Neo Counter-Insurgency: Vietnam Redux?

Thesis submitted by

Allan Orr BA (Hons) Queensland, Australia

in November 2007

for the degree of Master of Arts (by research)
in the School of Political Science
James Cook University

Abstract:

This thesis argues that current counter-insurgency doctrine, theory and practice as employed by the militaries of the Coalition (America, Australia and Britain) overlooks critical relationships between counter-insurgency variables in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Current counter-insurgency doctrine is thus falling dangerously short in its attempts to pacify the insurgencies of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the wider War on Terror. The need for the recalibration of the current counter-insurgency model employed by the Coalition and endorsed by most experts in the field of counter-insurgency has come to be of critical importance, particularly given the shortfalls of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns, shortfalls of which have become painfully evident in recent times. This thesis will therefore argue that the Coalition needs to develop an operational model of counter-insurgency warfare that better understands the field's dynamics as a whole if it is to prevail in the counter-insurgency conflicts of today and tomorrow.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

MAPS, TABLES, CHARTS & DIAGRAMS:

Neo Counter-Insurgency: Vietnam Redux?

Aim: To utilize applied analysis to develop a refined operational model for Coalition (Australia, United Kingdom and the United States) counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare in the 21st century. The forthcoming thesis will attempt to accomplish this by developing a counter-insurgency template drawn from a comparative analysis of the Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Specifically, lessons drawn from Vietnam will be superimposed onto the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to analyse current counter-insurgency field theory and practice to answer the question: Are Afghanistan and Iraq a case of Vietnam redux? If so how, if not why?

The answer to this question will be sought by utilizing an original conceptual paradigm for the field of counter-insurgency, *The Refined Integrationist Model (RIM)*, drawn from the above comparative and case study methodologies. These methodologies will be followed to derive policy lessons and conceptual management tools regarding present counter-insurgency doctrine. On a technical note, to make a distinction from counter-insurgency theory and practice of the 20th century, particularly as related to Vietnam, this study shall use the term *neo counter-insurgency* to describe counter-insurgency theory and practice as implemented in the 21st century.

This thesis will attempt to contribute the Refined Integrationist Model to the field's knowledge as current counter-insurgency field theory and doctrine misunderstands the field's dynamics somewhat. In analysing neo counter-insurgency theory and practice thusly it will be argued that artificial tiering and structuring mechanisms have produced counter-insurgency doctrines and operational strategies that have fallen short of expectations in Afghanistan and Iraq. That this is so appears to be because neo counter-insurgency theory and doctrine visualizes the political sphere as the highest priority, military force as an operational adjunct to the political sphere and psychological operations as the lowest priority.

The derived counter-insurgency phenomenon in Afghanistan and Iraq is having a detrimental effect on the Coalition's wars there, precisely because it ignores the *absolute* co-dependency the fields sustain (a relationship conceptualized by the Refined Integrationist Model herein). The readjustment of counter-insurgency field theory, doctrine and practice has not been as important or pertinent since the Vietnam War.

Justification: Upon the cessation of the Cold War many presumed the world was heading toward a new era of enlightenment. The Middle-East likewise reached a fork in the road. It had two possible choices for the future of the region. One turn would see the region adapt to theories of modernization. If Persians and Arabs wanted peace, modernization and stability then some of the intelligentsia of the region argued that they needed to adopt notions like democratization, privatization, the strengthening and empowerment of civil society independent of governmental and religious control as well as free speech. Lastly, peace with Israel and rapprochement with the US was necessary.

The other turn would continue down a well traversed road, with only a minor readjustment of the Middle-East's traditional political architecture envisioned. It was this paradigm that triumphed, a slight tweaking of the model that had run the region for the previous half-century at least. Specifically, a system that saw and encouraged the notion that the West was an enemy of all Muslims, that Israel must be decimated, that state run economies and dictatorial regimes were the natural lodestars of the region and that these systems should be run either by Kings, 'Nationalists' or Islamists.

Democratic political reform and overall development, the populace of the region was told, was a hostage to foreign threats, to American and Israeli 'aggression'. So long as the region was under such a 'threat' the people would have to tolerate the status quo for all the region's energy had to be put into its militaries and regime stability. The notion that it was the West's (mainly America's) and Israel's fault that the people lived in poverty, that there was not enough money to put into government and defence as well as economic and political development ballooned and perforated the region to the point where it could aptly be described as the region's second religion. One notion had to go and it had to be the latter- development and self-determination were luxuries, survival however was a necessity, or so the people were told:

> The United States is blamed for much that is bad in the Arab World, and it is used as an excuse for political and social oppression and economic stagnation. By assigning responsibility for their own shortcomings to Washington, Arab leaders distract their subjects' attention from the internal weaknesses that are their real problems. And thus rather than pushing for greater privatization, equality for women, democracy, civil society, freedom of speech, due process of law, or other similar developments sorely needed in the Arab world, the public focuses instead on hating the United States* (Rubin 2002: 74). *Plus the West by association.

Ideologically this structure is the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine. It is inherently self-reinforcing as any dissent is labelled treason, since only supporters of Israel and America would

seek to undermine the strong, benevolent systems of the region in the face of such a clear and present danger.

Hazem Saghia, a Lebanese writer based in London for security reasons is such a 'traitor': "For the regimes and elites, [these are] deliberate policies to benefit themselves. But the people are responsible for it…and [ultimately] they pay the price". Outside of their military forces these regimes, whether 'nationalist', monarchical or Islamic fundamentalist typically have two linchpins to their power base. 1-They control the media of the region (even the few private media companies do not stray far from the traditional line). 2- They control the education sector to mould the region's young minds from birth. This is the architecture the Coalition is up against in the War on Terror (WoT). According to the United Nations (UN) Development Program's *Arab Human Development Report (ADHR) 2003*, all Arab states received a score of 'low' in its index of adult literacy, school enrolment, life expectancy and per capita Gross Domestic Product, a situation that had not improved since 1990 (Sakr 2004: 185-186).

It also showed the region's indicators of civil liberties, political rights, media freedom and education standards were the lowest in the world (the worst sector was education and intellectual activity). What these results "convey is the outcome of systematic repression of intellectual activity inside Arab countries over several decades…multiple layers of censorship and coercion have stifled creativity or driven it out of the region altogether". The report's lead author Nader Fergany (like the other 39 authors of the report Arab himself) went on that "there was no point expecting the same forces that were responsible for the current situation to start working seriously to reverse it". Due to the self-perpetuating nature of the system however, the people of the region did not accept this independent analysis and rejected it as treason. Again since "territorial boundaries have long been used to block the entry of information deemed uncomplimentary to local regimes, thorough assessments of the dire situation have been in short supply"(Sakr 2004: 185-186).

People of the region have a hard time believing anything that does not gel with what they have been indoctrinated to believe, because the media and education sectors of the region have all told them the same thing since birth. But this 'truth', so delivered by these various vectors, originates from one of the two above sources of power in the Middle-East, regime or religion. As such its main reason for being is to perpetuate the status quo. Even where limited democratic reform has taken place in the region it has usually been strictly controlled and is thus no real threat to regime

survival or stability. Where enacted, bar Lebanon and Palestine (where recent progress is largely due to the democratic impetus the Afghan and Iraq models have engendered), it has merely been a Machiavellian exercise to release steam, not replace it with a new, more efficient and equitable engine.

> "For the masses, anti-Americanism falls in line with what they have been taught in school, told by the state-controlled media, heard preached at the mosque, and seen purveyed by their leaders, whether they be the nation's rulers or the Islamist oppositionists. Holding America responsible for everything wrong in their lives makes them feel better and provides an explanation of how the world works. The anti-American struggle makes them feel strong, giving them hope for a better future. It validates their pride in being virtuous Arabs and Muslims superior to their evil enemies" (Rubin & Rubin 2002: 97). Further, as Barry Rubin posited in a separate journal article: "What, then, should Washington do? U.S. policy makers should understand that various public relations efforts, apologies, acts of appeasement, or policy shifts will not by themselves do away with anti-Americanism. Only when the systems that manufacture and encourage anti-Americanism fail will popular opinion also change" (Rubin 2002: 85).

As this geo-political architecture is both the source of Islamic terrorism and self perpetuating, post 9-11 cultural relativism went out the window, for the "great indulgence granted to the ways and phobias of Arabs has reaped a terrible harvest" (Ajami 2003: 2). US President G.W. Bush developed the 'Bush Doctrine' in response. In part the doctrine recognizes the destruction of the Middle-East's current political architecture as crucial to combating terrorism (Donnelly 2003). A doctrine Australia and Britain have also adopted, evidenced by their participation in the 'Coalition of the willing'.

How this doctrine is conducted in practice is twofold; to pursue diplomatic means to change the region peacefully where possible and to use military force where necessary. As such, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are 'over-the-horizon' military interventions designed to favourably construct future democratic Allied nations initially and later gestate by force of example a democratic ground swell in the region of most importance to the War on Terror. The region had to be reshaped lest anti-Western public opinion in the Middle-East carry on perpetually and the Coalition do nought but combat the symptoms alone of terrorism for generations to come. As Diamond and Brumberg commented in 2003:

> "Why is the Middle-East the only region of the world to have been largely untouched by the third wave of global democratization? ...Only in the Middle-East and North Africa…has democracy failed to expand in the past three decades". They then answer there own question by stating: "Autocracies do not willingly commit political suicide. In the Middle-East, particularly, autocracies have repeatedly outlived predictions of their demise" (Diamond, Plattner & Brumberg 2003: ix & xi).

The structural lie that the West was out to destroy the Arabs and Persians, to steal their oil, corrupt their culture and 'defile their women' had to be redressed and the notions of democracy and moderation given room to breathe and grow, even given the inevitable short term spike in anti-Western opinion as the vested interests of the region fight to cling on to power. As Indyk observed in early 2002: "If the United States is to 'dry up the swamp' that generated the Al-Qaeda terrorist phenomenon, it is going to have to confront the dilemma of political change in the Arab World" (Indyk 2002: 86).

Now this approach is not as radical as many contend. It is in actuality the latest incarnation of one of the two historically contending schools of thought on American liberal 'exceptionalism'. The original school has been labelled 'exemplarism'. This school of thought sees America distinct from 'Old World politics' and the balance of power system it created, particularly in Europe. The school aims to entrench and perfect US institutions and values in a hermitically sealed experiment. The US can, according to this school, exert influence by the force of its example but little more as it takes an isolationist view of the world. The second school has been labelled 'vindicationism'. This school posits the US must, for its own security and morality, as well as its Allies', dispatch notions of 'exemplarism' and pursue policies to deliberately spread, by any means necessary, its 'universal political values and institutions'. In this school America is a crusading force, usually but not exclusively for mutually beneficial change. These two schools have prevailed in American intellectual thought at various times, 'exemplarism' having prevailed until the twentieth century after which point 'vindicationism' has been favoured (Monten 2005: 114).

Post 9-11 it was inevitable military force would be used to alter the political architecture of Afghanistan, but Afghanistan was on the periphery of the Middle-East. To truly transform the region and give modernization and moderation, democracy and the separation of mosque and state the required impetus (as much as could reasonably be expected in the short term) it was recognized that a democratic lodestar would have to be inserted into the heart of the region as a direct result of 9-11. The emphasis of Coalition policy thereby shifted from containment to regime change and rollback (Ajami 2003: 3).

This, along with the ambiguity of Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction program and Iraq's state sponsorship of terrorism combined and saw the Iraq War initiated. It is no coincidence then that since the turn of the century the only major democratic impetus and growth in the region

has been in Afghanistan and Iraq- the two countries where the Coalition has imposed democracy from without. But while the Coalition can defeat any military in the region, the trouble in enacting these strategic interventions comes when segments of the population in the occupied country inevitably resist the imposition of this new political architecture.

Accordingly, Taliban/Al-Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan and Sunni Ba'athist, Al-Qaeda and tribal insurgents in Iraq (and some Shia militias) are fighting Coalition forces there. Given this, counter-insurgency doctrine has been taken out of the closet, brushed off after its Vietnam inspired hiatus and re-constituted in Afghanistan and Iraq. Counter-insurgency doctrine and practice has thus become a key linchpin of American, Australian and British national security policy.

In actuality counter-insurgency doctrine has probably never been more important to American, Australian and British national security policy than it is today in the War on Terror. The question becomes, how relevant and optimal is current counter-insurgency theory, doctrine and practice? Has this theory, doctrine and practice adequately taken into account lessons from the past? Most pertinently, has it learnt the lessons from its last 'big day out', the Vietnam War? To succeed in the neo counter-insurgency campaigns of Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq and the Philippines to name a few, counter-insurgency theory, doctrine and practice requires clarification and rationalisation. Optimal counter-insurgency doctrine and practice is indispensable to success and as such Coalition nations fail to properly understand it at their own risk.

Research Methodology: This thesis shall utilize case study and comparative research design methodologies. A case study "is a factual description of events that happened at some point in the past" (Naumes & Naumes 2006: 4). Case study methodology enables the researcher to focus on a single individual, group, community, event, policy area, institution etc and study it in detail, over either a long or short period of time. The researcher utilizing this methodology usually has a number of research questions or hypotheses to give focus to the research and organize data collection, analysis and presentation of the material. Though both qualitative and quantitative analysis can be undertaken via case study methodology the approach generally has a more qualitative slant. In short, 'case study' "refers to research that investigates a few cases, often just one, in considerable depth" (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2004: 3). Here, three case studies will be undertaken to come to this thesis' model and conclusions- Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The strength and simultaneous weakness of case study methodology is that it generates a vast amount of data regarding one specific case/area. The data, according to some, can not be used to draw generalizations or universal truths as the case study is unique and a representative sample of one group, institution or policy area etc. Many researchers therefore argue that case studies should be used only to generate hypotheses and theories which then require testing by generating data through other forms of research design which may then lead to broader generalizations. This is where comparative methodology comes into this thesis, for as Oyen states: "Actually, no social phenomenon can be isolated and studied without comparing it to other social phenomenon" (Oyen 1992: 4). After undertaking a case study of the Vietnam War it shall then be determined via comparative methodology whether or not and if so where and how the lessons of Vietnam are being applied in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Without a case study of Vietnam it would be difficult to develop effective counter-insurgency paradigms. Vietnam is the largest counter-insurgency war in which both America and Australia have fought together. The equipment, tactics and techniques utilized in Vietnam, though obviously improved by time, are still being applied in Afghanistan and Iraq today. On their part the geo-political end goals are almost identical- the creation of stable, democratic allies in regions deemed geo-politically crucial to national security (Vietnam during the Cold War and Afghanistan and Iraq during the War on Terror).

All these macro-level commonalties, the players, tactics, techniques and geo-political end goals are sufficiently similar as to allow the study and evolution of counter-insurgency lessons from a past conflict in order to apply them to similar conflicts today and hopefully then to use these lessons to prepare for the ones of tomorrow. Finally, Vietnam is relevant not least as the counter-insurgency operation carried out during the Vietnam War was one of the largest, most viscous counter-insurgency conflicts in history. Researchers therefore have a responsibility to objectively analyse the war and learn all its lessons, not just those that fit a specific ideological slant.

Comparative research design has been said to be one of the most important research methodologies in Political Science. If one wishes to understand the conditions under which say, democracies develop and flourish or the conditions under which revolutions, insurgencies and wars break out, there is little choice but to compare numerous, independent occurrences of these events. Other research methodologies would be either impractical or inappropriate for this study. The more cases or examples that are analysed the more likely common causalities can be

discovered and thus generalizations made. As Crow contends also, to analyse any social interaction accurately (including of course war) is to intuitively engage comparative methodologies (Crow 1997: 9).

Whilst the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing, counter-insurgency tactics, operations and events can still be compared and lessons learned. Such as the Fallujah offensive of 2004, which when compared with Vietnam counter-insurgency practice highlights specific deficiencies (the failure to rebuild after the assault) as well as lessons learned (the evacuation of civilians before the offensive). Therefore this thesis shall comprise comparative case studies of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq to reach its model, generalizations and conclusions.

Insurgency Theory: Before delving further into counter-insurgency analysis it is first necessary to have an understanding of insurgency theory and practice. Gabriel Bonnet perhaps classifies insurgencies the most succinctly by the formula:

$$RW = G + P$$

Revolutionary Warfare = Guerrilla Warfare + Psychological-Political Operations

That is, guerrilla warfare conducted in pursuit of the establishment or entrenchment of a competing ideological, political and/or power structure (Fall 1967: 350).

> This formula of Revolutionary Warfare is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This is the real difference between partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and anything else. 'Guerrilla' simply means 'small war'… Political action, however, is the difference. The Communists, or shall we say, any sound revolutionary warfare operator- the French underground, the Norwegian underground, or any other European anti-Nazi underground- most of the time used small war tactics- not to destroy the German Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control over the population (Fall 1965: 1-2).

The term 'Revolutionary Warfare' is apt here even if it is somewhat of a Cold War appellation because what insurgents usually seek is a revolution in the political order. In other words they seek either to completely change the political landscape by ejecting all remnants of the current political order or at least alter it somewhat. Here *Psychological-Political Operations* include anything that enhances an organization's standing or kudos in the eyes of the target population. Coalition militaries make a distinction between politics and psychology, terming the non-political components of such operations 'Psychological Operations'. Operations encompassing anything that would psychologically endear the target population to one's aims and intentions, one's 'side',

or anything that draws popular support away from the enemy. These operations also encompass attempts to negatively affect the mindset of enemy combatants.

In relation to target civilian populations, psychological operations aim to harness popular allegiance which might be manipulated, manufactured or natural (Short 1975: 416). Another important tool to this end is propaganda, which has been defined by Jowett and O'Donnell as "the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (Page 1996: 42).

Toward the revolutionary end popular support for the insurgency and popular discontent with the ruling power is essential (vice-versa for counter-insurgents). Insurgencies wither and die without popular support of some kind (be it from within or without the operational area). For they are organizations which, from a position of military and political inferiority, seek to use armed force to usurp or at least alter the power structure of a given political entity. Popular support becomes more essential when force multiplication theory is accounted for, as popular support is just that, a force multiplier.

But popular support alone, even if attained, does not guarantee victory. Thus insurgents take up arms whilst seeking to attain or maintain popular support because they lack, or are denied access to, legitimate or established forms and institutions of political power. Insurgents also usually have a belief that they know the 'true path' for their country men and women and rarely hesitate to impose this path by force of arms. Thereby arms are important in two respects; they allow the insurgents to take the fight to the ruling power and company whilst enabling it to impose its will on any 'recalcitrant' citizens. In terms of operational strategy, O'Neill has broken down the methods of insurgency to four strands:

1- *The Conspiratorial Strategy* is the oldest and most uncomplicated strategy of insurgency. It seeks to rapidly supplant the ruling class/structure of a political entity through limited use of force. This strategy is usually found within the form of a coup, be it military or civilian led. Its focal points are the main urban centres where the opposing system's political and military nerve centres are located.

2- *The Protracted Popular Warfare Strategy* is popularly linked with Maoist notions of insurgency and generally renders military action subordinate to 'political action'. In political terms the strategy focuses on the population, militarily it consists of guerrilla warfare at the outset and later evolves into conventional warfare with the state. Mao broke down this modus operandi into three stages. The first was the strategic defensive, where the insurgents must concentrate on survival, political organization and low level attacks (terrorism mainly). The second stage is strategic stalemate, where the insurgency has gained support from some elements of the population and is able to incrementally raise the tempo of military actions to the level of guerrilla warfare. Continued military escalation and rising popular support levels lead to the final stage of the strategic offensive, where conventional warfare becomes possible for the insurgents. The demoralization of government forces here from the insurgency's military successes and rising levels of popular support lead to a collapse of the ruling government (see the phases of insurgency below).

3- *The Military-Focus Strategy* inverts strategy three and renders political action subordinate to military operations. Insurgents following this paradigm remain aware of the need for popular support, yet make no effort to acquire it through extensive political organization. Proponents of this stratagem hold that either pre-existing levels of popular support are sufficient, that popular support will evolve from military victories or that victory on the battlefield will negate the need for popular support. This strategy inherently retains the option of engaging in brutal suppression should opposition develop.

4- *The Urban Warfare Strategy* focuses on acts of terrorism in built up areas to achieve insurrectionary political goals. Inaccessible rural areas and/or government dominance of the country-side require the insurgency to splinter into minute operational cells (2-5 members) located in the urban centres, to blend in with the large population from which it is ostensibly indistinguishable. This strategy reduces the effectiveness of superior government forces by using the population as a shield, in the hope counter-insurgency forces overreact and/or inflict politically unsustainable amounts of collateral damage. Alternatively the strategy can be intended to wear down the patience of the population with counter-insurgency forces, alienating and turning the population toward the insurgency or making it a neutral party. Either way, the strategy attempts to translate terrorist actions into favourable political outcomes for the insurgents/terrorists by

alienating the population from counter-insurgency forces as a result of the wave of unmitigated terror. The strategy has two variations; one that calls for an eventual move from the cities to the country-side for the insurgent movement and one that focuses the movement's evolution solely in the cities (O'Neill 1990: 31-47).

Of those groups that do seek to evolve militarily to assume political power or realign the political foundations of a state there are broadly three military phases of insurgency:

- ➢ **PHASE 1 TYPE INSURGENCY**- Recruiting, training and equipping activities are embarked upon. Organizational and strategic planning is undertaken and a strategic doctrine developed.
- ➢ **PHASE 2 TYPE INSURGENCY**- Guerrilla warfare and/or terrorism (ambushes, hit and run attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices [IEDs] etc) favoured because conventional battle is not possible at this point due to a lack of insurgents and/or firepower.
- ➢ **PHASE 3 TYPE INSURGENCY**- Conventional battles waged by large numbers of insurgents able to fight for, take and most crucially hold ground (Global Security 2006).

In military-politico terms the following evolutionary model at least represents the intended evolutionary path conceptualised by most insurrectionists (though it must be remembered terrorists do not always seek to attain political power or concessions- the absolute destruction of their enemy can be the goal in itself):

This conceptualization of insurgencies is of relevance to counter-insurgency operations as insurgents have to keep growing. They have to remain on the offensive militarily and psychologically in order to realize the revolution. Protracted strategic defence indicates an insurgency is in retrogression (Hanrahan 1971: 120).

Hypothesis:

The aim in counter-insurgency is to return the parent* society to a normal, peaceful mode of interaction- *on terms favourable to ourselves* (italics added) (Kilcullen 2004: 27). *Target population herein.

Neo Counter-Insurgency Doctrine: America's latest doctrinal work on counter-insurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (published December 2006), is highly intricate and has been 20 odd years in coming for the US Army, 25 years for the US Marine Corps. There is a litany of variables at play in counter-insurgency conflicts and this manual rightly details them for the military practitioner, focussing on how military operations are related to and conducted within counter-insurgency parameters. The manual puts forth an impressively wide range of 'principles, imperatives, paradoxes and best practices' to conceptualize counter-insurgent warfare for the military practitioner. Abbreviated, they comprise the following:

Historical Principles for Counter-Insurgency:

☞ **Legitimacy Is the Main Objective**
1-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and non-military means…

☞ **Unity of Effort Is Essential**
1-121. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of non-military agencies. The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN* representatives, must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command.
*Host Nation.

☞ **Political Factors Are Primary**
1-123. General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong's central committee once stated that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military. Such an assertion is arguable and certainly depends on the insurgency's stage of development*; it does, however, capture the fact that political factors have primacy in COIN*. At the beginning of a

COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; however, political objectives must guide the military's approach. Commanders must, for example, consider how operations contribute to strengthening the HN government's legitimacy and achieving U.S. political goals. This means that political and diplomatic leaders must actively participate throughout the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. *The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable.* Most insurgent approaches recognize that fact. Military actions executed without properly assessing their political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are counterproductive. *Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that counterinsurgent actions do not hinder achieving that political solution* (italics added).

☛ Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

1-124. Successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted. Soldiers and Marines must understand the following about the population in the AO:
- Organization of key groups in the society.
- Relationships and tensions among groups.
- Ideologies and narratives that resonate with groups.
- Values of groups (including tribes), interests, and motivations.
- Means by which groups (including tribes) communicate.
- The society's leadership system.

☛ Intelligence Drives Operations

1-126. Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analysed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force.

☛ Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

☛ Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

1-131. The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the HN government's legitimacy. Soldiers and Marines help establish HN institutions that sustain that legal regime, including police forces, court systems, and penal facilities. It is important to remember that the violence level must be reduced enough for police forces to maintain order prior to any transition; otherwise, COIN forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the legitimacy gained by the transition.

☞ Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

1-134. Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The populace may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. The insurgents' primary battle is against the HN government, not the United States; however, U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government's viability. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and local populations often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the United States to abandon a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome that perception and bolster faith in the steadfastness of U.S. support. But even the strongest U.S. commitment will not succeed if the populace does not perceive the HN government as having similar will and stamina. U.S. forces must help create that capacity and sustain that impression.

Contemporary Imperatives of Counter-Insurgency:

☞ Manage Information and Expectations

1-138. Information and expectations are related; skilful counterinsurgents manage both. To limit discontent and build support, the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. IO* (including psychological operations and the related activities of public affairs and civil-military operations) are key tools to accomplish this. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the populace's tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences entailed by ongoing COIN operations. Where a large U.S. force is present to help establish a regime, such progress can extend the period before an army of liberation becomes perceived as an army of occupation.
*Information Operations.

☞ Use the Appropriate Level of Force

1-141. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

☞ Learn and Adapt

1-144. An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. In addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their enemy's vulnerabilities—even with insurgents in distant theatres. However, skilful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. Combatant commanders might also need to seek new laws or policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their AO*s looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required throughout the counterinsurgent force.
* Area of Operations.

☞ Empower the Lowest Levels

1-145. *Mission command* is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding…

☞ Support the Host Nation

1-147. U.S. forces committed to a COIN effort are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. HN governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner the main effort can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.

Paradoxes of Counter-Insurgency Operations:

☞ Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be.

☞ Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is.

☞ The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted.

☞ Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.

☞ Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.

☞ The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well.

☞ If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next.

☞ Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing.

☞ Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals.

(FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006: Ch1-p20 to Ch1-p29).

The manual lists an amended version of former US Special Forces officer and now US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Professor Kalev Sepp's 'best practices' chart in addition:

Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices:

Successful
- Emphasise Intelligence.
- Focus on the population, its needs and its security.
- Establish and expand secure areas.
- Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control).
- Conduct effective, pervasive and continuous information operations.
- Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.
- Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits.
- Expand and diversify the host-nation police force.
- Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.
- Embed quality advisors and Special Forces with host-nation forces.
- Deny sanctuary to insurgents.
- Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing.
- Secure host-nation borders.
- Protect key infrastructure.

Unsuccessful
- Overemphasise killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace.
- Conduct large-scale operations as the norm.
- Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection.
- Focus Special Forces primarily on raiding.
- Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host-nation forces.
- Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military's image.
- Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures.
- Allow open borders, airspace and coastlines.

(Sepp 2005: 10 & FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Ch1-p29).

Serving Australian Lieutenant-Colonel John Blaxland has discussed the problems fomenting from the field's hard to pin down theoretical and practical nature, reflected in the eclectic and lengthy list of 'principles, imperatives, paradoxes and best practices' above: "Critics have argued, however, that the manual is too strategic and theoretical and that company commanders need something more practically oriented at their level". Lieutenant-Colonel Blaxland details Australian Lieutenant-Colonel David Kilcullen's 'Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counter-Insurgency' as the main effort to remedy this and provide an operationally focussed adjunct to FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Blaxland 2006: 69).

The strident attempt of the American military to draft a detailed counter-insurgency manual has not to date been matched by the Australian military, which could be accused of under thinking the problem in contrast. A counter-intuitive outcome considering Australia's traditional military focus on 'Low Intensity Conflict'. The Australian Army's current doctrinal map for counter-insurgency warfare, the Land Warfare Doctrine edition *Counterinsurgency Operations* (LWD 3-

8-4) was published in October 1999 as 'developing doctrine'. For the sake of brevity Australian and British counter-insurgency doctrine will be represented by the following six thrusts found in LWD 3-8-4 according to Lieutenant-Colonel Blaxland (who comments Australian and British counter-insurgency doctrines are practically mirror images):

- Political Primacy (actions backed with sound economic, cultural & social policy).
- Coordination* (at the highest level).
- Intelligence (local knowledge and a sound intelligence organisation).
- Separating the insurgent from his support (to deny information, logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular support).
- Neutralising the insurgent (selective destruction or discrediting of insurgents).
- Longer-term planning (to remove the causes of social, cultural or economic disunity) (Blaxland 2006: 23).* 'Unity of effort' in American doctrine.

The 'Political Primacy' School of Thought: David Galula encompasses what could broadly be described as the 'school of political primacy' and its conceptualization of counter-insurgency warfare, to which the referencing of his work in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is indicative. Decades ago Galula argued along the same lines that FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 appears to run along- that necessary as the military sphere was the political sphere retained theoretical *and* practical supremacy: "That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both *principle and practicality*. What is at stake is the country's political regime, and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, that action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population". Galula continues, citing General Chang Ting-chen as far as can be told: "'A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political' is a formula that reflects the truth" (italics added) (Galula 1964: 84 & 89). FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 concedes that the ratio of military to political action is contestable at varying stages but seems to generally agree as cited.

Joes is a more recent prominent example of the school of political primacy, stating the concept behind his counter-insurgency book, *Resisting Rebellion,* was; "that guerrilla insurgency is quintessentially a *political* phenomenon, and that therefore any effective response to it must be primarily political as well…Concurrence with this essential concept- the primacy of the political in war- by distinguished practitioners and/or students of war and counter-insurgency across time and culture is abundant". Joes goes on to quote Sun Tzu, Julius Caesar, C.E. Callwell, J.F.C

Fuller, General Sir Gerald Templer, Michael Howard, Gene Hanrahan, Charles Freeman and Basil Liddell Hart to reinforce his point. He also quotes Clausewitz, in that; "no other possibility exists, then, than to substitute the military point of view to the political" (underline added) (Joes 2006: 8). Primarily political means here to the political end of neutralizing an armed insurgent enemy that exists between guerrilla warfare and political measures.

Another contemporary and representative example of current counter-insurgency theory is that found in McFate's work. After quoting the US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) (interim) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations,* which defines insurgency as an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. *Political power is the central issue in an insurgency"*, McFate then somehow comes to the conclusion common in the field that: "Winning on the battlefield is *irrelevant* against an insurgent adversary because the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no purely military solution" (italics added) (McFate 2005: 25-27).

From Taber: "The crux of the [counter-insurgency] struggle is the social and political climate" (Taber 1977: 147), military force is not even mentioned here. Kuster also encapsulates the school of political primacy and with Joes the common misinterpretation of Clausewitz regarding counter-insurgency warfare:

> Counter-insurgency is not the sacrosanct domain of the military. Regardless of all the military pontification, the astute military planner understands that, though critical, *his role pales in comparison* to other agencies. Only if his compatriots in the Foreign Service, intelligence and business communities and many others fail to increase the host nation's legitimacy and support will he see his ascendancy in the *support* paradigm. As the political, economic and social infrastructures fracture- the venue of the military- stands between the insurgent and total anarchy. The complexity of the insurgency environment, the so-called small war, *is predominantly a political issue*. The wisdom of Karl von Clausewitz regarding *the pre-eminence of politics* and the role of war must be heeded by the US military leaders facing the threats of the future (italics added) (Kuster 1987: 29).

Clausewitz & the Cold War as the source of the 'troubles': From the time of his writings Prussian General and military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz slowly but surely rose to the pinnacle of Western military thought. To paraphrase Clausewitz; 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' for 'the only source of war is politics'. To Clausewitz political objectives determine not merely why war is waged but also how (Graham & Maude 1997: XIV).

Counter-insurgency warfare may be the most nuanced form of Clausewitz's maxims as this variant is where the military and political *means* are inextricably linked. In conventional warfare the enemy and its population are eliminated until the enemy concedes defeat. In counter-insurgency warfare however the deliberate targeting of civilians is often counter productive, as is the blunt use of military force. Therefore counter-insurgency warfare is perhaps the most refined type of warfare on Earth. Even counter-terrorism is more blunt- terrorists are captured or killed, whereas the conversion or 'winning over' of populations and insurgents (where possible) calls for a more complex and delicate operation. Why some military officers refer to counter-insurgency warfare as graduate level warfare.

Yet to distinguish Clausewitz's ends and means, the term 'other means' here refers principally to military means, with room to encompass political and psychological means. These maxims were not meant to be construed as political means alone or primarily in the pursuit of any political objective in relation to war. Clausewitz was not propounding a school of thought calling for war to be reduced to a debating society or bartering session. Clausewitz spoke of political ends naturally but his writings were militarily focussed at the operational level- *On War* is not a political treatise (Graham & Maude 1997).

Analysis within the field of counter-insurgency, represented by Joes and Kuster above, points toward the misinterpretation of Clausewitz and the derived assumption of political primacy at the practical level. An assumption seemingly unique to the field of 'unconventional warfare', 'irregular warfare', 'asymmetric warfare' in the terminology of the 21st century or 'little war' in Clausewitzean parlance. Study within the field of conventional warfare and especially within Clausewitzean notions of warfare has always marked a distinct line between political objectives and the military methods relied upon to achieve the desired political outcome. Cable concurs, commenting Clausewitzean constructs of war are overwhelmingly focussed on conventional military operations. A focus Cable blames in part for America's poor performance in Vietnam, flowing from the focus on the conventional military aim of finding and vanquishing the enemy in traditional set piece battles (Cable 1986: 113-114).

Most analysts within the field of insurgency and counter-insurgency recognize the end goal in any counter-insurgency campaign is the political goal of popular indigenous support within the target country and the flow on development of the desired political architecture. Somehow though the field appears to have misinterpreted Clausewitz's ends and means to assume 'political action' is

the single most important counter-insurgency factor/variable towards achieving the sought after political outcome. The analysis of Iraq and Afghanistan will contradict this assumption by illuminating the difference between political support and popular support and the dangers of placing 'political action' at the peak of campaign planning. True, the school of political primacy recognizes concepts like 'unity of effort', but at the same time the school's model appears to tier this effort by tending to lean on the political sphere. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Australian and British counter-insurgency doctrine and the previously cited theorists are examples of this.

Put an alternative way, at the operational and theoretical levels Coalition soldiers and marines continue to follow a conceptual model that tells them their ultimate mission is to play a secondary, subordinate role to the 'political campaign'. To delineate ends and means, Clausewitz called for military operations to be enacted with a view to the desired political end goal. He did *not* mean it to be construed as political primacy at the operational level, no matter what the war's hue. If Clausewitz's contention was that political means were the pinnacle factor in any form of war he would not have commented that the power of guerrilla/revolutionary warfare was limited. To Clausewitz guerrilla warfare was little more than an auxiliary to conventional war- it could weaken but not defeat a determined and stronger enemy (Townshend 2000: 179).

Political goals to Clausewitz were the guiding light to be sure, but practically the political component was never more than one portion of the means to victory in armed combat. This confusion of ends and means is a blight on the field. British General Aylwin-Foster encapsulates this model:

> Western counter-insurgency doctrine generally identifies the 'hearts and minds campaign'-
> gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the
> insurgent- as the key to success. It thus sees the population as a potential instrument of
> advantage. It further recognises that military operations must contribute to the achievement of
> this effect *and be subordinate to the political campaign* (italics added) (Aylwin-Foster 2005:
> 4).

This assumption of political primacy does not entirely hold up to historical antecedents. 'Political campaigns', alone or primarily, did not end the insurrectionary conflicts of the Malayan 'Emergency' (Clutterbuck 1967), the Vietnam War (Herring 1996) nor the American Revolutionary War (Bicheno 2003), among others. It is this misperception that this thesis in part intends to address as current field theory and Coalition doctrinal works on the subject appear to ingrain the political sphere with conceptual *and* practical supremacy within counter-insurgency contexts. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 goes so far to state political negotiations/solutions in relation to

insurgents will be required in a majority of cases to end insurgencies. Backing this assertion is the fact that many current and former Coalition military officers interviewed by the media state this consistently (Newshour 2006).

In reality this approach is not best practice and will not be born out by the case studies herein. Indeed, British military historian John Keegan strongly disagrees with the conventional interpretation of Clausewitz. To Keegan war "is not the continuation of policy by other means" (in relation to counter-insurgency warfare Clausewitz's dictum holds true). Keegan points out that Clausewitz;

> actually wrote that war is the continuation 'of political intercourse' (*des politischen Verkehrs*) 'with the intermixing of other means' (*mit Einmischung anderer Mittel*)… In either form, however, Clausewitz's thought is incomplete. It implies the existence of states, of state interests and of rational calculation about how they may be achieved. Yet war antedates the state, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia. Warfare is almost as old as man himself, and reaches into the most secret places of the human heart, places where self dissolves rational purpose, where pride reigns, where emotion is paramount, where instinct is king. 'Man is a political animal' said Aristotle. Clausewitz, a child of Aristotle, went no further than to say that a political animal is a warmaking animal. Neither dared confront the thought that man is a thinking animal in whom the intellect directs the urge to hunt and the ability to kill (Keegan 1994: 3).

Keegan expanded his criticism later on in his book *A History of Warfare*, commenting on the advent of nuclear warfare and the prospects of total annihilation:

> Nuclear weapons preyed upon the mind of man, and the fears they aroused exposed the hollowness of the Clausewitzean analysis once and for all. How could war be an extension of politics, when the ultimate object of rationale politics is to further the well-being of political entities? (Keegan 1994: 381).

An indictment that can almost seamlessly be applied to certain strains of terrorism it could be argued, jihadist terrorism above all. Whereupon, terrorism is not always conducted in pursuit of traditionally defined political objectives but frequently conducted with the sole aim of annihilating the enemy, in the process displaying nothing but contempt for the safety and well-being of the terrorist movement or the populations' in whose name they purportedly fight. Transcendental theological concerns are the primary 'factor' here, not earthly political objectives.

A second reason political measures are overemphasized in neo counter-insurgency theory and doctrine appears to be because the field finds itself wedded to Cold War era constructs of revolutionary warfare ('people's war' in Maoist terminology). In critical respects FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 bears resemblance to Communist insurgency theory. Current Coalition counter-

insurgency doctrine may therefore partially be attempting to emulate the presumed success of its historical antithesis; "as in all Communist theory and practice-political and military aims are intertwined and inseparable, with the political objective taking precedence over the military at all times" (Tanham 1962: 140). Contrast this theory of Communist revolutionary warfare with section 1-123, *Political Factors Are Primary*. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 may have consequently picked up a few inherent contradictions.

For instance, if the military and political tangents are so bound together as to be inseparable how can the political factor have practical primacy in neo counter-insurgency theory and doctrine? More generally, exactly what constitutes 'political factors' and how precisely is military force rendered subordinate to these factors in practice? The answer to this riddle (namely during Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq), the way military force has been subordinated to the 'political campaign' in practice, has been to kill or capture enemy combatants opposing the state, allied forces and the desired political process in isolation. An assumption that has accrued in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq the oversight of military force's proper role in counter-insurgency warfare and its real relationship to popular support.

Frank Hoffman has added to criticisms of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, charging it does not depart sufficiently from the Cold War or 'classical' school of counter-insurgency, propounded in the musings of Sir General Robert Thompson, David Galula and the likes. He and other analysts raise serious questions about what retired US Army Intelligence Officer Ralph Peters has described as the manual's "outdated and dubious Maoist foundations". Or as David Betz is quoted: "While the new counterinsurgency field manual is thorough, serious, and stands in sharp contrast to the political rhetoric concerning the "War on Terror" of the last few years, it is not without failings, chief among them that it is pervaded by concepts drawn from Maoist-style People's Revolutionary Warfare, which is not the sort of insurgency now being faced" (Hoffman 2007: 72-73).

Frank Hoffman argues convincingly (among other relevant criticisms) that the political dimension so inherent to Mao's concept of 'people's war' has lost not an insignificant amount of lustre in regard to neo counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism practice due to globalization. The ease and speed of global communication, finance, travel and access to international support networks has decreased global insurgents' and/or terrorists' need for political or popular support within the target population. International insurgent and/or terrorist cadres and backers are each day more

able to fill the void and maintain a movement's momentum regardless of the indigenous political scene (Iraq is an excellent example). Political measures to address insurgencies and/or terrorist movements are becoming increasingly difficult or irrelevant within a globalized world as a result:

> Currently, we define insurgencies as a violent competition between a state and a rival political group to control a population or establish an alternative political order. There will undoubtedly be classical scenarios in which a weakened state is competing with a rival native political group for public support and the right to govern. But not all insurgencies may see themselves as competing to replace the existing government in a given set. These groups may seek to paralyse and fragment the state, rather than gain control of its apparatus and govern. Also, there may not be a direct competition for the population's support. Since the insurgent does not require food or arms from the population, he may not seek to coerce or solicit their support. Likewise, the limited goals of the modern insurgent seeking only to destabilize vice create an alternative political order may not require the popular support of the people*.

> Another fundamental that may be altered in this competition is the role of the population—the people may not be the prize. This is not an entirely ahistoric idea, as Lenin and Castro did not have a great deal of popular support. In a global insurgency, we need to be specific in a definition of which population we are referring to as the focus of popular support. The insurgent does not always view the civilian population in a particular operational area as relevant to his purpose; his support base may come from a much wider global population— what might be termed the "strategic population." Insurgents and terrorists may elect to ignore the civilian population in the operational battle-space or simply intimidate it to remain neutral. For al Qaeda and similar extremists, the pictures emanating from Iraq are not necessarily about influencing the local Iraqis as much as motivating and mobilizing the larger movement—the *ummah* (Hoffman 2007: 81).
> *Sentence verbatim

Segments of the global jihadist movement fuelling much of the strife in Afghanistan and Iraq are increasingly transcending the political dimension. These components of the global jihad fall under the militarily focussed insurgent strategy detailed previously. Partially explaining why indigenous political support for the Coalition's end goals in Afghanistan and Iraq has not significantly inhibited the insurgents, terrorists and militias there to date (reviewed below). The question then becomes; is the political dimension the *singularly* most important battle-space in counter-insurgency warfare?

The political battle-space will never be irrelevant, after all the recasting of the Middle-East's geo-political architecture is the end goal of the Afghan and Iraq wars. Political and popular support remains essential for Coalition forces if they are to craft the desired political systems of any particular state. However, it will become clear that to attain and sustain such support is not primarily a matter of 'political action' in the War on Terror. Political and/or popular support has become more important to counter-insurgents than some insurgent and/or terrorist groups today,

bringing into question the efficacy of an operational strategy that disproportionately relies on the 'political process' to end an insurgency or terrorist movement. The stature of military force has grown in relevance to the point that it should no longer be viewed as a junior partner in neo counter-insurgency theory and doctrine. Its proper role requires revision subsequently.

The focus on the political sphere within neo counter-insurgency analysis has caused the neglect of the 'psychological operations' field in addition. The field has long been delegated a subordinate role, its enhanced profile in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 notwithstanding (enhanced profile has not meant operational equality in Afghanistan and Iraq). For instance, 'Psychological Operations' and 'Information Warfare' are covered fleetingly in the Australian/British counter-insurgency principles listed above. On its part the American military has proven historically averse to waging 'psychological-warfare'.

Evidenced by the contemporary controversy surrounding General James Mattis' addition of a fourth block covering Psychological Operations/Information Warfare to US Marine Corp General Charles Krulak's popular *Three Block War* notion (Block 1- war-fighting, Block 2- humanitarian assistance and Block 3- peace-keeping). General Mattis: "We're adding a fourth block- which makes it the Fourth Block War. The additional block deals with the psychological or information aspects. This Fourth Block is the area where you may not be physically located but in which we are communicating or broadcasting our message". Lieutenant-Colonel Blaxland goes on to detail the contention surrounding this statement:

> Krulak's construct is now widely accepted and reflects a mindset adept at responding to counter-insurgencies. But General Mattis' conceptualisation of the 'fourth block' remains contentious, although his point about giving increased profile to the place of the informational domain is instructive and becoming widely accepted. In fact his emphasis on information points also to the centrality of seeing such conflict as encompassing all of society. After all, it is increasingly obvious that it is possible to win a battle but lose a war based on perceptions of the people in the theatre and popular support at home (Blaxland 2006: 63-64).

Frank Hoffman weighed in on the issue as well, lamenting the oversight of the psychological/information field in his critique of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5:

> Ideas and grievances are the seeds of most insurgencies. For more than a decade, the security implications of information technology has been evaluated. Given that most COIN campaigns are won or lost in the political and psychological dimensions, the importance of communications and ideas are vital. However, the new COIN manual is a bit understated in its acknowledgement of the impact of these developments. The manual simply states that the "Information environment is critical" and "interconnectedness" gives the adversary new capabilities, but offers only the broadest of supporting guidance…The new manual does recognize the importance of the information dimension, but devotes just three and a half pages

to the issue of media and information operations. Given the critical importance of this dimension in COIN, this omission handicaps American operators in competing effectively in the war of ideas. Of a total of 60 classical books and articles cited, only a single reference is dedicated to information operations… As Professor Lawrence Freedman concludes, "In irregular warfare, superiority in the physical environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advantage in the information environment (Hoffman 2007: 79-80).

