of new chum Chinamen”.41 Other disputes occurring throughout 1877 were similarly triggered by new arrivals.

Meanwhile the government had embarked upon yet another programme to halt further immigration through quarantine regulations, which by its poor timing almost cost them the support of the new
governor, Arthur Kennedy. From January 1877, with the discovery of a case of smallpox, all vessels from Chinese ports had to obtain admission to pratique at the first port of call south of Somerset. Kennedy, *en route* to Moreton Bay from Hong Kong, had intended disembarking at Cooktown but was prevented by the new regulation. Waiting dignitaries were obliged to row out to the governor-designate’s quarantined steamer to present their petitions including a magnificently hand-painted scroll from a Chinese deputation. With valuable cargoes remaining at sea for the quarantine period and shipping timetables disrupted, both European and Chinese commerce was severely affected. Little or no preparation was made to accommodate or feed the passengers of quarantined ships, and ship owners found themselves paying the costs.

The clumsy and unpopular quarantine measures were, however, only a stopgap. What the government had in mind was two-fold attack, involving not only an amendment to the *Gold Fields Act* to restrict Chinese mining, but also a measure to regulate immigration. The *Chinese Immigrants Regulation Bill* and the amendment to the *Gold Fields Act* progressed simultaneously through Parliament, and it is clear that most Parliamentarians did not distinguish between them in debate. The *Chinese Immigrants Regulation Act*, which became law on 20 August 1877, placed a £10 poll tax on Chinese entering the colony. The *Goldfields Act Amendment Act of 1877*, passed 1 October, was essentially the same as the bill which had been reserved by Cairns; it imposed a £3 fee for miners’ rights and £10 for business licences.

It was rumoured that the Chinese would physically resist any attempt by the gold field administration to extract payment of £3 for a miners’ right. Sellheim conveyed this undercurrent of discontent to the Under Secretary for Mines in 1877:

> I am informed by leading Chinamen that the passing of this Act is the cause of great discontent amongst their countrymen, and it is rumoured that at the expiration of many of the current licences, a rollup may be looked forward to, if the £3 licences should be strictly enforced. I trust such an event will not take place, as I fail to see how much bloodshed could be prevented in such a case.

However, no violence eventuated, as it became clear to gold fields staff that collection of revenue was now near to impossible. Indeed Sellheim asserted that “the issue of miners rights is a perfect dead letter”, for it was evident to him that most of the Chinese miners were simply too impoverished to pay. Fines served no purpose, and if imprisonment was ordered, all “the gaols in the colony would be filled in a fortnight.” Assistant Warden Farrelly, during his December patrol, let about one hundred Chinese miners go without payment, commenting that “the majority of the Chinese whose
Miners Rights have now expired are unable to pay for new ones. From October 1877 to July 1878 only 217 miners’ rights were collected by Sellheim, in some months none at all. By mid-1878, the manager of the Queensland National Bank reported a perceptible decline:

... the old workings here are no longer payable and the imposition on them of the £3 for a miners right has driven away many who had that sum ... (As this amount) is required for the passage back, numbers of them who have little or nothing are most afraid to venture for fear of being “run in”.

Not only was trade between the port and the field disrupted, but a large concentration of Chinese paupers was being created. News that assent had been granted to the Goldfields Act Amendment Act 1878 was hailed with much satisfaction on the Palmer from all quarters, both Chinese and European.

The plight of the Chinese under the old legislation came to a head in 1878 in what have become known as the “Lukinville Riots”. The Chinese Lukinville rush was the first substantial alluvial rush since the Hodgkinson. Its timing promised the remaining Chinese on the Palmer a release from the poverty that they had endured under the previous amendment to the Gold Fields Act. It was Lukinville which prompted a clamour for miners’ rights during August 1878, which Sellheim claimed was the “largest issue that ever has taken place during such a short period on any Australian Goldfield.” With the influx of 8,000 hopeful miners, including a small number of Europeans, competition over limited resources was bound to occur. Information was received that serious fighting had broken out among Chinese on or about 6 August, involving about 500-600 miners. This was the first of three disputes which became known as the Lukinville riots, possibly the most serious local affrays in Queensland history. The riots are still shrouded in mystery, as very little is known of the sequence of events, the numbers involved, or the issues from which the conflict arose. Certainly there were several days of violence, at least four deaths — other estimates vary from 9 to 48 deaths — and a number of other casualties occurred. The 6 August incident alarmed the gold field administration considerably, as violent disorder among the Chinese had been rare. Sellheim, having only just returned from the new rush, instructed Towner to proceed to Lukinville and arranged for additional police reinforcements from Byerstown. Fighting broke out again over a claim on 15 August. The police reported a “roll up amongst the Chinese ... There were 800 Macao against 400 Canton men. Two men were killed and several wounded.” Sub-Inspector Britten later put the number of deaths at three. Four days later, another man was killed in a gambling house.
In reporting the four deaths, Sellheim identified the primary cause as inter-group rivalry. According to the Warden, the "Hong Kong" men had previously been in possession at the upper workings at the Byerstown-Uhrstown area, the "Tartars" at Jessop's Gully and the Conglomerate, with the "Macao" men at Stony and Sandy Creeks. On the evidence of some Chinese, Sellheim also blamed "gambling vagabonds" for inciting riots to further their own interests. The supposed ringleaders were charged with vagrancy and sentenced to Rockhampton Gaol; one of them was a prominent storekeeper and mine owner, Sam Hand, a naturalized Chinese, married to an Irish woman, and resident in Australia for at least seventeen years.