The field's current counter-insurgency paradigm dominating professional discussion envisages politics as taking theoretical *and* practical supremacy in neo counter-insurgency theory and doctrine. In this light military operations are deemed at best subsidiary or at worst unnecessary and counter-productive to the enterprise. This model sees politics, military force and psychology as separate and distinct matrices in a counter-insurgency context. In reality it is impossible to separate these matrices, they are interdependent and form a symbiotic relationship- all feed off each other and likewise when one starves the others atrophy too.

Counter-insurgency theory and doctrine supports the integration of all counter-insurgency components to a certain degree, yet at the same time appears to stress the non-political components' subordinate, secondary operational role in counter-insurgency conflicts, accruing disorientation in all of the following case studies. Neo counter-insurgency doctrine can be viewed as calling for 'unity of effort' to an extent while still retaining Cold War era notions of political primacy. This view of political pre-eminence has also led to the commonly held notion that political negotiations/solutions should ideally be relied upon to end insurgencies.

In sum, although Coalition nations do not share a universal counter-insurgency doctrine they take a generally similar approach. At the theoretical level Coalition counter-insurgency doctrine informs soldiers and marines their ultimate mission is of secondary importance to the 'political campaign'. Coalition counter-insurgency doctrine gives priority to indigenous politics and/or political negotiations/solutions in the hope that such 'political action' will render impotent the insurgency for the most part.

However it is not the political process itself, nor its impact on insurgents, that is the most important factor in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism practice, it is the 'hearts and minds' of the target population. The gaining and holding of which can only be accomplished in part by the political process. Moreover, without a military shield this process can not be undertaken in the face of an insurgency. For their part, psychological operations are noticeably absent with

alarming regularity. The field's current theoretical and doctrinal paradigm might therefore be more easily conceptualized by the following model:

The Counter-Insurgency Model of Political Primacy:

Political Action

Military Offensive

Psychological Operations

Democratic institutionalism and/or co-opting the enemy via political solutions should not be the priority *operational* goal of neo counter-insurgency doctrine, for by emphasising one area of the counter-insurgency campaign other equally critical areas are inevitably neglected. In short, while some talk of ends and means within the field most confuse them. To draw a distinction between political primacy and political equality at the operational level may seem trivial at first sight but the results derived from the Model of Political Primacy in Afghanistan and Iraq will demonstrate the need to make such distinctions.

Derived from the above it might therefore reasonably be inferred that whilst proponents of the school of political primacy (likely a majority within the field at present) have little problem with the greater operational integration of the various arms of counter-insurgency practice ('unity of effort'/'coordination'), they continue to tier this effort and hold to a notion of political primacy at both the theoretical *and* operational levels. The conceptual fog impinging the field is all the more perplexing given the understanding the field retains of insurgency theory and the co-equal relevance of both force and allegiance to insurgent success. Both issues Kinross has critiqued:

Any conventional analysis of the Third World's so-called movements of national liberation would have shown that the latter should not have been able to stand up for long to their advanced opponents given the huge discrepancies in economic and military resources. The reality was rather different. The insurgents brushed aside the rules of 'civilized' warfare, ignored the distinction between soldiers and civilians, and gradually won over the indigenous population through a combination of *intimidation* and *persuasion* (italics added) (Kinross 2004: 41).

The 'Integrationist' School of Thought: According to Laqueur one of the more sturdy myths of counter-terrorism practice is that brute force is counter-productive in this mode of warfare and that only political and social measures can mollify or end terrorist movements (relating to insurgent and militia movements here also) (Laqueur 1999: 252). Insurgencies can not usually be defeated by prioritizing their grass-roots' political/psychological grievances, not least because insurgent movements of the War on Terror (and many militias in Afghanistan and Iraq) are fighting for absolute power and/or the total annihilation of their enemies, not political concessions. The political field (notably political negotiations) should not be given operational primacy in counter-insurgency doctrine for;

one cannot hope to end a revolutionary war by remedying the grievances of the population exploited by the revolutionaries; such terms are unacceptable to the revolutionaries because they are not fighting for this end; they only want to attain power. In fact, the French found that if reforms were instituted resistance only became stronger (Heilbrunn 1962: 162).

The political end goal of neo counter-insurgency is popular support towards the evolution of democratic political architectures. The means to this end are not however primarily political in nature. A confusion of ends and means it appears is exhibited by FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 and other proponents of the Model of Political Primacy. Consider Joes, who after stating effective responses to insurgency must be primarily political in nature goes on to state:

Guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency share some important features: both are (or should be), for example, concerned with winning the allegiance, or at least the acquiescence, of the civilian population. But among their essential differences, none is more salient than this: visible, physical control of a given territory, and the people in it, is of quite secondary importance to guerrillas, but it is the heart of a well planned counterinsurgency (Joes 2006: 234).

This kind of realization has contributed to the development of what might broadly be defined as 'integrationist' sentiment within the field contending the point of political supremacy at the operational level. The 'integrationist school of thought' within the field seems to have grown in the last few years and calls for the greater integration of counter-insurgency variables across the spectrum of counter-insurgency practice, delegating the political sphere to but one element of a

counter-insurgency campaign. This train of thought does not argue that political ends should not guide operational means. Felter encapsulates integrationist thought:

> Combating insurgency is a multifaceted politico-military challenge requiring the dynamic integration and synchronization of multiple assets and resources available to the state. History and contemporary experience underscore the maxim that there is no purely military solution available for dealing with this threat, however, experience also indicates no state can succeed in combating insurgents using strictly defensive measures alone. A state's demonstrated and perceived ability to protect its citizens from rebels and discriminately interdict belligerents taking up arms against it is a critical component of any successful counter-insurgency campaign and one that only its security forces can perform (Felter 2005: 7).

Cassidy similarly touches on the subject, while stating a thorough analysis of the relationship between the innumerable amount of counter-insurgency variables was not possible within the scope of his (already extensive) research: "Although any operational design for a counter-insurgency campaign must integrate the political, societal, military, economic, legal, informational and intelligence spheres to fully pacify the population and to establish the legitimacy of the host government, a comprehensive analysis of all these factors is beyond the scope of this chapter-length survey" (Cassidy 2006: 127). Essentially this thesis will go on where Cassidy left off and attempt to explicitly draw out the operational relationship between the multitude of counter-insurgency variables Felter, Cassidy and other proponents of the integrationist school, like Andrade, Willbanks, Soliven, Kilcullen and Rathmell allude to (authors covered further on).

Coalition counter-insurgency principles and codified 'lessons' are drawn from extensive past experiences and are not therefore automatically invalidated across the spectrum of counter-insurgency practice by the War on Terror. In this light the following thesis will aim to refine current Coalition counter-insurgency doctrine and analysis found within the integrationist school of thought, to put forth a more relevant and conceptually truncated lodestar for Coalition counter-insurgency campaigning. Consequently, this thesis' contribution to debate will be to argue not for greater integration but absolute integration. A result the Model of Political Primacy currently dissuades by definition. It will contend that no one counter-insurgency variable is more important than the next 'on the ground' and that all these variables are completely dependent on one another for survival. Counter-insurgency in this thesis will be portrayed as one amorphous operational construct, a construct that ideally should not be viewed under rigid and neatly tiered precepts.

This thesis will also aim to reduce the confounding amount of counter-insurgency variables to a more conceptually manageable duality, persuasion and coercion, in order to create a more universal and deliberately simple operational construct of counter-insurgency. A model to better ensure the target population remains the focus of counter-insurgency efforts, not the political process. Lastly, this thesis will attempt to delineate Clausewitz's ends and means to differentiate political goals and political means within counter-insurgency enterprises more adequately than the field does at present.

More precisely, military victories are by no means irrelevant or of secondary importance to counter-insurgency practice. In actuality they are essential, without a military shield all else is impossible. The perceptions found within the Model of Political Primacy are not backed up by the empirical data. Military force is just as important to counter-insurgency strategy as political and psychological considerations- without each other all wither and die. As Crane states regarding 'Phase IV' (nation building) enterprises: "But nothing in Phase IV can be accomplished without establishing a secure environment on the ground that only military forces, primarily the Army, can maintain" (Crane 2005: 35).

The idea that the political sphere should take practical supremacy, because most insurgencies' origins are political so therefore the best way to end an insurgency is through political action or negotiation, is fallacious. Further, the 'political negotiation' proposition has little realistic resonance in the War on Terror. There is minimal chance that any Coalition government is going to enter into negotiations with the terrorists of Afghanistan or Iraq. Each Coalition nation's, indeed almost every Western nation's widely known and oft stated counter-terrorism policy in part entails a 'no negotiations with terrorists' tenet.

In relation to the 'jihad', the 'political solution' proposition becomes equally impossible in the neo counter-insurgency conflicts waged against Islamo-Fascists, because their 'political' position entails a 'convert or kill' policy, making the prospects of reaching a sustained 'political solution' with these elements wishful thinking. In this event political reasoning, accommodation or agreements become nigh on impossible and the dual degrades to a fight to the death on the battlefield. A fight if the Coalition is to win in order to reshape the geo-political architecture of the Middle-East relies on popular support and the derived intelligence, not political support, because as shall be detailed they are not one in the same. Former leader of the Islamic terrorist organization Hezbollah, Abbas Mussawi shapes the dilemma facing those arguing for the primacy

of 'political solutions/negotiations' in relation to the Islamic insurgent/terrorist movements of the War on Terror: "We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy" (Laqueur 1999: 136).

In any case, to prioritize one sphere connotes the neglect of the other two. Where 'political action' is conducted primarily or without military force, insurgents are more able to impose their will by force of arms. Conversely, to conduct and prioritize a military offensive can lead to the oversight of the psychological and political aspects or their relegation to secondary status. Under such conditions insurgents are all the more likely to attain 'coalescence' (popular support) and thus the counter-insurgency enterprise fails likewise.

Political solutions are the rare four leaf clovers of insurgency and counter-insurgency analysis. They are the easiest way to end an insurgency if found but are unlikely as all sides believe in their cause enough to kill for it. A lot of time and blood can be wasted looking for impossible political solutions or a middle ground. The assumption of political pre-eminence in fact misunderstands a key lesson of Vietnam- that political solutions should *not* be relied upon to end insurgencies. It has been forgotten that a Model of Political Primacy of sorts was followed in Vietnam and a negotiated 'peace' was signed by the US and the Communists (it was the priority of US efforts in Vietnam from day one). In an operational context the blunt use of military force was intended to attrite North-Vietnamese combat strength and will enough to reach a negotiated political solution (Stone 1966: 89).

This it achieved, although the North-Vietnamese ignored the treaty and invaded South-Vietnam *post* Allied withdrawal anyway. At the same time the blunt nature of military operations conducted toward this political end inhibited the attainment of victory on a parallel level. That is, the subordination of military violence to a 'political solution' saw the notion of popular support overlooked for the longest time. On the battlefield what this translated into was regularly indiscriminate military operations that inhibited the war effort by concurrently alienating the very people the Allies were suppose to be fighting for. Rendering the massive amounts of Allied blood and treasure expended in Vietnam moot. The following case study of Vietnam shall contribute to the field's knowledge by drawing out the above contentions. It shall also attempt to contribute a more nuanced understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the military, psychological and political wings of counter-insurgency, alleviating the lack of a clear and well defined conceptual model for 'integrationist' sentiment.

This thesis then hopes to enlighten neo counter-insurgency theory, doctrine and practice by analysing the field's theoretical foundations, particularly in relation to the Vietnam War. What this thesis learns will then be transposed onto the neo counter-insurgency campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq to assess these conflicts in the hopes of better informing the field via an alternate and refined conceptual lens. Specifically, it will examine the interdependent relationship between politics, psychology and military force to elucidate its own theoretical framework regarding neo counter-insurgency practice. A framework this thesis will refer to as the Refined Integrationist Model:

The Refined Integrationist Model:

Political Action

Psychological Operations   Military Offensive

The Refined Integrationist Model will retain the truism of counter-insurgency warfare whereby political goals are the campaign's lodestar, but at the operational level relegates the political sphere to but one component of counter-insurgency in a model where no one element is more important than the next. The overlap between the fields of politics and psychology meanwhile make some feel that to divide the two is somewhat of a misnomer. Schaffner & Stone have described the study of this relationship as the study of "bidirectional interaction" (Schaffner & Stone 1988: 23). To this end the Refined Integrationist Model can be reduced to two variables, persuasion and coercion. Reminiscent of Bonnet's succinct and conceptually vital formulae of insurgency, counter-insurgency warfare in this light might be defined as:

$$COIN = C + P$$

$$\textit{Counter-Insurgency = Coercive Warfare + Persuasive Operations}$$

Admittedly, this formula does not adequately convey the symbiotic relationship the coercive and persuasive variables enjoy. One matrix can not survive without the other in counter-insurgency warfare and what happens in one matrix inevitably affects the other, for better or worse. Finally, the continued domination of both wings is a pre-requisite for counter-insurgency success. This model thereby posits the relationship between these two counter-insurgency variables forms the truncated Refined Integrationist Model, more adequately conceptualized by the following model:

The Refined Integrationist Model:

Persuasive Matrix   **Coercive Matrix**

- Where unitary field approaches are undertaken, where one matrix of this symbiotic paradigm is segregated and/or given priority by the counter-insurgency practitioner, the more likely the insurgency will endure, if not prevail.

- More specifically, where the coercive matrix is solely relied upon or given priority, the cognitive disposition of the target population and cognitive origins of the insurgency are neglected and thus so too the persuasive matrix. The insurgency, under such circumstances, is more likely to endure. Reliance on the coercive matrix increases

exponentially the insurgency's ability to achieve 'coalescence' due to the inevitable increased instances of unmitigated 'collateral damage', in addition to the abdication of the persuasive matrix in general by the counter-insurgency practitioner.

- Inversely, where the persuasive matrix is solely relied upon or given priority, the more likely the conflict will be decided by the insurgents. Under such circumstances insurgents can choose to agree to terms offered by their enemy or choose to impose their will on the enemy and targeted populations alike by force of arms. Either way it must be absolutely clear that under such circumstances the insurgents, being the predominant bearer of arms, will have sole discretion on how, where and when the conflict is terminated.

- In summation, where the two matrices are not inextricably linked in practice, where what happens to one is not recognized as affecting the other, for better or worse by counter-insurgency practitioners, the more likely the failure of the endeavour.

The Variables- Persuasion & Coercion: Getting into the minutia, persuasion has been described and defined a number of ways:

Brock & Shavitt: "Persuasion processes are at the heart of the social movements and social upheavals of our time. The ability of these processes to reconfigure millions of minds and hearts has enabled masters of persuasion and influence to become the leaders of the world" (Brock & Shavitt 1994: 2).

Perloff: "a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to change their attitudes or behaviour regarding an issue through the transmission of a message, in an atmosphere of free choice" (Perloff 2003: 8).

Perhaps the best definition is Reardon's:

"Persuasion involves guiding people toward the adoption of some behaviour, belief or attitude preferred by the persuader through reasoning or emotional appeals. It does not rob people of their ability to choose but presents a case for the adoption of a persuader-preferred mode of action, belief or attitude. It does not use force or threat and does not limit the options of others by deceit. Persuasion is not always in the best interest of the persuadee. Even the persuader with good intentions may lead persuadees to do what might not be in their best interests. *In all cases, however, persuasion does not deprive persuadees of other choices by deceit or force*" (italics added) (Reardon 1991: 2).

"Persuasion is about choice" (Larson 2004: 1), which highlights two things. Firstly, why democratic institutionalism forms the foundation of persuasive operations designed to elicit and harness popular support in the target country toward Coalition ends. Secondly, it introduces a

seemingly contradictory concept in neo counter-insurgency. That is that Coalition coercive elements mean this 'choice' is an illusion. Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are there to *impose* liberty and democracy. An oxymoron to be sure to Western minds but something that becomes crystal clear on the ground.

Democracy appears to speak for itself and has gained majority support in Afghanistan and Iraq (self determination has inherent appeal it seems, even in the most religiously conservative regions on Earth). This support is not however universal, there remain insurrectionary elements opposing this newly imposed status quo. Coalition forces walk a fine line in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are attempting to persuade Afghans and Iraqis into *thinking* they have a choice about their future political hue when in reality they only have a say in electing who runs the system. The system itself is not up for negotiation, debate or referendum, it is democratic institutionalism- there is no other choice. Plainly, those insurrectionists opposing the imposition of this new reality and can not be won over are incarcerated or liquidated.

On the ground in counter-insurgency environs 'persuasive' operations are geared toward anything that wins hearts and minds (indigenous or domestic). Linchpin operations include 'Psychological Warfare Operations' (including 'Information Warfare'), democratic evolution and Reconstruction & Development (including of course vital economic, material and food aid, medical and educational services, employment and economic enhancement programs etc).

For the purposes of this thesis democratic governance is deemed a macro-level persuasive operation as it is conducted at once on a national scope. Whereas persuasive operations like reconstruction, economic aid, medical and educational services etc are deemed micro-level because they are delineated in space and time to a regional or local level. Psychological Operations and Information Warfare Operations (propaganda) are likewise deemed micro-level as they do not affect entire populations at once but only segments of it at any one time. One fortunate side note here is that it has been proven easier to alter the mindsets of groups of people than individuals (Brown 1963: 294), something helpful for the Coalition as their persuasive campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are conducted at the national level.

Persuasion has a dual nature, it can be positive or negative (but is always voluntary). For example, people can be persuaded to an idea or behaviour that is good for them (as in anti-smoking campaigns) or bad for them (as in smoking campaigns). People cannot however be

forcibly persuaded. So while persuasion deals with reason and manipulation, coercion deals with the imposition of will to garner involuntary behavioural and/or cognitive responses. Furthermore, persuasion does not exist solely on the cognitive field and coercion solely on the physical plain, they overlap. Another reason why the two notions overlap and are deemed mutually dependent in the Refined Integrationist Model. Disingenuous propaganda for instance, from the above definitions, would be classified as coercive while the provision of physical security can be classed as persuasive. Coercive cognitive methods are nothing new, particularly to Western consumer societies (Rushkoff 1999: 4).

Persuasion aims at inducing favourable and voluntary behavioural and/or cognitive responses, coercion in counter-insurgency environs on the other hand ideally seeks to enable programs designed to protect and elicit persuasive operations, gain the obedience of recalcitrant segments of the population and/or kill and capture those who will not yield. Although those disobedient souls must be rendered a minority, the majority must be the ones' demanding obedience. Once the recalcitrants become a majority the situation becomes not one of insurgency but of revolution. To combat an insurgency a government and its allies must enjoy abundantly more allegiance than obedience. Precisely why democracy is important, for a majority rule system ensures the majority remains allegiant. Democracy allows autonomy, coercion and indoctrination robs one of it. Therefore indoctrination and coercion should always be conducted with the consent of the majority.

The catch is, though the need for popular support has misled many insurgency and counter-insurgency analysts into assuming this automatically means persuasion (particularly 'political action') should assume campaign priority, the truth is that garnering this allegiance is as dependent on coercive measures to attain as it is persuasive ones. Neither should persuasive democratic 'political action' be the *focus* for neo counter-insurgency doctrine as this can lead to the misconstruing of the conflict, producing an over-reliance on a 'hit and miss' method (political solutions/negotiation) to end the conflict favourably.

While coercive violence speaks for itself- it is the imposition of will and the denial of voluntary choice utilized in pursuit of specific objectives (to indoctrinate, kill or capture the enemy and/or to seize and hold ground or infrastructure), the relationship between coercion and persuasion is symbiotic in counter-insurgency contexts. For example the winning of hearts and minds or 'coalescence', means less enemy trigger fingers and insurgent support, meaning less insurgents

for the coercive counter-insurgency wing to combat. The loss of hearts and minds, say by the indiscriminate use of coercive violence or the failure to provide security for both the population and follow on persuasive operations, enlarges the insurgent pool.

Coercion can be controversial for moral reasons (Rhodes 2000: 135), since;

> to be coerced is to be compelled under duress or threat to do something 'against our will'… Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of controlling relations between conduct and consequences. Positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement and punishment…In positive reinforcement a person's action is followed by the addition, production or appearance of something new, something that had not been there before the act. In negative reinforcement an action subtracts, removes or eliminates something, causing some condition or thing that had been there before the act to disappear…Positive reinforcers make actions that produce them more likely; negative reinforcers make actions that terminate them more likely. Each type of reinforcement also has a symmetric counter-part: Sometimes we do things that terminate positive reinforcers; sometimes we produce negative reinforcers. These symmetric counterparts of positive and negative reinforcement constitute punishment (Sidman 1989: 31-39).

Negative reinforcers and punishment here are defined as coercion by Sidman, making positive reinforcement a form of persuasion. Needing mention here also is that coerced control is usually unsustainable (as the Vietnam chapter shall illustrate), why persuasive practices must be calibrated to any form of social control mechanisms: "Authority that depends solely on coercion cannot extend very far. Even prison guards, with seemingly all the resources stacked on their side, need the cooperation of inmates to keep order in the prison" (Stone 2002: 25).

Regarding coercion within a counter-insurgency context however, no matter how controversial, tools like military force and indoctrination via psychological-warfare are absolutely necessary to achieve the obedience of those whose allegiance can not be gained otherwise but which is nonetheless vital to success. As mentioned, it must also constantly be remembered that coercion can backfire if carried out ineffectively. Both major reasons why coercion must be married to persuasion, for; "societies based on consent can generate great energies, including energies that allow them to coerce with mighty effectiveness. Just as importantly, coercion can weaken, by putting people's backs up and so leading them to resist or retreat in the face of initiatives from above"(Hall 1994: x).

Some coercive or persuasive tools work in certain contexts and not in others. So the actual practice of counter-insurgency must be case specific, with the tools tailored to the situation in each distinct country. But while the tools may vary slightly from case to case the blueprint does

not and this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the Refined Integrationist Model contributes a more relevant counter-insurgency blueprint than that currently employed by the Coalition.

Genocide and mass murder can end any conflict when employed and although this is not an option for Coalition forces for obvious moral reasons, advocates of the 'Roman Model' of counter-insurgency aside, it nearly always is for insurgents. When not countered effectively it results, as in Vietnam, in victory and control of the populace/state for the insurgency. With this in mind the indigenous/target population demands not 'political action' but rather security first. Practically, this security must be provided in a proportionate, discriminate, fair and just manner. Ideally though this security, obviously provided predominantly by military and police elements, does not just protect the populace and combat the insurgency, it also creates the essential shield behind which persuasive operations are conducted.

Without a coercive shield to accomplish these things simultaneously insurgents can simply tear down anything built up by counter-insurgency forces, physically and cognitively. Minus this shield insurgencies where necessary are able to impose their will by force of arms in a manner that crushes all opposition, a manner Coalition forces do not employ (for the most part) as they adhere to high moral standards. Without such a shield persuasive operations to win hearts and minds become impossible in the face of insurgent contestation. This practical application can be conceptualized by the following model, though it should be noted that this model does not change the theoretical relationship between the variables:

Refined Integrationist Model Praxis:

Target Population
Persuasive Matrix
Coercive Matrix
Insurgency

The following taxonomy examines how the spheres of politics, psychology and force overlap and are co-dependent. It demonstrates how these fields can be reduced to two mutually reinforcing variables, because many of the following examples overlap themselves (take curfews, which are politically drafted and conducted forcefully for psychological reasons). The following taxonomy is illustrative, not exhaustive:

Refined *Integrationist Model*	Political Action	Psychological Operations	Military Offensive
Persuasive Matrix	-Laws granting amnesty to insurgents who cease and desist. -Legal participation of former insurgent political parties in the political sphere. -Legislation rewarding co-operation, like the granting of regional autonomy to certain segments of the population. -Democratic politics and self determination for target populations. -Where possible, political negotiations (rare).	-Psychological operations/propaganda campaigns to elicit voluntary co-operation and support from the populace. -Employment, Reconstruction & Development programs. -Rewards for public co-operation (like the granting of money, housing or land etc). -Free public health and education programs. -Psychological operations designed to 'turn' insurgents against each other and/or towards the government.	-The protection of a beleaguered and harassed populace from random and deliberate insurgent violence. -Protection and/or execution of Reconstruction & Development programs in a theatre of combat. -The provision of medical aid and/or medical evacuation to the public by security forces in remote areas in either peaceful or combat environments. -Conducting voluntary population relocations.
Coercive Matrix	-Punitive laws outlawing insurgent organizations. -The automatic death penalty for convicted insurgents/terrorists. -The legal unleashing of military and police forces onto insurgents, terrorists, militias and their sympathizers. -Legislation allowing collective fines and/or detention for populations deemed insurgent sympathizers. -The authorization of foreign troops to combat the insurgency.	-Forced indoctrination. -Coercive (disingenuous) propaganda. -Threats to one's family and/or friends to elicit cooperation. -Psychological torture, either to obtain information or as punishment. -Curfews. -The arrest of family members and/or the destruction of family homes as punishment for a terrorist's and/or insurgent's actions. -Fines (individual or collective) and/or confiscation of land or housing etc.	-The killing/assassination of insurgents/terrorists. -The capture/arrest of insurgents. -Physical torture, to obtain information or as punishment. -Conducting involuntary population relocations. -Enforced curfews. -The carrying out of lawful executions. -The destruction of say agricultural crops that are people's livelihood or housing, to intimidate and/or punish insurgents and/or populations.

The above table demonstrates the interaction of the various counter-insurgency arms in a conceptually helpful way. If the theory is not understood practical policy implications will undoubtedly follow (and have). This thesis shall not aim to alter the end goals of neo counter-insurgency doctrine. It will aim to construct a more efficient operational counter-insurgency template that better assures these goals are met.

A need that will become clear in the following analysis that draws out the divergence of theory and practice and the detrimental impact artificial tiering mechanisms and opaque theoretical lodestars have had regarding the implementation of coercive and persuasive warfare in the two 21st century counter-insurgency conflicts studied herein. American, Australian and British counter-insurgency doctrines all profess to place the target population's hearts and minds at the apex of campaign planning, 'real world' Coalition military operations have often been an entirely different matter. In this light the Refined Integrationist Model will be posited as a more pertinent and simplified conceptual tool to achieving the priority aims of neo counter-insurgency, which are:

1) To gain the support and allegiance of the target population.
2) To render impotent the insurgency.

Achieving aim one is not enough by and of itself though. It is however necessary to achieve aim two. What is more, aiming to achieve aim two without having first achieved aim one is to engage in an exercise of futility. Additionally, aim two must be pursued in a manner that does not inhibit the attainment of aim one, something the Refined Integrationist Model hopes to aid conceptually and practically.

Finally in this context, the origins of an insurgency must be understood. An insurgency is often sparked because opposing political, ethnic and/or religious factions are at diametric opposites. Political compromises, discussions and/or negotiations have failed or the ruling power has been ejected and so insurgents take up or continue to use arms to impose or reimpose their will. In the face of the resultant violence political negotiation becomes ever more impossible or at least extremely difficult.

To repeat, neither Vietnam, Malaya nor the American Revolutionary War, to name a few historical insurrectionary conflicts, were solved via political negotiation/solutions. They were resolved (by the Communists in Vietnam, by the Commonwealth in Malaya and by the American

insurgents) via a campaign of persuasion and coercion directed at the populace of the state being fought over primarily and at the enemy secondarily (Bicheno 2003, Carruthers 1995 & Stone 1966). A counter-insurgency strategy based on political pre-eminence can, and did in Vietnam, leave the insurgency in control of the battlefield and free to impose its will by force of arms. It can also lead to a failure to win or hold hearts and minds within the persuasive matrix as a whole, as well as the failure to utilize coercive violence effectively.

A caveat is required here irrespectively. Political solutions/negotiations should be attempted first *if possible*, however unlikely success may be, as coercive violence tends to entrench positions and escalates the conflict to a zero sum game. Where and when the coercive matrix is resorted to by counter-insurgency practitioners it should ideally be a response to the initiation of violence by insurgents. To initiate violence is to risk abandoning the moral high ground- what the persuasive matrix is all about. Again however, historic lessons from Vietnam will demonstrate that 'political solutions' regarding the insurgency should not be given campaign *priority*. On its part the persuasive matrix should be aimed primarily (but not solely) at winning the target/indigenous population, predominantly aimed at cutting the insurgency's roots off at the source (the people). The coercive matrix on the other hand should be aimed predominantly (but not solely) at securing the population and protecting persuasive operations.

The problem in Vietnam was that the Allies relied upon a variation of the Model of Political Primacy, placing a negotiated political solution with the North-Vietnamese forced about by Allied military pressure at the apex of war strategy. It was originally thought that the North-Vietnamese would be forced to quit the fight or agree to a negotiated peace because of unsustainable military losses augmented by political and diplomatic pressure. This prioritization was misguided and enforced upon the conflict by a flawed understanding of insurgency and counter-insurgency. The approach failed miserably because it did not sufficiently take into consideration the hearts and minds of the target population. Accordingly, this thesis will posit that it is better to conduct persuasive operations primarily aimed at the indigenous population to dry up the support base of the insurgency and solidify popular support for the Coalition's end goals instead of blindly pursuing a politically negotiated peace with the enemy.

Naturally this should be *attempted* if politically possible, but should not be *relied* upon. As a matter of practice this dichotomy is of the utmost importance. Political solutions/negotiations are not the only or even best way to end insurgencies. Neither can indigenous democratic politics be

relied upon, for progress is nigh on impossible without sufficient coercive forces to enable and protect this and other crucial persuasive measures. This thesis shall attempt to draw out this relationship via a simple counter-insurgency model that explicitly reflects the mutual interdependence of all elements of a counter-insurgency campaign, to refine and reflect more clearly the view emanating from the integrationist field. The Refined Integrationist Model therefore aims to build upon the field's previous study and posit an alternative model which needs to come into the light of mainstream thought, given the field's current model has proved suboptimal. A situation threatening to lead to counter-insurgent defeat as the Model of Political Primacy did in its Vietnam format.

Vietnam:

Mark Woodruff's controversial *Unheralded Victory* is relevant to this study. In it Woodruff gives a battle by battle account of the Vietnam War and contends that the Allies (America, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Thailand) won nigh on every major battle of the Vietnam War. Contrary to the popular view that the Allies were soundly defeated on the battlefield by the North-Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the southern Communist insurgent organization the Viet-Cong (VC) (Woodruff 2000: ix-xiv). If this was so the question becomes; how did it come to pass that the Allies won all the battles but lost the war?

The Vietnam War was a limited war conceived to prevent the spread of totalitarian Communism during the Cold War, to prevent 'dominoes falling' in South-East Asia and beyond, while simultaneously avoiding major combat with both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China. Though all the major powers wished to avoid direct conflict the USSR and China poured massive amounts of aid into North-Vietnam for the duration of the war (predominantly fought within South-Vietnam). But deficiencies in the counter-insurgency strategy meant that whilst the Allies won the military fight hands down they neglected to tie it effectively to the other half of the equation, the persuasive war. On the persuasive side meanwhile the crux of the problem was the lack of real democracy in the South. Despite the fact that both Vietnamese protagonists claimed to be pro-democratic (ironically it was the Communists who used the nomenclature Democratic Republic of Vietnam-DRV, whilst the South used the appellation the Republic of Vietnam- RVN), neither were anywhere near the term (Abel & Kabel 1971: 80).

It is here the tenets of failure in this counter-insurgency campaign begin to distinguish themselves. People become insurgents opposing the political status-quo because they have become disaffected with that very status-quo. In the counter-insurgency campaign that was the Vietnam War the people of the South did not have the choice of a democratic, independent South or a totalitarian Communist government led by the North. They had a choice of a united autocratic government or two divided autocratic governments, as the Allied counter-insurgency template in Vietnam sought 'political stability' enforced by southern military juntas in order to pursue attrition warfare to wear down the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Democracy it was presumed (always the Allies' end game) could wait until the war was won. The coercive method utilized to attain this political goal of a negotiated peace meanwhile ignored the key variable of the war, the people of South-Vietnam and so failed to link the persuasive and

coercive matrices sufficiently. Coercion was not just subordinated to a political goal in Vietnam but this political goal in itself was also rather inappropriate, a political goal more suited to conventional warfare than to the unconventional war that was Vietnam. This overriding political goal ensured a coercive strategy was undertaken that inhibited and neglected to support the persuasive matrix, rendering what persuasive operations were conducted sterile.

As a result the persuasive matrix was likewise conducted in a vacuum and without a base of democratic institutions in South-Vietnam was a moot exercise in any event. The lack of actual democracy meant that persuasion was conducted in a variety of ad hoc and disassociated programs that failed to tie the persuasive matrix together in a totality let alone to coercive practices.

The lack of democratic institutions did not only gestate the Allies' failure to gain the allegiance of the South-Vietnamese, it also produced corrupt, nepotistic, ruthless and detested military juntas. A flow on effect that saw corruption similarly eat away at most persuasive operations conducted by the Allies and eventually at the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's (ARVN) very viability. Persuasion and coercion were disassociated and misunderstood in Vietnam and the result was among the bloodiest failures in Western military history.

Coercive Matrix:

In the years 1961-63, after the French pulled out of South-Vietnam and when it became clear the Communists' ambitions were not going to stop at the 17th parallel, the US committed advisors to South-Vietnam in the form of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Vietnam (MAAG). The Military Assistance and Advisory Group's initial task was to combat what was at that stage a fight against the Viet-Cong. By 1963 Washington feared South-Vietnam was about to fall because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was sending precursor North-Vietnamese Army units south of the border. To prevent the Republic of Vietnam's collapse in the face of the impending onslaught, the US and her allies chose to engage both Communist combat forces (really two military wings of the one Democratic Republic of Vietnam) directly via a policy of gradual escalation and so began committing major combat forces to Vietnam in early 1963 under the guise of military 'advisors'. US General Maxwell D. Taylor summarized initial Allied war aims in this four point plan:

(1) To improve the effectiveness of forces on the ground in South-Vietnam.

(2) To exploit air superiority by attacking military targets in North-Vietnam.

(3) To stabilize the political, social and economic systems in South-Vietnam.

(4) To seek an honourable negotiated settlement.

General Taylor stressed that this plan's four points were interrelated and victory on all fronts was vital (Watt 1968: 104). There was some understanding here of counter-insurgency theory but it was subordinated to the political objective of reaching a negotiated settlement with Hanoi, enforced by overwhelming Allied ground, naval and air forces. As time went by points 1-3 would prove dispensable due to the imposition of politics atop the war's conceptual ladder, in turn causing the Allies to undertake an operational policy devoid of any real counter-insurgency merit. From the beginning bringing the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong to heel and thereby imposing a political settlement upon the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was the priority, not aiding the Southern Vietnamese to achieve their mutually beneficial democratic aspirations.

Perplexingly, from day one the Allies quite deliberately sought to fight, via entirely conventional means, to a stalemate. The stated Allied objective was to stop the war, not win it, by showing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union they could no longer expect to impose their will on the South. Only once this precondition was achieved would the Allies be willing to enter into 'unconditional discussions' with the Communists about the future of South-Vietnam. To this end American President Lyndon Johnson put the Allies on a course that would

haunt them the rest of the war. He married Communist aggression (especially North-Vietnamese) to all anti-government/Allied sentiment as a whole, meaning the cognitive roots of the conflict would never be addressed because the war was explained away as a product of foreign Communist aggression (Stone 1966: 90).

No doubt Communist aggression was an important element but it was not the sole one. The main objective of counter-insurgency practice, attaining coalescence, was not prioritized therefore and so coercive violence was conducted unilaterally with little or no thought of the persuasive matrix, until too late.

Attrition Warfare: December 1964 saw the first North-Vietnamese Army main force regiments march south. Northern conventional intervention proper changed the conflict's dynamic. Now North-Vietnamese Army regiments would need to be defeated simultaneously to the negation of the Viet-Cong. Allied intervention was required then to prevent a Communists take over, especially since by late 1964 the Communists controlled over half the land mass and population of South-Vietnam and their initial divisional size attack had decimated two elite Army of the Republic of Vietnam units at Binh Gia, 40 short miles from Saigon. Offensives enabled due to the massive aid provided by the Soviet Union, China and even the covert support of Cambodia and its Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Hammer 1966: 258).

Indeed, by 1964 it was apparent that the Republic of Vietnam could not arrest the evolution of the insurgency and prevent Communist main force units from taking over South-Vietnam since it was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam which was proving the prey (Gibbons 1989: 170). The latest military government was disoriented to say the least and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's morale, never adequate, went into freefall. The government, already deeply unpopular, was also hesitant to enforce the draft (in effect since 1957). The chances of expanding the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were not good as a result, while southern paramilitary and auxiliary forces built up by the Military Assistance and Advisory Group were disbanding and/or defecting rapidly. Thus a massive commitment of Allied (mainly American) troops was made to South-Vietnam (which at peak strength reached approximately 550, 000 troops). The man chosen to lead this force was General William C. Westmoreland (Anderson 2005: 43).

The Allied military intervention in Vietnam (of whose tactics were remarkably similar), was nigh on a completely military affair from the start. Somehow, despite advice to the contrary,

Washington adopted the military strategy of 'attrition' via 'Search & Destroy' operations, evolved by and subordinated to political ends. In other words a politically negotiated settlement was contrived as *the* end, the negation of the enemy on the battlefront the means, causing the Allies to misconceive the war. From the outset the Allies did not view the war as a counter-insurgency conflict but as a conventional war, as another Korea.

Nor did the Allies regard the North's determination as being less exhaustible than their own, which they would have had they realized two things. Firstly, that the war was an insurgency waged by the North who regarded the 'revolution' unfinished as it had only achieved dominance in the northern half of the country. Secondly, it was nationalism not Communism that was driving this conflict for the ordinary Vietnamese, misinterpreting the cognitive aspects of the war as a result. Thus attrition theory, with its concomitant end goal of negotiated settlement, would prove not to suffice for victory. Attrition warfare was a poor substitute in lieu of a carefully calibrated counter-insurgency campaign that created a viable South-Vietnam, particularly since the North had 200, 000 males reaching military age each year. Subsequently, the extraordinary attrition rates inflicted on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its subsidiary the Viet-Cong, at their peak reaching unbelievable rates of 158:1, would not win the war alone (Lanning and Cragg 1992: 203).

Search & Destroy operations alone are not the quickest, most efficient way of fighting insurgents who typically melt away at first contact if unable to take and hold ground. 'Clear & Hold' operations are an essential requisite of counter-insurgency operations as they provide security for populations, enable persuasive operations to be conducted and drive a wedge between the insurgency and the population. Without follow on forces to hold areas 'cleansed', insurgents simply sneak back into an area once counter-insurgency forces have withdrawn.

General Westmoreland ignored such lessons from previous counter-insurgencies, particularly the French experience in Vietnam, the British experience in Malaya and the American/Philippino experience during the 'Hukbalahap Rebellion' in the Philippines. Naturally applying these experiences in toto to the situation in Vietnam was not possible but there were aspects of these conflicts relevant to Vietnam, particularly regarding Clear & Hold precursor operations designed to enable follow on persuasive programs. Unfortunately such lessons were neglected during General Westmoreland's tenure as commander of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group

reincarnate, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), chiefly because he viewed 'pacification' (persuasive operations) as the 'stepchild' (Davidson 1989: 430).

1966-67 were the years of the big Allied sweeps, Search & Destroy at its pinnacle. Operations like ATTLEBORO, CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY though failed to inflict unsustainable levels of casualties on the insurgency. Time and again while engaging Communist forces insufficient consideration was given to civilians caught in the cross-fire in addition. The insurgents meanwhile consistently pushed back into the country-side once the Allies left an area of operations. Thus, while these types of operations did manage to inflict massive casualties on the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong and denied them the unimpeded movement previously enjoyed in formerly secure base areas, they did not affect the strategic balance of the conflict sufficiently (Rogers 1989: 158).

American Department of Defense computers were spewing out all kinds of favourable statistics on a daily basis, statistics telling them they were winning the war hands down. Unfortunately however, the computers were not programmed to calculate the persuasive matrix nor the relationship between persuasion and coercion. They were only capable of calculating part of the war- enemy Killed In Action. In spite of this, from such partial analysis a 'total' picture was derived by the American government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, whilst the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's decline was successfully arrested by Allied intervention and was now able to be deployed in pacification and static defence roles in some villages, it was by no means capable enough to do the job in South-Vietnam proper. In all, the big sweeps that produced the high enemy body count produced an equally high amount of collateral damage (civilian, pet and livestock deaths, property destruction etc), swelling resentment by leaving "vengeful villagers swelling in hastily constructed refugee camps" (Turley 1986: 80).

The military efficacy of Search & Destroy operations is not in question at this juncture, the way in which they were employed is. The fact is that coercive Search & Destroy operations conducted as they were, in a vacuum segregated from the persuasive matrix, lengthened the war and failed to create a viable South-Vietnam because they were the principle counter-insurgency operation of the war- on the ground Search & Destroy was *the* plan. Military operations must be intimately linked to the cognitive war, conceived of as both protecting and influencing the persuasive matrix. For example, the Allies early on did attempt to send some unprotected pacification teams into the country-side, but they were promptly executed by the Viet-Cong (Cleaveland 1973: 232).

As would be typical throughout the war, anything built up by the Allies would be torn down by the Communists for lack of a coercive shield. This did not mean however that pacification programs were entirely abandoned, though they were predominantly conducted in a vacuum and neglected. As shall be seen, pacification teams would continue to be sent to the villages of rural South-Vietnam, only on an even smaller scale than the previously limited effort due to insecurity (until 1968 at least). At the crux of the problem was the failure to interlink the coercive and persuasive matrices, conceptually or practically. These persuasive teams rarely enjoyed any real protection accordingly. In point of fact, it appears the Allies were not entirely sure where their pacification teams were stationed:

> I was in a village with some 20 social workers the night that the Viet Cong attacked the Saigon airport with mortars. The mortars were not more than one kilometre from where we were and we could hear the thump of their shells as they fired. Half an hour after the attack had ceased, and long after the Viet Cong themselves had withdrawn into the jungle, American planes came over on a reprisal raid. Their bombs fell on the village, and on our social workers in the village, and the bullets with which they strafed us hit innocent Vietnamese. There were no Viet Cong there and no Viet Cong were killed that night, but the village was almost totally destroyed and many of the villagers were badly wounded. At least one of the peasants was buried in the debris of his own house. If this were an isolated instance, it could have been explained away as the kind of accident that happens in war; the fact is, that it is far more typical than it is isolated. Such events and even more tragic ones occur every day, night and day, throughout our country- a southern villager (Cairns 1969: 176).

One program in particular exhibited the ignorance of the relationship between coercion and persuasion- Harassment and Interdiction fire (or free-fire zones). Harassment and Interdiction fire aimed to bring random and periodically sustained fire on major enemy base areas, known or suspected enemy unit locations, supply areas, command and control installations and infiltration routes in South-Vietnam by the use of strategic and tactical air, ground and naval fire- *without* guidance from ground or air controllers observing the strikes. Its aim was to harass, interdict and disrupt enemy activities.

In 1966 65% of the total tonnage of Allied bombs and artillery expended were during Harassment and Interdiction missions. In the first half of 1967 the figure dropped to 45%. Harassment and Interdiction fire required approval by government officials, which was given routinely. As a matter of fact the American military was procedurally more concerned with civilian safety than Republic of Vietnam officials. The program was designed to be utilized in lightly populated areas under Viet-Cong control to minimize collateral damage. In practice the program did little more than punish non-combatants for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, while terrorizing the rest of the population within these areas. Free-fire zones were traversed by South-Vietnamese

civilians for a number of reasons. Traditional traffic for food and to visit family graves were two reasons. Another causal factor of civilian casualties was that much of South-Vietnam was illiterate and unable to read warning signs advising the location of free-fire zones. When villagers strayed into free-fire zones it was assumed they were enemy combatants and treated accordingly. The intermittent advance oral warnings of Harassment and Interdiction fire were often misunderstood on top of this (Moss 1990: 209).

Harassment and Interdiction aerial fire was the most indiscriminate and frightening form of the program. B-52s alone dropped 41% of Harassment and Interdiction fire in the first half of 1967. By surreptitiously infiltrating their target area at high altitudes their 29, 000 kilograms of ordinance dropped silently onto unsuspecting enemy and civilians alike. In sum, the Harassment and Interdiction program alienated people needlessly for little substantial effect on the enemy:

> At times we used more military force than was called for by the situation, especially when fighting near or in populated areas. Since heavy firepower and area-type weapons, such as tactical air support, artillery and mortars, are not discriminating enough, their use risks civilian casualties and material damage which can be self defeating in 'pacification' efforts…This practice (Harassment and Interdiction fire) was not really effective militarily and was generally a waste of ammunition. Moreover, it ran the unnecessary risk of inflicting casualties on civilians and being counterproductive politically and psychologically, whether the people were helping the enemy or not (Palmer 1984: 167-168).

Search & Destroy did manage to decimate the insurgency and prompted it to precipitously launch the 'Tet Offensive', which as shall be seen would cripple the insurgency's coercive wing for years (Davidson 1990: 139). Painstaking headway was made via Search & Destroy, but these successes were not cemented by follow on holding forces or persuasive operations of any merit (discussed further on also). Search & Destroy operations were rarely calibrated to the persuasive matrix (i.e. designed to minimize collateral damage, not maximize enemy damage) and were infrequently the enabler of follow on 'holding' operations designed to enable persuasive operations, operations essential to developing a coherent South-Vietnam. Allied strategy hoped to defeat the Communist insurgency south of the 17th parallel with no real grand strategy other than to bleed the Communists into submission.

Tellingly, counter-insurgency operations aimed at winning the population were not considered a real option until late in the war. Around March 1966 Search & Destroy tactics became an issue of great dispute between General Westmoreland and the commander of US Marines in Vietnam, General Walt Rostow. The Marines felt they had made and would continue to make good progress towards pacification via the gradual expansion of their 'ink-blot' strategy (as in an area

is cleared, held and slowly expanded until the whole locality, region then country is declared 'clear' or 'pacified').

In conjunction with persuasive operations this strategy had created pacified enclaves around Da Nang and Chu-Lai over the previous 9-12 months. As early as 1965 the Marines had been arguing that attrition warfare was failing to defeat the insurgency and simultaneously hurting the war effort in the larger context of pacification. Marine Corps General Victor Krulak for example commented in 1966 on Marine Corps operations in the mountains of South-Vietnam (where he noted only two percent of the population resided), that the "raw figure of Viet Cong killed…can be a dubious index of success since, if their killing is accompanied by devastation of friendly areas, we may end up having done more harm than good". General Westmoreland retorted that he was winning the war militarily to which General Krulak replied "you have to win totally or you are not winning at all" (Olson & Roberts 1991: 175).

General Rostow was extremely reluctant to divert his Marines to purely Search & Destroy operations in remote areas that would likely achieve little lasting effect. On the other hand General Westmoreland felt Search & Destroy was the way forward, not least as his intelligence apparatus was telling him of a massive North-Vietnamese Army build up occurring just north of the De-Militarized Zone at the time. General Westmoreland's subsequent re-tasking of the Marines to Search & Destroy was also due to the fact that it was envisioned that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam would conduct Clear & Hold operations in rural South-Vietnam, leaving the Allies to concentrate on the enemy's main force units.

Unfortunately, the creature nurtured by the Allies was one in their own conventional image. Rarely did the Army of the Republic of Vietnam adequately push into and hold the country-side or even leave the roads where their armoured vehicles could not be employed. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam was trained to mimic American conventional doctrine and tactics, so that it was not often the Army of the Republic of Vietnam actually conducted any Clear & Hold operations, or any operations for that matter that did not involve large conventional formations tearing through the bush and any villages that got in the way. What the focus on attrition meant in effect was the inability of either the Allies or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to Clear & Hold South-Vietnam, thereby failing to link the coercive and persuasive matrices:

> The United States emphasis on military operations at the expense of 'pacification' might not have been harmful had it not created an even more damaging side-effect on ARVN. Taking their cue from their United States counterpart, the good ARVN commanders wanted some of

the 'big-unit' war too- not the tedious, unglamorous, piddling operations associated with 'pacification' support. Unfortunately, this support was ARVN's primary job, so mandated by the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan, and dictated by the nature of the situation and force structures of the two allies. If ARVN did not do it, or did not do it well, then 'pacification' would wilt, and in early 1967 it was a wilted and unhealthy plant indeed (Davidson 1989: 431).

Even the conventional training provided to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was sub-par. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam would remain throughout the war mostly untrained and unreliable consequently, especially in the Australian Army's eyes (Doyle & Grey 1992: 142). This coercive void left the insurgents an essential safe haven from which to continue their insurrection. The infusion of both Search & Destroy and Clear & Hold modalities into the Allies' and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's modus operandi, creating a more relevant coercive strategy, would never adequately be accomplished. This was primarily due to the Allies' misconception of the Vietnam War, their practical focus on attrition and the failure to understand anything approaching the Refined Integrationist Model hypothesis. Something the insurgents did not;

> the Allied forces* were built on a conventional basis, to fight a conventional war, and only reluctantly and with poor grace, did they stoop occasionally to dabble rather ineffectually in guerrilla warfare concepts. Unlike the Allies, the Viet Cong placed no restraints on themselves, on the contrary they pursued the war relentlessly by every means in their power; they had no intention of fighting 'half-a-war' as the Allies were doing (O'Balance 1975: 186). *In the quote meaning both the Allies & the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Around late 1966 it had become clear to American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that the Allies were proving unable to attrite enemy forces at a rate exceeding their replacement. At the same time and because of the coercive counter-insurgency void, the Communists were able to enhance their insurgent apparatus in the South, taking advantage of their continued success in recruiting local and regional guerrilla forces largely as a result of un-calibrated and often counter-productive Allied Search & Destroy missions. In other words a majority of insurgent recruits were not joining to fight *for* Communism but *against* the Allies. So despite the massive losses Search & Destroy inflicted on the insurgents' ability to contest the coercive matrix, any progress made in this matrix was to be negated by the damage done to the Allies' position in the persuasive matrix by their unmitigated, unilateral coercive actions.

The way coercive force was employed in Vietnam typically meant that for every step forward in the coercive matrix, one, even two steps were made backwards in the persuasive matrix due to the co-dependency the two spheres enjoy. It was not just then the fact that Search & Destroy based

parameters saw coercion conducted in a vacuum, thereby failing to provide population security and generate the shield behind which other equally important persuasive operations could be conducted. It was also the way the strategy was employed that divorced it from the persuasive matrix. Such disassociated Allied coercive actions cost it critical ground in the persuasive matrix, losing it popular support and intelligence assets whilst support and/or sympathy for the Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army rose in direct proportion to the amount of death and carnage inflicted upon the citizens of South-Vietnam by the Allies' indiscriminate attrition methodology:

> Communist forces seemed to grow ever stronger. Hanoi continued to infiltrate more supplies to arm the Viet Cong, who were able to recruit more soldiers to fight and die for their cause against the foreign army. Nationalism was surely on the side of the NLF*, as its appeals to avenge the dreadful toll of Vietnamese deaths and the devastation of their country were answered by hundreds of thousands of their own people. The more that the United States bombed and strafed and napalmed, the more that it killed and captured, the stronger its Vietnamese enemy grew (McWilliams & Piotrowski 2001: 209). *National Liberation Front (Viet-Cong).

It must also be mentioned here that the popular myth of Australian superiority in Vietnam does not stack up to analysis entirely, its often remarkable battlefield victories over numerically superior North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong forces notwithstanding (namely the battle of Long Tan). Australian forces, tracing the footsteps of their American brethren, were never able to fully discern coercive violence's relationship to the persuasive war, or the co-equal relevance of persuasion in counter-insurgency contests. Accordingly, the conventional battlefield victories Australian forces attained in Vietnam would form the apogee of the effort, because persuasive operations played second fiddle to the imperative of finding and exterminating the enemy. To cap this oversight off, what persuasive operations would be conducted were poorly planned and not coordinated with local officials, repeatedly resulting in the degradation of what infrastructure projects were actually undertaken (Ross 1995: 7).

Australian forces, designated 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF) never got above 8,000 odd troops in theatre. As such they never had the capacity to Clear & Hold all the villages in their area of operations around Phuoc Tuy province (population 160, 000), even had they tried. Hesitant efforts to rely on relatively incapable Army of the Republic of Vietnam and local paramilitary forces' assistance to this end meanwhile proved counter-productive. The Australian task force distrusted the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in any event, born from uncertainty pertaining to what extent it had been infiltrated by the insurgency. Incapable South-Vietnamese forces or not, the Australian contingent remained oblivious to the need to focus their coercive efforts on the population centres, though Australian coercive violence was slightly more attuned to the

persuasive matrix it appears, as Australians generally tried harder to limit collateral damage (Pemberton 1990: 53).

Australian methods differed from American methods mainly in scope it appears. Although the American way of war in Vietnam centred on the 900 man battalion and the Australian on the 30 man platoon, both followed similar methodologies- Australians seemed to have favoured 'Cordon & Search' operations. But the effect was essentially the same, the Australians predominantly patrolled the unpopulated jungle around their area of responsibility on Search & Destroy and when villages were come upon, by accident or design, Australian forces would cordon off the village and search it for enemy personnel and/or supplies, seek intelligence from the populace and leave by dusk. This meant the Viet-Cong, as usual, left before dawn and returned after dusk whenever necessary. Whilst Australians did conduct 'civic action', mainly via food and medical aid and the occasional development project, little more emphasis was given to the persuasive matrix, ensuring Australian victories in Vietnam would remain confined to the battlefield:

> Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to complete a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation between ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win the support of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts to train and equip RVN local units and their reluctance to allow these units any significant participation in the pacification program, coupled with the failure of these local units to perform adequately, destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned to the influence of the NLF on the ATF's withdrawal (Ross 1995: 7).

Clear & Hold: The aim of Clear & Hold operations in counter-insurgency contexts is detailed by General Sir Gerald Templer, a principle architect of the Commonwealth's successful counter-insurgency campaign during the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948-1960):

> It was in clearing one area after another of subversive elements, and bringing modern amenities by way of primary schools, better roads and so on. Gradually these areas were joined together and so you got larger and larger areas of country-side in which the inhabitants realized that the government was on their side and was trying to help them improve their living conditions. This of course, depends of being able to hand over control of each of these areas successfully to an efficient administration, which must include a very high percentage of indigenous inhabitants (Cleaveland 1973: 232).

Galula expands on this train of thought:

> In conventional warfare, when the Blues attack the Reds on Point A, the Reds can relieve the pressure by attacking the Blues on Point B, and the Blues cannot escape the counter-pressure. In revolutionary warfare, when the insurgent exerts pressure in Area A, the counterinsurgent cannot relive the pressure by attacking the insurgent on Area B. The insurgent simply refuses to accept the fight, and he can refuse because of his fluidity…However, when the counterinsurgent applies pressure not on the insurgent directly but on the population, which is

the insurgent's real source of strength, the insurgent cannot so freely refuse the fight because he courts defeat.

If the insurgent is fluid, the population is not. By concentrating his efforts on the population, the counterinsurgent minimizes his rigidity and makes full use of his assets. His administrative capabilities, his economic resources, his information and propaganda media, his military superiority due to heavy weapons and large units, all of which are cumbersome and relatively useless against the elusive insurgent, recover their full value when applied to the task of obtaining the support of a static population. What does it matter if the counterinsurgent is unable on the whole to run as fast as the insurgent? What counts is the fact that the insurgent cannot dislodge a better-armed detachment of counterinsurgents from a village, or cannot harass it enough to make the counterinsurgent unable to devote most of his energy to the population… (Galula 1964: 82-86).

The US precluded any meaningful counter-insurgency campaign by its rejection of sage advice to this effect proffered by its close ally Britain, advice drawn from extensive counter-insurgency experience. The British advisory mission to South-Vietnam, headed by Sir Robert Thompson (another architect of the successful anti-Communist counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya), gave salient advice to the US administration to the effect that this was a war for the allegiance of the South-Vietnamese primarily and the guerrillas, if possible, secondarily. Sir Thompson advised the conflagration should not be one waged for territory alone nor the physical destruction of the enemy:

If the main emphasis is placed merely on killing terrorists there is a grave risk that more Communists will be created than are killed. Winning the people must, therefore, be kept in the forefront of the minds of every single person, whether military or civilian, who is engaged in anti-terrorist operations…
…The aims of the Plan are: a) to control, protect and win the population with particular emphasis on the rural areas; b) to obtain the intelligence necessary to break the Vietcong organization within the population; c) to isolate the armed Vietcong from the population and then eliminate them; d) to establish and maintain 'white' areas which have been cleared of Vietcong…
This is a battle for the control of the villages and protection of the population. If security and Government control are restored, then, with the assistance of the people themselves, the elimination of the Vietcong will automatically follow. The Vietcong cannot exist unless they can intimidate and gain support of elements in the population. They depend on these elements for supplies, food, intelligence and recruits. This is a continual traffic and represents the weakest link in the Vietcong organization (Shaw 2001: 57 & 60).

To the British, what was necessary was to stop emphasising Search & Destroy operations and begin conducting meaningful corollary Clear & Hold operations in order to provide a screen to pursue essential persuasive operations behind:

The main government target, Thompson argued, should not be simply the destruction of Viet Cong forces. Rather it should be to offer an attractive and constructive alternative to Communist appeals. This could only be done by emphasizing national Reconstruction &

Development in the populated rural areas. To do so would require extensive and stringent security measures… (Gravell 1971: 139).

Such advice was subsequently ignored and so reconstruction projects and pacification efforts in general would remain impeded and neglected for quite some time. Essentially the British advice was rejected because the Pentagon and General Westmoreland sought to dictate strategic circumstances instead of react to them. The American and British difference of opinion was based on profound philosophical deviations. The American philosophical approach to war balked at a strategy that concentrated on protecting the villages from a static security framework. The American military disdained the notion of 'static defence' as it equated to a policy of strategic defence their minds, antithetical to most American Generals. With the exception of the small US Marine Corps, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Forces detachments, the majority of American Generals in the field concerned themselves with conducting Search & Destroy campaigns.

The British on the other hand did not regard this to be a defensive policy. Rather, they considered it an offensive policy aimed at seizing the initiative in both the coercive and persuasive spheres. What to the Americans was *strategic defence* to the British was *strategic offence* via a policy of *tactical defence*. Roger Hillsman was a leading American proponent of this British approach which emphasized 'political, economic and social action into which carefully calibrated military measures were interwoven'. His early advice was therefore akin to Sir Thompson's; "protect the people, don't chase the Viet Cong, just use the troops to protect the people. Then behind the screen you have social and political reform-education, everything. And the sea of people in which Mao said the guerrillas swim like fish would dry up" (Shaw 2002: 31).

The architect of America's earlier fruitful campaign against the Communist insurgents of the Philippines during the 'Hukbalahap Rebellion' of the 1950's, retired US General Edward Lansdale proffered advice to the same effect, commenting that purely military tactics would stop the Viet-Cong no more than they previously did the 'Huks'. General Lansdale's advice that real persuasive progress had to be made in parallel with military operations, that the North-Vietnamese had to be beaten at their own "military-political-economic" game (Young 1991: 43-45), would never be incorporated sufficiently into war policy. Even when General Lansdale converted Senator Hubert Humphry to his notions as early as 1964 the future US Vice-President likewise was unable to make headway into the American administration's 'Counter-Insurgency

Plan', in spite of his pleas that the administration change course given American succour to South-Vietnam to date;

> has been a concentration on heavier weapons, with nearly zero attention to civic action, nearly zero attention to winning the people of Vietnam to the side of the Vietnamese Government and the Vietnamese Army…the Vietnamese Government has promulgated no goals for the people that are believed, and has begun no action programs that would give the people something to be for (McAllister 2003: 9).

The point here is that American counter-insurgency policy in Vietnam was to kill enough insurgents as to enforce a politically negotiated solution. Thereby, they were there to fight *against* the Communists, not *for* the people of South-Vietnam and so they never gained the people's support because they never sought it (at least not until too late) - a fundamental purpose differential. This is not to espouse an altruistic national security policy, but when nations undertake a counter-insurgency campaign in the national interest then popular indigenous support is the linchpin of the whole endeavour.

Allied forces could only have won the people of South-Vietnam were they there to protect and serve the people's hopes and aspirations in concord with their own. Search & Destroy failed to do this because it did not enable effective follow on persuasive operations, including the provision of security (since the Allies were in the main hunting 'Charlie' in the bush, leaving the rural villages unprotected), itself an indispensable persuasive operation and something by definition only able to be undertaken by coercive elements.

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups & Combined Action Platoons: As mentioned, some Allied forces did try to better marry coercion to persuasion. Evidence that perhaps Special Forces (SF) commanders should run counter-insurgency campaigns is born from an analysis of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group and the fact that the American Special Forces were one of the few units operating under a comprehension of counter-insurgency warfare from the beginning of the war. Evidenced by their distinct counter-insurgency plan:

> The SF Counterinsurgency Program is a phased and combined military-civil counter-insurgency effort designed to accomplish the following objectives: (a) destroy the Viet Cong and create a secure environment; (b) establish firm governmental control over the population; and (c) enlist the population's active and willing support of, and participation in the government's programs.
> Concept of the Operation**:** This is essentially a clear, secure and develop operation. A fundamental point in the counterinsurgency program is that, where possible, the Strike Force personnel should be locally recruited in order to provide an exploitable entry to the populace which, in turn, facilitates military-civil relations (Kelly 1992: 76-77).

Basically the intent was to blend Search & Destroy with Clear & Hold tactics, specifically because Special Forces commanders realized the enemy could neither be permitted to contest the Republic of Vietnam in the population centres nor roam freely and establish rural base areas. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group program aimed to blend these tactics whilst simultaneously winning over minority Montagnard villages which occupied strategic tracts of South-Vietnam and of who were traditionally disaffected with the governments and people of South-Vietnam (making them susceptible targets of insurgent cognitive operations). This the program accomplished, gaining the enthusiastic participation and support of the Montagnards, to the point that approximately 50% of all actionable Military Assistance Command Vietnam intelligence in the early 1960s emanated from the program (Kelly 1992: 76-77).

Montagnard villages would prove one of the few population areas the Viet-Cong were unable to penetrate throughout the war. By securing *and* conducting micro-level persuasive operations in the Montagnard villages the Special Forces troopers proselytized the Montagnards and in turn became so ingrained in their own respective villages that most Special Forces troopers were initiated as village members in ancient Montagnard ceremonies. Alas, the program eventually evolved into a predominantly offensive Search & Destroy program when the Civilian Irregular Defense Group platoons (comprised of 3-12 US Special Forces troops and 10-30 Montagnards) came under the command of the 'heavy metal' Generals with the massive commitment of conventional Allied troops in 1963/64 (Kelly 1992: 76-77).

The success of this hybrid model was ignored by most because the Special Forces were (are) a small 'outside' unit of the military. Although the program was delimited to the minority Montagnards for the most part (one-twentieth of the population), it was nonetheless successful beyond all expectations. Unfortunately it never became a catalyst program for the war effort at large. Only the US Marines would take note, despite evidence that un-calibrated Search & Destroy tactics alone were failing to win the war.

General Westmoreland constantly denigrated any advice that did not 'sync' with his opinion and since American field commanders have traditionally been given a long leash on campaigns, his was the last word. Of similar advice he received from the young men of the Assistant Secretaries for Defense and International Security Affairs offices ('McNamara's Whiz Kids'), he commented they "constantly sought to alter strategy and tactics with naïve, gratuitous advice". The US State

Department's constant attempts to apprise General Westmoreland of the importance of calibrated coercion and the persuasive matrix was consequently overlooked as well (Lewy 1978: 114-116).

Of such "self appointed field marshals", General Westmoreland asked: "What special audacity prompted civilian bureaucrats to deem they knew better how to run a military campaign than did military professionals? Is no special knowledge or experience needed?" General Westmoreland's strategy betrayed a misunderstanding of counter-insurgency warfare and it was this misunderstanding that was one of the most dangerous elements in the Vietnam equation. As one former US Brigadier General stated around the time: "A political revolution is something quite different from a conventional military campaign and yet we persist in viewing Vietnam as a war which will be won when we bring enough power and force to bear" (Lewy 1978: 114-116).

It was not the US Special Forces and civilian bureaucrats alone that were pleading with General Westmoreland and the American administration to change course. As noted the US Marine Corps let its opposition be known. Perhaps the most successful internal security program of the war was the US Marine Corps' Combined Action Company program (begun mid-1965). At the centre of this program was the creation of Combined Action Platoons (CAP). Although the CIA and US Special Forces ran similar programs the Marine Corps' program was on an entirely larger scale.

The locus of the Combined Action Platoons consisted of a Marine Corps rifle squad (roughly 15 men) and one US Navy medical corpsman, all volunteers. This Marine rifle squad was integrated with a local paramilitary Popular Forces platoon (roughly 38 men) to form a Combined Action Platoon. Popular Forces were the focal point of local security at the time and throughout the war for that matter since the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was incapable of filling the local security vacuum (Brewington 1996: 15). Again, due to the fact that despite plans to the contrary the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was being trained by the Allies to be a conventional, Search & Destroy focussed entity. As a result no military or national police force was available to properly Clear & Hold South-Vietnam, leading to the development of a civil guard.

These Popular Forces and Regional Forces ('Ruff-Puffs') were created to Clear & Hold the villages and to free the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to combat the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong main force units. The weak point of this revised strategy was as always the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, which usually neither combated the enemy's main force units adequately nor prosecuted its Quick Reaction Force responsibilities in support of the 'Ruff-Puffs'

sufficiently. That poor was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's Quick Reaction Force performance in the years 1960-62 that the civil guard took the bulk of South-Vietnamese war casualties and for their trouble were denied access to Army of the Republic of Vietnam surgical facilities (Duncanson 1968: 306), a real hearts and minds winner. Nor did the fact that there was no reliable government or Allied security presence in most villages help in this regard either, it was the villagers defending themselves so little residual good will was generated.

One Combined Action Platoon was generally responsible for a village of approximately 3-4000 people. Tactically the Marines gained critical local knowledge and for their part the Popular Forces gained firepower and tutelage in the art of war. Combined Action Platoons were also symbolically important as the Marines' fate was now entwined with that of the village and vice versa (particularly since these platoons were an assurance that the village would not be decimated by Allied fire, either preparatory or return fire, resulting from insurgent agitation tactics).

This demonstration of goodwill was also critical for intelligence gathering purposes, which in turn enabled the extermination of the Viet-Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in both the village and surrounding areas. Goodwill and trust equalled intelligence born of faith as the Marines did not arrive at dawn and leave at dusk, thereby leaving the inhabitants vulnerable to the Viet-Cong during the night (when Allied forces came at all). Rather, the Combined Action Platoon lived in and protected the village which in turn enabled aid, development and cognitive programs in the villages, building an hitherto unknown level of goodwill- demonstrating how effectively utilized coercive violence can positively effect the persuasive matrix:

> They provided security at the local level and initiated civic action programmes as part of the 'pacification' effort. The CAP's mission was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the area of responsibility, provide security for the friendly infrastructure, protect bases and communication within villages and hamlets, organize intelligence nets, participate in civic action and conduct propaganda (Tucker 1999: 126).

Yet the program never got off the ground. Bureaucratic institutionalism assured General Westmoreland would not acknowledge his Marine Corps counter-parts knew better how to prosecute the war. By 1967 a mere 79 Combined Action Platoons existed in I Corps Tactical Zone. True, the program was nascent and its original goal of creating 3 effective Popular Forces soldiers for every one embedded Marine had not been achieved and the Marines were far from being able to withdraw (Marines took casualties at a rate 2.4 times that of their Popular Forces counter-parts). Results were however evolving in the right direction, diametrically opposed to the heading pure Search & Destroy tactics were taking (Brewington 1996: 20-21).

For example, by July 1967 hamlets possessing a Combined Action Platoon achieved a security score in the Hamlet Evaluation System nearly double those hamlets minus Combined Action Platoons achieved. Despite active patrolling of their area of responsibility Combined Action Platoons were also achieving their pacification objectives at substantially lower casualty rates than regular infantry units tasked to Search & Destroy. What is more, because it was the Marines making the insurgents come to them they were proving a success on the 'kill ratio' side as well. As illustration, in 1966 the 'kill ratio' was 14:1 in favour of the Combined Action Platoons. While in 1968, though Combined Action Platoons accounted for 1.5 % of total US Marine Corps strength in Vietnam they accounted for 7.6% of Viet-Cong 'kills' (Ridderhof 2005/06).

General Westmoreland stated he had not the man power to Clear & Hold South-Vietnam and that had he followed the Marine Corps' model he would have left his forces open to defeat in detail. Besides, as far as General Westmoreland was concerned Clear & Hold and pacification was Saigon's responsibility, evidence it was not up to the task notwithstanding. On top of this Clear & Hold was too static and defensive for his liking as mentioned. Traditional military doctrine sought to seek out, close with and kill the enemy- but this was not a traditional war.

On the contrary, to the commanders of the Marine Corps the real enemy was hiding among the villagers. For the Marines, upon the securing of the villages the repelling of North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong main force incursions could have been designated to locally and/or regionally based Quick Reaction Forces. Moreover, the Marines argued that without local pre-positioned supplies enemy units could not effectively carry out their offensive operations, an insurgent asset Combined Action Platoons inhibited severely. One last noteworthy point, the Combined Action Platoons demonstrated that the South-Vietnamese were more than willing to fight Communist insurgents if properly equipped, supported and motivated. From a Marine on Combined Action Platoon duty: "The Vietnamese like being part of an organization which cares and they respond well and bravely…There are sufficient men who will fight if they know the system is competent and cares"(Lewy 1978: 117).

A course as this was all the more possible when one takes into consideration the tremendous amount of US air support the Allies could depend on. Detrimentally however, Allied militaries lost sight of a predominant function of military force in a broader counter-insurgency context. That is the provision of the shield behind which persuasive operations are conducted. Programs

like the Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Combined Action Platoons were badly needed, but too many civilian and military bureaucrats had committed themselves to the attrition strategy.

Much vested interest and prestige was at stake for too many to admit prior error. The Combined Action Company program never got off the ground then, peaking at 114 Combined Action Platoons around 1968- numbering two thousand Marines and Navy Corpsman and three thousand Popular Forces in some 350 villages. Thereafter the Marines were overwhelmingly assigned Search & Destroy operations and to defend conventional strong points south of the De-Militarized Zone, as the commitment to Combined Action Platoons dropped to a token level soon after and was scattered over a large, discontinuous area. The last remaining Combined Action Platoons were deactivated in May 1971, disregarding one of the few examples of success and progress in the war to that date (Vandiver 1997: 188).

'Tet': January 30th and 31st 1968 (the Lunar Vietnamese New Year 'Tet') saw a massive, coordinated, three pronged North-Vietnamese Army/ Viet-Cong offensive nation wide- the 'Tet Offensive'. The first prong composed an urban assault on the cities of South-Vietnam, the second a conventional offensive against the large American base area in and around Khesanh and surrounding outposts. The third prong was intended to fill the void created in the country-side if and when Allied and government forces pulled back to defend the cities. The first and third prongs proved to be the most effective strategically. The third prong, by seeing Communist forces fill both the coercive and persuasive voids in the rural areas (temporarily as it were) permitted the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong to savage and in some cases terminate what few pacification programmes were being conducted in rural South-Vietnam. Pictures of the brutal urban combat of prong one and the corollary Allied and civilian casualty count concurrently broke the Allied publics' will to continue the fight (domestic support in Australia and America originally favoured the war) (Anderson 2005: 61).

Even after a month's fighting (far longer than the Communists were expected to be able to sustain high intensity operations and another testament to the massive aid China and the Soviet Union were contributing), many cities and towns remained either occupied by Communist forces or dependent on American airlifts for survival. The fighting in and around Saigon was still bloody through February 20, particularly around the district of Cholon. Here approximately 11,000 US and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops fought an entrenched Viet-Cong force of around 1,000- 5,000- so well entrenched in fact that artillery and air strikes were required to dislodge

them (one squad of which managed to wrench control of the US embassy in Saigon for eight hours). Allied counter-attacks of the ilk that proved enormously successful from a military standpoint, extracting 33, 000 enemy dead, 60, 000 wounded and 6, 000 prisoners of war in the first two weeks of Tet alone (Hughes-Wilson 1999: 207).

However, this Allied riposte was once again conducted in a vacuum with little thought for the persuasive war, inflicting unknown levels of civilian casualties and alienating many more. All over the country Allied/Army of the Republic of Vietnam counter-attacks were as brutal as the initial Communist offensive, if not more so, showing a near total disregard for the symbiotic nature of the coercive and persuasive matrices. Subsequently, the Allies and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam managed to alienate their primary if not only support base left by that time in South-Vietnamese society, the urban quarter (a welcomed unintended consequence for the Communists). Finally, it must be added that cities like Saigon and Hue (the religious and cultural heart of Vietnam) were identified as priorities for the Tet Offensive because the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong understood the 'revolution' required a coercive shield in the population centres if it was ever to come about (Ford 1995: 125).

In their strive to retake Hue the Allies obliterated the city, exhibiting a complete cognitive dissonance from adequately calibrated coercive practices. When Hue was taken by the North-Vietnamese Army it took a contingent of American Marines ten days to penetrate the city and reach its inner core, the Citadel, in perhaps the most brutal urban combat of the war. It took another two weeks to retake the city, whereupon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was permitted to retake the Imperial Palace in perhaps the only action of Tet where the US took into consideration the persuasive matrix. In the end the insurgents chose not to fight until death and withdrew, but not before a total of 80% of the city had been decimated, 75% of the population rendered homeless, 2,000- 4,000 civilian dead and widespread looting, much of which was carried out by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam herself. Prevailing on the physical battlefield did not translate into campaign headway however, a by-product of the 'perfect storm' that was Communist propaganda and a hostile Western press corps:

> The US and to a lesser extent the international press corps in Vietnam fell on the story with alacrity. A series of highly misleading television and press pictures were passed to the media audience with equally biased reports. Thus Saigon was alleged to be "in ruins" – it was not. The communists had "inflicted a bitter defeat on the US and South Vietnamese"- on the contrary, the US and ARVN forces had successfully repulsed the communists at the cost of only 2, 800 ARVN and 1, 100 US soldiers (less than ten percent of NVA/VA casualties). The press almost totally ignored the thousands of South-Vietnamese refugees and victims of the

communist offensive, and, to the undying shame of Western journalists in Vietnam, failed even to report the 5, 000 South-Vietnamese tortured and murdered by the VC during their brief occupation of Hue (Hughes-Wilson 1999: 208).

One other related and important point from Hue was that although the North-Vietnamese Army initiated the conflict by invading and occupying the city and whilst both sides were responsible for the civilian deaths, Communist propaganda was able to paint the picture that the US was almost solely responsible for the civilian deaths. This, despite the fact that such deaths were overwhelmingly a result of accidental cross-fire on the Allies' part (throughout the war in point of fact). Nevertheless, as the Allies never effectively contested the propaganda field during the war this became the popular image worldwide. Nor did the media comment much on the fact that it was the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong who invaded these centres and who conducted innumerable and *deliberate* atrocities of their own accord. Again and again the Communists' cognitive warfare campaign achieved the kinds of results that crippled the Allied campaign, in turn enabled equally by un-calibrated Allied coercive violence and the Allies' abject neglect of the information war. Reporter David Douglas' comments were typical of the battle for Hue:

> The Americans pounded the Citadel and surrounding city almost to dust with air strikes, napalm runs, artillery and naval gunfire and the direct cannon fire from tanks and recoilless rifles- a total effort to root out and kill every enemy soldier. The mind reels at the carnage, cost and ruthlessness of it all (Hoopes 1970: 142).

The above statement is not merely an accurate account of the Allies' coercive tactics undertaken as they were in isolation, it is also typical in that almost no mention is made of the Communists' initiation of this battle or the viscous murders and torture these forces committed. In any event, a second stage of the offensive was launched on February 18, but was mostly harassing mortar and RPG fire as the Communists had exhausted themselves in the primary offensive. The physical toll of these offensives was innumerable, particularly the civilian toll, with at least 25,000 Southern civilians dead, 116, 000 rendered homeless and hundreds of thousands more made refugees. By the end the Communists had taken an enormous hit also, losing roughly 45,000 (5, 000 alone in Hue) out of approximately 84, 000 troops committed, by attacking and occupying 35 major South-Vietnamese cities and towns. On their part the Allies lost 3, 100 troops (Westmoreland 1985: 344-345). Yet here again such levels of punishment would not suffice since the attrition tactics utilized, not just to counter Tet but as Allied strategy as a whole, fell short for they;

> were designed to minimize their own casualties and might inflict heavy casualties on the enemy: However, they could generate more guerrillas than they killed. Even if they did not, they would certainly not make the people of the Republic of Vietnam better love their dysfunctional government, the sine qua non of the war effort. Further, always short of men and fearing an 'enclave' strategy equated with defeat, instead of Roger Hillsman's 'Clear &

Hold' strategy, MACV favoured a search-and-destroy strategy that in practice (if also not in theory) placed little value on local security (Gilbert 2002: 170).

The way coercive force was employed during the Allied counter-offensive rendered Tet a Pyrrhic victory, since it inflicted an equal amount of damage on the persuasive matrix as it did upon the Communists' coercive elements. Physical victory resulted in cognitive loss both within South-Vietnam and at home and unfortunately Tet was the Allied war effort in microcosm. For their part the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong murdered thousands of civilians, ostensibly government officials and members of the upper class, all of whose bodies were ditched in a common grave outside the city. These facts did not preclude the Communists from selling such killings via Communist propaganda as targeted and delimited to enemy members, though of course they were not (detailed below). By contrast the blunt trauma inflicted by the Allies looked, as it undoubtedly was, like an operation conducted with disregard at best and contempt at worst for the people they were supposed to be protecting.

Fortuitously one positive point was generated by Tet, in that the offensive proved to be of vast significance as it was the native Viet-Cong who bore the brunt of the combat. It was these insurgent ranks that were decimated during the offensive, leaving a coercive void for the Allies and government to fill in the rural villages of South-Vietnam. So while Allied pacification efforts were ravaged during Tet this ground was unable to be held by the insurgency. The Viet-Cong was never able to recover its former strength post Tet (Brown 1991: 232), probably Hanoi's intent all along- no Viet-Cong meant no political competition after the Allied withdrawal. Lastly, the failure of the Tet Offensive to furnish the revolution by instigating a mass uprising was undoubtedly another blow to the Communists' game-plan (Scholl-Latour 1979: 139).

On the Allies' side, in theory this Communist defeat should have encouraged many neutral citizens of South-Vietnam to place more confidence in the ability of the government and the Allies. The un-calibrated use of coercive force however negated this possibility. The way coercive force was employed prevented gains in the persuasive matrix, assuring popular passivity and neutrality continued to hamper the war effort. Moreover, whilst Tet did drain Communist military resources it had little to no effect on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's determination.

The same can not be said of the Allies. In the wake of Tet casualty levels in Vietnam became unacceptable to the Allies first. The footage of Tet's combat was responsible for turning a

military victory into a psychological defeat on the domestic battlefront. The problem for the Allies was that the war was always popularly viewed as a limited war, a war fought more for geo-political grand theory than national survival. As such there was a decidedly lower threshold of casualty tolerance on the Allied publics' part. North-Vietnam simply out-bled the Allies, highlighting a universal tenet of war- the most committed wins.

Tet also rammed home the notion that the conflict would not be won militarily, providing the psychological impetus needed for the Allies to embark upon schemes like the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Schemes that increased the emphasis on Clear & Hold methodologies and concomitant persuasive programs in general with hitherto unseen energy, pressuring the Communists in ways that for the first time threatened the insurgency's viability. Before analysing the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the persuasive war further it is first necessary to examine one other example of Allied coercive violence.

'Phoenix': The 'Phoenix Program' was in all probability a counter-action to the successful Viet-Cong campaign of assassinating top Republic of Vietnam personnel (combatants and non-combatants). Their assassination created the necessary vacuum that permitted Communist 'political' operations, particularly in rural South-Vietnam. Initially the Viet-Cong targeted police, informers, hamlet/village chiefs and ranking government officials. Flowing from the Viet-Cong's post Tet weakness armed pacification and propaganda teams and 'ralliers' (Communist turncoats) became the top priority. That the Republic of Vietnam's physical infrastructure and 'turncoats' were priority targets under Viet-Cong policy was due to the realization that counter-insurgency operators and their assets in not just the coercive matrix but also the persuasive one, represented a clear and present danger to the 'revolution' (Chanoff & Toai 1996: 168-169).

Initiated around 1968, the Phoenix Program had a twofold intent; to capture Communist cadres for intelligence purposes where possible and eliminate these cadres where necessary. Controversial as it was, the targeted assassination of Communist cadres under Phoenix was absolutely vital, considering at many stages most Southern villages had overt and/or covert Communist cells comprised not merely of armed cells but a Communist Party secretary, a finance and supply unit, as well as information, culture, social welfare and proselytizing sections. Communist cells also rendered medical, 'education' and 'justice' services backed up vigorously by propaganda teams 24 hours a day (Andrade & Willbanks 2006: 17).

The CIA, US Special Operations Group (SOG) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces were tasked to neutralize this infrastructure under the umbrella of Phoenix, a programme that relied on 'special intelligence' to target and destroy the Viet-Cong leadership and infrastructure. It proved one of the most successful strategic initiatives pursued during the war, one of the few programs conducted that would push the Communists onto the back foot and seize the initiative. Phoenix proved essential because it massively disrupted the capability of the insurgency to maintain its momentum by eviscerating the Viet-Cong Infrastructure in the South. Stanley Karnow's measure of its effectiveness places the toll Phoenix extracted from the Viet-Cong at 60, 000 (Brewington 1996: 12). Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam's foreign minister after 1975, admitted that Phoenix "wiped out many of our bases in South-Vietnam, compelling numbers of North-Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to retreat to sanctuaries in Cambodia" (Summers 1985: 284).

One report holds that 250,000 people passed through the system each year and in congressional testimony William Colby, director of Phoenix and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme (CORDS- formed in 1967 to unify for the first time the military/coercive and civil/persuasive spheres under a single command structure towards a unified pacification effort), testified that between 1968 and 1971 a total of 28,978 people were arrested, 17,717 rallied and 20,587 were killed, with 86.7% of the latter in combat situations under Phoenix (approximately 13% were assassinated) (Prados 1995: 214). While these figures show the operation had a significant impact in contributing to the eclipse of the Viet-Cong Infrastructure, Phoenix did not contribute to that other important aspect, pacification.

Under Phoenix's quota system the program did not always get Viet-Cong alone. Civilians were frequently detained or arrested because Phoenix, like most Vietnam counter-insurgency programs, was subject to corruption and abuse (government officials used the program to eliminate their competition or settle old scores). Another factor was civilian abuse, whereby civilians used the program to similarly label the disliked "Communists". This conundrum may have been mitigated had an impartial domestic security service been conducting the intelligence operations. Due to the Republic of Vietnam's undemocratic, corrupt and incompetent nature however, often when someone for one reason or another did not like you, you were Viet-Cong.

Needless to say the way this programme was conducted did little to foster good will amongst the people, either in the cities or the country-side, so yet again the way coercive force was conducted

inhibited the achievement of persuasive goals. A final factor was that Phoenix's effectiveness was also hampered by bureaucrats who failed to define who precisely constituted the Viet-Cong Infrastructure. Phoenix operators subsequently erred on the side of caution and cast an unnecessarily wide net, filling South-Vietnamese jails to the brink with often innocent people (Snepp 1977: 12).

Phoenix must be analysed nonetheless as it holds lessons for current and future counter-insurgency operations. Phoenix was an overwhelming coercive success in terms of decimating the Viet-Cong Infrastructure, critical since it (like all insurgent infrastructure) enabled the Viet-Cong to conduct both coercive and persuasive operations. As such Phoenix was a legitimate program redressing serious insurgent competition. Unfortunately its efficacy was hampered by corruption and bureaucracy which meant this exercise of targeted coercive violence had a negative impact on the persuasive matrix.

Although Phoenix was problematic it was also progressive and an improvement in calibrated coercion. Still, it came too late, for once US President Richard Nixon gained office in late 1968 disengagement was the policy and no program, no matter how revolutionary, was going to win the war before the impending Allied withdrawal (completed by 1972/73). Yet even given this and its flaws, the program was successful in its aim of decimating the Viet-Cong Infrastructure within South-Vietnam. Making the program useful as an educational tool for current and future counter-insurgency campaigns, because Phoenix mitigated perhaps more than any other Allied program of the war the Viet-Cong shadow government's control over South-Vietnam (Blair 2001: 189).

Regarding the relevance of Phoenix then and considering the Refined Integrationist Model hypothesis, it must be made absolutely clear that any insurgent operating within either the persuasive or coercive matrix is a legitimate military target- there is no such thing as a non-combatant insurgent. Persuasive insurgents, armed or unarmed, need to be neutralized equally as much as coercive insurgents. Insurgent propaganda is just as dangerous as insurgent bullets and the nullification of an insurgency's persuasive matrix is therefore equally as important as the nullification of the insurgency's coercive matrix. Should either insurgent wing be left to operate un-harassed the insurgency will likely not cease.

It was not until Phoenix in 1968 that the Allies realized this and the Viet-Cong Infrastructure attacked in any meaningful way. Thus the over-riding necessity of eliminating the Viet-Cong

Infrastructure, of combating both coercive and persuasive insurgent wings simultaneously was, again, recognized as relevant and critical to the Vietnam enterprise belatedly (Andrade 1990: 28). To cap, Phoenix turned the tables on the Communist insurgent infrastructure and contributed immeasurably to drive a coercive wedge between the insurgents and the population. At the same time Phoenix assured this coercive wedge, as implemented, unnecessarily drove one more cognitive wedge between the counter-insurgents and the population somewhat.

Persuasive Matrix:

'The Other War': Pacification is a difficult business at the best of times but it became practically impossible when combined with factors like; insecurity, local officials constantly changing, strongarm local and provincial Army of the Republic of Vietnam 'governors' wrenching 'tribute' or 'taxes' from the villages via gratuitous violence, government corruption and factional manoeuvring, official taxation constantly excessive and ever increasing insurgent recruitment and activity. Added to this, such low priority had been accorded pacification early on (1963-65) that the endeavour had been proceeding negatively.

That is, it was the Viet-Cong who was despatching main force units to prop up local guerrillas in the villages specifically to enable persuasive operations, expanding areas of insurgent control at the expense of the Allies and government. By 1965 only some Allied officials had realized the war's strategy was proving unable to fend off the Communists because it emphasized the commitment of conventional US forces to combat the North-Vietnamese Army divisions Hanoi had now committed to the insurgency.

The US and the Republic of Vietnam simply concentrated too much on the military aspect of the war. As such they allowed short term tactical expediencies to fog the strategic picture and pursued a counter-productive policy of coerced 'political stability' enforced by military juntas in South-Vietnam. The policy was adopted because it was assumed it would better allow the Allies to root out the North-Vietnamese Army/ Viet-Cong, over political revolution, which is what the people really wanted, what the war was all about. Even after the military situation stopped regressing in 1966 (due to conventional Allied military victories), pacification efforts by the Allies continued to be neglected and where actually undertaken were inadequately coordinated and faced an uphill if not impossible battle in any respect due to the massive amount of collateral damage inflicted on South-Vietnam by the Allies' coercive wings.

Persuasion and coercion were cut off from one another in Vietnam, particularly pre-1968. The need for a dual track strategy was later identified, although pacification was still carried out incoherently and ad-hoc on the ground for the most part. Under these programs separate civilian teams run by the US State Department and Agency for International Development (US-AID), referred to herein by one of their names- Revolutionary-Development teams ('Rev-Devs') - were tasked to live in certain South-Vietnamese villages.

'Rev-Devs' were responsible for delivering rural health, education, welfare, reconstruction schemes, propaganda and indoctrination programmes etc. The teams fostered *local* democratic elections and institutions in conjunction. In spite of a number of pacification *plans* and the constant and confusing name changes to the program, there were never enough teams 'in-country'. These ad hoc, insecure programs/teams run by mainly civilian agencies meant no coherent program with the potential for success was on the horizon by 1966. Due to two facts; the neglect of the persuasive war in general and the lack of a coercive shield to protect and enable what persuasive programmes were being conducted; "without security the rest of the 'pacification' operations were ineffective" (Cable 1986: 257).

In other words, in spite of the facts that the teams were operating in the Allies' own backyard and many were eventually armed, Search & Destroy modalities assured most of the teams were operating behind enemy lines, constantly outmanned and outgunned by the insurgency in the rural areas. All in all early on the insurgents were able to tear down the small Allied and government persuasive gains made by the 'Rev-Devs' ad nauseam, in parallel with their own infrastructural growth;

> …'pacification' has if anything gone backward. As compared with two or four years ago, enemy full time regional forces and part time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cut; the rice crop…is smaller; we control little, if any, more of the population…In essence, we find ourselves no better and if anything worse off- A memorandum sent by US Defense Secretary McNamara to President Johnson in 1966 (Addington 2000: 99).

The 'Rev-Devs' were not coordinated sufficiently with each other or the military and vice versa. Overarching this was the continued primacy of unilateral Search & Destroy operations that provided no real coercive screen for the teams. Advice and programs undertaken were thus ill conceived- the civilian agencies were not responsible for security and the military was not responsible for pacification:

> "Not only had the war diverted resources from 'pacification'. American advice and support for the South-Vietnamese government was poorly organized", whilst US civilian agencies "had neither the authority or ability to assist the Vietnamese in combating terrorism. Nor had the US Army a mandate to foster political development or economic growth" (Nalty 1996: 127).