Sellheim's charge against Hand prompted a number of Chinese businessmen to forward a petition to the Governor requesting him to review the case. They attributed the main cause of the disturbance of 15 August to a breach in mining ethics on the part of the "Macao" men who had locked up valuable ground by force of arms to all newcomers, including those referred to as "Canton" men. When the latter attempted to occupy the disputed ground, fighting began. Hand, they submitted, was neither vagrant nor ringleader, it being "known to the Bench that he had a claim on Stoney Creek worth two hundred pounds and had on his person when arrested over twenty pounds in money besides jewellery."

Mining disputes involving the locking up of ground or the jumping of claims were certainly not unusual on gold fields. While district group rivalry cannot be discounted, for the Chinese themselves acknowledged its existence, the role of Sam Hand in the affair was most likely accidental, although it is quite probable that, as a storekeeper, he was the creditor for one of the groups involved in the episode.

Lukinville was the swansong of the Palmer's alluvial phase. By the end of 1883, the Chinese population had dropped to 1,043, a size approximating that of the first Chinese rush in mid-1874.

FOOTNOTES
2. Queenslander (hereinafter Q) 8 January, 18 March 1876; Cooktown Herald (hereinafter CH) 8 January, 8 March 1876.
5. Taam Sze Pui came from Ny Chuen in Namhoi, a Sam Yap district. Taam Sze Pui, My Life and Work (Innisfail 1925), p. 9.
Listed by James McHenley, *Q* 22 May 1875.

8. *Q* 29 March 1879.


10. F. Farrelly to Under Secretary for Mines 7 January 1879, 79/5 MWO 13A/G1, Queensland State Archives (hereinafter QSA).

11. *Q* 29 March 1879.

12. *Q* 26 February 1876.

13. St. George to Secretary for Works & Mines 13 July 1874, 74/3730 WOR/A88, QSA.


15. Sellheim to Secretary for Works & Mines 4 April & 14 May 1875, 75/125 & 75/172 CPS 13B/G1, QSA.

16. Sellheim to Colonial Secretary 23 March 1875, 75/1091 COL/A 208, QSA.

17. Sellheim to Secretary for Works & Mines 13 March 1876, 76/70 CPS 13B/G1, QSA.

18. Sellheim to Dorsey 6 May 1876, 76/106 CPS 13B/G1, QSA.


20. AR 1878 p. 17.

21. See Hill to Inspector of Mines 1 May 1876, 76/21 MWO 13A/G1 and Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 4 November 1876, 76/241 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.

22. Hill to Under Secretary for Mines 18 April 1877, 77/53 MWO 13A/G1, QSA.

23. Annotation J. C. Hodel for Sun Yee Lee and other Chinamen Storekeepers to Colonial Secretary 18 October 1877, 77/4973 COL/A246, QSA.

24. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 28 October 1877, 77/248 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.


27. J. W. Elcoate to General Manager 23 August 1880, BR/QNB/032, National Bank Archives, Brisbane (hereinafter NBA).


29. *CC* 4 August 1875; Tenant Shields to General Manager 1 June 1876, BR/QNB/032, NBA.

30. Elcoate to General Manager 20 September 1880, BR/QNB/032, NBA.

31. Minutes of 343rd meeting of the Directors of the Queensland National Bank 31 December 1878, A/QNB/301 pp. 606-7, NBA.

32. See for example *Q* 1 May 1875; *CH* 23 August 1876.

33. *CH* 13 October 1877.


35. S. Conradi to H. H. Massie 12 April 1875, 75/3403 COL/A216, QSA.
37. Preamble to *Gold Fields Act Amendment Bill of 1876* as passed by the two houses of Parliament 20 September 1876.
39. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 1 June 1877, 77/122 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
41. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 7 April 1877, 77/79 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
42. Queensland *Government Gazette* XX, 2 (6 January 1877), pp. 9-10.
43. *CC* 21, 24 March 1877. The Chinese greeting was apparently very elaborate, designed by Ty Tong Yik, an artist, and translated by Samuel Ashew.
44. 41 Victoria 12.
45. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 2 November 1877, 77/252 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
46. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 5 February 1878, 78/29 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
47. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 5 February 1878, 78/29 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
48. Farrelly to Under Secretary for Mines 14 January 1878, MWO 13A/G1, QSA.
49. Register of Mines’ Rights, Warden’s Office, Maytown, MWO 13B/12, QSA.
50. Kent to General Manager 24 June 1878, BR/QNB/032, NBA.
51. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 7 September 1878, 78/168 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
52. *CC* 10 August 1878; *Q* 10 & 17 August 1878.
53. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 7 September 1878, 78/168 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
54. Mentioned by Sellheim in his report to Under Secretary for Mines 5 August 1878, 78/157 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
55. *CC* 17 August 1878.
56. Item from *Palmer Chronicle* reprinted in *Q* 19 October 1878; *CC* 21 August 1878.
57. Sellheim to Under Secretary for Mines 7 September 1878, 78/168 MWO 13B/G1, QSA.
58. Petition of Chinese Residents Cooktown 16 September 1878, 78/846 COL/A266, QSA.
59. AR 1883 p. 20.