Stemming from this and to repeat, in 1967 President Johnson created the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme and imbued General Westmoreland with overall power, head of both civil and military operations. A civilian, Robert W. Komer, was designated his second in command and charged with pacification efforts. 1967's increased efforts at

pacification, like the few additional propaganda campaigns, the rejuvenated effort to foster local democratic governance and increased Reconstruction & Development (road, water, electricity, school and health projects etc) in both rural and urban South-Vietnam were just starting to gain traction when the Communists launched the Tet Offensive. While the Hamlet Evaluation System had rated only an additional 268 villages 'secure' in the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme's first six months of operation (short of the goal of 1, 103), slow progress was being made as persuasion and coercion were slowly being linked by the tentative addition of Clear & Hold tactics to the war effort (Hunt 1995: 135).

Unavoidably in response to Tet, again the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's intent, massive numbers of Allied personnel were diverted from pacification duties to counter the Communist offensive. Here the Communists were once again successful in preventing the Allies from sustaining their hard won momentum in the persuasive war, momentum that would take time to regain whilst the blood shed by the Allies continued to flow and domestic patience inexorably continued to retrograde along with it.

The 'APC': The 'Accelerated Pacification Campaign' (APC) was originally intended as a stop-gap measure to reassert government control over the rural areas in the wake of an eviscerated North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong post Tet, but was institutionalized and expanded in 1969/70 when the worth of persuasive warfare finally became apparent to policy planners in Washington. The previous Search & Destroy operational focus was altered after Tet to incorporate more Clear & Hold operations in addition. So it was not until late in the piece that a semi-coherent 'new model' Accelerated Pacification Campaign was initiated.

Detrimentally however, as would become clear, the previous strategy of attrition had done so much damage to the persuasive matrix that even when under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign coercion was better married to persuasion, the damage already done severed any short term if not long term possibility of attaining coalescence (along with the lack of real democracy). In any case, it appears this new predominantly rural strategy had three main aims. Firstly, it attempted to maintain a more secure local environment in order to, along with Phoenix, launch a more vigorous attack upon the Viet-Cong Infrastructure, enable persuasive operations and protect the 'Rev-Devs'. Secondly, it aimed to re-invigorate village life. Thirdly, it aimed to carry out land reform and encourage self-help development projects, at last realising to some extent the relationship between coercion and persuasion.

Yet once more in Vietnam the program faltered. For one, its persuasive incentives, like schools, roads, health, electricity, water, sanitation and general economic development were not sufficiently linked to the coercive matrix. These persuasive incentives neither demanded any response from the population, like intelligence assistance or support in general. Until 1970 the program did not either encompass land reform, an invaluable pillar of Communist cognitive warfare operations from the time of the original French occupation (Hyde 1968: 135-136).

Indeed, the American embassy had previously opposed land reform on the basis that it would anger the landlords (a minority in the country) and turn them, thereby precipitating the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam. Having said this, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was a watershed. Though General Westmoreland neglected pacification efforts during his tenure (a major reason for his replacement), there were a few pacification successes his newly instituted successor, General Creighton Abrams could build on (commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1968-72). Whilst too small in scale to have an impact on the war effort as a whole, effective pacification efforts by the American CIA, Special Forces and Marines during General Westmoreland's tenure provided a model for the Accelerated Pacification Campaign because, although undertaken unilaterally by all, where employed they seemed to have worked well.

These three minority organisations appear to have been the only ones to have recognized the importance of persuasive warfare from the outset of Allied involvement. As mentioned these programs evolved around the development of local defence forces to provide protection from the Viet-Cong and recognized the importance of village security as a pre-requisite for improved populace-government relations, in enabling persuasive operations and in facilitating the suppression of the Viet-Cong Infrastructure. General Abrams, long before taking command of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, regarded this as the more pertinent strategy. To this he was involved in the radical shake up of American counter-insurgency policy in May 1967 by which all the various, ad hoc American and Republic of Vietnam military and civilian pacification programmes were placed under the control and direction of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme (Valentine 1990: 159).

Shortly thereafter and to underscore, to further pacification efforts in 1968 General Abrams switched tactics from purely Search & Destroy to a Search & Destroy/Clear & Hold hybrid approach. Following on from lessons learned, Clear & Hold tactics were now a modus operandi

of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam writ large. General Abrams' tactics involved military attacks on North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong units and strongholds followed post engagement by the permanent stationing of military and paramilitary units in the area. During the early stages of General Abrams' command the *Chieu Hoi* or 'open arms' programme (where insurgents who defected were guaranteed safe passage and pardon) was also re-emphasized. Results were almost immediate, yet it must be said that some estimate as much as 30% of 'ralliers' were everyday peasants forced to enter the program by corrupt Republic of Vietnam officials in return for a share of the reward or one year's deferred conscription. Officially at least in 1968 there were 17,836 defectors to the Republic of Vietnam. The figure jumped again in 1969 to 47,088 (Olson 1988: 82).

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign was the initiation of a program that saw the ever so important and hard won military victories in the country-side held to enable persuasive operations for the first real time during the war. Losses of government influence and control from Tet were redressed and security and pacification levels reached all time highs according to the Hamlet Evaluation System This progress was all the more possible due to the insurgents' Tet induced weakness. Often Allied and Republic of Vietnam pacification cadres just moved into previously contested areas and took control. Overarching these developments it requires note, the program was conducted with one eye on the US' position at the negotiating table, in the hope that enhanced physical control of rural South-Vietnam would translate into a political advantage and retain at least what villages had been resecured for the Republic of Vietnam in anticipation of a peace treaty (Degroot 2000: 177).

1968 then, five to six years after the war had begun, saw for the first time hard won coercive gains finally being taken advantage of and used to conduct persuasive operations. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam on its part was increased and finally issued modern American fire-arms. The US and the Republic of Vietnam likewise paid more attention to increasing the size and reach of the police force, charging it with providing internal security and the enforcement of 'law and order' (due to the lack of democracy however it, along with Army of the Republic of Vietnam, would only ever really protect and serve the government, not the people). As these goals were steadily achieved the standard of living began to increase, for with the post Tet lull in fighting infrastructure was now replaced or built anew on a national scale, including roads, bridges, power and phone lines, irrigation, water and sewerage pipes etc. Also as mentioned, in 1970 land reform under the auspices of the 'Land to the Tiller' program was belatedly initiated. By 1973 9000 sq

km of land had been titled to 600, 000 former serfs, redressing a crucial point over which the Vietnamese insurgency was fought on the cognitive front. An old Asian proverb puts it best: "A land title is the hoop that holds the barrel together" (Barber 1971: 105).

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign was carried out with a speed and focus unheard of. Along with government compensation for former land owners and relatively free access to markets the program changed the rural economy from subsistence and barter to a market driven economy, thereby striking at the heart of the insurgency's Communist ideology for the first time since the war began (by giving the people a stake in the anti-Communist war). Political reform was also adjudged to be a critical component of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

Accordingly, 1969 on saw the government pushing villages harder to hold their own *local* elections of councillors to oversee local matters, settle local issues and allocate funds for local development projects. Intent and reality parted ways again however, since bona fide grass-roots democratic institutionalism was atypical. Corrupt government officials regularly refused to relinquish control, promises to the contrary notwithstanding. Infrequently were villages administered locally, rendering the grass-roots democratic enterprise a facade because outsiders (government officials at the district and provincial levels usually) continued to run the rural hamlets and villages. Yet the spur given to pacification by the combined effects of the establishment of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the galvanising effect of Tet, was reflected in the increased proportion of the US/Republic of Vietnam war budget allocated to pacification. In 1965 US $582 million was spent on pacification, by 1970 the figure had almost tripled to US $1.5 billion (Komer 1972: 55).

President Nixon's policy of 'Vietnamization', the policy of rapidly handing over responsibility for the prosecution of the war to South-Vietnam, was a direct result of the Tet Offensive and a thorn in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign's side. In the aftermath of Tet Republic of Vietnam President Nyguen Van Thieu realized the American commitment was beginning to waiver and subsequently began giving pacification the government's fullest attention as well. President Thieu for the first time participated wholeheartedly in pacification efforts, establishing a People's Self Defense Force and expanding the 'Ruff-Puffs' to enable these efforts. In 1969 2,000,000 people were on the People's Self Defense Force rolls, 'Ruff-Puffs' numbered over

550,000 men and 400,000 arms had been issued. Eventually over 4,000,000 people equipped with over 600,000 weapons participated in their own defence (Brown 1991: 232-233).

But as the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was not initiated until the end of 1968 it was not until then that the Allies and Republic of Vietnam had committed a major portion of their combat strength to controlling and winning rural South-Vietnam. Catastrophically the epiphany came all too late given Vietnamization and again was severely inhibited in any event by the damage done to the persuasive matrix by the strategy of attrition as practiced, not to mention the lack of actual democratic institutionalism (discussed further on):

> …'pacification' and Vietnamization were both long-range undertakings however and the frenzied efforts of 1968 could not make up for years of neglect. It was the end of the year before the 'pacification' program got back to where it had been before Tet. The establishment of a presence in the villages was not tantamount to gaining the active support of the people, something that could not be accomplished overnight (Herring 1996: 233).

Vietnamization rendered operational models moot, it was exit models that now counted in Washington. Therefore, although there were some pacification successes, pacification efforts were ultimately a failure because they did not build a viable nation. From the inception of Allied involvement Allied and Republic of Vietnam efforts detrimentally neglected pacification efforts, so by the time both realized the importance of the persuasive matrix Vietnamization and the Allied withdrawal had begun in earnest. Numerous problems were not addressed in time to prevent a Communist victory, a wholesale repeat of the French experience in Vietnam: "The French discovered at the end rather than the beginning that pacification should have been a far more important component of their effort than it was. We went through a very similar process, I'm sorry to say"- Robert Komer (Maclear 1981: 255).

Until too late in the piece the Allies and Republic of Vietnam tackled pacification as one facet of a subsidiary war, highlighted by the fact that pacification was widely regarded 'the other war'. In contrast the Communists placed their entire political, military and social programmes all at the heart of their revolutionary doctrine. The failure to perceive this crucial difference rendered the majority of pacification programmes ineffectual and the attempt to craft a nation resulting in a stillborn death, directly because segregated coercive and persuasive campaigns were conducted for the longest time. The fault-line of this dilemma was a basic, fundamental short-sight, whereby the two interfacing spheres of coercion and persuasion were not recognized as having a symbiotic relationship regarding counter-insurgency warfare (in part) until late in the day, rendering the Vietnam exercise ultimately futile.

Democratic Institutionalism: It was not just attrition that proved counter-productive in the persuasive contest. A principle failure in that campaign was likewise the lack of real democracy, for South-Vietnam was never going to be won by security and material enhancement alone. Persuasion is a totality and just providing enhanced security and material development in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign smacked of neo colonialist bribery without self-determination. From the earliest stages of the war the people of South-Vietnam made it clear they yearned for real democracy and not merely the facade of 'grass-roots democracy' (local rule).

Even before the large scale commitment of Allied combat troops, events like the 1963 Buddhist self-immolations highlighted the people of South-Vietnam would not support any dictatorship or regime. Supporting evidence comes from General Lansdale's paramount accomplishment during his second tour of Vietnam, the national 1966 constitutional elections which saw an 80% voter turnout. These constitutional elections (ratified on April 1st, 1967) enshrined an independent judiciary equal in power to the executive, called for the establishment of another layer of government (the Senate) and legalised opposition parties, limiting their role though. The problem was that General Lansdale wanted the reality of democracy whilst the Johnson administration thought they needed only the appearance of it in order to prevail in Vietnam, at least until the war was won. Unfortunately self-determination was a huge part of what the war was about. Most of the credit for what was South-Vietnam's closest flirtation with free and fair national level elections during the war lay in General Lansdale's lap, but because of inter-administration politics he was denied any significant role whatsoever from there on out (Fall 1967: 343).

General Lansdale and others realized the coercive matrix was being overemphasized and gave advice to this effect. Until the war had a political/psychological base of legitimacy, until South-Vietnam had a government based on popular support as opposed to popular acquiescence, progress in the war would be little to none. In this view America had to continue to foster and move towards the longer term goals of liberty and freedom. Reality was different, purported political 'stability', sought as a result of South-Vietnam's twelve changes of government (military coups) between 1963 and 1965 (Bown & Mooney 1976: 95) was the priority on the South-Vietnamese political front. In point of fact, the recipe for 'stability' produced the diametric opposite effect- the policy was a main causal factor of the campaign's instability.

By 1966/67 President Johnson had settled on the government of General Nyguen Van Thieu and Air Vice Marshall Nyguen Cao Ky who together had recently come to power in a coup of their

own (initially Ky led the government but was ousted by Thieu later) and determined there would be no more political instability. To this end in 1967 the US tacitly permitted Thieu and Ky to curtail opposition by delimiting candidates, in effect barring their most pressing opponents and favourably constructing the ballots for the national 'elections' of September 1967.

In the end Thieu and Ky gained a plurality, 34.8% of the vote, enough to govern. The 'elections' of 1967 were suppose to provide political legitimacy and stability, but by limiting opposition and disingenuously constructing the electoral system the election lost all legitimacy and so did nothing to bolster popular support. Thieu would hold elections again in 1971 but they were even more rigged than the 1967 elections- Thieu garnered 90% of the vote. The irony of which is that American backed Thieu could probably have won these elections fairly. Needless to say said 'elections' were a boon for Communist propaganda and created nothing but a disenchanted and disenfranchised populace, crippling the war effort (Tucker 1998: 118-119), as earnestly as un-calibrated Search & Destroy missions did.

Perhaps the best proof that democracy was the missing persuasive linchpin required to coalesce the people of South-Vietnam behind their government and the Allies was the 1966 Hue and Da Nang uprising. On March 11th 1966, 'Vien Hao-Dao' (the 'struggle movement') formed in Hue and Da Nang, predominantly comprised of Buddhists (the traditional moral compass of South-Vietnam). The movement was formed after the dismissal of General Ngyuen Chanh Thi from the South-Vietnamese government (General Thi was not towing the government line and therefore represented a potential threat). The failure of Southern military juntas to move towards real democracy was also something the Allies were held directly responsible for, since the provision and protection of democracy was supposedly why America and her Allies were there in the first place (Raskin & Fall 1967: 373-374).

On March 12th their northern chapter leader in Saigon, Thich Tam Chau, issued a four point communiqué calling for: 1) The rehabilitation of the 'old generals'. 2) The return to barracks of the military. 3) Early progress towards establishing democratic institutions and an elected government. 4) A genuine social revolution. Perhaps earlier than most the movement foresaw the continued dictatorship of Ky and Thieu, pushing the movement to initiate a democratic insurgency in Hue and Da Nang when these demands were not met, in the process sparking the greatest public relations nightmare for the government and Allies since the Buddhist crisis of 1963. The 'Honolulu Conference', ratified on February 9th 1966 by the Republic of Vietnam and

the US, had it been followed, may well have prevented the uprising for it viewed coalescence via a true democratic social revolution and the eradication of social injustice as important a tool to victory as military force. But as always, theory and practice clashed in Vietnam (Raskin & Fall 1967: 373-374).

Initially the South-Vietnamese government sought to use force to resolve the crisis but this plan quickly ran into problems. The police force in both cities refused to take action against the insurrection and the civil service agencies in both cities made their support for the movement public in a similar vein. These insurrectionary forces eventually captured Da Nang, causing Ky to inform a press conference that Da Nang had to be "liberated" from "Communist forces". He also threatened to kill a 'struggle movement' leader, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, who he accused of using public funds to fuel this "Communist" insurrection (Keesing 1970: 92). This was indicative, any expressed anti-government opinions during the war were considered 'Communist' inspired by the American and South-Vietnamese governments. Therefore they need not be addressed by anything other than brute force- a direct result of President Johnson marrying all anti-government sentiment to the Communist cause.

What role the Communists did play, if any, is unclear, although it was likely not significant. What it is clear is that popular opinion in at least two of South-Vietnam's biggest cities was pro-democratic and the 'struggle movement' never adopted a pro-Communist platform. Corollary evidence of this is the backlash at the time against the Communists after terrorist attacks on the American air base of Tan-Son-Nhut and police posts in Saigon. This democratic insurrection threatened a civil-war itself when the entire Hue based Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1st Infantry Division declared its support for the movement. It was these dissident police and army units in Da Nang that prevented Ky from regaining control of the city by force on April 6th, ensuring that the movement retained effective political control of both cities. Back in Saigon Ky was determined to impose his will and bring the movement to heel. With President Johnson's approval and the expedited provision of US tanks to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam units tasked with assaulting Da Nang, Ky's forces had the backing necessary to take down the insurrectionary elements of the police and military holding Da Nang (Smith 1991: 340).

The preliminary assault began on May 15th and took nine days to recapture the city, such was the resistance. Hue proved more difficult, but by the middle of June a substantial part of the 1st division was back in the bush hunting North-Vietnamese Army troops operating in the area,

leaving the door open for Ky to employ loyal forces to retake the city (it appears defending their country from Communist forces took priority for the men of the 1st division). By June 19th resistance in Hue had been crushed. Such blatant use of anti-democratic coercion to secure government rule provoked in Saigon "some of the most violent demonstrations ever to take place in the capital". Buddhists took their rage to the Americans as well, burning down the library of the US Information Service and committing that persuasive matrix nightmare, self-immolation by Buddhist monks and nuns in Hue, Dalat and Saigon. The flare up ended on June 23rd with the occupation of the Vien Hao-Dao's headquarters by government troops, ending "one of the most serious political challenges ever mounted against the Saigon government" (Smith 1991: 340).

This farce was possibly the single greatest example of America's misconception of counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam. In essence President Johnson actively colluded with Ky to cut off this democratic insurgency at the knees. Truly free and fair national elections excluding the Communists were never really considered an option towards providing a workable solution to either the uprising or the war in general for that matter for the Johnson administration. As a result, from this point on it became abundantly clear to the people of South-Vietnam and the world that Allied troops were not there to bring that cliché of 'democracy and freedom' but were there to kill Communists. In counter-insurgency warfare the termination of the enemy is not the ends, it is one mean to a greater end, something the Allies never grasped until the dying years of the war. Allied support for undemocratic Republic of Vietnam regimes ensured that the Allies would only ever gain the appreciation of the minority in power, since the South-Vietnamese saw clearly that their 'democratic' institutions were more "show than substance" (Kann 1977: 123).

American military aid rendered regarding the anti 'struggle-movement' assault meant the democratic insurrectionists killed would be attributed to the Allies as earnestly. An outcome negatively influencing the persuasive matrix, which in turn had a negative impact on the coercive matrix as intelligence aid fell and enemy adherents and combatants rose. Instead of adapting after the insurrection President Johnson continued with his 'stability' formulae, ever guided by his original policy converging all dissent with Communism. Hue and Da Nang did not teach the US administration the importance of concomitant democratic political development, it taught them to loosen the reins of the various South-Vietnamese governments and permit them do what ever was necessary from there on to quell internal dissent and ensure 'stability'. Not only did this result in corrupt and nepotistic governments but also in reins of state terror, constant waves of arbitrary

arrests and assassinations, in addition to the wholesale curbing of civil rights and the rule of law.

Blurring the line between Communist and governmental terror to near indistinguishable levels:

> Never allowing the events of 1966 to fade from its consciousness, for the remainder of the war the United States worried about a repeat of 1966 and thus always emphasized stability over democracy. As a result it tolerated the widespread, barely concealed corruption of the Ky and Thieu regimes and the state-sponsored terror of the Thieu government, since they allowed it to prosecute the war while silencing internal dissent. By doing so, however, it ensured that South-Vietnam would never form an effective government capable of resisting the NLF after its departure (Topmiller 2002: 146-147).

The Psychological & Information War:

> During the period 16-19 March 1968, US Army troops of Task Force Barker, 11th Brigade, Americal Division, massacred a large number of non-combatants in two hamlets of Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. The precise number of Vietnamese killed cannot be determined but was at least 175 and may exceed 400.
>
> <div align="right">Peers Commission Report, 1970.</div>

The 'My Lai massacre' as it is known today inflicted a proportional amount of damage on the persuasive matrix to that a nuclear weapon dropped on the battlefield does for the coercive matrix. Still, emotional analysis of this event does not help. The *deliberate* atrocity perpetrated at My Lai was an incident outside the realms of nominal Allied operating procedure, as Abu Ghraib was in Iraq (discussed below). In both cases however the insurgents were able, via an admirably effective Information Warfare campaign, to convince the world that My Lai and Abu Ghraib were the result of barbarous routine policy. Relating to Vietnam directly, the Communists managed to convince much of the people of South-Vietnam and the Allied nations, indeed the world, that nearly every time a civilian was killed during the war it was solely America's fault, a product of American 'aggression'.

This somehow came to be accepted from an entity that *purposefully*, as a matter of policy, used southern villagers as human shields- 'clutching the people to our breast' was the euphemism used by the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong. Not to mention of course the innumerable amount of civilians (as opposed to government officials) they *deliberately* killed and kidnapped themselves. Truth be told, it was the Communists who relied more on sheer force and terror to extract support from the population, especially intelligence and supplies.

For instance, it was not uncommon for the Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army to decapitate and/or disembowel village children and leave their bodies on pikes to intimidate the populace and extract said support wherever necessary. The Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army would also,

as a matter of war-fighting doctrine, kidnap and kill uncompliant hamlet or village chiefs and/or their families, disguise themselves as civilians during fighting, deliberately build their fortified bases within villages and use men, women and even children to plant mines and booby traps, all too often resulting in their deaths. Finally, buses were mined and railways and bridges sabotaged with complete disdain for life (Ellsberg 2002: 72).

Yet the Communist tactic that damaged the Allies' standing in the cognitive war unimaginably was the deliberate goading of Allied troops. Insurgent snipers or patrols would deliberately open fire from populated areas, not only in the hope that using the populace as human shields would deter the Allies from engaging but just as often in the hope that it would achieve the opposite result. It was regularly hoped that the Allies would decimate the village and its inhabitants with return fire because the Communist insurgents intimately understood the impact this utilization of coercive violence would have on the persuasive matrix. They understood that they could, via propaganda, blame the Allies for the carnage. Now Allied attrition tactics were indeed partly responsible, but that the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong got off scot-free from their deserved blame is astounding and a direct result of the fact that the Allies let them get away with it by not properly contesting the persuasive matrix in general and the propaganda battle in particular, especially after My Lai:

> But to compare the crime of a handful of Americans at My Lai with the massive, systemic slaughter by the Communists of selected groups of their countrymen is simply to refuse to understand the difference between one sadistic outburst and the use of prolonged Terror as a Communist politico-military weapon…Their [the Communists'] answer to the problem in the South, as in the North, crystallises in one word- Terror… Over the massive terrorism in South-Vietnam a silence has fallen. The Men of Conscience seem to be sleeping… Instead the presses of America pour out a cascade of abuse against the government and soldiers of their own country, whose crime is that they helped to save South-Vietnam from being overrun by an unwanted despotism, unique for its primitive violence and willing to destroy an entire country rather than see it slide from their hands…All of it is linked with the deliberate creation, by South-Vietnam's enemies, of two separate moral standards- one used to condemn the South, the other to excuse the North…The Vietnam War has been made the Double Standard War. It has crystallized an entire moral attitude. The enemy is uplifted by idealism, we are sunk in materialism. He is truthful, we always lie. His motives are pure, ours vile. His soldiers never retreat, ours run from the battlefield. When he kills children silence falls, and the cameras are turned elsewhere. So it goes on, now so ingrained in our societies that we are no longer conscious of the duplicity of it all (Grenville 1972: 79-82).

To underscore, the Allies' coercive methodology was also a primary enabler of this situation- Allied coercive actions played a major part in the loss of the persuasive matrix. Their coercive actions fed the Communist coercive and persuasive apparatuses by procuring for the insurgency recruits and collaborators, who typically were not necessarily pro-Communist but became anti-

American and/or anti-government as a result of attrition methodologies. Goading tactics and the resultant collateral damage, especially at My Lai, assured every dead villager left behind many more family members and friends who would either at the least not co-operate with the Allies and government or begin to actively oppose them with alarming regularity. It is like shooting oneself in the foot and the Allies fell for it time and again in Vietnam because there was little understanding of the relationship coercion and persuasion enjoy.

Interestingly, Norman Podhoretz has commented that when civilian casualties of a war are counted as a proportion of total numbers, the Vietnam War was no more lethal for civilians than previous wars. At 45% Vietnam was roughly equal to World War II levels and substantially less than Korean War levels (70% of total casualties) (Podhoretz 1982: 187). This did not prevent the insurgents from painting the Allies as the barbarians, in spite of the fact it was the Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army committing the lion's share of civilian killings, particularly after 1969 when the Allies attempted to marry coercion to persuasion to an extent and curtail collateral damage.

Nonetheless, the common perception gestated by the media and insurgents was of the most lethal, indiscriminate war in Western history. Through the Allies' near total abdication of the persuasive matrix the insurgency was able to dominate half the war's battlefield from early on. That the Information Warfare aspect of the persuasive contest came to be neglected was a result of the over-emphasis placed on coercive force. By Allied neglect then, propaganda espoused by the insurgency and broadcast by many media outlets and domestic anti-war movements became (and remains) *the* truth;

> the evil was taken to be the American intervention itself: an act of aggression against a people fighting to liberate themselves from a corrupt and repressive regime. Far from resisting the spread of totalitarianism, we were propping it up. We were the counter-revolutionaries, we were the imperialists, we were the enemies of freedom and self-determination…So well and widely established did this view become, and so half-hearted and ineffective were the replies, that the word Vietnam became serviceable as a self-evident symbol of evil, even outside of the context of politics (Podhoretz 1982: 13-14).

The way the Allies conducted their counter-insurgency campaign shares responsibility for this common perception in another way. In that it was a by-product of the Allies' *postponement* of national democratic evolution (democracy was always the end goal) and of their inability to comprehend the notion of popular support and its relationship to coercive violence. So that it became not just Allied methods that were criticized but the war's very purpose. The best example

of the insurgency's domination of the persuasive matrix was that a few short months before My Lai, as detailed, the Viet-Cong while withdrawing from Hue tortured and executed thousands of civilians. Contrastingly however, this well known, un-paralleled war-crime (regarding the Vietnam War) never drew anywhere near the amount of popular opprobrium that My Lai did, an atrocity a fraction of the scale of the Hue massacre:

> There (Hue) Communist troops attacked and captured the Imperial Citadel, where they held out for twenty-six days. During this occupation they murdered a great deal many South-Vietnamese; more than 3000 bodies were later discovered in mass graves. Few tears were shed, however, by the anti-war protesters in the United States over this mass murder (Middleton 1977: 19).

This double standard was possible was for three reasons. 1) Allied coercive actions overtly proved enemy propaganda true by their un-calibrated nature. 2) The Americans, regarding the Republic of Vietnam, put short term political 'stability' and anti-Communist hues before pro-democratic intent, crippling consequent persuasive policy in South-Vietnam. 3) The bankruptcy of the Allies' persuasive campaign at large assured the regrettable fact of the matter was that the US and her Allies were on the back foot in the cognitive domain throughout the entire war, with the inevitable associated outcome.

On the Allies' part the My Lai massacre was probably inevitable, a result of the American way of war followed during Vietnam: "Still, obviously there is a connection between higher policy and those who-let us say on their own initiative- carried out the massacre…the massacre was detonated by the Search & Destroy concept" (McCarthy 1974: 407). Then Professor of International Law at Princeton University, Richard Falk, likewise thought My Lai the inevitable result of American counter-insurgency practice: "It was perhaps an exaggeration and an extreme case, but not discontinuous with the way war was being waged and the climate that was created in the minds of the soldiers as to what was permissible and what was not permissible". Indeed, well before My Lai some 70% of the villages in the province had been destroyed by Allied aerial and artillery bombardment (Bilton & Sim 1992: 13-14). The climate Search & Destroy in its Vietnam format fostered in relation to the safety of the South-Vietnamese enabled the minds of some Allied soldiers to leap from disregard to murder.

Refugee numbers and collateral damage statistics help conceive the scale of the problem. In 1972 7.8 million of South-Vietnam's 19 million citizens were refugees. By 1975 the figure was 10 million- 55% of the population. The 'kill ratio' in favour of the Allies was on average around 20:1 if not 40:1 (approximately 1-2 million Communist troops are said to have been killed to the

Allies' approximate 60, 000). The toll of South-Vietnamese civilian deaths was similarly high-approximately 500, 000 dead and 1 million injured (Stewart 2005: 366), a number attributable to both sides. This indiscriminate use of force therefore meant that for every 2-4 insurgents killed 1 civilian was likewise killed. Poor counter-insurgency practice, whether the civilians were killed in the cross-fire or by insurgents for lack of a protective counter-insurgency shield.

On the government's side these civilians were not victims of cross-fire alone. Refugees attempting to return to villages under insurgent control after fighting had subsided had to contend with the North-Vietnamese Army/ Viet-Cong *and* the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam took a more liberal interpretation of the term force. Around Quang Ngai for example loudspeakers warned refugees attempting to repatriate that they would be shot if they attempted to leave their squalled refugee camps. For their part the South-Vietnamese police had a strong presence in the refugee camps to police the insurgency, ensuring they were apprised of escape attempts. One boatload of refuges returning to Da Nang during a lull in fighting was intercepted by the South-Vietnamese Coast Guard and disappeared. Additionally, if a family member did not return to the refugee camps by Seven p.m. the family head was incarcerated (Porter 1975: 255).

Perhaps though it was the idea that the *deliberate* killing of civilians was Allied policy which hurt the Allies' ability to contest the persuasive matrix most, a popular opinion My Lai solidified and one made possible by the Allies' abandonment of the cognitive field to the insurgency. The conclusion is thus- propaganda is not a dirty word in a counter-insurgency context. Lastly, My Lai is an excellent example of what impact ill conceived coercive actions have upon the persuasive matrix and therefore the war as a whole.

Communist Strategy & the Republic of Vietnam, a nexus: Long ago Alexis de Tocqueville opined a "true but complicated idea has always less chance of succeeding than one which is false but simple" (Hoang 1964: 120). When viewed under the lens of Vietnam he was prescient. For the duration of the war the Allies attempted to rationalize the copious amounts of pain they were inflicting on South-Vietnam for little discernable benefit by informing the South-Vietnamese they had to suffer today for a better tomorrow.

The Communists on the other hand did not have to achieve a thing as they were not the one's holding the reins of the state. All they had to do was to say what they *would* do once in power and

this they said was to install real democracy in a unified Vietnam. Of course, as history explicitly testifies, this was a lie. But it was a simple lie that was easier to believe for many Vietnamese than anything America said about future democracy, no matter how sincere, chiefly because American words and deeds existed in separate dimensions during Vietnam.

Furthermore the Communists, especially in the crucial nascent stages, went to greater lengths not only to win hearts and minds but to make sure the one's they had already 'won' did not revert. The Communists undertook any means necessary to accomplish this, including deceit and enforced indoctrination. Indeed, they possibly worked harder at indoctrination and 'political education' than they did at winning hearts and minds since their intense indoctrination programs provided the fuel that fed the Communist machine, namely its military component. Communist cognitive warfare efforts, nefarious and apocryphal as they were, followed a far more holistic approach (Hoang 1964: 120-128). Even former Communist cadre members acknowledge their party's duplicitous conduct:

> Our aim was to present ourselves to the world as a large representation of the South's population. And the American media is easily open to suggestion and false information given by Communist agents. The society is completely hypnotized by the media. For example, Pham Xuan An manipulated several important American reporters for years...Another big problem is the way the Communists twist ideology. They always use words like: freedom, peace, democracy. And the better impulses of people who truly want peace are manipulated into a popular movement against the free world's defenses…Now, this is not to say that America did not make mistakes in Vietnam, or that war is anything but a horrible thing. But I can assure you that not only were the South-Vietnamese and American public lied to by the Communists, even those of us who lived in the jungle and sacrificed for true independence and concord were made victims of the Communists' lies and deceit (Santoli 1999: 165-166).

Instructively, propaganda and bullets came to be valued equally by Hanoi. Eventually as many cognitive operations (coercive and persuasive) were waged as were military operations. Ho Chi Minh had initially wanted to keep violence to a minimum and convert the South cognitively as opposed to militarily. From 1959-63 90% of Communist cadres were conducting hearts and minds operations and a mere 10% were engaging the Republic of Vietnam and Allies militarily (both spheres combined to form the North-Vietnamese concept of insurgent warfare- *dau tranh*). Allied and Army of the Republic of Vietnam military strength came to negate this game plan, so by 1971-74 the figure had dropped to 55% psychological operations, 45% military operations. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam eventually came to realise that insurgent conflicts were one fully integrated, symbiotic effort comprised equally of both persuasive and coercive means. Each was as important as the other and to neglect either was to court defeat: "Every military clash,

every demonstration, every propaganda appeal was seen as part of an integrated whole"- Communist strategist Truong Nhu Tang (Degroot 2000: 106).

In contrast Allied psychological operations (where actually conducted) were consistently reactionary, defensive in nature and largely delimited to South-Vietnam. The only real offensive Allied Information Warfare campaigns conducted in Vietnam were the propaganda leaflet drops (usually addressed to insurgents). Conversely, whenever possible Hanoi attacked their enemy's domestic cohesion, ramming the war right into the Allies' living rooms. Consider Tet, where Hanoi knew full well what impact footage of American troops dying on mass for an undemocratic South-Vietnam would have on the domestic will. The Tet Offensive broke Allied morale directly because of the way the Western media played it too however, a slant the North was counting on. The media did not concentrate on the fact that Tet was the biggest Allied military victory of the war but that it was a 'disaster' solely as it was unforseen, as if war was an engineering schematic (a habit the next chapter will exhibit is retained by Western media organisations to this day). To follow up these types of psychological offensives journalists and celebrities were invited to North-Vietnam to see what the 'evil' Allies were doing to the 'helpless' North-Vietnamese. The most famous trip of which being Jane Fonda's visit to Hanoi in 1972 (Doyle 1986: 113).

The cognitive impact upon their enemy's cohesion, the will behind the barrel if you will, of a famous American celebrity effectively siding with the Communists was worth 100, 000 tons of ammunition. One final cognitive warfare tool the Communists took advantage of was negotiation. Negotiations were nothing if not another tool utilized towards unification- they were not an end:

> For them [the Communists], negotiation at a peace conference is merely a continuation of war under another form. Similarly, concluding an agreement is a strategy by which they weaken or immobilize the enemy; then they apply force to conquer by surprise. To accept talks proposed by the Communists or negotiation on terms initiated by them is merely to be trapped by their strategy for the future. South-Vietnam, in 1975, fell victim to such a trap (Van Canh 1983: 257).

Put alternatively, any politically negotiated solution, unless gaining Hanoi total control over Vietnam (an outcome the Allies went to war to prevent), was never going to be honoured as a matter of Democratic Republic of Vietnam war policy:

> Negotiation is a technique, not a method of conflict resolution; it is to be viewed solely on a tactical-strategic continuum. It could be (and was) used to advance the cause, to disrupt the enemy's internal scene, to mislead enemy leaders, to divide the enemy camp. Democratic Republic of Vietnam/Party negotiators never regarded negotiation as a process of compromise, of give-and-take dealing. Nor was there ever any sense of obligation to an agreement once reached. The Paris Agreement-actually a cease fire arrangement, not a

political settlement-bound the Vietnamese Communists to conditions that, if they had been fulfilled, would have destroyed the Party in the South and ruined all chance of unification. But commitment to the agreement never was the intention, as candid post-war writings by top party officials admit, much to the embarrassment of their foreign apologists (Pike 1978: 120).

This more than any other factor demonstrates why political solutions/negotiations should not be relied upon by counter-insurgency practitioners. Nonetheless, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 explicitly states this and so strong predilection towards an over-reliance on political solutions/negotiations is an issue that the Refined Integrationist Model hopes to identify and rectify to a degree, or at least underscore the inherent dangers thereof.

An illustration of the dominance of Communist Information Warfare operations is demonstrated in the figures of Viet-Cong terrorism. Despite having committed approximately 33, 000 acts of murderous terror for the effect of killing only 2, 700 government officials, despite kidnapping approximately 57, 000 people, of who only 1, 300 were government officials (Lanning & Cragg 1992: 283), despite the fact that "the aphorism 'grab `em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow', a favourite of the Americans, could be applied equally to the revolution" (Degroot 2000: 115), despite all this the Communists managed to hold the high ground in the cognitive campaign.

A victory won regardless of the fact that the Allies did not commit acts of terrorism and kidnappings *as a matter of doctrine*. To get world opinion to overlook these acts (as the terrorists of Afghanistan and Iraq have managed), demonstrates the deleterious impact of the dominance of the cognitive field in this war by the insurgency. The above figures draw out the indiscriminate nature of Viet-Cong terror, evidenced by the massive inequity between the total number of terrorist actions and resulting casualties with the minute number of government officials affected. To highlight, that this terror was by and large overlooked was due to the general neglect of psychological operations by the Allies, a situation which greatly hindered the viability of the counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam and an oversight only reinforced by the Model of Political Primacy today.

Early counter-insurgency propaganda campaigns, even before American involvement, were not that less sophisticated than the programs of later years- illustrating the neglect of the field from day one. Programs like the ill conceived 1956 Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign (ACDC) and the later Communist Activities Denunciation Campaign (To-Cong) are illustrative. The Anti-

Communist Denunciation Campaign for instance seems to have inflamed the situation rather than subdue it (Thayer 1989: 117).

Mirroring Phoenix people could and many did, denounce anyone they held grudges against as 'Communist'. For this reason the programs achieved the inverse to what the theory said they would. By swamping the security services' investigation and intelligence units, mass arbitrary detentions and assassinations were conducted. Numerous innocent people were put in jail where real Communists could mould their anger and direct it toward 'the cause'. Not to mention the damage it and programs like it did to the trust of the people. Republic of Vietnam governments were able to conduct such mass arbitrary arrests and killings due to the total lack of checks and balances in South-Vietnam's political architecture. As Sir Robert Thompson has said of the Republic of Vietnam's lack of legal accountability and its arbitrary, dictatorial rule:

> Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law…It loses respect and fails to fulfil its contractual obligation to the people as a government…there is to all intents and purposes a civil-war within the country in which neither side can claim to be the government. In such circumstances there is so little difference between the two sides that the people have no reason for choosing to support the government (Fall 1967: 372-373).

America consequently found it was unable to rein in the Republic of Vietnam when it attempted to do so later in the war, for it was at heart an institution interested in self, not national interest. It was always impossible for the Americans to reconcile their assumed need for 'stability' with legitimacy and legality. Whenever the US tried to mitigate the Republic of Vietnam's self destructive, dictatorial and terroristic behaviour the Republic of Vietnam responded in kind, determined to assert its independence.

With the growth of the Allied commitment the Republic of Vietnam's autonomy was inevitably threatened, making the Republic of Vietnam evermore prone to overreact to US policy requests in an attempt to demonstrate its independence to the people of South-Vietnam and prove the North's charges of 'puppetry' false. Yet the harder they tried to establish their autonomous credentials the more the US bypassed them. The amount of interaction between the two eventually dropped to near zero and the Allies assumed the bulk of the war's burden as a result (Karnow 1983: 444). An ideal outcome for many South-Vietnamese military commanders who were subsequently able to indulge their preference for rorting the system and the people.

Authoritarian juntas and corruption went hand in hand in South-Vietnam. Another reason democracy is important in this context. Democracies usually have inherent checks and balances and tend to be meritocracies- if you do not perform you inevitably have to answer to the people. Democracy allows the population to rectify any situation deemed undesirable (like corruption, authoritarianism, state brutality etc) and elect someone else- to have their say and have it followed.

Lamentably, the people of South-Vietnam never saw real democracy, they instead saw a skewed version, a version they were informed was at least a prototype of Western democracy and it left an unpalatable aftertaste, especially in the country-side where the war was mainly fought. Republic of Vietnam corruption and its undemocratic, authoritarian nature would eventually prove a major factor in the fall of Saigon in 1975. Although it was not just democratic political evolution and psychological operations that were lacking, development programs as conducted in a persuasive context were as much a disaster, along the way creating more insurgents for the Allies' coercive wing to deal with.

Strategic Hamlets: The 'Strategic Hamlets Program' was nearly identical in theory and almost diametrically opposed in practice to the 'New Villages' program of the 'Malayan Emergency'. Under the program selected South-Vietnamese villagers residing within infested Communist areas were forcefully relocated to 'pre-developed' and 'secured' villages. Application was a different matter. Unlike the 'New Villages' of Malaya the Strategic Hamlets were often located on or near infertile or less fertile land than the farming villagers previously enjoyed and were neither secured nor developed as a matter of course. Some peasants were more fortunate and were not relocated, yet they did not get off scot-free. The price they paid came in the form of reduced crop yields derived from enforced government labour (by digging moats and erecting barbed wire fences or palisades etc), contribution of materials for the program (bamboo for instance), direct payments for concrete posts, barbed wire and so forth and finally a price was extracted via the economic costs associated with the sacrifice of cultivable land for defensive earth works (Donnell & Hickey 1962: vii).

The program went under various guises during the 1950s and 1960s, illuminating the inconsistency of the endeavour. They were designated 'Agrovilles', Rural Reconstruction in Vietnamese, Revolutionary-Development villages in English, 'New Life Villages' and even *Ap Doi Moi* ('New-New Life Villages'). Republic of Vietnam President (dictator) at the time, Ngo

Dinh Diem, with American support, reconstituted the Strategic Hamlets Program proper in 1962 under a national plan to resecure rural South-Vietnam (Busch 2002: 137).

Different names for programs with one common result - failure (this thesis for ease of reference shall consider these endeavours as 'Strategic Hamlets'). While the theory was to secure the hamlets then utilize this security screen to root out the Viet-Cong Infrastructure and continue to develop the villages, on the ground once again theory and practice clashed. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam failed to secure the villages as tasked and governmental corruption ate away at the program's funding and supplies:

> Precious little of the economic aid intended to succour refugees and to provide a better life in the villages got through. I heard of one instance in which five hundred cases of cooking oil left the provincial capital but, according to the district chief, only one hundred arrived at his headquarters. In another district I found that all the village chiefs lived in the capital and some had never visited their villages. I talked to a senior official about it 'Corruption! It is terrible. It is almost impossible to get a district chief who is not corrupt. They expect graft as their right. They take risks and they expect rewards. It is very hard to fight this sort of corruption. Very few province or district chiefs are brought to court. The punishment is usually to let them go back to their military units. People like corruption. Everybody expects their share (Warner 1977: 136).

Where conducted efficiently the program inhibited Viet-Cong operations, intelligence gathering, logistics and general infrastructure, but this was the exception to the rule. Corruption, the lack of security and the failure to ensure the hamlets were superior to villages from which the peasants had been wrenched meant the few successes came at a high cost within the persuasive matrix, both foreign and domestic spheres.

Newscasts in the West night after night showed wailing and traumatized villagers being forcefully evicted from their traditional lands. It was these pictures that began to turn Western public opinion against the war. In a majority of the hamlets corrupt government officials also failed to deliver much needed weapons for the defence of the villages, on top of embezzling the funds and supplies intended to create functioning and more importantly happy communities. The lack of security meanwhile ensured Viet-Cong elements the program was intended to weed out relocated with the villagers. In illustration, one villager, a Mr. Tan asked a government official; "why dig this hole in the hot sun? ... The official gave a very long lecture. He told everyone that the moat must be dug so that the Viet Cong could not enter the hamlet. After he left, everyone laughed for many days. The sentry stopped and, seeing our perplexed look, added, 'You see, Mr. Tan was a Viet Cong himself'!" (Luce & Sommer 1969: 150).

On paper the program was intended to weld the coercive and persuasive spheres. On the ground it segregated them and had a negative impact on both spheres due to flawed enactment. In any case, where rarely the program was successful material improvement meant little to the South-Vietnamese without political freedom or security (Luce & Sommer 1969: 151-152) - demonstrating the holy trinity of counter-insurgency and why they are mutually interdependent (the Refined Integrationist Model meanwhile reduces this trinity to an interdependent duality). Neither matrix was truly comprehended in Vietnam and where undertaken were disassociated in what was a bicameral war and in this respect the way the program was administered was indicative.

The failure to provide an adequate coercive shield in the villages meant that persuasive operations were rendered moot as the Viet-Cong were still there to impose their will and tear any gains down. Moreover, the way these persuasive operations were conducted meant that authoritarianism, graft and corruption negated any possibility of fulfilling the program's objectives of linking the coercive and persuasive spheres. Ensuring little good will was generated, little intelligence garnered and few Viet-Cong negated or defectors created.

The program was not conducted effectively and so had a negative impact on the persuasive matrix where a positive one was entirely possible. As opposed to the British in Malaya, the Allies did not ensure the forced relocation programs made the people's life better (Moorhead 1963: 209), particularly by relocating them to the less fertile land of Vietnam. Sabotage of which was a result of the fact that the Republic of Vietnam comprised the landed 'gentry' who protected their holdings by nepotistic practices (Dareff 1971: 4) (until 1970), ignoring a fundamental facet of Cold War counter-insurgency warfare. In short the program further alienated the people whose support the Allies needed to win the war. Forcibly removed to inferior villages then effectively abandoned, most of the villagers turned away from the Allies and the Republic of Vietnam and began to either sit on the fence or actively support the 'revolution' in one way or another.

Economic Development: Besides monetary loans, general financial aid programmes and the overall evolution of a market driven economy, economic development in support of counter-insurgency operations in South-Vietnam additionally ran along the Western model of mechanization. Mechanization however meant higher unemployment, generating more hostility towards the government and more trigger fingers for the 'revolution', whether of an ideological or mercenary hue.

Each machine donated or subsidized by the Allies in the psychological war, like tractors and water pumps etc, on average meant the loss of at least 5 village jobs. More became aware of the situation and hearts and minds were lost at an incredible rate. Furthermore, because the wealthy already owned most of the land (until 1970) the programmes only helped the ruling class get richer. Added to this was the fact that since all the local land that could be tilled was, the machinery did nothing to increase productivity. In fact, the program did not even manage to feed the South. Traditionally a rice exporter, by 1967 South-Vietnam was importing 750, 000 tons of rice a year (Young 1991: 177).

South-Vietnamese villagers could not comprehend why the Americans were helping the 'elite' with free or subsidized machinery and punishing them by putting them out of work. Naturally this state of affairs was another boon for Communist cognitive warfare operations because it once again ostensibly proved what they were saying must be true- the Americans and her allies were there to keep down the ordinary South-Vietnamese.

Corporate profiteering similarly hurt the cause, as a villager commented: "The Americans bring their machinery over here, and sell it to the Vietnamese at a profit. Then an American company comes and sells us gas. Then another American company comes and sells us parts and tools to repair the tractor. All this does is make the American companies richer, and make people like us, who have to work with their hands, poorer". The most damaging economic development program was probably the "I.R" rice program. In an effort to increase rice yields and farmer profits, a higher yield strain of Philippino rice dubbed "I.R." was imported for South-Vietnamese farmers (the principle occupation of rural South-Vietnam). Regrettably, this strain was high maintenance and required large amounts of fertilizer, pesticides and water (Trullinger 1980: 151-153).

Initially the "I.R" seeds, pesticides and fertilizer were subsidized but after a couple of years prices for these items suddenly doubled or tripled in price (and keep in mind government officials did not just promote the program, they set prices and controlled the economic models in the villages since they owned most of the money making enterprises). More from the villagers affected: "The retailers were making huge profits, especially on the pesticides, which only a few places sold and which we needed most of all". Another: "There was an arrangement between the buyers and the fertilizer and pesticide retailers…They divided the profits. They were making so much and we made less than before". One more: "Many people here did not care much about politics. We only wanted to plant rice and live happily. I am an example of that. But when we saw the cadre and the

businessmen getting rich on that program we became angry at the Government. We saw clearly how corrupt the Government was and we began to support the liberation" (Trullinger 1980: 151-153).

Allied officials presumed this development programme would generate higher agricultural yields and increased profits, in turn generating satiated farmers unlikely to support anti-capitalist Communist insurgents. Substandard impact assessments on the Allies' part, combined with government corruption, saw the programme's effectiveness curtailed. Raging unchecked such incompetence and corruption handicapped the war effort in both the persuasive and coercive fields.

The predominant forms of corruption that reached dizzying, seemingly impossible heights were; misappropriation of funds, the sale of promotions or safe posts in the military, contracting kickbacks, the diversion of American equipment and aid to the black market, cheating on soldiers pay and food and the creation of 'ghost soldiers' (*linh mah*), whereby Army of the Republic of Vietnam officers pocketed the payrolls of non-existent soldiers. Flowing from this, corruption neutered the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, rendering it combat ineffective from early on.

In 1964 for example, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was losing a battalion a week (700-1000 men dead) due to incompetent commanders. A result of the fact that promotions were based on dollars or loyalty to the government, not ability and as these commanders were concentrating more on 'business' than war. Rather than attempting to structurally remedy the problem (by imposing democracy as it has in Afghanistan and Iraq) the US military and government pushed their South-Vietnamese counterparts into the background, making them gradually more dependent on Allied military forces. Corruption and nepotism, with their knock on effects concerning the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's incompetency, assured that the only bulwark keeping the insurgents from power throughout the war was the awesome firepower of the US military which, lacking a relevant counter-insurgency strategy, utilized this might "in Macbeth-like proportions from one act of destruction to another" (Lockhart 1989: 270).

Instead of aiding coalescence and though on the surface striking at the insurgency's core via the creation of a capitalist economic system in rural South-Vietnam, the above ill conceived and executed persuasive operations contributed one more negative impact on the persuasive matrix, accruing one more equally negative impact on the coercive matrix. The disenfranchisement of

rural South-Vietnam fuelled the insurgency as a whole, securing it fighters and supporters. What happened in one matrix affected the other, whether positively or negatively, in equal measure throughout the war.

These persuasive programs were no exception, for by procuring not the allegiance but the ire of the people it ensured the coercive elements of the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong gained recruits. Gestating more enemy combatants for the Allies' coercive elements to combat, meantime pumping up the insurgency's support base by securing it access to essential sustenance, safe havens and intelligence among other things. Vietnam was one vicious downward spiral. Each matrix it seemed was contesting the other to see which could drag down its partner fastest.

Conclusion:

It has been said there are two types of violence in warfare- quantitative violence and qualitative violence. Quantitative violence is the wholesale, relatively indiscriminate use of coercive violence to attain victory (World War I & II etc). On the other side of the coin there is qualitative violence, the utilization of discriminate violence in such a way as designed to mitigate collateral damage and avoid negatively impacting the war's 'cognitive terrain'. As Lynn states: "To put it bluntly, in quantitative violence how many you kill matters; in qualitative violence, who you kill matters". The Allies' choice to utilize quantitative violence in a qualitative conflict contributed to negate the possibility of achieving geo-strategic end goals in Vietnam. Quantitative violence, as conducted in Vietnam, generated Lynn's "three Rs", resentment, resistance and revenge (Lynn 2005: 23 & 27).

The quantitative use of firepower by Allied and Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces in Search & Destroy operations created huge numbers of civilian casualties, pet and livestock deaths, property destruction and refugees, hurting the cause of pacification immeasurably. Not least because it served to play into the hands of insurgent propaganda: "In the battle for hearts and minds the Americans disarmed themselves by the lavish use of firepower- especially airpower- in South-Vietnam" (Record 1998: 88).

The un-calibrated, uni-matrix coercive paradigm practiced in Vietnam also failed to fulfil a primary function of coercive violence in a counter-insurgency campaign- to secure South-Vietnamese villages for follow on persuasive efforts, at least until too late. Briefly put, when areas are not held violence perpetrated in or around population centres increases civilian anxiety and encourages fence sitting at best, since under such circumstances people will usually not fully or openly support one side over the other for fear of reprisal (Fishel 1968: 370), or insurgent support at worst as counter-insurgency forces are blamed for not providing security.

Vietnam elucidates how coercive force is not only essential to combat insurgent main force (conventional) units and drive a wedge between the population and insurgents, but that it is equally essential to neutralize the insurgency's infrastructure and attack insurgent synapses and those of their supporters. However, even should the above pre-conditions be met coercive violence can not win independently, as the Vietnam case study explicitly highlights. Full spectrum security is a necessary precondition but withers if not followed by full spectrum persuasive operations. Likewise, full spectrum persuasive operations in population centres can

only be undertaken once coercive counter-insurgency forces have effectively neutralized the insurgency's own coercive *and* persuasive apparatuses.

Phoenix came about due to the realization that the clandestine Communist persuasive architecture was as dangerous as the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong main force units rampaging through the bush. On their part the insurgents realised that without such a surreptitious infrastructure it was almost pointless fighting. They similarly realised setting up such infrastructure was just as pointless should it not be secured by the North-Vietnamese Army and/or Viet-Cong inside and outside the villages. In this light the big Allied sweeps were not pointless, they were essential because they broke the insurgency's coercive wings repeatedly. Yet without follow up Clear & Hold operations (not really conducted until 1968/69 on and then crippled by government authoritarianism, corruption and incompetence) proved insufficient.

The practical primacy placed on coercion meantime further assured the other half of the equation, persuasion, was generally ignored. Moreover, where conducted micro-level persuasive operations consistently inflicted a negative impact on the campaign. Even in the psychological war, the lack of effective propaganda campaigns did not only contribute to the inability to sway the South-Vietnamese to the Allies' cause, it eventually allowed the Communists to undercut the legitimacy of the entire campaign within the domestic and international spheres- a principle reason for the Allies' precipitous disengagement.

Rather than gaining cognitive ground persuasive programs typically lost it due to poor conception and conduction. The Strategic Hamlets and economic development programs are educational in this regard. These programs negatively affected the persuasive matrix in Vietnam for aforementioned reasons, ceding cognitive ground to the insurgency and fuelling its persuasive wing, in turn creating more guerrillas for the Allied coercive wing to combat and more insurgent sympathizers for the persuasive wing to win over.

In any event, micro-level persuasive operations whether successful or not proved unsustainable due to the failure to marry a coercive shield to persuasive operations, of which the 'Rev-Dev' teams' insecure existence is illustrative. Persuasive operations were, for too long, conducted in a vacuum as earnestly as coercive operations were in Vietnam. Seeing Republic of Vietnam and Allied control, until at least late 1968, extend from dawn to dusk in the villages, on a good day.

As a result anything built up by the Allies and their persuasive operators was immediately and constantly torn down by insurgents.

Within the wider picture, if the persuasive war for hearts and minds in Vietnam is to truly be understood it must be remembered that 'pacification' was a subsidiary war. The main Allied effort was geared toward securing a political settlement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam- the Model of Political Primacy of the mid 20th century. Pacification efforts were comprised of micro-level persuasive operations. Political action as conducted in a *persuasive* context was the last priority for the Allies.

The political campaign in Vietnam was not designed to win hearts and minds and so it can be extrapolated that the political campaign was of little concern within the context of pacification. 'Political action' in Vietnam exuded scant regard for the opinions of the South-Vietnamese, micro-level persuasive operations/'civic action' did not. Thus within Vietnam's persuasive war micro-level operations were relied upon and the political campaign was of secondary importance in relation to the civil populace. 'Political solutions' were at the peak of Allied campaign planning, in the 'other war' they were an afterthought.

In spite of the Allies' conduct of the war, the Communists never attained coalescence in the South (why the North-Vietnamese Army had to invade South-Vietnam conventionally in 1975 to win the war). Thereby, the Communists would have been unlikely to win elections if permitted to participate. Furthermore, the segment of the population to be alienated as a result of such a ban (which could have been declared on the grounds of Communist terrorism for instance), would have been the minority who supported the insurgents in the first place. Allied support for the military juntas of South-Vietnam and poorly conceived and executed persuasive programs equally stifled coercive and persuasive missions as a result.

Moreover, despite additional micro-level persuasive operations being undertaken behind a coercive shield in the villages under the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, in lacking national democratic progress and inhibited by previous coercive practices that produced intolerable levels of collateral damage, such operations were successful only to a point- the point of popular nonchalance. The reason this thesis' counter-insurgency paradigm is termed the Refined *Integrationist* Model.

The undemocratic nature of the Republic of Vietnam had another tangible effect on the ground, impinging persuasive operations by adding another stumbling block- graft and corruption. Of which the Allies were held equally responsible for in the minds of the South-Vietnamese by tolerating at best and supporting at worst the state terror, authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism and elitism of the government. Tragically, just as the synchronized relationship coercion and persuasion sustain was recognised to a degree, Vietnamization was initiated and the ability of the Allies to operate in either matrix decreased in direct proportion to the withdrawal of Allied troops. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam meanwhile remained largely untrained and unwilling to conduct Clear & Hold operations because it was trained and indoctrinated to conduct conventional warfare.

The government's corrupt and nepotistic nature ensured neither it nor the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had much interest in conducting persuasive operations anyway. Added to this, the inept, undemocratic and corrupt nature of the Republic of Vietnam saw the military's top ranks filled with Generals who were promoted not on merit but servility and hard currency. In the end, the net effect of this tragicomedy was that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was staffed by soldiers who, despite having fought with the Allies, in the end were unwilling to die for the government because it represented the elite not the people. Explaining why an army like the Army of the Republic of Vietnam folded so rapidly in the face of the 1975 North-Vietnamese Army invasion:

> The swift collapse of the South-Vietnamese Army and the Saigon regime was not the result of an overwhelming attack by superior military forces. It came about because of the degree of moral disintegration the South-Vietnamese army had reached in 1975. This in turn reflected the degree of moral and political decay to which South-Vietnamese society had sunk after years of increasing political terror, mass misery and corruption. Moral disintegration alone can explain why an army three times the size and possessing more than five times the equipment of the enemy could be as rapidly defeated as the ARVN was between March 10 and April 30, 1975 (Buttinger 1977: 148).

The failure to provide adequate US air support and the military and aid funding cuts to South-Vietnam made by the US Congress post Allied withdrawal no doubt were crucial factors in the collapse (Van Canh 1983: 259). Still, the *speed* of the 1975 collapse reflected the overall 'moral decay' of the nation, so by 1975 South-Vietnam was dead in the water. Overall neither the soldiers nor people of South-Vietnam fought the North-Vietnamese Army seriously in 1975 specifically because they had no stake in the government's survival. On their part the Allies, by pursuing coerced 'stability' over democracy failed to build a viable South-Vietnam, failed to give the South-Vietnamese something to be *for*.

Therefore even when the 'Ruff-Puffs', Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Allies were positioned to Clear & Hold population centres for follow on persuasive operations as conducted under the gamut of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the undemocratic nature of the government crippled all coercive and persuasive practices. For the persuasive matrix was incomplete, it lacked national democracy.

To sum, in Vietnam the persuasive matrix was neglected, built on a shaky foundation of coerced social control and generally inhibited by the insurgency because it was de-linked from coercion. Just as coercive practices were de-linked from the persuasive matrix by attrition's resulting collateral damage and its failure to provide population security. Thus the marrying of coercive violence to the persuasive matrix effectively enough to ensure both were conducted simultaneously in a relevant and supporting manner was never accomplished, in spite of belated attempts to do so at the grass-roots level. In Vietnam these matrices were not sufficiently interwoven or comprehended, resulting in the failure of the enterprise. Missteps derived from the fact that 'political considerations' formed the campaign's strategic lodestar and not the South-Vietnamese population, a conception that permitted the insurgency to become the tactical lodestar of the war.

The lessons of Vietnam drawn from this chapter notwithstanding, the forthcoming analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq indicates the principle lessons extracted from Vietnam by Coalition militaries from the outset was the requirement for democratic political evolution and the value of enacting qualitative methods of coercive violence. These lessons are relevant of course but do not encompass Vietnam's lessons in their entirety.

On top of this the requirement for democratic political evolution was placed atop the Afghan and Iraq wars' conceptual ladders at a high price, causing other lessons to be missed. Lessons concerning the relevance of developing native security forces from day one and the importance of calibrating counter-insurgency operations not with the enemy or the 'political process' at the focal point but rather the population, regardless of what Coalition neo counter-insurgency doctrine states. Other Vietnam-era oversights that shall become clear include the essential part Psychological Operations and Information Warfare play, the indispensable role of Reconstruction & Development and the profound mutual-dependency of the coercive and persuasive matrices in any insurgent vs. counter-insurgent dual.

Neo Counter-Insurgency:

The field's current conceptual counter-insurgency paradigm has undoubtedly been influenced in no small measure by the Vietnam War. Influenced by the assumption that because the Vietnam counter-insurgency model of predominantly coercive violence failed the correct strategy must be to give persuasion (in the form of 'political factors' or 'political solutions/negotiations') doctrinal pre-eminence. Presumptions of this mould were not substantiated by the previous chapter on Vietnam however. What the previous chapter elucidated was the need for equal emphasis to be placed on both the persuasive and coercive matrices and the need to render the two mutually reinforcing concerning the war for popular allegiance.

The lack of national democratic institutions was not the only reason for the failure in Vietnam, military force was another reason the enterprise failed. Specifically, by the way this coercive force was implemented, in a vacuum with little thought for the persuasive matrix. Likewise grass-roots persuasion (development projects/ 'civic action', 'local rule' etc) fell short in Vietnam because it was conducted the same way, in a vacuum. Persuasion was not sufficiently married to a coercive shield or to essential macro-level persuasive tools like democracy, resulting in this matrix's implosion in a similar vein. Vietnam also highlighted why persuasion is a better way of thinking about the field as it encapsulates both traditionally distinct fields of politics and psychology. 'Persuasion' ensures on a conceptual level that neither field is neglected, for both are essential and nearly indistinguishable in counter-insurgency warfare.

The following study of Afghanistan and Iraq will attempt to demonstrate the primacy originally accorded democratic 'political action' proved no more effective than coercive supremacy did in Vietnam, particularly on an indigenous institutional level. It shall likewise attempt to demonstrate that in spite of this original doctrinal approach counter-insurgency momentum on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq has come to be subsumed by the coercive matrix. Inverting doctrine/theory and repeating the Vietnam experience by rapidly reverting to an overdependence on disassociated coercive methodologies, despite sincere initial efforts to avoid such a course, a reversion almost certainly the result of the conceptual fog hanging over the field.

Through demonstrating the above the following analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq will elucidate what lessons Coalition nations have learnt from Vietnam. Precisely, it shall draw forth the sad truth that the Coalition has learnt some lessons from Vietnam yet overall is repeating many of the same mistakes of their Allied predecessors, or has repeated and re-learned these lessons as it

were, costing valuable time, blood and treasure. Outcomes transpiring from the fact that the Coalition, particularly the US, has neglected to adequately study Vietnam in order to develop a doctrine that encompasses all its lessons for 'Low Intensity Conflict' operations (whose gamut includes war-fighting operations like counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and "peace-enforcement" but does not including peace-keeping, which relies on consent, not force) (Kinross 2004: 36-37).

The American national security apparatus, under the Powell-Weinberger doctrine, institutionalized a predilection for 'major combat operations' post Vietnam (McFate 2005: 27). The worrying lack of strategic foresight and attempt to dictate military contingencies instead of responding to them (called the 'art of war') is a major reason why progress is threatened in Afghanistan and Iraq (again, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 was only published in December 2006). Rarely in history has a nation been able to dictate or predict where, when and in what manner military force will be employed in pursuit of the national interest.

The American military has eschewed 'nation building' in a similar light because it is not explicitly enunciated as a military responsibility under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code* (which delineates the responsibility, functions and duties of US military forces). Apparently even the wealth of experience garnered under the 'Reagan Doctrine' of the 1980s, where then US President Reagan and his administration supported and/or created anti-Communist or pro-democratic insurgent and counter-insurgent organizations worldwide in an effort to facilitate the demise of the Soviet Union, has been cast by the wayside. Particularly as conducted in Central and South-America, notably in its support of the insurgent 'Contras' in Nicaragua and the counter-insurgent Duarte government of El Salvador (Molloy 1989: 14-15).

Counter-insurgency theory and practice has been as neglected by Australia and Britain as it has been in the US, if not more so. Australia and Britain, possibly mimicking the US but definitely forgetting their own wealth of historical counter-insurgency experience in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Vietnam to name a few, subscribe to the Model of Political Primacy of counter-insurgency that gives 'politics' (persuasion) conceptual primacy (Hills 2004: 50 & 92) and neglects the real function of coercion. The flow on effect has seen Coalition nations playing doctrinal catch-up whilst following a model that does not adequately convey the lessons Vietnam taught regarding the interdependent relationship between coercion and persuasion.

Afghanistan:

In response to 9-11 the US National Security Council (NSC) provided President Bush two retaliatory plans. The first, drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), foresaw several Army divisions and months of preparation. The second, drafted by the CIA, was more 'outside-the-box'. The CIA's plan was drawn from a similar program it ran in Vietnam which embedded CIA and Special Forces teams with indigenous allies in an offensive program that was combined with US air power to interdict North-Vietnamese Army supply lines running north to south down the Ho Chi Minh trail. The CIA's Afghan war plan thus called for small CIA and Special Forces teams to be combined with US air power and indigenous Afghan allies, principally the Northern-Alliance, in order to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Andres, Wills & Griffith 2005/06: 129).

The US Special Forces' reputation was not that brilliant pre-Afghanistan, the 1980 catastrophe at 'Desert One' (the failed Iran hostage rescue mission) and the bloody 1993 'Gothic Serpent' operation in Somalia did not inspire confidence in the Special Forces by conventional American Generals. In fact, the 'Desert One' tragedy appears to have been a major reason US President Clinton did not act against Al-Qaeda any more than the launching of a few cruise missiles at their bases pre 9-11. The Clinton administration was of the view the tragedy effectively ended then President Carter's presidency (Coll 2004: 499) (demonstrating again the inherent risks of placing political considerations, albeit domestic ones, before everything else).

President Bush would opt for war plan two for several reasons: Because he had to take immediate action (US domestic opinion and deterrence theory called for it) and because the administration subscribed to the Model of Political Primacy of counter-insurgency. Persuasion, in the form of indigenous 'political considerations', was placed atop Afghan war plans because it was worried sizable numbers of Coalition troops would inspire popular Afghan hostility and feed the Taliban/Al-Qaeda defence:

> Beyond these considerations however, loomed the larger strategic fear among some that a successful invasion of Afghanistan by US forces was likely to lead to a prolonged guerrilla war. As repeated recorded conversations attest, President Bush and members of his cabinet were well aware of Afghanistan's reputation as the 'graveyard of empires' and feared a US led invasion would result in a guerrilla war. Most recently, the Soviet Union had lost thousand's of lives and spent billions of rubles fighting a losing war against Afghan insurgents during the 1980s. Both the fiercely independent character of indigenous tribes and the mountainous geography made the prospects of an insurgency against an occupying US Army likely. Bob Woodword concisely describes the administration's dilemma: "If the US repeated the mistakes of the Soviets by invading with a large land force, they would be doomed" (Andres, Wills & Griffith 2005/06: 131).

Well before the war in Afghanistan started the Coalition was petrified of repeating the 'Vietnam experience', or the 'Soviet experience' in Afghanistan for that matter, by not placing persuasive 'political considerations' before coercive ones. After 9-11 Afghanis knew there would be serious consequences for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. More importantly they did not care and that they did not care was common knowledge among international analysts- the Taliban and Al-Qaeda never enjoyed popular allegiance, only obedience (proving once more the limits of coerced social control). Nonetheless, it was feared that introducing significant amounts of conventional troops would offend average Afghanis who were deemed rabid xenophobes, meaning 'political considerations' were given primacy at the outset. A situation naturally ending with the coercive matrix assuming a secondary position (Sobchak 2005: 89), detrimentally and unnecessarily:

> The notion that Afghanistan would be a graveyard for the Americans in much the way it unquestionably proved to be for the Soviets was highly misleading. Afghans do not automatically resent foreigners: much depends upon what foreigners actually seek to do. 'The intervention of foreign troops in any country' said Zahir Shah [former Afghan monarch] in an interview for the BBC, 'is something that's not easy to accept. But if its an intervention such as we witnessed in Europe with the Second World War when the British, the Americans and the Canadians came down in France to get rid of the Nazis, this is different' (Maley 2002: 267).

Tora Bora: Persuasive considerations would remain throughout the *initial* combat phase the primary consideration, evidenced by a case study of the battle at Tora Bora. Lamentably, winning hearts and minds does not automatically achieve peace or victory. The security factor is equally important for without it little persuasive ground can be held. The reason 20, 000 Coalition (mainly US) troops were ultimately committed to defend the nascent democratic political architecture of Afghanistan (a number paling in comparison to the 550, 000 Allied troops in Vietnam and the 170, 000 odd Coalition troops in Iraq currently). With the consent it must be added of the Afghan people as the coercive wing was partially synthesized with the persuasive wing, both by macro-level democratic evolution and micro-level operations like medical aid and food drops (discussed further on).

Although these troops were not committed in time in order to achieve a primary war aim- Osama bin-Laden's head and the Taliban/Al-Qaeda decimated. Even late in the conventional phase of the war the few hundred Coalition Special Forces troops committed remained the only troops relentlessly hunting down the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In the main these troops were embedded within elements of the Northern-Alliance, few of who were liberation fighters.

When the Coalition and Northern-Alliance managed to surround fleeing Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants in the mountains of Tora Bora Coalition troops had three separate Warlord armies to coordinate with. These groups had next to no interest in taking down the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, their chief concern was how much money they could get out of the Coalition for their services and then in getting out alive. So rather than assaulting the enemy these groups took to 'negotiating' with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for their surrender. During the ongoing 'negotiations' the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces slunk out of the net (including possibly bin-Laden himself). From such collusion, nonchalance and ineptitude on the Afghan mercenaries' part much of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda escaped into Pakistan, aided by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and the Pakistani Army. The sum total of such Machiavellian scheming by supposed 'allies' cost the Coalition dearly- thousands of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists lived to fight another day (Moore 2003: 274).

To leave such an operation to mercenaries having no allegiance to the Coalition or its cause in lieu of committing Coalition troops to do the job, for fear of placing military solutions ahead of 'political considerations', was the outcome of the Model of Political Primacy. Thousands of terrorist escapees remain out their scheming, training and indoctrinating accordingly, only time will tell how much the Model of Political Primacy has cost the Coalition. Persuasive considerations are only one portion of counter-insurgency operations. Tora Bora demonstrated the dire outcome of relegating coercion a subsidiary of persuasion, helpful as an analytical tool. Especially when contrasted with Vietnam in general and the previous case study of Hue during Tet in particular, both of which demonstrated the dire outcome of relegating persuasion a subsidiary of coercion.

The persuasive matrix was *originally* accorded pre-eminence by the failure to understand Vietnam's lessons in whole. War plan two did not evolve to encapsulate war plan one as soon as it became feasible (which it was by the time of the battle at Tora Bora) and the result was the escape on mass of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The legitimacy and popular support of the 20, 000 odd Coalition troops eventually deployed was provided by the Coalition's participation in immediate follow on persuasive operations, like the 1, 000, 000 humanitarian food ration packs dropped during the initial war phase (though perplexingly they were yellow like Coalition cluster bombs). When combined with follow on democratic progress and development programs (few as they are as shall be seen), this has meant the initial Joint Chiefs of Staff troop level request of several divisions has been endorsed by the majority of Afghans.

Indeed these forces are widely recognised by most Afghans as the cause for what little peace and stability Afghanistan currently enjoys, as well as preventing a relapse into civil-war. That said, persuasion and coercion have not been linked sufficiently. For while some Vietnam lessons have been applied or re-learnt in some areas, they have not in others. Neither can it be said that by re-learning some of these lessons in Afghanistan has it meant said lessons have been transposed onto Iraq. Strange, for though Afghanistan is a rural insurgency and Iraq an urban insurgency, it does not automatically flow that lessons learnt in each combat zone are mutually exclusive, even given Afghanistan has a larger population and is more rural than Iraq and thus more suited to insurgent warfare according to Kenny (Kenny 2001: 4).

Coercive Matrix:

The ability to exploit the persuasive matrix fully and retain majority Afghan support the Coalition enjoyed following its ouster of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 2001/02 (Tanner 2002: 325) has been inhibited by the misconstruing of coercive violence in neo counter-insurgency environs. Sustaining coalescence has been impinged by the inability to secure (Clear & Hold) Afghanistan. Repeating the inability to do so in Vietnam and likewise then inhibiting persuasive operations. Not only has this situation dangerously inhibited Coalition persuasive operations in the main but has also prevented the outsourcing of these operations to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to any significant extent - many have pulled out or refused to go in due to the lack of security (Bristol 2006: 384).

Reflecting the symbiotic nature of the two fields elucidated by the Vietnam chapter, this situation within the coercive matrix is threatening progress not merely in the persuasive matrix but the coercive matrix additionally, since Afghans are withholding support and intelligence as a by-product. Leading Curt Goering, senior deputy executive director for policy and programs at Amnesty International USA to comment after recent extensive interviews in Afghanistan:

> While many people voiced appreciation for Coalition efforts to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban, they stressed the need for continued U.S. assistance. The most elementary forms of security remain elusive for ordinary Afghans. Attacks and threats by Taliban or Al-Qaeda sympathizers are a daily occurrence. And many believe that tactics developed by the Iraqi insurgency are finding their way into Afghanistan. In fact, 2005 was the most lethal year since the Taliban was overthrown in 2001. More than 1,500 people were killed in fighting between anti-government forces and the U.S.-led Coalition and Afghanistan National Army. Government authority hardly extends beyond Kabul and what little had been established is quickly eroding. Many believe the Taliban are clearly on the ascendancy and that some territories are again reverting to its control (Goering 2006).

Attrition Revisited: The retrograding picture depicted by Goering stems in large part from the fact that where Coalition coercive violence is being employed it is unmarried to the persuasive matrix for the most part. The Vietnam legacy concept of 'attrition' (Search & Destroy) is being transposed onto neo counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, generating the same deleterious effects (by not providing a coercive shield for persuasive operations in most population centres).

Put another way, the destruction of the enemy is again the operational priority of the Coalition, separating doctrine/theory from practice and coercive practices from persuasive ones along the way. The eventual attempt to marry coercion and persuasion in Vietnam post Tet, born of invaluable experience, has apparently been missed. As Vietnam bore out, prioritizing the

destruction of the insurgency and so divorcing coercion from persuasion is an inherently risky tactic. With the allegiance of the people comes intelligence and support, eventually decreasing insurgent momentum to a point where the insurgency becomes unviable.

Now while the Coalition recognizes this in doctrine/theory there has developed a gulf between theory and practice on the ground, casting by the wayside the initial strategy of persuasive primacy and reverting back to Vietnam era coercive superiority. A typical paper by Majors Grubbs and Forsyth (US Army) contributes a complex argument concerning the Afghan insurgency's 'cognitive depth' and how attacking the enemy's cognitive coherency is equally important to their physical destruction.

Grubbs' and Forsyth's argument provides an illustrative example of how cognitive warfare has evolved in importance in neo counter-insurgency theory to some extent, but something broader at the same time- that coalescence, as a function of coercion, has come to be neglected and bringing the enemy to account (in both the physical and cognitive realms) has reassumed priority in neo counter-insurgency. In their representative argument popular support is a means to a specific end- the decimation of the enemy. Popular support here is not the end in itself. Risky, as only by altering cognitive attitudes to favour the Coalition can the long term goals of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq be achieved.

> If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyse the insurgent system or produce operational shock…The leaders, communication network, and population represent critical vulnerabilities. Targeting them for destruction, disruption, and influence forms a line of operation that can produce shock in the enemy system… (Grubbs & Forsyth 2005: 30-31).

To expand, one notices here popular support is the last vulnerability to be raised and is only relevant because it augers the more efficient destruction of the enemy- it is the cognitive terrain and physical disposition of the enemy that matters here, not that of the populace. An approach like this is also dangerous because in the wake of Vietnam the Coalition's respective publics no longer have the stomach for war, even wars in the national interest it seems. Prioritizing the destruction of insurgent cells saw the war drag on in Vietnam ad nauseam because the root cause of the insurgency (partial population support and popular apathy) was never addressed. Only the symptoms were treated, missing the insurgency's locus.

It would appear this particular Vietnam lesson pertaining to the finite patience and support levels of domestic Coalition publics has been forgotten. The result of which is that Coalition domestic

support is being retested, popular support which originally favoured the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but now barely supports the Afghanistan War and definitely does not support the Iraq War. Actually, fully half of the respondents in a recent MSNBC poll questioned whether the War on Terror is worth the cost at all, in blood (the approximate 4000 dead Coalition troops in Iraq and the approximate 300 dead in Afghanistan) or treasure (approximately $430 billion to date) (MSNBC News: 01/09/06).

By focussing on the physical destruction of the enemy the needs and wants of the population have again become secondary considerations in practice, as happened in Vietnam and despite being emphasized originally. Theory and practice exist on alternate plains once again it appears and therefore little residual loyalty or gratitude toward the Coalition is being gestated. The destruction of the enemy has been delegated the priority once more and so the Coalition is getting sucked into the same vortex that sucked in the Allies during Vietnam, a vortex that saw the Allies continue to follow a flawed counter-insurgency paradigm even when it became apparent that the paradigm was indeed flawed.

Insurgent prioritization also assured there was no capable indigenous security force developed to take over the fight post Allied withdrawal because the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's development was never a priority, another short-fall Afghanistan and Vietnam share. Be this a flawed historical paradigm as it may, the Coalition is nonetheless repeating some of the same coercive mistakes in Afghanistan as the Allies committed in Vietnam, by its focus on unilateral attrition methodologies and the failure to develop the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP) forces sufficiently:

> The Coalition's mission to defeat the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan has focussed on eliminating guerrilla forces through conventional military attrition in the southern and eastern areas of the country. Little emphasis has been placed on securing and stabilizing the country-side beyond Kabul. The absence of security has diminished the trust of the population in the central government*, impaired relief efforts, prevented nationwide reconstruction and rendered aid agencies vulnerable to guerrilla actions. Guerrillas capitalize on the situation by targeting relief workers and projects and government officials in an effort to impede stabilization and progress. The absence of government control has resulted in the growth of local militias and the influence of Warlords (Roe 2005: 20-21).*As well as the Coalition by association.

A majority of Coalition forces in Afghanistan are tasked to Search & Destroy. The United Nations mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on the other hand, comprised mainly of North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members from America, Britain, Canada,

France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, have undertaken Clear & Hold operations (NATO forces do not principally operate outside of the larger cities and surrounding areas). For the most part NATO has gone to great lengths to avoid Search & Destroy missions in rural or even urban Afghanistan for that matter.

Given then that the Coalition is concerning itself with Search & Destroy and the enhanced NATO force that recently took control over the south of the country is not really tasked to operate outside of the larger cities like Kabul and Kandahar or the surrounding areas, like Vietnam insurgents are able to walk into most Afghan villages and impose their will. Not only have these distinct methodologies allowed the insurgents to impose their will physically in the villages but the new phenomena of Taliban 'night letters', letters dropped under villagers' doors in the middle of the night intimidating them into withholding cooperation and support regarding the Coalition and Afghan government (Baker 2006: 26), reminds analysts coercion exists on both the physical and cognitive plains.

Harking back to Vietnam, while Coalition coercive forces have inhibited insurgent infrastructure in Afghanistan and are dominating the physical battlefield, gains made are not being solidified due to a practical failure to ensure coercion is linked to persuasion by the provision of an enduring coercive shield. Coalition governments and military officers know that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan's hinterland is being reconstituted the second the Coalition leaves an area yet are not developing the Afghanistan National Army or Afghanistan National Police to fill this void as a matter of priority.

The reason being that persuasion (especially in the form of indigenous democratic governance) and coercion exist in their own independent and tiered universes (again for the fields of military force, politics and psychology are viewed as stand alone fields and imbued with value differentials, be it in theory or practice). A segregated coercive modality is being enacted in Afghanistan that in practice prevents sufficient persuasive operations from being conducted. This coercive vacuum has also given the Taliban and Al-Qaeda room to breathe, as it did the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong, room they have used to regroup and push back into Afghanistan.

NATO on its part boosted troop numbers from 9, 000 to approximately 21, 000 in late 2006 (roughly half of which are American forces, 7, 500 Britons and 2,500 Canadians), assumed responsibility for the south and is envisioned to take control of the east in late 2007. The modest

troop increase, outside of the significant contribution of Coalition partner Britain, is attributable to the fact that most NATO members really do not want to be there fighting but have committed forces to Afghanistan to placate demands from the US that they do something in the War on Terror (France, Germany, Italy and Spain have gone as far to restrict what small amounts of forces they have deployed to the relatively quiet North and West of the country in the main). Demands like those of US Congressman Tom Lantos at a hearing of the House International Relations Committee preceding the troop increase in September 2005:

> I must say . . . that a large group of wealthy European countries with vast military forces, which have been protected overwhelmingly by the United States for two generations should be able to mount a more effective presence in Afghanistan. It seems incomprehensible to a rational human being that France, that Germany and Italy and the Low Countries and the Scandinavians and others, the new NATO members, together, cannot mount a significant NATO presence in Afghanistan (Serchuk 2005: 2).

The additional NATO troops are subsequently proving incapable to secure the south, let alone being able to secure the east as well in the near future. In point of fact, in the face of withering insurgent attacks in August 2006 the British were forced to pull back troops manning remote forward observation posts in Helmand province. NATO pleaded for reinforcements in September 2006 as a result, a plea that was ignored, even by Australia who withdrew her Special Forces contingent around the same time. Providing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda not just physical ground but a propaganda victory also (BBC News: 17/10/06).

In light of such developments US Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized European NATO members for failing to fully deploy what minute levels of NATO troops have actually been promised in October 2007: "I am not satisfied that an alliance whose members have over 2 million soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen cannot find the modest additional resources that have been committed for Afghanistan" (Burns: 2007). The derived insecurity has promoted fence sitting at best and retrogression of the campaign at worst in the areas of NATO responsibility as earnestly as the Coalition's strategy has in its areas of responsibility (the east). Beleaguering the war effort in a manner akin to Vietnam:

> At this uncertain time, Afghans are hedging their bets. Men in Lashkargar have started to don black turbans, growing their beards long and taking their daughters out of school, precautions for the day the Taliban may return to run their lives. Less than half a mile from the British base in the Helmand capital, extremist clerics who had fled to Pakistan after the fall of Mullah Omar's regime are again preaching jihad. Preachers who spoke up against the Taliban have been assassinated, without receiving the protection promised by Afghan government forces. The market in Lashkargar has already experienced bombings. The headmistress of the local girls' school has had death threats and has to have bodyguards. Students at the town's boys' school have been killed. Stallholder Ali Jawad Ali, 33, measured the length of his growing

beard with his fist. 'We do not know what is going to happen here', he said. 'We have already had killings and I do not want to offend anyone. There are people who only used to come in the night, but now walk about in daytime. I do not want to say any more'. Gul Mohammed, a carpenter, is keeping his two daughters away from school. 'It is a pity, they liked their lessons', he said. 'But the situation is difficult. We need to be safe for the time being. We are not safe now, it is more dangerous than it was just a few months ago' (Sengupta & Rahim 2006).

The insurgency has begun operating in platoon and company sized formations again (20-150 men), something it has not been able to do since 2002 and something that has meant foreign forces in Afghanistan in 2006/2007 suffered more casualties than at any time since 2001. In theory NATO follows a Clear & Hold doctrine designed to foster persuasive operations, notably development. Analysis on the other hand indicates hesitation on the part of many NATO members to engage the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militarily. Of those NATO forces that do seek to engage the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (America, Britain, Canada and the Dutch), Clear & Hold operations are in the main conducted in the larger towns and the surrounding areas, leaving the Taliban and Al-Qaeda much of the country-side where they are able to wrench and/or coax support from the inhabitants.

Permitting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to develop their own particular integrationist model in the country-side where they dominate swathes of areas according to recent reports. Mimicking the Viet-Cong, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda upon entering villages are said to immediately hang several farmers to intimidate the villagers and townsfolk. After securing the village/town they purportedly begin psychological operations which, along with government corruption and insecurity, are eroding Afghan government and Coalition support:

> Afghan officials in all three southern provinces said the Taliban had evolved as a movement as well. Taking advantage of popular frustration with government corruption, the Taliban have broadened from a close-knit, ideologically driven movement to an amalgam of loosely affiliated groups fighting the government. Across the south, the term "Taliban" now encompasses a shifting array of tribes, groups, criminals, opportunists and people discontented with the government (Rohde 2007).

From the military aspect, the relatively few NATO operations conducted in the restive rural areas entail operations to clear Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements from valleys, villages and small towns with the Afghan army in support. The areas are then left to the Afghan police who are frequently unable to hold ground recaptured because of low personnel levels, poor training and equipment. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have subsequently been able to increase their operational tempo. Attacks have risen from 500 a month in 2006 to 600 a month in 2007, a jump of 20%. Coalition and NATO casualties have had a corollary leap of 20%. The results of counter-insurgency

operations in the Australian and Dutch sector of Oruzgan province have similarly been stifled, as a result of more emphasis being accorded persuasion in the form of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams there (detailed below). The minute amount of forces (a few hundred) tasked by the Australians and Dutch to offensive operations in support of Afghan army and police forces stationed in the rural areas of Oruzgan has meant they and the Afghan government hold the regional capital, a few of the district centres and little else (Rohde 2007).

The situation in Britain's area of operations (Helmand province) and Canada's (Kandahar province) is not much different. The Afghan government and NATO have a "strong presence" in approximately half of each strategic province. The regional capitals and a few larger towns are held but the country-side remains a veritable "no mans land" dominated by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and various criminal gangs (the largest non-American NATO ally Britain for instance has tasked a small force of 2, 000 troops to offensive missions in rural Helmand). Retracing the footsteps of the Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are now also taking to using the population as human shields in the hopes of using it for physical protection or manipulating civilian casualties inflicted by the Coalition and NATO in operations against them as propaganda points (Rohde 2007).

Points the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are crafting to undercut Coalition, NATO and Afghan government support via Information Warfare operations that have been able to shift the blame from themselves and onto their opposition as effectively as the North-Vietnamese did (examined below). Another factor handicapping NATO's ability to stem this insurgent tide is the fact that the organization is inhibited by rules of engagement drafted by politicians in Berlin, Paris and Vancouver etc. Rules designed to differing degrees to minimize casualties to their own forces and offset political losses at home resulting from casualties. Technically NATO troops can engage insurgents and terrorists only in "proactive self-defence". Given this NATO's Clear & Hold purview becomes problematic on the ground to say the least and the lack of an adequately staffed, trained or equipped Afghanistan National Army and Afghanistan National Police force becomes more apparent (McAllister 2006).

The small Afghan security force is overwhelmed- retired US General Barry McCaffrey has described the Afghanistan National Army as "miserably under-resourced". In reality the only non-Coalition members of NATO to have been tackling the Taliban/Al-Qaeda problem with adequate coercive force (especially in the south) have been the Canadians and the Dutch to a

smaller extent. Offensive counter-insurgency operations that have been led by British forces in the south and backed up by re-tasked American contingents for the most part from late 2006. But again these forces' effectiveness, like the Coalition, is diminished by their relatively small numbers. The likelihood of NATO nations contributing any more troops or money is also unlikely. Contrasted to the previous Vietnam chapter this paints a less than promising picture and illustrates again how inadequately enacted coercive force affects the persuasive matrix. For "the awful logic of almost-failed states is hard to escape: without security, development is impossible and without development, security is impossible" (McAllister 2006: 22).

Although there is little popular support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda on an ideological basis their appeal is nonetheless slowly growing because persuasive operations are being inhibited by the lack of security. In any event, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are circumventing these low popular support levels where necessary, again as the North-Vietnamese Army/Viet-Cong did, by imposing their will on the villagers.

Coercive will able to be imposed as there is an insufficient coercive counter-insurgency shield in rural Afghanistan to protect the villagers and any persuasive gains made (see the failure to protect the anti-Taliban preacher in the previous quote) or persuasive operations conducted (especially nascent governmental and civil infrastructure in rural Afghanistan). To wit, Michael Scheuer (former chief of the CIA's Counter-Terrorist Centre and its bin-Laden unit) is of the opinion that US forces in Afghanistan have not even conducted sufficient Search & Destroy operations: "The military has basically been inactive in Afghanistan. The 18, 000 forces we have there, as far as I understand it, remain mostly in garrison" (Byman, Scheuer, Lieven & Lang 2005: 3). Plainly speaking, the current coercive counter-insurgency strategy conducted in Afghanistan is proving inadequate and misguided, particularly given the Vietnam lesson of the necessity for precursor coercive shields.

> Nowhere has the failure been greater than the inability to bring security to the lives of the citizens of these countries. This was perhaps the greatest single challenge to the international community in the wake of the Taliban's removal from power in Afghanistan. Certainly it was the number one priority for Afghans. Yet security in Afghanistan is now worse than it has been for years. Most of the South and East of the country is off-bounds for government, UN and NGO staff- Afghan as well as international. Even in Kabul, many aid agencies have retreated into compounds encircled with sandbags and layers of razor wire... Armed robbery and kidnappings abound and night-time rocketing is again the norm, demonstrating the tenuous grip that international forces have on the city (Johnson & Leslie 2005: 209).

Vietnam underscored that as vital as Search & Destroy may be, so too is Clear & Hold and the failure to Clear & Hold Afghanistan falls to three reasons. Firstly, due to attrition based parameters employed by the Coalition. Secondly, due to NATO's failure to carry out its Clear & Hold mandate adequately. Thirdly, the failure to Clear & Hold rural Afghanistan is attributable to the Coalition's Model of Political Primacy. By giving persuasion conceptual and practical priority early on, particularly regarding indigenous democratic institutions, national military and police forces have been woefully underdeveloped. A situation necessitating the Coalition's reliance on unwilling international allies and Warlords (reviewed below).

Years after the war began there are a mere 50, 000 military and police members trained (approximately), while 'militia' (Warlord) forces number at least an equal number. Not only has 2006/07 been the most deadly years for Coalition troops and Afghan civilians since the end of the conventional phase of the war in 2001/02, additional evidence that this coercive void is allowing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to reconstitute and re-engage is demonstrated by the fact that United Nations evaluated 'high risk' areas of Afghanistan grew from 8% in 2003 to 15 % of the country in 2005 (O'Hanlon & Albuquerque 2005: 1-5).

Base-line indices of progress are going the wrong way. The failure to adequately link coercive force even to the few persuasive operations currently being conducted (examined further on) is endangering the entire enterprise. Moreover, like Vietnam 'local' security forces are being relied on to Clear & Hold rural villages where the Coalition and NATO are not and reminiscent of Vietnam these forces ('Ruff-Puffs' in Vietnam & Warlords in Afghanistan) have failed to properly fill this void. Therefore as with Vietnam no equitable indigenous military or police force exists to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the villages, attributable to the fact that on the *indigenous institutional level* secondary importance is given to coercion and its associated indigenous institutions at the expense of 'political action' (democratic institutionalism).

Washington and surprisingly enough international Non-Governmental Organizations are not happy about NATO's predominantly Clear & Hold methodology. While this criticism is justified somewhat, for too many NATO members refuse to aggressively track down and combat the insurgents, terrorists and drug runners (especially in the rural areas), it belies a deeper misunderstanding of counter-insurgency theory. While Regehr goes too far in calling for a purely Clear & Hold approach he is correct when he states the Coalition, notably the US military, is having trouble leaving Vietnam's attrition paradigm by the wayside and in marrying Search &

Destroy to Clear & Hold methodologies. This neglects important lessons of Vietnam which illustrate the dangers of purely Search & Destroy methodologies. As Regehr states, overall;

> the effort needs to be on providing security and opportunity to people in their homes and communities and thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Neither in Iraq nor Afghanistan can patrols* provide security throughout the country. Rather, the focus must be on gradually expanding regions of relative stability (Regehr 2006: 2). *Search & Destroy patrols.

Vietnam illuminated both Search & Destroy and Clear & Hold tactics are indispensable in achieving this outcome. Yet to accomplish this interoperability the relationship between coercion and persuasion needs to be identified and an equal effort to that put into the persuasive operation of democratic governance put into developing the Afghan security sector. Clearing and Holding Afghanistan is something only indigenous military and police forces will accomplish in the long run, particularly given the small amounts of Coalition and NATO troops 'in country'. It is also something the small Afghanistan National Army and Afghanistan National Police will be unable to do for many years to come, taking into consideration the minimal importance accorded their evolution.

So while the Coalition has learnt the coercive lesson of the necessity of qualitative violence in counter-insurgency environs there is much more to be learnt from Vietnam. That said, the Afghanistan model appears in some respects to be evolving towards a quasi integrationist framework, recognizing and relearning more fully the lessons of Vietnam with initiatives drawn from that war. Initiatives resembling the Phoenix program and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams). But before analysing these programs two more analogies with Vietnam must be recognised.

Foreign Succour & 'Political Solutions': That the Taliban is perpetually able to mount insurgent operations and deflect the Coalition's Search & Destroy approach in the east is not merely a result of the coercive void in the rural population centres there (by permitting the insurgents to extract from the population, voluntarily or involuntarily, sustenance and intelligence etc). Foreign patronage is proving a harmful factor in kind. As China, North-Vietnam and the Soviet Union proved dangerous variables during the Vietnam War so too is Pakistan in the Afghan War (and as shall be seen like Syria and Iran are in Iraq, anecdotal evidence Iran is providing supplies for Taliban/Al-Qaeda offensives inside Afghanistan aside).

Pakistan's loyalty in the War on Terror is highly suspect to say the least, 83% of Pakistanis opposed the Coalition's war in Afghanistan to begin with. The Pakistani Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate were no exception, neither were interested in seeing their creation the Taliban destroyed (Lieven 2002: 114). Such support comes from an assessment of national interests by the Pakistani elite and pan-Islamic based support from the general populace. Pan-Islamism as a motivation for the majority of Pakistan does not require explanation. But that the 'moderate' ruling class refuses to crack down on Taliban and Al-Qaeda camps and staging posts in Pakistan in any meaningful way (it mounts the odd anti Taliban and Al-Qaeda operation to placate the Coalition from time to time), is not only because they are hesitant to upset their domestic constituency. It is also because they have always regarded the Taliban as the key to preventing an Indian friendly government rising in Kabul (resulting in the strategic encirclement of Pakistan.

Due to this and to offset war with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani government signed a peace and autonomy treaty in September 2006 with the major players of Pakistan's Waziristan province on the Afghan border. Signatories included its protégé the Taliban (and probably Al-Qaeda), tribal elders of Waziristan, local 'mujahadeen' and Ulama (Islamic clergy). Knowingly securing Taliban and Al-Qaeda basing rights by default indefinitely since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda roots in Waziristan are robust. This situation has solidified the disturbing growth of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups in Pakistan, in addition to the disconcerting fact that weapons and training camps are being provided by some elements of the Pakistani Army to these groups. Said foreign sanctuary and succour is providing the exact kind of safe haven and secure base area that North-Vietnam did for the Communist insurgents of the Vietnam War, further hampering purely Search & Destroy approaches in Afghanistan (Saikal 2006: 138).

A supplemental Vietnam analogy to come from the Waziristan deal addressing the field's insistence on 'political solutions' pertaining to counter-insurgency conflicts is found here. As with the Communist insurgents of Vietnam the above deal was not respected because the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, like the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, will settle for nothing less than their enemy's absolute defeat and destruction:

> According to the agreement, the Taliban agreed not to cross over into Afghanistan and to refrain from the 'target killing' of tribal leaders who oppose the group, and the foreign militants are expected to either live peacefully or leave the region. But only two days after the agreement was signed, two anti-Taliban tribal elders were assassinated; US military spokespeople claim that cross-border attacks increased three-fold after the deal (Rubin 2007: 71).

Begging the question; if the Taliban will not honour political deals struck with its benefactor what hope does its mortal enemy the Coalition have of reaching a sustained 'political solution'? Yet confoundedly Rubin himself, indicative of the Model of Political Primacy dominating the field, goes on to state that the Taliban terrorists should be folded into the political process in order to somehow end the conflict, if they promise to be 'good': "If, as some sources claim, the Taliban are preparing to drop their maximalist demands and give guarantees against the reestablishment of Al-Qaeda bases, the Afghan government could discuss their entry into the political system" (Rubin 2007: 73).

Afghan President Karzai has gone as far to reward the Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist offensive by offering the Taliban seats in government. An offer unsurprisingly rejected by the insurgents because they would be a junior partner in government and foreign troops would remain in the country under Karzai's plan. The US administration has stuck to its 'no negotiations with terrorists' policy in relation to this proposal, the Europeans have not. European NATO countries tend to hold more stringently than the Coalition to the 'political primacy' school of thought. NATO's ambassador to Afghanistan, Daan Everts commented the organization was looking into the possibility of ' talks' with an enemy that has already disregarded political deals struck with its benefactor and murdered thousands of Coalition soldiers and civilians. An enemy that has only increased its conduct of terrorism and kidnappings following the South-Korean government's appeasement of its demands that South-Korea withdraw its troops in exchange for the release of 21 hostages out of the 23 South-Koreans originally kidnapped (the Taliban murdered 2 hostages) (New York Times: 30/09/07).

To revisit this thesis' argument, it is more reliable to win over the population and sever the insurgency's roots rather than cutting 'political deals' with its protruding, unquenchable and ever expanding branches. By way of precedent Malaya demonstrated this as much as Vietnam did, among many other things (Coates 1992).

Phoenix Rising: A reconstituted Phoenix program has been initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Joint Task Force-121 (JTF-121), made up of US, UK and possibly Australian Special Forces and intelligence operatives has been created and tasked to do what Special Forces units and the CIA did under the Phoenix program in Vietnam. It is tasked with the physical destruction of insurgent infrastructure, both persuasive and coercive operators, recognizing the importance of eliminating

not just enemy combatants but enemy 'political' and 'psychological operations' personnel simultaneously.

Joint Task Force-121 operates under tenets derived from Vietnam. It targets the insurgent architecture in toto as it has been remembered that all insurgents, no matter what capacity they operate in, are equally dangerous and as such all are legitimate targets. The Coalition has realized Phoenix was one of the few strategic programs to make headway in Vietnam. Joint Task Force-121 does not sweep and clear population centres or search blindly for the insurgency's coercive elements, it is far more discriminate- it is a 'Direct-Action' force (a euphemism for an assassination squad) for:

> Only by identifying and destroying the infrastructure of the subversive organization can the fledgling government persevere. Stated another way, just as the traditional war is not fought with the individual soldier or platoon in mind but rather the state's capacity and will to continue hostilities, modern war seeks to destroy the organization as a whole and not simply its violent arm or peripheral organs (Tomes 2004: 18).

Joint Task Force-121, imitating Phoenix, is nonetheless the exception to the rule regarding the calibration of coercion to persuasion (by targeting the enemy's capacity to mount coercive *and* persuasive operations). The emphasis of Coalition military operations remains on attrition, ensuring the coercive and persuasive spheres have been divorced in Afghanistan in a similar vein to Vietnam. Coercive actions are generally not enabling or supporting persuasive operations in the rural villages (where most of the population resides) let alone providing the populace with basic security. Mimicking the failure of attrition to secure or develop a viable South-Vietnam and inflicting concomitant negative effects subsequently.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A small but significant step to redressing this Vietnam legacy strategy are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are responsible for most of what Reconstruction & Development is taking place in Afghanistan, considering the insecurity. Provincial Reconstruction Teams might be small in number but find themselves imposing a disproportionately positive impact on the campaign for they intimately link coercion and persuasion, albeit fleetingly. That their beneficial impact on the war is out of proportion to their size deserves analysis.

In contrast to the 'Rev-Devs' in Vietnam the teams enjoy an adequate coercive capability in order to facilitate persuasive operations. Although Provincial Reconstruction Teams are relatively small (50-500 personnel), they comprise civil affairs units, Special Forces, force protection units,

psychological-warfare personnel and both civilian and military reconstruction experts. Provincial Reconstruction Teams have built health clinics, schools, government buildings, roads and other vital infrastructure. Puzzlingly they are also small in number- only approximately 19 Coalition and NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams are operational in a country with a population of 31 million (CIA 2006: Afghanistan). Nonetheless, Provincial Reconstruction Teams are crucial because they provide tangible evidence of good will. As Vietnam taught, words and deeds are intimately linked in counter-insurgency environs whilst action must not be delimited to the coercive matrix and words delimited to the persuasive matrix:

> Propaganda of the word and propaganda of the deed are complementary. Talk must correspond to something visible; the visible, active element must be explained by talk. Oral or written propaganda, which plays on opinions or sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which produces new attitudes and thus joins the individual firmly to a certain movement. Here again, you can not have one without the other (Chandler 1981: 203).

Australia deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team of its own of approximately 500-700 troops to central Oruzgan province in late 2006 and re-committed its Special Forces contingent of around 200 offensive troops in mid 2007 to conduct Search & Destroy operations in the province and provide an outer perimeter for the Reconstruction Task Force (ADF 2007). The contingent's miniscule size ensures Australia's ability to affect the strategic dynamics of the conflict is limited however. Its intermittent deployment of Special Forces troops meanwhile eventuates in mission repetition and popular Afghan frustration because inroads carved by Special Forces contingents in Oruzgan province are ceded back to the insurgency each time the contingent is redeployed (has occurred three times since 2001). What is more, apparently the latest Australian Special Forces deployment will amazingly be the first contingent authorized to target insurgent/terrorist leadership cells in Oruzgan (The World Today: 10/04/07).

These shortcomings aside, the mutually supportive Australian Search & Destroy and Clear & Hold methodologies are important exemplars of how to marry Search & Destroy with Clear & Hold modalities and coercion to persuasion, albeit an infant strategy in a war six years old. That said, the Australian battle-plan does not marry coercion to persuasion as widely as the Combined Action Platoons and Civilian Irregular Defense Group did in Vietnam- the emphasis in Australian war policy is transitory persuasion in the form of the Reconstruction Task Force. A strategy leaving the Taliban/Al-Qaeda much of the country-side in Oruzgan province, allowing them to move at will for the most part and extract or coax support from villagers where and when necessary.

Astoundingly zero Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently operate in the east or south, the primary areas of insurgent activity. Here then, though Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a step forward, once more a shortfall can be viewed in adequately calibrating coercion and persuasion. The eastern and southern areas have not seen Provincial Reconstruction Teams despite being front-line provinces of the war, areas where insurgents are contesting government control over the population most fiercely. So again, while the Afghan counter-insurgency model has seen persuasion and coercion being conducted, these two matrices are not supporting each other sufficiently throughout the country and the insurgency is gaining strength as a result. This does not however alter the fact that Provincial Reconstruction Teams are indeed;

> a key part of the counter-insurgency campaign in winning indigenous support, extending the authority of the central government and helping facilitate development and reconstruction. Provincial reconstruction teams also aim to support reform of the Afghan security sector: demobilizing and disarming militias; building an accountable national army and national police force; stamping out the drug trade and building a legal system (Jones 2006: 118).

Overall it must be said, according to their small size and number the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have had limited strategic impact. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams also appear more interested in the security of the teams as opposed to the security of population centres, repeating another shortfall of the Vietnam strategy. Nor have the persuasive benefits of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams been forcefully linked to the cognitive coercive sphere.

It is not communicated to Afghans that Provincial Reconstruction Teams will be precipitously withdrawn if assistance and intelligence is not provided, thereby leaving villagers vulnerable to the coercive elements of the insurgency and bereft of material support (an empty threat to be sure, but necessary nonetheless). The training of indigenous security forces by Vietnam era Combined Action Platoon style programs within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is being neglected as earnestly, only some do it. Neither is indigenous employment a guiding factor in all Provincial Reconstruction Teams, failing to realize that persuasive development operations are an invaluable bridge toward reducing the available man pool for the insurgency to recruit from.

Regardless, the program's sole purpose is to aid persuasive efforts under a qualitative coercive shield. In this way the program is an initial step to re-defining Coalition counter-insurgency practice and has been so successful it has been introduced in Iraq. In both theatres though the program is not a priority, despite the fact it has proved a rare success story by delivering essential services that positively enhance Afghanis' and Iraqis' welfare and quality of life, programs rarely provided by the national governments. As Roe advises, in Afghanistan a "mutually supporting

network of PRTs could lead to enhanced security over the *entire* country. However, any expansion must include efforts to train and equip local police*, a task some PRTs have neglected" (italics added) (Roe 2005: 23). *Clear & Hold forces.

The bulk of persuasive counter-insurgency operations can only be provided under a shield of coercive force. Exactly why these Provincial Reconstruction Teams are composed predominantly of military personnel, thereby enabling the Provincial Reconstruction Teams to conduct and complete their mission sets. As such they are able to significantly and positively influence Afghanistan's populace *where emplaced*. From previous analysis it becomes apparent that although Provincial Reconstruction Teams do link the coercive and persuasive matrices they have neglected, on an institutional level, to do what is required to ensure the central government can do likewise perpetually. Ensuring the program is more aptly described as *Provisional* Reconstruction Teams.

Reminiscent of Vietnam, once the teams move on with their coercive shield insurgents often tear down persuasive gains made due to the coercive void left behind. So even where employed insurgent contestation is something the teams only ever remedy temporarily. Hence coercion is being married to persuasive operations on a provisional, ad hoc basis (or is outsourced by the reliance on unaligned Warlord militias). Situations transpiring because, on an *indigenous institutional level* at least, the Coalition continues to follow its own doctrinal and theoretical Model of Political Primacy. The under-developed coercive capacity of the Afghan government is an inevitable flow on effect of the Model of Political Primacy's underestimation of the utility of coercive violence and its relegation to secondary, stand alone status. The eventuating coercive void is ceding the insurgency welcomed space and time to breath, reconstitute and recruit- a carbon copy of Vietnam:

> With access to followers in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban can tap new recruits as long as the Afghan central government struggles to exert control over the southern provinces…The Taliban, HiG* and Warlord militias rely on the lucrative opium trade, taxation and extortion of the local inhabitants, and various legal and illegal market activities. Shutting down these sources of funding is largely dependent on the central government's ability to extend its control over the country. Heretofore, progress in this regard is slow (Metz & Millen 2004: 15-16). *The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) is another, smaller Afghan insurgent entity.

Specifically, the coercive void in the towns and villages lacking the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams or NATO forces (most of the country) is permitting the insurgency to remain viable and leaving villagers vulnerable to insurgent appeals/propaganda, indoctrination

and/or coerced support. The end results of which have been made abundantly clear regarding concomitant efforts by the Communists in Vietnam. Even where Provincial Reconstruction Teams are stationed the good will and support generated is fleeting. Forsaken Afghan villages, like the villagers of South-Vietnam before them, are rarely grateful and forget rather quickly- they find themselves preoccupied with survival.

In short, while Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a step toward an evolving Refined Integrationist Model type of understanding regarding counter-insurgency warfare, at the same time they are a sideshow to the Coalition (particularly the US), failing to reconcile ends and means. The end, of transforming coercive actions into lasting geo-political outcomes by affecting the mindset of the populace favourably, transforming the region politically and ideologically in turn, is being bypassed due to the Vietnam era Search & Destroy syndrome. Leaving NATO allies in their new, incrementally expanded role to carry the largest part of the nation building burden. Michael Clarke, Professor of Defence Studies at King's College, London:

> But this next phase of military operations in Afghanistan is especially problematic, because while NATO's expanding mission has tactical similarities to the continuing U.S. mission there, fundamentally, the two could not be more different. The U.S. has 19,000 troops in the country, devoted to a particular brand of counterterrorism: search-and-destroy sweeps, intelligence gathering, infiltration, targeted assassination. The Americans have never been keen on "nation building". They have run PRTs, but only as a second string to the imperative of counterterrorism. The Europeans, on the other hand, are only there for nation building, albeit in a muscular way. They see this as their particular contribution to the long-term eradication of jihadist terrorism… Europeans worry that their new role in 75% of the country will just encourage the U.S. to concentrate even more exclusively on counterterrorist search-and-destroy operations, undermining the "softly, softly" approach the European troops are equipped to handle (Clarke 2006: 20).

Relating to coercive military operations therefore, the efficacy of NATO's Clear & Hold tactics and the Search & Destroy approach of the Coalition are being mitigated because they are not carried out in conjunction- the reason they were married under Vietnam's Accelerated Pacification Campaign. By NATO mainly Clearing and Holding major population centres in its area of responsibility, chiefly Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzgan (with Australian Coalition forces), it is leaving the isolated rural areas and villages open to insurgent activity by failing to conduct mobile Search & Destroy operations adequately.

To repeat, only NATO forces from America, Britain, Canada and the Dutch have proved willing to attack the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, particularly in the south. These operations have been hamstrung by the insufficient amount of forces specified for such operations in any event,

especially regarding the Australian and non-Coalition Canadian and Dutch elements. Conversely the Coalition, by focussing on attrition in an entirely different region in the east, is failing to secure even the major population centres there sufficiently for follow on persuasive operations. A shortfall Provincial Reconstruction Teams do not mitigate whatsoever since they do not operate in the south or east, the areas where the war is being fought most fiercely.

<div align="center">**Persuasive Matrix**:</div>

The Political Factor: From the above it can be distinguished that on the *operational* level coercion via attrition warfare has come to assume the bulk of Coalition time and energy in Afghanistan. Accordingly, regarding indigenous institutions it appears the US in repetition of Vietnam (as in disingenuous 'local democratic rule' and rigged national 'elections') is content to have a stultified version of democratic rule, ignoring its theoretical primacy**.** From the end of the initial invasion phase, since on the ground the Coalition's priority "was to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, they have relied extensively on the existing forces and social structures (Warlords). However, even if the goal is minimalistic- to prevent a return of the Taliban- there is no choice other than to engage in state building"(Roy 2004: 172).

Despite imbuing 'political factors' with supremacy doctrinally and conceptually and although more effort has been put into developing Afghanistan's political organs than its coercive organs, the fact remains that a hollow political shell is being relied upon in the persuasive matrix. The physical liquidation of the insurgency meanwhile has assumed priority in practice within the coercive matrix (and overall), divorcing not merely coercion from persuasion but persuasion from itself.

Institutional development is being hindered as a result. For example, the population of Afghanistan has voted enthusiastically several times but has seen little actual progress as Warlords remain the real power in the country. There are signs that Afghans are becoming disillusioned subsequently, in part explaining the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgency from 2005, stemming from the reduced effort put into developing indigenous Afghan institutions, be they governmental, judicial, educational, medical, legal or security institutions and so on.

What little effort is being put in is proving insufficient to negate Warlord contestation and/or is withering in the face of insurgent attacks. Afghans have elected and developed a nascent democratic government yet its authority does not extend far from its seat of power Kabul, principally because the government has not sufficient coercive institutions to extend said authority throughout the country, the areas of insurgent contestation least of which. The Coalition strategy seems to be to imbue Non-Governmental Organizations and NATO where possible with the actual practical responsibility for providing and running Afghanistan's day to day governmental machinery.

NATO has increased its presence and assumed an enhanced role within the country's coercive matrix in lieu of indigenous military and policing institutions and some Non-Governmental Organizations are being contracted to develop and run Afghan civil infrastructure, like medical services and education facilities etc. Repeating the ignominious policy failure of Vietnam regarding the model of under-developed democratic architectures (intended or accidental), and the associated incompetent, ineffective and corrupt indigenous governmental structures.

As Vietnam demonstrated, this affects the persuasive matrix negatively and simultaneously denies the central government a chance to win hearts and minds by providing these services itself. That foreigners are doing such tasks 'in country' longer than necessary is likewise denying Afghan citizens the chance to accomplish these tasks themselves and since unemployment is a causal factor of insurgencies, along with the existence of weak states, high levels of poverty, political instability and large populations (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 88), the dangers of such approaches are self evident.

The reliance on foreigners is not alleviating unemployment and so too then is fuelling resentment, for Afghans see foreigners in gainful employment within their own country but not themselves. Mirroring Vietnam, under programs like the Strategic Hamlets and the misguided economic development programs of that war previously discussed, misconceived persuasive campaigns such as those contracted Non-Governmental Organizations are tasked with are having a negative impact in some respects on both the persuasive and coercive fronts as angry, unemployed young men are partly fuelling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda resurgence. But the failure to realise the necessity for real institutional development does not lie solely at the feet of the Coalition. For instance, the responsibility for developing the Afghanistan National Police was initially undertaken by Germany, which failed miserably at the task (Serchuk 2005: 4).

Nor must it be said does Australia take its responsibility seriously. The current deployment of 700-900 odd troops to Afghanistan and 1500 odd troops to quite southern Iraq is blatant tokenism. Australia committed 4, 000 troops to East-Timor in 1999 (Dusevic 2006: 19) on a mission that had little to do with national security. On a mission no where near as important as Afghanistan or Iraq are strategically (discussed in more detail below).

Britain's 8, 000 odd troops meanwhile are two-thirds of the forces it committed to Northern-Ireland during the relatively stable times. Causing US General Dan McNeill to comment that recent gains made by British forces will probably have to be remade after the coming winter

because there are nowhere near enough NATO or capable Afghan security forces to hold these gains. Chris Parker, former chief of staff of the British Army's 'Desert Rats': "The problem remains that we do not have enough resources to occupy an area that is not too far off the size of England with forces which number around 8,000 now on the British side". He went on to note there were 12,000 troops deployed to Northern Ireland "when it was relatively peaceful" (BBC News 28/09/07).

It becomes apparent here that real institutional progress is not being made in order to regain the initiative in not merely the persuasive matrix but within the coercive matrix concurrently. Minus effective indigenous coercive institutions the campaign is retrogressing. Indigenous coercive institutions are as important to the Coalition's end goal of moulding Afghani conceptions favourably and creating a stable, moderate, democratic beacon for the Muslim world as democratic, judicial, health and educational institutions etc are. Evidenced by the dire effects the improperly trained, equipped and oriented Army of the Republic of Vietnam had on the Vietnam War. Institutional progress required to win and hold hearts and minds can not be accomplished when the central government's remit is delimited to Kabul for a lack of adequate indigenous coercive institutions.

As shall be detailed this situation is preventing micro-level persuasive progress in kind, congealing to lose cognitive ground as Afghans are becoming disillusioned by the lack of practical political, material and security progress. Illustrating as eagerly as Vietnam that counter-insurgency is a vicious downward spiral when either matrix is neglected in whole or part, let alone both. Without a coherent infrastructure based on the pillars of a centrally controlled security apparatus that enjoys a predominance of power within the indigenous coercive sphere and legitimate and effective democratic institutions that hold the central government's predominance in the persuasive sphere, the exercise is vulnerable. The decision to outsource essential governmental responsibilities to foreign institutions without rendering this situation a transitory phase while Afghans are trained to do the job themselves *as a matter of priority*, is risking the viability of the Afghan enterprise:

> "Elections are of course an incredibly powerful force- establishing popular legitimacy for the exercise of power, forging a closer bond between those who govern and those who are governed, allowing the 'quiet majority' of Afghans to demonstrate to themselves as much to the world, just how small the extremist fringe actually is- but we cannot be so complacent as to assume that the act of voting alone will raise living standards or establish a sense of civic inclusion". Or as Holmes puts it: "Liberal values are threatened just as thoroughly by state incapacity as by despotic power… Toppling tyrants, or at least pressuring them to liberalize, is a fine beginning to the global war on terror. But what happens if we are granted our wish and

127

genuinely democratic, albeit weak, governments begin to take root in the region? If the present US experience in Afghanistan is any indication, the US remains a long way from having a good answer to that question- if indeed it has even begun to ask it at all" (Serchuk 2005: 5-6).

Hence political democratisation has not been as magic as supposed by the Model of Political Primacy, neither in areas contested by insurgents nor in the Warlord controlled regions. Democratic elections have not won the war alone and by viewing politics, psychology and force in stand alone tiers a persuasive 'political' strategy has been enacted on the ground that fails to realise how dependent persuasive operations are on coercive ones and vice-versa. Meaning segregated persuasive 'political' methodologies have been followed which fail to develop Afghan institutions and fail to hold cognitive ground won by the electoral process.

Warlords: Regional Warlord rule was originally a default option for the Coalition in 2001. A lack of viable alternatives forced the Coalition to tacitly allow regional 'Khans' to assume power over the only earth from which the hewing of a democratic, civilian paradigm of politics could sprout. This situation is becoming problematic however in light of the incongruity of these Khans' purported espousal of loyalty to the central government on one hand and their contrary, self-interested actions on the other. The 'centrifugal' power the Khans currently enjoy remains more powerful than the 'centripetal' force of the central government.

The Khans have become 'peace-mongers' grafting what benefits they can from the peace, notably by profiting from the drastic increase in the drug trade. An increase the direct by-product of Warlords permitting Afghan farmers to become once more economically dependent upon opium crops. If anything the reversion was encouraged, since the Warlords of Afghanistan routinely concern themselves with little more than retaining their paramilitary units in order to maintain control of the population and the drug trade. A situation the petite Afghan military and police have been unable to remedy.

Not to mention that, lacking governmental oversight, many corrupt government, military and police officers participate in the drug trade on top of this. Another noteworthy and inhibiting side effect of which has been that since Afghan security forces are unable or unwilling to police the drug trade effectively counter-narcotics operations have been left to the Coalition, whose legitimacy in indigenous policing is less than solid in most Afghan eyes. Moreover, in failing to recognize fully the Refined Integrationist Model, Coalition attempts to police the drug trade have regularly backfired. Evidenced by US and UK counter-narcotics agents' actions whereby they

have been razing poppy fields by force in Afghanistan minus sufficient compensation, failing to mitigate the damage coercive operations are inflicting upon the persuasive sphere:

> As a result, the United States' narco-terrorism efforts have, in part, fuelled anti-American resentment, thereby increasing the potential for additional terrorist activities by groups such as Al-Qaeda… Another concern is that narco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgencies. Can Afghanistan and Colombia continue to be addressed in narrowly defined military and law-enforcement frameworks that neglect political, economic and social considerations? (Dolan 2005: 468).

The Coalition appears not to have canvassed alternative, longer term persuasive counter-narcotic strategies to compensation either, another effect of the focus on coercive force in Afghanistan. Alternatives like shifting farmers from agriculture to livestock with the provision of seed stock and continuing free or subsidized feed and/or Coalition educational or vocational scholarships granted to opium farmers' children. Scholarships that could be withdrawn if poppy fields are re-sown (more effectively increasing the strength of the link between coercion and persuasion in the grey area nexus between the War on Terror and the War on Drugs). Possible persuasive programs that would require permanent coercive screens.

Khans have used coercive violence to enforce their will under the guise of 'peace and stability'. Not only have they controlled the population for their own purposes, used and not protected it per se, but have generally combated the insurgency only when their own interests are threatened, particularly as related to control of the drug trade. In traditionally feudal Afghanistan a coherent, peaceful, democratic country will likely only be achieved in the long run, as South-Vietnam demonstrated in its rapid collapse post Allied withdrawal, by effective, democratically controlled and supported coercive institutions.

The exact make up of a future democratic Afghanistan is hard to predict (if it comes about at all) for a country comprising 55 ethnic groups and speaking 45 languages (Allan 2003: 195). No matter what its form however, an elected central government is meaningless without adequate national coercive institutions (and vice-versa considering the Vietnam experience), the inhibiting lack of which is identified by a deeper study of Warlordism in Afghanistan today:

> Warlords are characterized as leaders who control and police specific areas of territory within the state where the writ of the central government does not run. Their political ascendency is inextricably linked to their military power. Through either trade in extractive resources or the levying of taxes and duties, they exercise degrees of economic and political power which often exceeds that of the country's central government. With a personal and charismatic form of leadership, a Warlord's style is autocratic with little formal consultation…Rooting their legitimacy in their backgrounds as military commanders, many of Afghanistan's significant

leaders have regional power and authority that collectively match-if not out weigh- that of the fledgling central administration, set up in December 2001 to replace the Taliban regime (Peake 2003: 182).

A major problem with Warlord structures is that the "replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalized control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence" (Jackson 2003: 149). Jackson may be referring to Warlord based political architectures here but it is just as apt a description of the Republic of Vietnam. The various Republic of Vietnam military leaders (Warlords) ran their southern fiefdom by licensing provincial 'governors' to run South-Vietnamese provinces anyway they saw fit (via gratuitous violence) for 'tribute'.

It would seem the US is content with coerced social control mechanisms and a semblance of democracy within the Afghanistan project, for the elected government of Afghanistan is little more than a notion that exists in large measure in the minds of Afghans alone. Little tangible progress is being accomplished by the government per se. In spite of the *theoretical* importance accorded to democratic 'political action' that old Vietnam recipe has been chosen again, discredited as it is, sacrificing long term viability for short term 'stability' and expediency as earnestly. All because a key lesson of Vietnam, that purely coerced 'security' provided by undemocratic, corrupt and nepotistic political architectures is counter-productive and inhibits not merely the persuasive matrix but long term geo-political goals in general, has been forgotten: "Warlords offer security, rewards and stability (at least in the short term) at a local level, but may not (indeed, historically do not) offer long term stability beyond the life of the individual Warlord" (Jackson 2003: 149).

Warlord self-interest translates into a supplemental problem today as the Taliban gained power originally by taking down the divided provinces of Afghanistan one at a time. No Warlord aided another and by the time it became clear that an alliance would be required to stop the Taliban the moment had passed (McCauley 2002: 79). Were the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to regain a single province or piece of territory after a Coalition withdrawal in a similar fashion, this would be of dire consequence. The results of the world leaving the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to develop secure base areas in Afghanistan during the 1990s are a matter of record (Khalilzad & Byman 2000: 69-70).

The probability of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda reconstituting significant operating bases in Afghanistan while Coalition forces are operating there is minimal. But unless the Coalition plans to colonize Afghanistan the Afghan military and police force's evolution requires greater emphasis than heretofore. Otherwise as things stand a repeat of Vietnam, where insurgents meandered in and assumed control by force post Allied withdrawal cannot be discounted. One other dissuading factor concerning the efficacy of Warlord structures is that the internecine civil-war waged by many of the current Warlords when last in power created enormous amounts of refugees. Refugees who felt they had no prospects in the refugee camps of Pakistan. The only 'out' they saw were the madrasses (Islamic schools), "where excitable mullahs can fill their minds with Wahabbist propaganda, distorting Islam for political purposes" (Poulton 2003: 408).

These madrasses provide the backbone of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, madrasses where much of the world's Islamic terrorists and insurgents have been educated. A repeat of the civil-war of the 1990s beget from the Warlords' continued refusal to relinquish power would create more refugees and feed the very system the Coalition is trying to starve. The distended tolerance of an institutional architecture run by Warlords in Afghanistan is all the more confounding taking into account such regimes are amongst the most corrupt types of regimes, corruption of which played a key role in the implosion of the Vietnam enterprise.

Corollary corruption to that studied in the previous Vietnam chapter is becoming a major problem in Afghanistan due to the inability of the weak central government to police the country. Afghans are being bled economically in an almost identical light to the South-Vietnamese; 'taxed' at multiple points by multiple actors, aid supplies stolen or sold and generally exploited. Resulting in a familiar retrogression of the counter-insurgency campaign, especially when combined with the overall deficiency of development operations. It must also be commented that one more result of the continued reliance on Warlord structures and the associated failure to develop the government's security and law enforcement apparatuses adequately has been a growth in government corruption (including within the security institutions), gelling detrimentally to ensure that:

> The failure of aid policies to make a difference in southern Afghanistan and increasing corruption in the government and the national army, are spreading the power base of the Taliban. The trucking companies, who backed them first in 1994 when they emerged to clear illegal checkpoints on the roads, are now backing them again. This time the checkpoints are manned by Afghan government soldiers, who demand money at gunpoint from every driver.

The failure of the international community to stop this makes the military task of the British-led NATO force in the south much harder (Loyn 2006).

The weak central government of former Afghan ruler Najibullah permitted a similar feudal Warlord structure to evolve in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a structure that wrenched the country inexorably towards the last civil-war- a civil-war that cost 30, 000 dead and 100, 000 wounded in the battle for Kabul alone (Ewans 2002: 174-184). The feudal Warlord structure developed by Najibullah and the Soviets was a complete failure and this failure needs to be recognized by the Coalition. They too tried granting autonomy, outsourcing state power in the hopes of co-opting the Warlords, but the stratagem failed. Instead of gaining their allegiance the Warlords went from strength to strength, disintegrating central power from the periphery inwards (Giustozzi 2004: 9).

By condoning autonomous Warlord rule Najibullah and the Soviets permitted competitive sources of power to grow unimpeded. The principle elements preventing another civil-war are the Coalition and NATO and fortunately most Afghans appear to acknowledge this. Little foresight can be detected though in the Coalition's counter-insurgency paradigm regarding the solidification of central rule and towards giving it the military might it needs to enforce the popular will. Were the Coalition to leave precipitously tomorrow (for any number of reasons- say a war with Iran or North-Korea) there is every chance another internecine civil-war would break out, taking the Coalition back to square one because there is little chance Afghan President Karzai could prevail.

In point of fact, President Karzai is derogatorily referred to as the 'Mayor of Kabul', since Coalition forces have neglected to build and train a force of sufficient number and skill to enforce the government's writ outside of Kabul. This is not a result of power politics in and of itself however as mentioned. With no governmental oversight or national law enforcement institutions capable of enforcing the law, the drug trade fuels and perpetuates anti-government/Coalition forces in equal measure.

There is evidence that the renewed drug trade is fuelling the insurgency's resurgence and international jihadi terrorism across the board. Take for example that when the Taliban outlawed opium crops in 2000 production fell from 4700 Metric Tonnes to 74 Metric Tonnes. Between 2002 and 2004 under effective Warlord rule production rose to 4200 Metric Tonnes. In recent years it was estimated Opium production accounted for 60% of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic

Product (Goodhand 2005: 191-192). Not only by permitting Warlord structures to continue to evolve has the Coalition created a system that is directly and indirectly fuelling sources of competitive political power in Afghanistan, it is concurrently tolerating a system that feeds international Islamic terrorism. A status quo the campaign was designed explicitly to counter.

Warlordism is a roadblock on the path to reforming the Middle-East, a central strategic goal of the War on Terror. Tolerance and/or support for this structure undercuts the persuasive matrix because words and deeds do not gel much more than they did in Vietnam. In the words of Vietnamese Communists, internal 'contradictions' in counter-insurgency conflicts are deadly. Every illegitimate use of coercive force by Warlords (for no one elected them to rule) imparts an equal yet negative effect on the persuasive counter-insurgency matrix (as Afghans blame the Coalition for installing these Warlords the same way the South-Vietnamese blamed the Allies for installing and supporting the numerous authoritarian military juntas of South-Vietnam). Inversely, this imparts an equally positive effect for the insurgents on both their persuasive and coercive organs.

Taken as a whole the above situation ominously harks back to the Republic of Vietnam. Warlords like the leaders and 'governors' of South-Vietnam control and utilize the economic, political and military spheres for the self-interest. Whether through ignorance or neglect the lessons of Vietnam have not been sufficiently applied in Afghanistan it would seem. Seeing the good will the fall of the Taliban and democratization initially fostered in Afghanistan slowly eroded. Erosion the direct result of the imbalance between results and expectations regarding the benefits of Coalition and international intervention: "The public has grown disappointed and disillusioned with the international community, which it increasingly blames for failing to deliver on the lofty promises that preceded the US attack on the Taliban. The West has even empowered their former persecutors" (Gannon 2004: 41).

Contributing to the problem, international donors have failed to honour paltry pledges already made. Officially at least pledges of $75 per person in foreign aid were made for 2002 with that number dropping to $45 per person over the next five years, compared with the $200- $300 per capita donated to the people of Bosnia, East-Timor, Kosovo and Rwanda, all far less important strategically to the world than Afghanistan. As the Centre for Economic and Social Rights has observed, the international assistance packages pledged to the Balkans, Palestine and East-Timor would result in a similar pledge of approximately $5 billion per year for Afghanistan, three times

the figure pledged. The low amount of proffered aid is attributable to the insecurity; "security is regarded by all as the absolute prerequisite for a successful reconstruction process" (Marsden 2003: 103).

Warlordism and the insurgency are the most pressing problems in this context. Foreign governments hesitate to put money into insecure, unstable and politically fractured nations- exposing once more how coercive counter-insurgency voids inhibit persuasive progress. Sub-optimal Coalition and NATO battle-plans, the strength of the insurgency, its foreign sanctuary, the empowerment of Warlords and the failure to develop the Afghan military and police within the coercive matrix has meant critical persuasive operations (by the Afghan government, the Coalition, the international community and Non-Governmental Organizations alike), general institutional progress and persuasive operations funding from international sponsors, have all been stifled- highlighting the Refined Integrationist Model again. Combining to mean that although the Coalition, NATO and their small Afghan army and police allies have;

> defeated insurgents in engagement after engagement, the weakness of the government and the reconstruction effort- and the continued sanctuary provided to Taliban leaders in Pakistan- has prevented real victory (Rubin 2007: 70).

The Psychological & Information War: The Taliban controlled up to one-third of the country in 2004. It is unclear how much territory they control today (in practice they control portions of the southern and eastern areas at a minimum). It is enough to remain viable at any rate. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have not achieved this because of popular support, which is still tentatively behind the Coalition and President Karzai. Even during Taliban rule most Afghans only acquiesced to their rule because the Taliban enforced stability and were Pashtuns (who comprise 40% of the population). The remainder of the country (Tajiks, Kizilbashes, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kirghiz) never supported the Taliban (Poulton 2003: 411).

Relevantly then the Taliban, who enjoy minimal popular support, are able to operate in Afghanistan due to their improperly countered coercive capacity in parts of the country and foreign succour. The Afghan government holds the persuasive field (by a margin decreasing daily) and the Coalition is supported for the moment as the honest arbiter (albeit tentatively, as the anti-Coalition demonstrations of mid-2006 demonstrate), due to initiatives like democratic evolution, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the nascent development of social equality and the rule of law and freedom of speech etc. Yet counter-intuitively this predominantly political support

has not meant the end of the insurgency, predictions to the contrary implicit in the Model of Political Primacy notwithstanding.

The Coalition and central government (more so the latter) managed to gain a predominance in the persuasive matrix thanks in large measure to national democratic elections, evidenced by the electoral process and popular turnout- 8 000, 000 Afghans voted in the October 2004 national elections, nearly all those registered (O'Hanlon & Albuquerque 2005: 16). Strangely however the insurgents have been able to damage the counter-insurgents' support pool by fostering insecurity. Counter-insurgency forces are equally blamed for not stopping the violence. As per Vietnam this situation is engendering fence sitting at best and increasingly, insurgent support at worst amongst the populace. A recent ABC America poll illuminates this strange dynamic well. Eighteen months ago 77% of Afghans considered Afghanistan to be on the right track. Recently this support barely broke even. The poll numbers dropped a massive 22 points rapidly to 55% (ABC America News: 07/12/06).

So while the Coalition has dislodged an enemy *currently* unable to attain coalescence via persuasive operations independently, a situation that has aided the attainment of coalescence for the Coalition and the government, this support has been taken for granted. Particularly in the cognitive war by the US' continued hesitation to engage in Information Warfare/propaganda operations (traditionally these operations have been considered dishonourable and underhanded) (Ecklund 2004: 63), with the results reflective of the failure to give Information Warfare the emphasis it deserved in Vietnam.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have been increasingly able to blame the Coalition and NATO for the violence. A charge more and more Afghans are buying by the day because of the abdication of the propaganda field: "Regional Islamic extremists and their affiliates readily and unabashedly attempt to marginalize the United States in the war of ideas, so refusing to engage the local citizens in this arena places the Coalition on the defensive" (Millen 2005: 7).

In spite of winning the persuasive matrix the concentration on 'political' (democratic) action within the persuasive matrix is proving insufficient to hold cognitive ground won. In failing to conduct psychological operations progress made in the cognitive realm by the democratic process is being slowly but steadily eroded by unchallenged insurgent propaganda as much as it is by insecurity. Like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda charge that the Coalition is out to colonize

Afghanistan, another charge gradually gaining sway due to stultified institutional progress regarding the central government.

By not combating insurgent propaganda effectively insurgent cognitive operations are degrading the persuasive legitimacy of the counter-insurgency campaign in the manner uncontested Communist propaganda did in Vietnam. Many analysts are of the opinion that the Afghan and Iraqi insurgents/terrorists are winning the global propaganda battle for this reason, aided by some media organizations the same way the terroristic North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong were. Impinging the legitimacy of both interventions and their aims of liberation, equality and freedom:

> Are the bloody terrorists who decapitate innocent hostages on camera morally equivalent to the democratically elected governments of the United States and Great Britain? Are they as deserving of empathy and respect as the freely elected leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq? Some media outlets- and not insignificant numbers of citizens in the Muslim world- would contend it is so. We do not have to agree with these chilling perceptions to register them and to reflect seriously on what measures are required to reverse them. The painful implications of this set of arguably common Islamic perceptions should give us pause. Is nothing commonly reprehensible to all peoples? All these complexities of perception and culture are alive in a 24/7 news-cycle world of instant communications, and they utterly change the dynamics of fighting and winning a war against a global insurgency today (Barno 2006: 26).

That 'psychological operations' are being omitted and 'political action' (democratic evolution) is being relied upon in the persuasive war is the inevitable outcome of the Model of Political Primacy. Furthermore, the democratic enterprise itself has been less than perfectly implemented, likewise threatening popular support. Because how must it look to ordinary Afghans that the Coalition has re-empowered their former persecutors whom previously maimed or murdered so many of their family and friends? Democratic politics' *theoretical* supremacy aside, the Coalition like their Allied forefathers in Vietnam before them appears satisfied with a semblance of democracy and is hoping this will suffice to win and maintain hearts and minds.

The required effort to translate democratic rule from a notion in the mind to a reality on the ground in Afghanistan has not been made. Accruing to mean that although the Coalition sanctioned democratic political process initially *won* hearts and minds, the counter-insurgency campaign as conducted is proving unable to *hold* hearts and minds, slowly ceding cognitive ground to the insurgency as a result of uncontested insurgent propaganda as much as underdeveloped democratic governmental structures, stultified Reconstruction & Development and insecurity.

Conclusion:

When viewed in totality the amount of troops, police and financial assistance committed to Afghanistan, one of the poorest nations on Earth, has been at the bottom rung of nation building enterprises since World War II. Take the fact that the US and her allies put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops into Kosovo than into Afghanistan (Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell, Swanger & Timilsina 2003: xix), incredible given Afghanistan's strategic importance. Along with the practical implications flowing from the doctrinal segregation of coercive force (the failure to effectively calibrate coercive violence in order to enable and protect persuasive gains), the above situation is starting to inhibit the effort to a dangerous degree:

> Public Opinion polls show that Afghans consider the absence of security, which includes threats from Warlords, insurgent attacks and other violence such as crime, the most significant problem facing the country. Approximately two-thirds of Afghans believe the most important priority of the Afghan government should be to disarm commanders and Warlords, strengthen the Army and police, eliminate the Taliban and remove Al-Qaeda. Most Afghans believe the country is going in the right direction, and political and social conditions have improved. But they are still deeply concerned about the security environment, which could undermine this progress (Jones 2006: 114).

The symbiotic relationship espoused in the Refined Integrationist Model distinguishes itself here. The lack of an effective coercive shield in Afghanistan proper is diminishing the trust, faith and support of Afghans, located in the persuasive matrix. Yes some persuasive operations are being conducted, but not symbiotically with residual coercive forces to the requisite degree. Thus momentum in the persuasive matrix is moot as persuasion (primarily in the form of democratic elections) is being conducted almost in a vacuum, unsupported by Vietnam-era attrition methodologies, inexorably losing exceedingly valuable cognitive ground.

Outside the few major cities of Afghanistan and the surrounding areas that constitute the Afghanistan National Army, Afghanistan National Police and NATO's practical jurisdiction, there is no such thing as democratic governance or the expected associated political and material development. Not to forget that coercive gains made by the Coalition and NATO in the rural areas are often unable to be held because of the Afghan military and police force's immaturity and inability.

On the other hand, those few rural villages that do enjoy a coercive shield with the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams only enjoy this shield for as long as the teams are stationed in the area- when the teams move on so too does the coercive counter-insurgency shield. Consequently, anything built up by the Coalition (all too rare to start) outside of Kabul, Kandahar

and their adjoining areas, especially governmental posts or infrastructure (schools, clinics, power stations etc) is typically torn down or taken over at a time and place of the insurgency's choosing. Options the North-Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong also retained.

This deficiency is resulting in a strikingly similar outcome to the inability to marry persuasion and coercion sufficiently in Vietnam- the retrogression of the counter-insurgency campaign. As a result the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have been able to regain lost ground in Afghanistan. Colonel Mohammed Hussain of the Afghan Interior Ministry on the slow turn away from the Coalition and national government due to the failure to render persuasive and coercive operations mutually supporting: "Civilians are willing to cooperate with the Taliban because the government is not doing anything for them" (Baker, Habibi & Morarjee 2006: 10).

Almost then the exact opposite counter-insurgency strategy to the persuasive one utilized in Vietnam (macro-level democratic political evolution favoured where micro-level persuasive operations were favoured in Vietnam) has not prevailed. The fact that the persuasive strategy has been disassociated by a similarly unilateral and over-emphasized coercive approach to that conducted in Vietnam (attrition) has neither had a positive affect. It has been assumed by the Coalition that emphasized 'political action' in the form of democratic elections and a few hearts and minds operations, primarily in the form of the scarce and fleeting Provincial Reconstruction Teams, is all that is required to prevail in the persuasive matrix. On its part attrition has been presumed sufficient to hold the segregated coercive matrix. Ignoring lessons from Vietnam that teach persuasion and coercion must be compressed in an admixture.

The value of indigenous coercive institutions has likewise been overlooked in Afghanistan as a flow on result, as has their interdependent relationship with the persuasive matrix, itself more complex than the sum of democratic elections. Persuasive operations and/or organs are therefore either unable to be implanted or conducted, or where implanted or conducted are often torn down by the insurgency in short measure. While then persuasion and coercion have been married somewhat, via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams concept and the complimentary Clear & Hold doctrine of NATO, the two spheres have not been married in a holistic approach to counter-insurgency warfare. Due mainly to attrition, NATO's hesitation to engage the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the low priority accorded to the development of Afghanistan's military and police organs. The failure to sufficiently render coercion and persuasion mutually supporting is thereby affecting the entire enterprise:

Afghanistan ranks 117 out of 158 on Transparency International's 2005 index of perceived corruption. Around 60% of the population has no electricity and 80% no potable water. The returning refugees have found few houses or jobs. The country is the world's biggest supplier of opium…The illegal drug economy- which some analysts estimate is equivalent to half the country's official GDP- corrupts its politics and finances the Taliban's recruitment of the unemployed and its purchase of high quality weapons. President Karzai is highly regarded by foreign politicians who are trying to prop up his government…but instability and unkept promises have sapped his appeal at home. New hospitals and schools stand half finished because money has run out or because aid agencies have removed their workers for fear of attack. Even in Kabul, the city that has profited most from international aid and relative stability, many say life has changed little in the last five years (McAllister 2006: 21).

Taken as a whole within the Coalition's counter-insurgency enterprise in Afghanistan, persuasion and coercion are being conducted in separate vacuums, while coercion has assumed priority focus on the ground for the Coalition *in practice-* Vietnam rekindled. Meanwhile from the institutional perspective indigenous coercive organs have not been given co-equal priority with democratic political organs and so most population centres have not been Cleared and Held and nascent governmental institutions and developmental infrastructure emplaced (particularly the persuasive political, judicial, medical, power, water and educational organs etc) have not been defended. Enabling the insurgency and Warlords alike to routinely tear down Coalition and Afghan government persuasive progress at will outside the major cities and surrounding areas.

Corruption has grown exponentially, Information Warfare neglected, Warlords have not been rendered a stop-gap measure and the drug trade, which fuels international terrorism and the insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, has expanded apace. As elucidated by the Refined Integrationist Model hypothesis and the Vietnam chapter herein, shortfalls in the coercive strategy are invariably affecting the persuasive matrix negatively for counter-insurgency elements by inhibiting government and Coalition persuasive operations. The lack of which, along with insecurity of itself, aids the insurgency's efforts to recruit and proselytize, making the Coalition's job on both the coercive and persuasive fronts ever harder.

Afghanistan is a quasi Refined Integrationist Model in certain respects (democratic governance and the developmental projects in the few major cities and surrounding environs conducted behind a coercive shield provided by NATO and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams). It is Vietnam redux in many others (Warlordism and under-developed democratic institutions, predominantly Search & Destroy approaches, the failure to adequately develop Afghanistan's military and police and the failure to Clear & Hold and then develop rural Afghanistan). Finally, while the Afghan counter-insurgency model has developed a co-dependent relationship between

coercion and persuasion in some respects, relearning priceless lessons of Vietnam that were to be found in programs like the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, this experience is not redrawing the Coalition's current counter-insurgency blueprint to the requisite degree. Something the next section on Iraq will draw out.

Iraq:

The Coalition, chiefly the US, went into Iraq with hampering baggage extending from its decision not to support the 1991 post Gulf War Shiite revolt. The political structure of the Middle-East meanwhile assured no matter how much liberty the Coalition brought to the table Coalition intentions would be twisted by the regimes, mullahs and media of the region, in a survival reflex if nothing else. According to them the Coalition came not to free but to oppress, to control the region's oil deposits and to secure Israel's position. These factors, as well as the West's prior support of Saddam Hussein, meant the persuasive matrix could not be taken for granted (Abdullah 2003: 207). But this it was somewhat by the American, Australian and British administrations who collectively assumed democratic politics spoke for itself. Added to this, micro-level successes of the Vietnam War have been left by the wayside and coercive force has again been misunderstood and conducted unilaterally for the most part.

In Iraq the situation is at once similar and dissimilar to Vietnam. Security, like Vietnam, is not being adequately provided at many population centres, though to some degree this problem is being slowly remedied by the evolution of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the American 'surge'. From the outset macro-level indigenous democratic institutions were created as the priority, stultifying coercive institutional development. Micro-level persuasive operations on the other hand are of secondary import, inverting Vietnam's *persuasive* strategy. Yet it is interesting to see the net-result of this is much the same as Vietnam- an insurgency raging. Counter-insurgency is therefore similar to those nine words that make up the whetstone of Western democracy: "Yes, but what have you done for me lately"? Democracy, security, propaganda and development are not being universally provided concurrently and persistently but ad hoc and intermittently in Iraq, at best.

The Model of Political Primacy and the overwhelming sense democracy was thought to make led the Coalition to believe the Iraq War would be a quick one. The Coalition would go in, remove Saddam, hold elections and withdraw. The result would be a quickly and easily established democratic beachhead in Iraq (Dalacoura 2005: 9963-9965). Once more this confused Clausewitz's ends and means. While democracy is the goal it has not itself alone transformed Iraq anymore than it has been able to Afghanistan, let alone the region. This assumption neglected Newton's Third Law, which does not just apply to science, it also applies to the art of war- for every action there is a reaction. Whilst not always equal in scope on the battlefield it nonetheless occurs, for better or worse. In Iraq the action of disenfranchising the Ba'ath Party/Saddam and

imposing Western style democracy in the religious Middle-East resulted in an almost inevitable reaction- a Ba'athist and Islamic insurgency.

Stemming from the presumption of political pre-eminence coercive violence, micro-level development and propaganda operations have been inhibited by the Model of Political Primacy in Iraq from day one, repeating the Afghan experience. Lastly, as shall become clear, the initial pre-eminence accorded 'political action' rapidly morphed into coercive pre-eminence along the attrition model of Vietnam, permitting the insurgency to again become the focus of Coalition counter-insurgency operations. Divorcing theory form practice and retracing shortfalls in the Vietnam and Afghan models.

Insurgent Compositions, Motivations & Aims: Firstly it is prudent to examine the Iraqi insurgency. The four basic insurgent operating tenets are applicable to the insurgent/terrorist elements operating in Iraq to varying degrees. 1) Cellular networks to enable covert action. 2) The utilization of terrorism to undermine the existing governmental structure and promote insecurity and disaffection. 3) Attempts to elicit popular support. 4) Attacking government and counter-insurgency forces physically to destroy opposition (Tomes 2004: 18). Compositions, motivations and aims are more complex as there exists a myriad of insurgent groups operating in Iraq today, ironically to the benefit of the Coalition somewhat as this indicates they enjoy neither a unifying ideology nor command structure.

For ease of reference there are broadly three groups of Sunni insurgents operating in Iraq (none having much hope of achieving pan-Iraqi support). The three groups are: 1) Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) who seek a return to Ba'athist and Sunni rule. 2) Foreign and Iraqi jihadi terrorists or 'Islamo-Fascists' led by 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' (AQ-I) (Former Regime Loyalists and these groups enjoy support from Syria which is threatened by a democratic beachhead in Iraq). These jihadis seek authoritarian Sunni rule under fundamentalist Islamic Sharia law. 3) Non-aligned Sunni tribal elements form the third and smallest component of the insurgency. They also seek a return of Sunni rule and their former privileged position (Hashim 2003: 4-9). These Sunni groups seem not to care whether they control all or part of Iraq.

To this it should be noted within the last year "large gains", as US Army counter-insurgency expert Colonel Herbert McMaster has put it (McMaster: 2007), have been achieved in Al Anbar province. 14 out of 18 major Sunni Tribes in Al Anbar (the former locus of the Sunni insurgency)

have sided with the Coalition, up from one the previous year (Whitaker & Cornwell 2007). The about face was driven by the indiscriminate terrorist actions of other Sunni insurgent groups operating in Iraq (examined below), Al-Qaeda's foray into the smuggling networks traditionally controlled by the Sunni tribal Sheiks and pay-offs made by Coalition forces to splinter the insurgency. These elements have been absorbed uncomfortably by American forces in the Sunni areas of Iraq as local militia ("Concerned Local Citizens"- CLCs) or as direct recruits into the Iraqi Army or Police, operating with and in support of US forces (Gordon 2007: 36).

Certain Shiite militias are technically an element of the insurgency, Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army chief among them in contesting government and Coalition control of Iraq, with considerable military and financial support from Iran who backs it, the Badr Brigade and any other violent group it can. Besides religiously inspired hatred of the US, Iran has two principle political reasons for playing its substantial spoiling role in Iraq. Firstly, it wishes to see a democratic beachhead established in Iraq as much as Syria. Secondly, Iran and Syria aim to dissuade the Coalition from embarking on any further military missions of regime change in the Middle-East by turning Iraq into a killing field. Evidence has also come to light that Iran is aiding and abetting Sunni insurgent/terrorist groups in a concerted effort to fuel the strife in Iraq (Jones 2007: 31).

In the main Shia militias are more concerned at the moment with the sectarian conflict and political manoeuvring as opposed to ejecting the Coalition or destroying the nascent political architecture of the country. Shia militias tend to use coercive violence to maximize their or their political party's position within the new system, to combat rival militias or insurgent groups and/or to attack Sunni populations. In terms of numbers, 60,000 militiamen belong to the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi- JAM), 15,000 to the Iranian trained Badr Brigade (the military wing of the largest Iraqi political party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council- SIIC) and 5,000 to minority militia cells (Jones 2007: 30).

One noteworthy fact here is that the attempted invocation of an anti-Coalition uprising by Shia militia segments like the Mahdi Army (the Shia militia/insurgent element Coalition forces most frequently battle) has been unable to inspire a popular anti-Coalition Shia revolt, due to the democratization element of the Coalition's counter-insurgency plan. Regardless, the key to defeating Iraqi insurgents and extinguishing the nascent Sunni-Shia civil-war by reining in the insurgents and militias at once are coercive Coalition forces and an ethnically mixed and

representative Iraqi Security Force. Only together can these two groups form the requisite coercive shield to suppress both elements of the violence in Iraq and allow critical macro and micro-level persuasive operations to be undertaken simultaneously to begin mollifying the conflict and eventually end it. As Biddle states: "The underlying dynamic of many communal wars is a security problem driven by mutual fear" (Biddle 2006: 5).

To achieve the goal of a stable, mixed and representative Iraqi Security Force Coalition forces are essential because they act as the honest arbiter and a force against ethnic civil-war. They comprise the principle element holding the Iraqi political and security components together for the moment. Were the Coalition to withdraw not only would Iraq become another case of Afghanistan pre 9-11 (whereby jihadi terrorists will have gained another patch of dirt from which to plan and launch attacks on the Coalition's homelands from) but Iraq would probably degenerate into another case of Yugoslavia, with rampant genocide and ethnic war. The only thing preventing such an outcome at the moment and thus enabling the political process to continue and the Iraqi Security Forces to remain a national force, as opposed to splitting into ethnic militias, are the Coalition's coercive elements. The dilemma of the dual insurgency and ethnic civil-war "leaves Washington no choice but to continue providing enough U.S. forces to cap the violence in Iraq" (Biddle 2006: 11).

Coalition forces are indispensable since they are enabling the macro-level political process (particularly the political process currently being pushed by the Coalition and slowly undertaken by bickering Iraqi politicians concerning constitutional wealth and power sharing arrangements among Iraq's ethnic factions) and what micro-level persuasive operations are being conducted (examined below). Operations aimed at winning pan-Iraqi grass-roots support towards the evolution of a national democratic political architecture.

Iraqi insurgents hover amongst six retrograde lines of operation; counter-stability, counter-election, counter-reconstruction, counter-mobility, counter-collaboration and counter-Coalition (Eland, Newman, White & Lang 2005: 10). None of these lines enjoy any real potential of attaining coalescence as currently the best hope for a pan-Iraqi insurgency breaking out has been negated by the evolution of a majority rule democratic political system and the Coalition's declared intent to withdraw. To which the training of Iraqi Security Forces has been important proof. The above lines of operation are designed to prevent coherency, development and growth, split Iraq into ethnic enclaves and/or designed to drag Iraq back to either Sunni rule as practised

under Saddam or back to strict Islamic Sharia rule as practiced under the ancient Caliphates. Whereas however the insurgency does not have a universal aim, motivation or composition, it does have a universal modus operandi- terrorism.

The Oxymoronic Logic of Terror: Terrorism is an innate feature of the inchoate insurgency in Iraq for the five core reasons common to terrorism as a genus:

1) Creation of societal dislocation or chaos.
2) Discrediting or destroying a particular government.
3) Rendering economic and property damage.
4) 'Bleeding' state security forces and doing other military damage.
5) Spreading fear for domestic and international effects.

What is notable here is that the above resultants; "meld violence and propaganda in some form to gain public effect. Normally these strategies include both *destruction and construction*; that is, the actions yield not just damage to targets but some form of progress for the group in its drive for greater power" (italics added) (Harmon 2001: 39). Succinctly, the act of random physical destruction does not solely destroy, it also constructs a favourable cognitive environment for terrorists and/or insurgents to operate within target audiences.

The above resultants concerning Iraq specifically then require further analysis because terror is the primary operational tenet and common denominator of the various insurgent groups for two factors: Coalition conventional supremacy and as it is a continuation of the Eastern philosophy of war tracing back to the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu. This philosophy is fundamentally inverse to the Western way of war, favouring guerrilla tactics to wage an 'asymmetric' war of indirectness, perfidy, attrition and prolongation (Cassidy 2005: 335-339).

This field has long been bypassed in the West for it is considered a cowardly way to wage war. Be that as it may in Western eyes, the failure to completely understand 'irregular warfare' has at times cost Western nations dearly, Vietnam chief among them. Ironically, there are signs that the insurgents of Iraq (namely Al-Qaeda in Iraq) have not accurately studied their own history either. Ignorance affecting their viability in a manner akin to the Allies' own flawed understanding of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Vietnam, ignorance of perhaps the pinnacle tenet of the field- as go the people, so goes the war.

Initially terrorism was utilized effectively in Iraq because government and Coalition forces were the target. Through propaganda of the deed and effective 'perception management' the use of such violence was sold by the terrorists and bought by many Iraqis and much of the world's media as legitimate resistance under nationalistic, ideological and/or religious banners. But this terror, mainly conducted by foreigners of all things now, is preventing the various insurgent elements from attaining coalescence as it has since been re-directed towards the Iraqi people themselves, especially the majority Shia in a civil-war type situation, procuring counter-productive results (some Shia militias conduct suicide bombings but on a far smaller scale than Sunni insurgents/terrorists).

Sunni terrorism has failed to be calibrated to the cognitive war and thus has divorced itself from the persuasive matrix. Being the big winners of the post Saddam political re-alignment the majority Shia and Kurds generally have not sufficient reason to fight the Coalition. The Sunni insurgent/terror groups have perhaps realized they will likely not prevail in the cognitive war as a result. This factor, combined with historic Sunni-Shia enmity, has resulted in the adoption of indiscriminate terror directed at the Shia and Kurdish majority. If not gaining the insurgency total control of the country by brute force its intimated secondary aim, as Frank Hoffman noted was an increasing insurgent trend, may be to fragment or 'Balkanise' Iraq and create independent Shia, Sunni and Kurdish nations or de facto nations (obviously an independent Sunni enclave or nation controlled by Ba'athists and/or jihadists is unacceptable to the Coalition).

It may be controversial but the fact remains terrorism works best when calibrated to persuasive considerations. In an Iraqi context, when directed solely at foreign forces and the indigenous government. Explaining why terrorism worked to the advantage of the insurgency in the early stages of the war by increasing popular disaffection and frustration with counter-insurgency forces. In imposing the image of sterility and feebleness onto the Coalition and Iraqi government (given their inability to provide law and order), it perplexingly leant support to the perpetrators of the acts. When this terror was indiscriminately turned against the civil populace as well it broke the bonds between coercion and persuasion, retracing mistakes the Viet-Cong and North-Vietnamese Army committed. In Iraq this second wave of terrorism has achieved an identical outcome by engendering popular resentment and hatred, particularly in the Shia and Kurdish zones (75-85% of the population) (CIA 2007: Iraq).

Hence Abu Musab al Zarqawi, former head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, over-extended the Sunni insurgency by following a dual track insurgent paradigm. He simultaneously attempted to eject the Coalition and foment a civil-war. Even Osama bin-Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri attempted to persuade Zarqawi to better calibrate his reign of terror after a July 2005 suicide bombing targeted a group of children taking candy from Coalition troops, killing 27 people (mostly children) in an act which effectively negated the possibility of attaining coalesce for the Sunni insurgents (for the short term at the very least):

> It is hard to fathom how such an attack could garner good will among the Iraqi populace. In doing so, the insurgents violated the most fundamental axiom of guerrilla warfare as articulated by its chief theoretician Mao Tse-tung. As he explained, insurgents must 'swim in the sea' of the population in whose name they fight. Without support from a significant portion of the Iraqi population, it is hard to imagine how the insurgency could ultimately prevail (Michael & Scolnick 2006: 118).

Michael & Scolnick go on to detail how Zawahiri himself expressed public frustration with Zarqawi's methodology at the time:

> If we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic emirate in Iraq, or a caliphate if possible, then, we will see that the strongest weapon which the mujahadeen enjoy- after the help and granting of success by God- is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq and the surrounding Muslim countries…this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow…In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows… I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma (Michael & Scolnick 2006: 119).

It is strangely fortunate from a counter-insurgency perspective that Zawahiri is pinned down in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Coalition military and intelligence services, leaving Zarqawi to run Al-Qaeda's war in Iraq. For the damage Zarqawi did to the Sunni insurgency's persuasive matrix via his utilization of coercive terror is possibly irredeemable. What Zarqawi's death, almost certainly carried out by Joint Task Force-121 or its latest incarnation (code names are changed frequently) (Thomas & Nordland 2006: 18-25) will mean for the future is unclear. If a bin-Laden/Zawahiri acolyte fills the leadership void a more populist insurgency may sprout. If a Zarqawi acolyte gains power then more divisive operations may be the norm (it appears this might be occurring at the moment).

Vietnam rammed home the point that in counter-insurgent warfare it is exceedingly difficult to make up ground lost on the persuasive front for it involves regaining trust, the toughest cognitive

operation. There are signs that Iraqis, even in Sunnis areas, are growing weary and unsupportive of the violence as a result- 47 % of Sunni Iraqis consider the wave of terrorist and insurgent attacks an illegitimate form of resistance (still, 53% do not) (O'Hanlon & Kamp 2006: 48). On top of causing in part the previously mentioned realignment of sections of the smallest insurgent group, the non-aligned Sunni tribes toward the Coalition (but not necessarily the Iraqi government as it is comprised mainly of Shiites), terrorism is degrading the jihadis' and Ba'athists' ability to mount operations.

In a somewhat oxymoronic sense the insecurity and fear terrorism has fostered has not been for nought. While it has rendered the insurgency unable to attain coalescence it has somehow had the same effect on the Coalition, as the Vietnam era attrition methodology enacted in Iraq missed the symbiotic relationship coercion and persuasion sustain. No single counter-insurgency factor is more important than the next on a theoretical level, implementation is another matter. Certain factors have to precede others in space and time. Security is the necessary precursor for everything to follow in a counter-insurgency context. Depriving the population of security is the first aim of most insurgencies, counter-insurgency forces meanwhile can not achieve a thing without it. Insurgents need to tear down security, counter-insurgency forces need to build it up. The terror and insecurity therefore is generating the kind of seemingly illogical and contradictory resultants discussed earlier. The Coalition and the Iraqi government are sharing the blame for these acts of terror, if not accruing the bulk of it.

Consider that after a terrorist bomb killed 24 policemen, 2 women and 1 child in December 2003, a US Major bewilderingly recounted: "The crowd that gathered after the blast didn't seem angry at the insurgents responsible for the carnage. Instead many of them blamed the G.I.'s". The Coalition's shortfall in securing Iraq has enabled insurgents/terrorists and militias to rampage and as a consequence lost progress in the persuasive field, a situation effecting Coalition coercive elements by increasing their enemy's pools and decreasing intelligence assistance. An Iraqi insurgent after the 2004 Ashura bombings: "They promised to liberate us from occupation" (the Americans) "promised us rights and liberty and my colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act. They should have come and just given us food and some security… It was then that I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liberators and my colleagues and I then voted to fight" (Hoffman 2004: 16).

Counter-Insurgency Coercive Matrix:

Most of the barriers to a stable, democratic Iraq are directly or indirectly related to security (Byman 2003: 49). To this must be added the viability of the persuasive matrix. Unfortunately all volunteer Coalition militaries, *Transformation* (the US war-fighting doctrine emphasizing lighter, smaller and faster forces) and the desire of Coalition governments to minimize casualties has meant the on average 150,000 strong Coalition security foot-print in Iraq was insufficient from day one. Put another way, the coercive means committed to the Iraq and Afghan enterprises have never been commensurate with the end goals, particularly on Australia and Britain's part.

Add the policy of attrition to the mix and the stemming failure to use what forces were deployed to protect and conduct persuasive operations in even a few exemplar cases, has seen the war's viability drastically, perhaps terminally hindered. Moreover, the Model of Political Primacy followed on the indigenous institutional front impeded the development of the Iraqi Security Forces by ignoring the mutually dependant relationship coercion and persuasion sustain in counter-insurgency environs. These factors have gelled to mean the situation has not improved fast enough to effectively inhibit the insurgency and militias or stave off the massive drop in Iraqi and domestic Coalition support for the war. Combining to jeopardize the creation of a democratic Iraq, crucial not just for the country and region but for international security at large (Hollis 2003: 23).

Coalition Grand Strategy: Present Coalition grand strategy in Iraq appears to have two pillars, both incompletely understanding Vietnam 'lessons learned'. The first is that within the persuasive matrix paramount importance has been given to the need for legitimate, democratic governance in the target country. The second is 'Iraqization', derived from the policy of Vietnamization, as the end goal within the coercive matrix (Laird 2005: 25-30). Neither of these stratagems addresses the Coalition's operational dynamics, as Krepenivich has commented:

> On the political front they have been working to create a democratic Iraq, but that is a goal, not a strategy. On the military front, they have sought to train Iraqi security forces and turn the war over to them. As President George W. Bush has stated: "Our strategy can be summed up this way; as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down". But the President is describing a withdrawal plan rather than a strategy (Krepenivich 2005: 87).

The lack of coherent strategy from the beginning is attributable to the Model of Political Primacy of counter-insurgency favoured post Vietnam: "The common assumption among many policy makers in the United States had been that the bulk of the foreign presence could leave once elections were held" (Von Hippel 2004: 87). Early practical supremacy of democratic 'political

action' did not however enable the Coalition to prevail even on the persuasive front- elections have proved inadequate to 'win the peace' by and of themselves. The Coalition's operational method thereby swung 180 degrees back to unilateral Vietnam era attrition methodologies, inverting theory and doctrine.

The key tactic to link coercion to persuasion, Clear & Hold or the 'ink-blot' strategy, was lacking for the longest time. Clear & Hold is essential not solely for reasons discussed but also because it provides a protective layer of force for people who collaborate with the Coalition in one way or another, whether they are labourers on development projects or intelligence assets etc. In Iraq people do not share intelligence or openly work for counter-insurgents if they fear reprisals, as they did not in rural Vietnam or have not in the main in rural Afghanistan.

The protection of these sources is crucial and in turn is reliant on persuasive operations to garner in the first place, again unable to be conducted without a coercive shield- demonstrating once more the symbiotic relationship between coercion and persuasion. The attrition strategy in Iraq, by attempting to kill insurgents at a rate exceeding their replacement, neglected this factor as earnestly as it was in Vietnam. To go further, the attrition methodology, reminiscent of Vietnam, did not even achieve this aim. In 2003 an estimated 5, 000 insurgents were operating in Iraq, by October 2006 the strength of the insurgency and Anti-Coalition Militias was estimated at 20-30, 000 (O'Hanlon & Campbell 2007: 17).

The Coalition can win all the battles it wants, in the same vein as the Allies in Vietnam, yet if it can not protect its supporters while holding and expanding its gains then the phenomenon of fence sitting that plagued Allied efforts in Vietnam will likely continue unabated in Iraq, crippling counter-insurgency efforts. The follies of this unilateral coercive strategy were recognized too late in Vietnam and only time will tell if this was similarly recognized too late in Iraq. Neither however can counter-insurgency forces dedicate their entire effort to population security. Specific forces must be designated for Search & Destroy duty to keep insurgents off balance and eliminate those who can not be won over- both coercive methodologies must be conducted. Vietnam and Afghanistan are illustrative in this regard.

For though it is true attrition operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan curtail/ed their respective insurgencies, it is also true that as conducted in isolation attrition did/does not insert a coercive shield for follow on persuasive operations designed to win the most valuable ground of the war,

the people. In resemblance of Vietnam and Afghanistan attrition based parameters failed to gain strategic headway in Iraq, the methodology saw conflict indicators across the board head the wrong way. Mirroring Afghanistan 2006 was the most violent year in Iraq since the 2003 Coalition invasion (BBC News: 21/12/06), while popular support (indigenous and domestic) keeps retrograding:

> During the Vietnam War, US strategy focussed on killing insurgents at the expense of winning hearts and minds. This search-and-destroy strategy ultimately failed, but it evidently continues to exert a strong pull on the US military, as indicated by statements like that of a senior army commander in Iraq who declared, "[I] don't think we will put much energy into trying the old saying, 'win hearts and minds'. I don't look at it as one of the metrics of success". Having left the business of waging counter-insurgency warfare over 30 years ago, the US military is running the risk of failing to do what is needed most (win Iraqis' hearts and minds) in favour of what it has traditionally done best (seek out the enemy and destroy him). Thus, US forces have recently pushed forward with more offensive operations of this type in western Iraq, which has produced some insurgent casualties but had a negligible effect on overall security (Krepenivich 2005: 93).

That a senior US commander stated the above publicly portrays a Coalition rife with confusion. Certain Generals get counter-insurgency, many others do not. A derivative of the field's vague and flawed theoretical foundation. To remedy this situation the Coalition has belatedly and rapidly attempted to develop the Iraqi Security Forces to take responsibility for Clear & Hold duties. Belatedly because the Model of Political Primacy ensured the utility and value of capable indigenous security forces was misunderstood from day one- Afghanistan repeated.

It took 12-18 months to realize their importance and begin their development, ignoring the Allies' experience with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Although the Iraqi Security Forces are currently being imbued via Iraqization and its Vietnam era Combined Action Platoon style training programs, with a superior understanding of counter-insurgency warfare to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Imbued with an understanding of T.E Lawrence's maxim that 'irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge' (Miska 2005: 64-69).

Nonetheless, the fact remains the stultified development of the Iraqi Security Forces is inhibiting the ability to provide an adequate coercive shield to conduct persuasive operations behind, endangering the Iraq enterprise for the failure to reconcile coercion with persuasion sufficiently from the beginning. A direct result of artificial tiering mechanisms inherent in the Model of Political Primacy. On the indigenous institutional front the creation of democratic (persuasive) institutions rapidly outpaced the creation of coercive ones, leaving persuasive organs vulnerable and persuasive ground won by the democratic process slowly but surely degraded.

The neglect of counter-insurgency theory has had serious consequences in both Afghanistan and Iraq. From the outset Coalition troops at all levels have not been operating under an adequate understanding of counter-insurgency warfare and so are repeating failed strategies of Vietnam, whilst inventing new ones of their own. Though 'political action' was initially emphasized in the post invasion phase of the war (Vietnam inverse), quickly this approach was abandoned due to its inability to overcome, seeing coercion come to be relied upon by Coalition forces to deal with the insurgency again (Vietnam reborn).

Not only has it been re-emphasized but its relationship to the persuasive matrix has been consistently missed. Dual Pulitzer Prize-winner and Washington Post senior military correspondent Tom Ricks, author of a new book on Iraq, 'Fiasco' (based on interviews with a slew of military personnel including more than 100 senior officers, plus access to 30,000 odd pages of official documents):

> And one of the things that really struck me was the US military used the wrong tactics in the Fall of 2003 - for example, using large cordon and sweep operations to round up tens of thousands of military-aged males in areas they deemed hostile. They were humiliated in the course of being arrested, frequently had boots put on their heads, disrespected in front of their families, they wore sandbags on the way to the prisons, weren't given water. They were tossed into prison, held for 90 days sometimes without their families being told where they were, and were held in prison cheek by jowl with hardcore Al-Qaeda terrorists. And so almost certainly when they came out, they were less pro-American than when they went into prison (Ricks 2006).

The above is not merely representative of the general strategic failure to recognize how symbiotic coercion and persuasion are in counter-insurgency environs, it bears an uncanny resemblance to what happened in Vietnam under the Communist Activities Denunciation Campaign and the Phoenix program. In erring on the side of caution, arresting a broad swathe of mostly innocent Iraqi youth and incarcerating them in prisons where real terrorists and insurgents had unfettered twenty-four hour access to these now angry and disillusioned young men, Coalition coercive actions negatively influenced the persuasive matrix.

Effectively the Coalition cast a wide net, coerced many young and innocent men into prison heavy handedly and provided the insurgency a pre-fabricated indoctrination camp for good measure. Phoenix and the denunciation campaigns of Vietnam have been inadequately studied by the Coalition, ending in self-inflicted harm during the early stages of the occupation. Inadequately calibrated coercive violence impacted negatively the persuasive matrix, losing not just the hearts and minds of the innocent young men arrested but of their family and friends. Procuring the

insurgency both persuasive supporters and coercive fighters. A snowballing effect common to un-calibrated coercive violence be it in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq.

It requires mention here also that the US is by far carrying the largest part of the counter-insurgency burden in Iraq, since its force levels are around 30 times that of Britain's, 100 times that of Australia's and as its areas of responsibility include the Sunni dominated areas of the country and Baghdad. British and Australian forces are stationed in the south of the country. Their main responsibility is countering the growth and actions of the Shiite insurgents and/or militias and keeping the peace in the Shiite dominated south. The small British (approximately 5, 500) and Australian (roughly 1, 500) contingents (ADF 2007) similarly rely on coercive military force to accomplish their mission sets.

Britain and Australia predominantly use military force to either protect themselves or to negatively affect the insurgent and/or militia elements operating in the south, as the major British operations of recent years attest to; the rescue of captured British troops from Iraqi police/Shia militias (Knickmeyer & Finer 2005) and recent joint British and Iraqi Security Forces anti-militia raids (Semple 2007). The British and Australians have likewise fostered the use of segregated coercive force to combat the insurgency and militias per se, as opposed to also utilizing such force to enable follow on persuasive operations (there are no Australian or British Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq for instance). In any event, the British and Australian troops are extremely limited in their ability to shape and influence the coercive sphere of southern Iraq considering their finite numbers.

In contrast to the American government's actions on Iraq, the incongruous nature of Australian and British governments' political rhetoric with actual military measures taken have been important factors in the war's de-legitimization. By leaving the US to assume the disproportionate bulk of counter-insurgency operations and occupation duties north of Basra and in refusing to commit any troops to help arrest the retrograding security situation under the 'surge' (analysed below), domestic Coalition, indigenous Iraqi and international public opinion has come to view the war as an American occupation rather than an international liberation. If American troop commitments and political pronouncements on the Afghan and Iraq wars' strategic importance have occasionally been on different pages, Australian and British political rhetoric and military deeds have rarely been in the same park.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard, May 2004:

Iraq is caught in a complex and crucial contest of values and ideals. It is a contest between the majority of Iraqis who want to establish a viable democracy and a violent and determined minority who want to install a new dictator or a Taliban–style regime in Iraq. It is a contest of will – as the terrorists and insurgents try to use fear and intimidation to drive the forces that support the democratisation of Iraq – the coalition forces - out of Iraq. Ultimately, it is a contest of conviction – whether the free world is prepared to protect and encourage democratic values. Those values Australians cherish – tolerance, opportunity, security and respect for one's neighbours. A wide range of contending forces in Iraq have demonstrated they are prepared to use violence, against both coalition forces and the Iraqi people, to achieve their political objectives… But we also need to understand that this contest in Iraq represents a critical confrontation in the war against terror. We recognise this and so do our enemies.

I find it astonishing when people claim that Iraq is a diversion from the real war against terrorism. The reality is that international terrorism has invested an enormous amount in breaking the will of the coalition in Iraq… It will be a heavy blow to the terrorist cause if democracy and all that it offers is brought to the Iraqi people. That is why the ferocious campaign of recent times to derail not only the transfer of power on 30th June* but also the establishment of a democratic infrastructure for Iraq has been so determined. The terrorists know that if democracy is installed in Iraq they have lost. Iraq is the key to creating new hope for the people of the Middle East. It will be a great encouragement for them to see democracy take root in Iraq - to witness a more equal distribution of wealth and greater opportunity for ordinary people to live peaceful and independent lives (SMH: 20/05/04). *The transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority back to Iraq in 2004.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, February 2007:

But what nobody should doubt is that whatever the debates about tactics, the strategy is clear: to bring about enduring change in the Middle-East as an indispensable part of our own enduring security. The poisonous ideology that erupted after 9/11 has its roots there, and is still nurtured and supported there. It has chosen Iraq as the battleground. Defeating it is essential. Essential for Iraq. But also, now, for us here in our own country. Self-evidently the challenge is enormous. It is the purpose of our enemies to make it so. But our purpose in the face of their threat should be to stand up to them, to make it clear that however arduous the challenge the values that they represent will not win and the values we represent, will (International Relations and Security Network 2007: 6).

The enormity of the challenge aside, in terms of deeds Britain's military commitment to the Iraq War outstripped the US commitment as a proportion of population at one point, the invasion phase (in approximate terms Australia has a population of 20 million, the UK 60 million and the US 300 million). Shortly thereafter the approximately 45, 000 strong UK force decreased rapidly to around 10, 000 troops by 2004, regardless of the deteriorating security situation (Burke 2004).

While some of the effort has been diverted to the more politically correct front of the War on Terror that is Afghanistan (7, 500 troops of the decreased 35, 000), the British commitment to Iraq, or even the War on Terror, does not match the American commitment proportionately. To do so in Iraq would require a sustained British commitment of roughly 30, 000 troops or 20% of US forces in Iraq. Current British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is even less inclined to support the Iraq venture, declaring that he intends to cut British troop levels by approximately 2500 in early-mid 2008, leaving the door open to a full British withdrawal by the end of 2008 (BBC News: 08/10/07).

Neither has Australia matched the American commitment to the War on Terror proportionately. To do so would require a sustained Australian commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq around 7% of American forces- roughly 10, 000 troops. Currently the Australian commitment to Iraq is at best 1% of the American commitment (1500 troops). Contemporary Australian commitments to second priority peace-keeping missions in East-Timor and the Solomon Islands have outstripped token Australian contributions to the War on Terror by far.

Favouring the use of Australian troops for peace-keeping/policing missions instead of prioritizing theses forces to do what the nation's military forces were founded to do- fight and win the nation's wars (in this case combat the clear and present danger of the global jihad)- is short-sighted strategic planning. A war declared by bin-Laden himself in the wake of the original 1999 Australian led East-Timor intervention that wrested that country from Muslim Indonesia (an intervention and liberation mission unlamented in either Australian popular or political discourse for provoking Al-Qaeda, unlike the Iraq War paradoxically);

> bin-Laden, November 3rd, 2001: "The Crusader Australian forces were on the Indonesia shores ... they landed to separate East-Timor, which is part of the Islamic world". Bin-Laden, November 12th, 2002: "We warned Australia before not to join in [the war] in Afghanistan, and [against] its despicable effort to separate East-Timor. It ignored the warning until it woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali. Its government falsely claimed that they were not targeted" (Australian Government: 2004).

At both the tactical and strategic levels Afghanistan and Iraq, under their parent war, are conflicts being fought to combat Al-Qaeda and its own particular strain of international Islamic terrorism. A strain of terrorism that has already extracted approximately 4000 Coalition military deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 3000 American civilian deaths on 9-11, 52 civilian deaths in the 2005 '7/7' terrorist attacks in London and 88 Australian civilian deaths (out of 202) in the

Bali terrorist attacks of 2002 (ABC News: 29/09/07). The links between Al-Qaeda and the perpetrators of the Bali bombings are not subtle:

> The attack was a Jemaah Islamiyah operation, but it is thought that Al-Qaeda helped with advice and training. Al-Qaeda and senior Jemaah Islamiyah member Hambali (arrested in Thailand in August 2003) provided funds. Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, including Hambali and Samudra*, received training in Afghanistan - probably from Al-Qaeda. *Imam Samudra coordinated the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist cell that conducted the 2002 Bali attack (Australian Government 2004: Chapter 6).

Conversely, the Solomon Islands and East-Timor peace-keeping missions have not combated any terrorist groups, or any armed groups for that matter, possessing the will and demonstrated capacity to kill and maim Australian citizens and those of her Allies. These missions have nonetheless attracted a misdistribution of troop commitments. Even today there are almost as many troops in East-Timor (1100) as there are in Iraq (1500) and more troops in East-Timor than Afghanistan (700-900), where the War on Terror began (ADF 2007).

The Australian and British governments' casualty averseness stemming from placing domestic political considerations before national security interests, though nowhere near as stark as traditional European allies, has severely impacted the possibility of achieving Coalition war aims in Afghanistan and Iraq. Max Boot shapes the consequences of failing to meet the terrorist challenge in the War on Terror:

> The insurgency war currently raging in Iraq is likely to typify the future form of warfare because it is clearly a strategy that works. The unconventional strategy, the asymmetric strategy, is obviously the way to fight a modern Western military. Terrorists now operate globally and have greater destructive potential than ever before. Any comparison of the two major attacks on American soil in the twentieth century makes this demonstrably clear. On 11 September 2001, nineteen men armed with box cutters killed far more Americans than the Imperial Japanese Navy did on 7 December 1941. This is a microcosm of the trend that places more destructive power in the hands of fewer individuals. Dealing with guerrilla and terrorist warfare is no longer optional for Western militaries. It is becoming an existential threat that must be faced (Boot 2007: 25).

The practical oversight to gel coercion with persuasion and the inadequate security footprint have combined to mean that many Shiite groups, political and/or religious (particularly anti-Coalition and anti-government Shia insurgents/militias) have been able to proselytize, train and equip their militias to conduct more frequent anti-Coalition attacks and participate in the nascent civil-war. A situation that has caused British military officers to pull back their forces into one central camp at Basra airport as part of Britain's phased withdrawal, from where they will be able to do little more than protect themselves. Moreover, in repetition of Vietnam, precipitous attempts to hand

over responsibility for security to indigenous coercive organs have backfired to a degree given the Iraqi Security Forces' immaturity and as it has been permitted to be penetrated by Shia militias (enabling them to strengthen their hold on the political and security organs of Iraq).

The Shia militias and Iran as a flow on effect have had a free run in the south, fuelling the anti-Coalition/Iraq government violence, insecurity and civil-war inevitably. The focus on 'force protection' and the insurgents/militias has not created a secure polity in Basra for instance anymore than it did in the American sector. Insecurity of which has strained relations between the average southern Iraqi and the British particularly, considering the failure to provide security and the associated developmental shortfall has been frowned on by the population, from day one (Egnell 2006: 1068-1069).

An outcome threatening to tear the country apart now many of the various ethnic and/or religious groups feel it necessary to provide for their own protection and/or enact coercive violence to strengthen there position at the political level. The lack of security is degrading indigenous Iraqi support for the war and feeding the insurgent and militia components of the conflict (given each wing's policy of violent reciprocity).

Spiritual leader of Iraq's majority Shia, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani warned in October 2007 that the insecurity in southern Iraq is alienating the population there and risking the disintegration of the Coalition's end goal of a democratic Iraq. A spokesman for Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, Sheik Abdul-Mahdi al-Karbalai expanded on the issue of insecurity in southern Iraq after claiming 200 people had been killed in Basra between July and October 2007: "It is the right of the citizen to enjoy stability and security. If these aspirations are not met, who will guarantee that the citizens will continue supporting the political process" (MSNBC News: 26/10/07). A coherent, democratic and demilitarized Iraq has been jeopardized as a result. Insurgent and militia driven violence is most virulent in the American sectors however. Naturally therefore this study will focus on American counter-insurgency practice in Iraq from this point.

Fallujah: Operation 'Phantom Fury' (the battle of Fallujah) is an example of American coercive strategy in microcosm. Fallujah illustrates that where coercive force has been applied by the US it has been conducted in a vacuum for the most part. Fallujah is also important because it is an example of how the Coalition has not learnt the lessons of Vietnam in their entirety.

Iraqi Sunni insurgents and foreign terrorists had established a secure base of operations in certain Iraqi cities in and around the Sunni Triangle in the inevitable chaos of the 2003 post major combat environment (see map). These insurgent bases were unacceptable to the Coalition and so Fallujah was assaulted in April and November 2004 by the Coalition (mainly American troops with some British Special Forces) and a few Iraqi military elements in order to retake the city. Prior to the assault US forces evacuated civilians from the city via secured check points to ensure minimal insurgent leakage. The city was assaulted soon after by Coalition soldiers and marines in a battle that would inflict enormous casualties on the insurgency- the 'kill ratio' would prove to be an estimated 1200 insurgents Killed In Action (of approximately 2-3000) to 38 US troops (Global Security 2007: Operation 'Phantom Fury').

By the evacuation of the city's civilians the US made sure it mitigated civilian deaths and departed from the Vietnam paradigm of unfocussed violence. It was assumed this would prevent any loss of ground on the cognitive front. Ultimately this assumption proved invalid as the military success of the operation was not capitalized upon, leaving the residents of Fallujah worse off than they were pre Coalition assault. The Coalition opted not to rebuild the city after the assault, missing an opportunity to win hearts and minds. Rather than being seen as benevolent liberators and benefactors, not only by residents of Fallujah but the people of the Middle-East in general, the Coalition was instead seen as heartless, destructive occupiers.

'Phantom Fury' contained an inherently small margin of error given the prejudices of the people of Iraq and the Middle-East, thus the failure to remedy the damage inflicted was seen as further evidence of the supposed "imperial" Coalition. A direct result of de-linking coercion from persuasion in the main, for the Fallujah paradigm followed American standard operating procedure and is indicative of American coercive strategy writ large, wherein from May 2003 to May 2005 for example a token 6% of US military operations were designed to create a secure

158

environment for the Iraqi people. The overwhelming focus was on Search & Destroy, Cordon & Search etc, in order to expedite the liquidation of the enemy (Aylwin-Foster 2005: 5)- Vietnam revisited.

The city may have been left in rubble for one of two reasons. Either because the Coalition did not have the resources available to secure and rebuild or it was left demolished in resemblance of the Israeli counter-terrorism tactic of demolishing the houses of the families of terrorists in a punitive deterrent policy. The people of Fallujah may or may not have cooperated with and supported the insurgents as a whole willingly (certainly part of it did), but collectively punishing the people of Fallujah, be it by design or neglect, overlooked pertinent lessons of Vietnam. Populations occupied by armed insurgents rarely have any choice- opposition is liquidated. The examples of Viet-Cong and Taliban/Al-Qaeda control of rural villages in South-Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate this dynamic.

The destruction of Communist held villages during the Vietnam War did not win any hearts and minds, the "grab em by the balls" approach was an unqualified disaster in relation to the persuasive war. Particularly when non-Communist villages were decimated (occurred frequently). Neither Iraqi nor Coalition reconstruction elements were inserted into Fallujah or temporarily diverted from Afghanistan to rebuild the city. From the Iraqis' point of view at least the insurgents had left the people of Fallujah their homes. Rebuilding Fallujah would have been tangible evidence of the Coalition's benevolent intentions, especially had it been rebuilt better than before as a symbolic example of the benefits of liberation, cooperation and collaboration, thereby mitigating cognitive opposition in Iraq and the region. A mini Hue paradigm was enacted instead and the results were almost identical. Fallujah demonstrates that coercion, as in Vietnam, has been conducted in a vacuum in Iraq for the most part:

> Washington's overall strategic objective in Iraq is reconstruction*, which depends on the acquiescence or support of Iraqis, but US actions in Fallujah were authorized and justified in terms of the 'war' on terrorism and force protection; that is, on its ability to pursue and destroy its enemies. Washington's approach was predicated on the neo-realist belief that military might could not only establish a set of connections between US and Iraqi practices (thereby fixing specific identities and practices), but also that the totality of US power could be exercised *in isolation* from its stated objectives. Power relations in Fallujah were in this way based on military capabilities… Physical force was used to punish, challenge or shape the environment, even though historical experience suggests that such situations are best understood in terms of the limited ability of military capabilities to mould and conduct the self-awareness of those involved. For power in a city such as Fallujah concerns the ability to influence and protect, as well as to coerce, constrain, punish, destroy or intimidate (italics added) (Hills 2005: 194). *In all senses- politically, physically, ideologically, psychologically.

The flouted opportunity to rebuild Fallujah and increase popular support levels ensured the operation achieved a portion of its objectives, since this critical area of Iraq was not Cleared and Held physically *and* cognitively by the conduct of coercive violence *in isolation*. The primary reason the considerable physical damage committed upon the insurgency did not automatically translate into campaign headway anymore than it did in Vietnam.

In turn the critical intelligence asset pool in the largest Sunni city, located in the heartland of the Sunni insurgency, was not augmented either, inhibiting the effectiveness of the Coalition's residual coercive wings operating there more so. This coercive operation did nothing to harm the insurgency's support base because it was not tied to persuasive calculations. The Fallujah case study demonstrates that the US has grasped some lessons of Vietnam, namely the importance of civilian casualty mitigation, but that it has not fully grasped them all, like the Reconstruction & Development link to the persuasive war or the link between coercion and persuasion in general. As Dobbins concurs in his own assessment of the Fallujah assault: "Pulverizing cities to root out insurgents may restore some control to the Iraqi government, but the benefits are unlikely to last long if the damage also alienates the population" (Dobbins 2005: 18).

Stemming civilian casualties is of course an important lesson of Vietnam, but it is not the only one. Perhaps the most important lesson is to marry coercive and persuasive approaches. The Fallujah case study is Coalition operational strategy in microcosm, a strategy General Westmoreland would have appreciated. Fallujah, mimicking attrition warfare stratagems pursued in Vietnam and Afghanistan, elucidates the nonsensical waste of effort put into shaping a favourable physical environment when not followed up with operations designed to maximize this physical advantage by wielding it to shape the cognitive environment favourably in turn. In the end Fallujah was not reconstructed if nothing more than a singular example of Coalition intent.

Fallujah once again draws forth the point that unilateral military operations are worse than a waste of time. In point of fact they are counter-productive in a counter-insurgency context. The casualties suffered and inflicted by the Coalition in such operations usually leverage no lasting strategic effect as such other than to inexorably drag down indigenous and domestic support by upping the casualty count (Coalition and Iraqi) for no discernable benefit- a major casual factor of the eventual drop in both indigenous and domestic support for the Allies in Vietnam. Coalition national security imperatives have been endangered as a result, perhaps terminally regarding Iraq.

Persuasive Matrix:

The Political Factor: Democratic institutionalism has been as crucial in Iraq as it has been in Afghanistan in delimiting resistance. Demographics and attack statistics aid in demonstrating this dynamic. The four provinces that compose the Sunni heartland in Iraq account for 85% of insurgent attacks. Iraq's other 14 provinces, containing around 80% of the population, account for 15% of insurgent attacks (Iraq is approximately 60% Shiite, 20% Kurd and 20% Sunni) (CIA 2007: Iraq). Former Regime Loyalists are responsible for a majority of insurgent/terrorist attacks, predominantly carried out by the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance and the Mujahadeen Army in Iraq (together composing 70% of Ba'athist attacks). Al-Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for 15% of insurgent/terrorist attacks. It remains unclear which wing has extracted the highest body count, taking into account the jihadis' predilection for Mass Casualty Incidents (Jones 2007: 27-29) and flirtation with Weapons of Mass Destruction (in the form of rudimentary chemical weapon attacks) (MSNBC News: 22/02/07).

Sunni insurgents/terrorists are accordingly able to mount attacks due solely to the coerced or willing support (in the form of safe houses, supplies and intelligence etc) from the minority Sunni population within Iraq and/or from the 'strategic population'. There is relatively minimal anti-Coalition violence in the majority Shia and Kurdish provinces due to democratization. Where insurgent or militia attacks take place in these regions and when not conducted or supported by Tehran or Damascus (frequently), they are aimed in equal measure at the Iraqi Security Forces, competing terror and/or militia cells, the Iraqi government or is more for the 'defence' of sect or ethnic group as opposed to any high minded anti-Coalition ideology capable of attaining coalescence that accounts for the majority of violence in these areas (Biddle 2006: 3-4).

The Communist Vietnamese version of 'people's war' was as much about capturing ideas as it was killing the enemy. To counter this type of insurgency the Allies sought purely to kill or capture those fighting for that idea until too late in the piece. Though Iraq is not a 'people's war' but more an ethnic and religiously based conflict, it is the government and Coalition attempting to capture the ideas of the Iraqi people towards revolutionizing Iraqi society whilst liquidating their enemies. In this way the Coalition fulfils the revolutionary role the Communists did in Vietnam strangely enough.

On the other hand the ethnic minority Sunni insurgents in Iraq today are predominantly concerned with the liquidation of their enemies (including those who happen to form the majority), playing

the Allies' role in Vietnam in effect. To this revolutionary end the transitional post Saddam Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred power back to Iraqis in June 2004, instigating the unavoidable and excruciatingly slow democratic process Iraq is currently undertaking.

Iraq's democratic elections were enabled by simultaneous political, psychological and military operations on the two days in Iraq post 2003 where the country has been sufficiently secured to do so- the 2005 Constitutional and Council of Representatives election days. The cities and villages of Iraq were secured sufficiently for one day at least to permit Iraqis to vote (enabled by nation wide curfews, no drive laws and so on). Tellingly however, although elections were well received in the Shia and Kurdish zones from the outset, Sunnis were originally coerced and/or persuaded by tribal chiefs, Imams and insurgents not to vote in the January constitutional elections.

Turnout in Sunni areas was extremely low subsequently. Coalition military operations and the realization the Iraqi Security Forces were being developed to protect the nascent democratic infrastructure turned this around. Most Sunni insurgent supporters came to resile themselves to the new Iraq and participated to maximize their own sect's influence in the new government (i.e. not necessarily because they support the concept but as they are playing the game enforced upon them). Consequently, by the representative elections in December 2005 turnout in the Sunni areas skyrocketed. For example, turnout in Sunni Nanawa and Salah ad Din provinces blew out from 17% and 19% respectively in the January elections to 70% and 98% respectively in December. Similarly spectacular was turnout in Al Anbar province, the heartland of the insurgency, going from 2% in January to 86% in December. Nationally turnout rose from 58% in January to 77% by December (Cordesman 2006: 6).

A caveat is required here, for while it is true this indicates popular support for the Coalition's *goals*, Coalition strategy as implemented has not translated this goal oriented support into a more general form of support. Most Iraqis support the evolution of democracy but not necessarily the ones bringing them this democracy, they do not support the Coalition itself- strange but true. It appears most Iraqis, like the people of Afghanistan and Vietnam, favour self-rule over subjugation and though there are many thorny issues to be dealt with it appears democratic consensus politics is slowly establishing itself in Iraq. The majority of Iraqis have sided with the Iraqi government and democratic rule in regards to their political future.

162

But below the surface the persuasive campaign is not as rosy as would seem. Iraqis view the political process as a positive but it has not been enough in and of itself to win the cognitive war for the Coalition, let alone the war proper. Deep mistrust and dislike abounds among Iraqis concerning the occupation, lack of development and day-to-day insecurity. Highlighting the dangers of relying on a segregated and primarily 'political' persuasive strategy (Vietnam inverse on the persuasive front) and a disassociated coercive stratagem that takes up the majority of the Coalition's energy on the ground (Vietnam repeat).

Focusing on 'political action' within the persuasive matrix and 'attrition' within the coercive matrix has not failed to maintain ground won alone, it has lost it. Consider 47% of Iraqis supported attacks on Coalition forces in January 2006 (16% of Kurds, 41% of Shiites and 88% of Sunnis). Nine short months later in September 2006 the figure had jumped to 61% overall (15% of Kurds, 62% of Shiites and 92% of Sunnis) (O'Hanlon & Campbell 2007: 44). A September 2007 ABC/BBC news poll put the figures of Iraqis supporting attacks on Coalition troops at 93% of Sunnis, 50% of Shia and overall at 57% of Iraqis (BBC News 10/09/07), meaning the Coalition no longer enjoys coalescence. Those who feel the Coalition invasion was worth the trouble tally 98% of Shiites, 91% of Kurds and 13% of Sunnis, 77% overall. When asked if Iraq is heading in the right direction 84% of Shiites, 76% of Kurds and 6% of Sunnis (64% overall) answered yes (O'Hanlon & Kamp 2006: 39-48) - explicitly drawing out the strengths of democratic evolution in counter-insurgency exercises.

The political factor of democratization is not all powerful in counter-insurgency warfare however. Iraqis have embraced democracy, namely the majority Shia and Kurds, something that has proved essential in mitigating Coalition opposition. In practice what this has meant is that the Shia and Kurds have not opposed the Coalition in the main, quite different from active, overt support. They are no more bothered for instance than the Sunnis by Coalition casualties. Nor are they in any rush to provide intelligence and support to the Coalition's coercive campaign.

The majority of Iraqis support democratic evolution but the persuasive strategy of predominantly 'political action' has not sustained coalescence let alone won the war for the Coalition, implications to the contrary inherent to the Model of Political Primacy notwithstanding. It must also be briefly mentioned that a politically negotiated solution has been sought with some Sunni insurgent groups by the US (the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades). Unlike Vietnam though and to the US' credit they have not relied on a 'political solution' with the

insurgents, terrorists and militias thus far, they have only attempted it in places (BBC News: 23/03/07). Having said this there are signs the US may be moving toward a reliance on a by-proxy political solution with the 'surge' strategy and its aim to mollify the violence in Iraq enough for Iraq's ethnic factions to reach some kind of political arrangement (covered below).

Neo counter-insurgency persuasive warfare blueprints that *depend* on an agonisingly slow and convoluted political process in order to negate fast moving insurgent and militia elements, not a few of whom choose to transcend the political dimension (ill advised as it may be), might not be the optimal course today. President Bush exhibited his own frustration in August 2007, commenting the political progress of Iraqi Prime Minister al-Malaki's government to date in relation to national reconciliation and power and wealth sharing agreements amongst Iraq's ethnic groups had been "frustrating". Iraqis themselves are becoming disillusioned with and tired of the political infighting stemming from the fact that Sunni, Shia and Kurdish politicians have no shared vision for Iraq at present. A situation exacerbated when the largest Sunni block of the Iraqi government withdrew its support in August 2007 (MSNBC News: 02/08/07). Leading analysts like George Packer, staff writer for the New Yorker and author of *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq*, to describe the Iraqi government as not dysfunctional but non-functional;

> there is basically a problem of lack of shared vision by the three main factions, Sunni, Shia and Kurd. Several American diplomats with a lot of experience in Iraq have said to me that they have grown to despair of the possibility of achieving accommodation, let alone reconciliation, because at bottom there is no shared vision among the major groups. And also, those groups themselves, their leaders, are really isolated from the Iraqi people. A lot of polls show that Iraqis are fed up with sectarian government, and many of these leaders came from exile and have not established deep grassroots support. Instead, they've got militias and they've got cronies who they put in positions of power, and that's why the government is unable to function (Newshour: 22/08/07).

What is more, it can by no measure be guaranteed that were the various Iraqi political parties to come to some kind of political arrangement that it would be honoured by the insurgents/terrorists or militias. The worth of settlements negotiated with North-Vietnam and the Taliban/Al-Qaeda in Pakistan has been reviewed. The relationship between Sunni politicians and the various insurgent groups is hazy. The situation is unlike that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its military wings. *Should* Iraqi politicians reach a 'political arrangement' in the short to mid-term (if at all), it does not guarantee the military wings of the insurgency and militias will follow suit or that Coalition popular indigenous support levels will increase, support of which forms the geo-political foundation stone of the War on Terror.

Nor would it assure that Coalition forces or domestic Coalition publics will not be attacked by the various insurgent, terrorist and militia elements following any agreement because the Coalition is separate from the Iraqi political process, it plays no part and has no representatives in the Iraqi parliament. An intra-political understanding amongst Iraqi politicians will not mean the Coalition has come to a 'political' understanding with the insurgents, terrorists and militias of Iraq, or the people for that matter. Political support and popular support are two different notions in Iraq and Afghanistan and to confuse them the way the Model of Political Primacy does threatens the attainment of the Coalition's bottom line in the War on Terror.

Security, Reconstruction & Development- A Rejoinder: The inability to fully comprehend the persuasive matrix beyond democratic institutionalism is inhibiting the war effort in other ways. Counter-insurgency and nation building are intimately linked. Vietnam provides ample evidence of this. In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, such development efforts have stalled for want of a coercive shield:

> Without security, a country has nothing but disorder, distrust and desperation- an utterly Hobbesian situation in which fear pervades and raw force dominates. This is why violence-ridden societies turn to almost any political force that promises to provide order, even if it is oppressive. It is a big reason why the CPA was unable to spend most of the $18.6 billion for Iraqi reconstruction appropriated by congress last fall. And it explains why a country must first have a state before it can become a democracy. The primary requirement of a state is that it hold a monopoly on the use of violence. By that measure, the body that the United States transferred power to in Baghdad on June 28 [2004] may have been a government- but it was not a state (Diamond 2004: 37-38).

While it is hoped by the insurgents that their violence as enacted will morph into a cognitive victory akin to North-Vietnam's and see an exhausted and divided Coalition driven out as a result of the violent atmosphere, the more immediate aim is to hinder the development of Iraq's infrastructure- one of the most important factors in counter-insurgency persuasive warfare and an enterprise prevented in no small measure by the insurgency's strategic doctrine.

The various insurgent/terrorist groups, by forestalling development and the delivery of basic services via terror and violence, are causing Iraqis to become apathetic at best or resentful and hostile at worst towards the Coalition and Iraqi government. Reconstruction expertise, since mainly found in the international civilian sphere, has fled or stayed out of Iraq because of the insecurity. Attempts to man and train Iraqi Security Forces have been violently sabotaged in a similar vein:

These people know what they're doing. They are trying to terrorize the people who have come here… to try and assist in the reconstruction of Iraq on the one hand and by the suicide bombings of recruits to the Iraqi police force and the Iraqi National Guard they're clearly trying to deter the build up of Iraq's own security forces which everybody, including the United States command here, regards as absolutely essential to the entire American enterprise in Iraq (Burns 2004).

On top of the physical liquidation of their enemies, the insurgents and terrorists have been able to effectively thwart micro-level persuasive counter-insurgency operations with coercive violence. By deliberately targeting development projects and creating an insecure environment they have consistently rendered impotent the government and Coalition's ability to rebuild the country and thereby win popular support. The initiative was seized early for Iraqi insurgents and terrorists immediately recognized the need to hinder persuasive Reconstruction & Development projects. In essence Iraqi insurgents have repeatedly accomplished what this thesis recommended in the praxis model of chapter one.

Technically the insurgency has thrown its own coercive shield around the population time and again, preventing the Coalition from getting at it for persuasive purposes (where outside of elections the Coalition has tried that is for persuasion is no longer the operational priority-coercion is). Its relatively small size aside, the insurgency has crippled national development projects, the provision of aid and so forth, derived from the realization that such persuasive operations are essential to the Coalition's war effort.

An additional result of the insecurity and terror has been that many developmental projects have morphed into short term security oriented activities, along with the fact that 20% plus of aid spending now goes directly into security for the relatively few reconstruction programs undertaken. International investors, Non-Governmental Organizations and even the United Nations have refused to operate for the most part in the country due to the insecure environment. Iraqi insurgents recognize the imperative that all levels of life must be harassed in Iraq if they are to prevail. The reason it is not beneath them to mine garbage piles (to maim and kill garbagemen) in order to prevent any sense of normalcy in Iraq, coercive violence that morphs into anti-government and anti-Coalition sentiment.

Insurgents deliberately target the oil infrastructure in a parallel effort to inhibit Iraq's sole economic card, responsible for 94% of Gross Domestic Product. Estimates range from 300-700 attacks on oil infrastructure since 2003. In December 2005 oil production dropped below pre-war

levels of 2.5 million barrels a day down to 1.57 million barrels a day, costing Iraq approximately $11 billion until then (the cost rises daily). The impact of such deliberate targeting is a major casual factor of the Iraqi government's inability to improve its citizenry's lot, raising disaffection and fuelling the insurgency and militias. Again, this persuasive/coercive symbiosis was realized by the insurgency early on. The slow pace of reconstruction insurgent violence engendered meant that in the crucial first year of the war an infinitesimal $400 million of the $18.4 billion designated for development was spent (OSI & UNF 2004: 60), losing essential counter-insurgency initiative.

Resembling Afghanistan, indigenous employment is neither a focus as what development is being conducted is predominantly accomplished by foreign nationals, failing to take young Iraqi men off the street and offer alternatives to the insurgency and militias (now likely among the largest private employers in Iraq). Incredibly, even truck drivers are being imported from Pakistan, China and around the Middle-East to drive government and Coalition supply trucks. Now certainly many Iraqis would hesitate to drive these trucks considering the threat of attack, another way the insurgency's coercive violence has been tied to the war's persuasive matrix, but they are certainly not being given ample opportunity to decide for themselves.

To remedy this situation the US State Department in late 2004 felt it necessary to go to the US Congress itself to acquire the authority to reorient reconstruction spending away from large scale infrastructure projects implemented by expensive and often corrupt foreign contractors to smaller scale projects directed toward more immediate results at the grass-roots level, through indigenous Iraqi contractors where possible. The intent was to focus development programs more on Iraqi self-sufficiency and sustainability to dry up the insurgency's recruiting pool to the extent possible (Rathmell 2005: 1036).

Outside the US State Department the dynamics of insurgencies, employment and development are still often misunderstood. In any case such programs are delimited by insecurity. Civil infrastructure projects, government buildings, health clinics, schools and so on are frequently bombed to rubble by insurgents. Persuasive progress is constantly threatened, both physically and cognitively. As in Vietnam and Afghanistan the dangers of theorizing and conducting persuasive and coercive counter-insurgency operations independently has been missed from the beginning and initiative has inevitably been hamstrung. Ignoring Vietnam in general and the reasons for the evolution of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support scheme most notably

(the agency eventually developed in Vietnam to marry civilian/persuasive practices and military/coercive operations under one agency to one end- winning the people of South-Vietnam):

> Difficulties arose as the Coalition's civilian leadership only sporadically acknowledged the causal linkages between security and other policy areas such as political and economic reforms. The military leadership meanwhile, did not do a good job of conceptualizing the campaign as an integrated political-military effort, sometimes failing to put tactical military operations in the broader political context (Rathmell 2005: 1031).

Corruption has also reared its head in Iraq and is inhibiting the persuasive and coercive matrices in the fashion it did in Vietnam and is in Afghanistan. According to an Iraqi finance minister, Ali Allawi, insurgents take 40-50% of oil-smuggling profits in Iraq by infiltrating governmental structures. Corrupt government officials and crime syndicates take the rest, probably in concert. Iraq's Defence Ministry has been compromised in a similar vein by corruption, with $1 billion missing from the ministry's coffers. Despite what the media has reported about the Iraqi Security Forces being outgunned by the insurgents because of a failure on the Coalition's part, it is actually Iraqi politicians, criminals, militias and insurgents who are rotting these forces from within. Not only by infiltration of the security forces but by also infiltrating the political organs responsible for equipment, training, pay and doctrine development etc (Cockburn 2005).

To be fair there is little the Coalition can do about such things, lest they prove insurgent propaganda correct and become true overlords. This has resulted in the Iraqi Defence Ministry, in spite (or because) of having ample funds to purchase adequate equipment, has instead purchased third rate weapons systems past their use by date from second rate suppliers like Egypt, Pakistan and Poland.

For instance, via contracts negotiated by shady middle men in Baghdad (as opposed to being negotiated directly by the Ministry), it purchased 28 year old Soviet helicopters from Poland at least three years past their use by date. The case of the MP5 automatic machine-guns purchase demonstrates how these scams unfold. Corrupt officials purchased cheap Egyptian knock offs at $200 each, claimed they were top of the line copies worth $3, 500 each and pocketed the remainder. Armoured cars that were in fact unarmoured have been purchased and a deal was made to purchase 7.62mm bullets worth 4-6 cents each for 16 cents each. In all, approximately $200 million at best of the ministry's $1.3 billion procurement budget has been spent on usable equipment. When one factors in the $500-$600 million suspected to have been siphoned from the Electricity, Transport, Interior and other ministries the total figure lost so far to indigenous corruption blows out to around $2 billion (Cockburn 2005).

The deleterious effects of these actions are self-evident, particularly when superimposed onto Vietnam. This corruption undercuts growth and viability while simultaneously bankrolling the insurgency and militias. It remains to be seen whether this state of affairs will prove terminal in the manner it did in Vietnam, for its "gone beyond Nigeria levels now where it really threatens national security… The insurgents are involved at all levels"- Ali Allawi (Cordesman 2006: 5).

Yet it should be remembered that the democratic institutions governing Iraq now have a better chance of reining in this corruption than the Republic of Vietnam since corruption, as far as can be told, is not a matter of governmental policy and such incidents are apparently being investigated. The reason it has not caused the complete disassociation of the population from the government. Iraqis seem to understand these are individual criminal, militia and insurgent enterprises and not a matter of governmental policy the way it was under the Republic of Vietnam, a factor that has mitigated the cognitive damage done by indigenous corruption.

Other guises of corruption are hindering the war effort, namely domestic Coalition, international and multinational corruption. Numerous development projects contracted to Coalition, international or multinational companies have not been fulfilled or have been inadequately constructed or delivered. Government buildings, health clinics, sanitation and school projects for example, where built, have regularly been constructed with sub-standard building supplies, causing injury to civilians and school children. One American company, Parsons, was directed by the US Congress in September 2006 to rectify a sub-standard police academy in Baghdad it had erected under a $72 million contract. Deficiencies included leaking sewerage pipes and the erosion of concrete floors and reinforced steel. US Congressman Henry A. Waxman was forced to write to Parsons in November 2007 to insist these deficiencies be addressed;

> "the ceilings are still stained with excrement, parts of the structures are crumbling, and sections of the buildings are unusable because the toilets are filthy and nonfunctioning";

> "[t]he concrete used in the construction was substandard and is already collapsing in places because of the constant rain of sewage"; and

> "[t]he problems were so severe ... that the military had also been obliged to build new latrines outside and demolish some structures entirely and start over" (Waxman 2007).

Many contracted aid and humanitarian deliveries meanwhile have simply not been conducted, making the trend of privatization in military circles too dangerous a practice to be justified in the 'mission critical' areas of aid and humanitarian succour at a minimum. Not to mention the flouted opportunity to garner good will by Coalition forces delivering these aid and humanitarian services

themselves. The American company Haliburton has probably been the worst of many private international, multinational and Coalition firms to engage in corrupt acts. It has been accused repeatedly of criminal actions, from overcharging for fuel and cutting corners in construction projects to billing for services not rendered, totalling $1.8 billion (Singer 2005: 121). If true, treasonous conduct at a time of war.

Regarding the persuasive warfare effort, what is interesting is that although democratic political evolution was neglected in Vietnam by the Allies' focus on grass-roots persuasive operations (development/'civic action' and so forth), the persuasive focus and dependency on the macro-level democratic political process in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is flailing in a parallel vein. Contributing to the persuasive struggle is the fact the Coalition precipitously handed the Iraqi government the main (but not total) responsibility for development. The problem being, because elected Iraqi officials have been pre-occupied with arguing over the make up of the constitution, government and power and wealth sharing legislation, they have neglected nearly everything else. Reconstruction & Development programs have been inadequate as a result and in combination with corruption and insecurity it is proving an added inhibitor of the persuasive war.

Until recently, where coercion had been tentatively linked on the ground to the persuasive war outside of the main effort of attrition, the Coalition and Iraqi government's main focus had been on utilizing this coercive violence to protect the political process per se (by protecting Iraqi politicians, defending polling sites and government buildings etc). The 'Green Zone' is one example of the ramifications of this focus. This zone is a section of Baghdad where well off Iraqi and international politicians, ambassadors, military officers and professionals live and work. Its higher levels of both security and development have not helped the cause at the grass-roots level. Iraqis are naturally angered when they contrast their living standards with that of the 'Green Zone'.

In the grand-scheme of things infrequently has Coalition coercive violence been conducted in order to provide a protective shield proper for Iraqis themselves *and* micro-level persuasive operations. In such circumstances coercive violence has most definitely been conducted to support 'political action' and 'political action' almost alone. Analysts like Baldwin recommended development be sped up as early as December 2003, well before the insurgency got going, since it is a powerful signal not just to Iraqis but the entire Islamic world that "the West wishes to be a partner in humanity, despite differences in belief" (Baldwin 2003: 435).

Development is the tangible evidence of goodwill, instigating an effect as important as 'political' words and action, but is an effect impossible to accomplish minus security. The inability to secure the country and the belated attempt to remedy this situation by the evolution of the Iraqi Security Forces has meant the flow on inability to reconstruct and develop the country- physically and cognitively. The Iraqi Security Forces' development was possibly not begun in time as their coercive role on an indigenous institutional level was under-estimated from day one, given the Model of Political Primacy. Currently roughly 134,700 Iraqi troops and 188,300 police officers have been trained. 85 Iraqi military units are "in the lead" or operating independently and 21 military units are fighting "side by side" with Coalition forces. Independent Police combat battalions number only 5 while 27 are operating "side by side" with the Coalition (O'Hanlon & Campbell 2007: 25-26).

The numbers sound impressive but it is quality that counts and to date Iraqi Security Forces have been unable to secure even Baghdad independently. Indeed, as a temporary (approximately 1 year) measure the US was forced to commit a latent 'surge' capacity of around 17,000 troops in January 2007 in an attempt to re-secure Baghdad and the surrounding environs (plus 4,000 more marines to help secure Al Anbar province), on account of the Iraqi Security Forces' shortfalls and the spiralling insurgent and sectarian violence. Moreover, President Bush himself recently admitted that Baghdad had not been pacified because Coalition forces did not previously remain in areas they had won with military force:

> In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighbourhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared (Bush 2007).

To reduce counter-insurgency strategy to a matter of troop levels risks over-simplifying the problem. The aforementioned outcome was not merely a matter of troop levels, it was as much a matter of operational orientation (i.e. because US forces were conducting Search & Destroy operations alone in Baghdad). The (re)realization of the requirement for more Clear & Hold operations (it remains to be seen whether, mimicking the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, Clear & Hold evolves into a base-line operational tenet) *four* years after the war began could mean the nascent 'surge' is now;

> too large for the political climate at home, too small to crush the insurgency in Iraq and surely three years too late… The Chiefs also complain that the surge seems to involve only guys with guns. There is a widespread feeling that the Pentagon has shouldered the entire load in Iraq while U.S. government agencies better suited for reorganizing political and economic systems have dropped the ball. Other agencies, most notably State, Justice and Energy departments, lag in sending experts and advisors to help the Iraqis pull themselves together. Uniformed

> Officers say they can pull off a surge, but it won't make any difference if there isn't a larger, government-wide strategy to mend the broken country (Duffy 2007: 18 & 20).

US Army General David Petraeus' initial September 2007 report on the 'surge' indicated the augmented emphasis on population security (Clear & Hold) was responsible for the significant security oriented headway made in an impressively short time frame, most notably in Baghdad, Al Anbar and central Iraq (Newshour: 12/09/07). The overdue decision to interdict Iranian military, paramilitary and intelligence operatives supplying, coordinating and/or conducting attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces and civilians has been similarly vital. For instance, the 'surge' has gestated a 75% reduction in religious and ethnic/sectarian killings to date (Shanahan: 2007). The question becomes will US forces continue to carve coercive inroads and concurrently translate coercive headway made into persuasive headway or will these painstaking gains be squandered in repetition of the 2004 Fallujah model?

An outcome jeopardized by the Bush administration's forecast to proceed with the intended early-mid 2008 draw down of the 'surge' in the wake of American battlefield successes. Coalition militaries and governments have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from Vietnam era calculations equating enemy Killed In Action with progress in the war as a whole. The US administration may nevertheless be using attack statistics in lieu (see 2007 graph below) to extrapolate campaign wide progress from statistical indices measuring one part of the coercive matrix.

Vietnam pushed home the ramifications of using statistical indices of progress in one half of the war (enemy Killed In Action), extrapolated from computer banks in the American embassy in Saigon, to quantify progress at the campaign level. The intended draw down of the 'surge' threatens to preclude follow on persuasive progress, an outcome that could inflict concomitant effects to that the withdrawal of American forces had in relation to the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (draw downs in both cases inextricably tied to the lack of domestic resolve, in turn the result by no small measure of sub-par counter-insurgency campaigns). Particularly if security levels in Al Anbar, Baghdad and central Iraq retrograde following American troop reductions. A better than even chance considering the Iraqi Security Forces' inability to hold what ground US forces have made during the 'surge' in its entirety (BBC News: 25/06/07).

(BBC News: 14/09/07).

The proposed American draw down of the 'surge' would not be such a military problem were Britain and Australia to take their responsibility more seriously and commit forces to fill the coercive void departing US troops will leave in central Iraq and Al Anbar province. In any event, other analysts concur with the Joint Chiefs' concerns over the military focus of the 'surge'.

Packer for one has labelled the 'surge' "superficial" because its operational intent as he sees it is purely military. Packer and Laith Kubba (former spokesman for Iraq's previous government from April 2005 to January 2006) are of the opinion the 'surge' is only tentatively linked to the persuasive war, in that it is hoped outside the immediate goal of enhancing local security the 'surge' will quell sectarian and insurgent violence enough to create 'breathing space' amongst

Iraq's ethnic political factions to foment some kind of political solution to the war. Kubba is also of the opinion that the 'surge' is not achieving this aim so far: "I think the recent 'surge' was supposed to create the space and the opportunity to fix that dysfunctional political system. So far it hasn't happened, and I think this is what's adding to everybody's frustration". Packer added as a consequence of the operation's military focus Reconstruction & Development remains stultified in Iraq and emigration levels continue to be high (Newshour: 22/08/07).

Zakaria has estimated it would cost as little as $100 million to take advantage of the 'surge' to reinvigorate Iraqi infrastructure and restart Iraq's state owned companies. Developmental outcomes of which are necessary if the 'surge' is to have a broader persuasive impact than upon the narrowly defined and presently traction-less intra-Iraqi political process:

> An economic surge is long overdue. One of the less-remarked-upon blunders of the Coalition Provisional Authority was that- consumed by free-market ideology- it shut down all of Iraq's state-owned enterprises. This crippled the bulk of Iraq's non-oil economy, threw hundreds of thousands of workers into the streets and further alienated the Sunnis, who were the managerial class of the country. The economic effects of this decision have been seismic. For example, Iraq's agricultural productivity has plummeted because fertilizer plants were summarily closed. Unemployment in non-Kurdish Iraq remains close to 50 percent, which helps explain why so many young men are joining gangs, militias and insurgent groups. For the moment at least, democracy in Iraq has sharpened the country's divisions. Capitalism and commerce can make them less relevant. That is the lesson of many conflict-ridden countries from Northern Ireland to Mozambique to Vietnam…

> Of the original 193 state enterprises, 143 could be restarted soon, says Brinkley*. Management and workers are desperate to get jobs. The problem is money. Brinkley points out that his next target, a ceramics factory in Ramadi, is only waiting for two generators before it can reopen. They cost $1 million each. But funds for this purpose are hard to find. Washington has pledged more than $18 billion to fund "reconstruction" in Iraq but will not appropriate a cent to start up state-owned Iraqi companies. The Iraqi government has billions in oil revenue of its own but is so dysfunctional that it cannot move a new project through the system. So the factory is idle. A major global consulting firm has reviewed Iraq's state-owned enterprises and estimated that it would cost $100 million to restart all of them and employ more than 150,000 Iraqis- $100 million. That's as much money as the American military will spend in Iraq in the next 12 hours (Zakaria 2007). *Paul Brinkley, a US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

The failure to tie micro-level persuasive operations to the 'surge' in all probability explains for the most part why popular support levels have not risen in line with enhanced security levels. At the same time Iraqi opinion differs from official US assessments of the 'surge'- approximately 70% of Iraqis believe the 'surge' has made matters worse (see graph below). This may be explained by the increased fighting required to retake insurgent and militia strongholds for little discernable benefit (the poll also shows approximately 70% of Iraqis think the 'surge' has had a

negative effect on reconstruction and development respectively). Iraqis only see the increased violence necessary to eject the insurgents, terrorists and militias in isolation (living in a war-zone is not a positive in anyone's book). Iraqi opinion might be persuaded to view the 'surge' more favourably were it not a quasi Fallujah 2004 operation and Iraqis saw follow on micro-level persuasive operations as a reward.

(BBC News: 10/09/07).

US strategy has not been completely recast. US forces stationed on and around the outskirts of Baghdad in cities like Baqubah are not on pacification duties. Rather these forces have been designated Search & Destroy missions in order to offset an enemy counter-offensive into Baghdad. Essential pacification missions in these areas are not being conducted because of a lack of sufficiently trained Iraqi Security Forces to hold all the gains made under the 'surge' and the necessity on the part of US forces to fight on a multitude of fronts with precious few competent troops:

> US forces have been trying to achieve critical mass in Baghdad with the addition of extra forces, accepting that there will be some losses on the periphery and that they will not be able to establish the degree of control around Baghdad that is considered ideal. US troops in towns such as Baqubah on the outskirts of Baghdad are feeling the effects of the lack of critical mass. They are conducting an economy of force mission characterized by insufficient troops in the face of a very determined enemy. Their mission is not pacification; their task is simply to disrupt the activities of insurgent forces to prevent them from using the Baghdad belt as a staging ground for an offensive into Baghdad itself (Boot 2007: 9-10).

Boot additionally provides a clearer picture of the change in US strategy concerning US operations in Al Anbar province, in cities like Al Qa'im, Fallujah, Hit and Ramadi where Clear & Hold operations have ironically become easier than in other areas of Iraq. Boot points out that the military success of the US Army and Marines' strategy in Al Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq has been enabled in the main by the realignment of the former Sunni tribal elements of the insurgency and their contribution to intelligence and local 'holding' operations.

But to recap, this shift was not a product of political negotiation/compromise or Coalition persuasive operations. It was the result of an assessment of self-interest by the Sunni sheiks in light of the indiscriminate, self-defeating coercive campaign of terror perpetrated by the other segments of the insurgency and the desire to protect their lucrative smuggling networks, which Boot acknowledges (American pay-offs did not hurt but were not the key factor). Progress in these Sunni areas has been enabled by another fragile marriage of convenience then, not a true alliance. Boot's analysis also appears to concur with the Joint Chiefs' and Zakaria's assessments to indicate that US forces have conducted the military phase of the operation with nought but the *hope* of obtaining funding for follow on Reconstruction & Development:

> Over the course of the last six months Ramadi, formerly one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq, has become among the safest. Ramadi was targeted by US forces, which ran a classic counterinsurgency campaign between September 2006 and February/March this year. US soldiers moved through the city, clearing it block by block, despite heavy resistance. This was one of many clearing operations conducted by US forces in Iraq. In the past, however, once a city was cleared, the troops withdrew, allowing the insurgents to return. US forces are learning from this bitter experience and they now commit not only to clearing an area, but to holding and to rebuilding it… Ramadi looks like Berlin in 1945. The streets are awash as the water mains have been destroyed and many buildings have been reduced to rubble. This has been a war zone for the last four years and, up until six months ago, the marines were struggling just to hold the government centre. Now their control extends throughout the entire city. With the clearing phase completed, US forces are turning their attention to what will be their biggest task—rebuilding the city. *Ideally, USAID or some other outside agency will be persuaded to finance the rebuild, with assistance from the Government of Iraq.* Ramadi now has a future (italics added) (Boot 2007: 8-9).

A more accurate assessment might be to discern that Ramadi and Al Anbar in general enjoy the *potential* for a future, a potential that like Fallujah in 2004 may or may not be squandered taking into account the Reconstruction & Development shortfall and the intended near term draw down of the 'surge'. The reconstruction shortfall is the result of conceptual fog regarding counter-insurgency conflicts. Precisely, micro-level persuasive operations have been handicapped by their segregated, lower tier relegation in Coalition counter-insurgency theory and practice:

Iraq is the latest, but certainly not the only case which demonstrates that ground forces must be prepared to take on stabilization and reconstruction tasks in the immediate aftermath of war. This is not a popular conclusion: both military and civilian authorities generally agree that these are civilian tasks. Civilian police should be responsible for providing law and order, they argue, and organizations such as the US Agency for International Development and the UN technical agencies should take the lead in creating governance structures, promoting economic development, and other reconstruction tasks. In principle, they are of course correct...Yet the stark reality is that in the vast majority of post-conflict situations, only the military will be capable of executing these important tasks (Bensahel 2006: 468).

Of course this does not mean development has been abandoned completely. To be sure some development projects have been carried out, but as regularly they have been physically destroyed by the insurgents/terrorists or militias. To date the total figure spent on Reconstruction & Development by the US ranges between $13.4 and $40 billion, an inadequate figure before the war commenced and a fraction of the approximate $430 billion dollars spent on the War on Terror. In other words the Coalition's military/coercive organs have, harking back to Vietnam, been delegated overwhelming budgetary and practical emphasis. It has taken four years then to use the $13.4 to $40 billion in this devastated, backwards country- a slow time frame for counter-insurgency warfare. The Iraq government is equally culpable for the Reconstruction & Development remiss it must be said. Oil rich Iraq allocated a paltry $10 billion dollars for reconstruction in 2007 (of which just 24% had been spent as at October 2007), dropping to $4 billion in 2008 (GAO 2007: 1).

Take electricity levels, pre-war they were 3958 Megawatts, by March 2006 they had reached 4106 Megawatts. The average electricity hours provided per day was 4-8 nationwide and 16-24 in Baghdad pre-war. By March 2006 it was 13.1 and 8 respectively. The inability to secure and develop the electricity grid is typical and so too are the modest gains at the national level (Baghdad electricity levels have plummeted in contrast). The insurgents and militias therefore, by inhibiting economic, social and infrastructure growth, have been able to decrease the counter-insurgents' pool of support. Finally, while unemployment levels have dropped from 50-60% in June 2003 to 25-40% in February 2006 (O'Hanlon & Kamp 2006: 25-38), this improvement has proved insufficient to affect the strategic equation. An outcome a product of the minimal economic development in Iraq, in turn a consequence of the insecure environment and poorly conceived and enacted Reconstruction & Development programs. The net effects being these projects have been unable to keep pace with Iraqi expectations.

It would seem the lesson of the importance of economic development and its dependency on coercive shields has not been taken from Vietnam adequately in practice on the ground in Iraq. Afghanistan and Iraq thereby have one other thing in common with Vietnam, persuasive Reconstruction & Development programs have been insufficiently conducted and divorced from the coercive matrix concurrently. Meaning the insurgency in Iraq retains an abundant pool of unemployed men to recruit from, men who join for fiscal reasons as much as ideological ones. That Reconstruction & Development has been conducted insufficiently is a failure of Coalition grand strategy, effective deterrent actions by the insurgency and militias and attributable to internecine political infighting among Iraq's elected officials, who remain more interested in the power balance than getting on with the job of reconstruction and winning hearts and minds.

The pervasive acts of terror have also intimidated the international community sufficiently to preclude substantial contributions of troops, dollars or development expertise (the United Nations, foreign governments and Non-Governmental Organizations alike), inhibiting the Coalition's ability to secure and develop Iraq more so. All Iraqis see as a result is one side fighting the other in a war for power- exactly what the South-Vietnamese saw. Attempts to redress this have been inhibited by the focus on macro-level democratic political evolution at the persuasive and institutional levels, the subsequent delayed effort to staff and train the Iraqi Security Forces and the practical focus on coercion (notably in relation to unilateral Search & Destroy methodologies), combining to prevent meaningful micro-level development projects.

Bewilderingly, Provincial Reconstruction Teams neither have evolved in Iraq adequately, though they have been implemented on a small scale as part of the Administration's Clear, Hold and Build strategy for Iraq (NSC 2005: 18). Even President Bush publicly stated in his revised Iraq Strategy speech of January 2007 that he was going to double the amount of Provincial Reconstruction Teams deployed to Iraq (Bush 2007). Time will tell if this is a case of too little too late.

Mimicking Afghanistan, while democracy has gained the tacit and tentative political support of the majority in Iraq (but not popular support for the Coalition), stalling developmental progress and insecurity is eating away at this support and promoting apathy. Moreover, the political losers of the invasion, the Sunnis, need more still. They need power and wealth sharing arrangements codified in the legal and political structures of Iraq (being attempted currently) and need to more clearly see the Coalition brings benefits they have not previously known. At the same time they

178

must be assured the amount of coercive force the Coalition and Iraqi government brings to the table makes resistance futile and a return to the status quo ante impossible. The principle causal factors for the war playing out the way it currently is fall to the lack of security and propaganda of both word and deed. All the Coalition has done on the persuasive track is talk 'politically' and half-heartedly at that. As Edelstein comments: "Security goals and reconstruction goals often feed each other" (Edelstein 2004: 54).

In Iraq the Coalition is well behind in the persuasive contest thanks in large measure to the Model of Political Primacy: "Full reconstruction and democratization beyond superficial electioneering could take more than ten years…and that is assuming the international community can act in concert" (Day & Freeman 2003: 309), which it has not. Development broadly falls under the gamut of psychological operations and as such it is a distinct and lower tier priority for the Coalition in the persuasive war, subordinated to 'political action' in doctrine, theory and practice:

> Of particular concern is the lack of strategic plans to guide U.S. and Iraqi efforts to rebuild and stabilize the country. Our assessment of the U.S. strategy for Iraq and recent efforts to build central ministry capacity show that U.S. planning efforts have been plagued by unclear goals and objectives, changing priorities, inadequate risk assessments, and uncertain costs. Weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the lack of strategic planning in Iraq's energy sector, the sector that provides the most government revenues (GAO 2007: 14).

Reconstruction & Development operations have withered because of this as much for the reason that they have not been assimilated with the coercive matrix to the requisite degree. The Refined Integrationist Model is helpful in this regard since it breaks down conventional conceptual structures and formal tiering mechanisms to put forth an entwined, mutually dependent paradigm where no one part of the effort attains pre-eminence or is conversely subjugated and neglected. Again though, because Psychological Operations are a lower tier priority the next area analysed, Psychological and Information Warfare, has atrophied in kind.

The Psychological & Information War, Spain 1808 & Iraq 2007: The term "guerrilla warfare" originated in Spain following a revolt by the illiterate and deeply religious Spanish peasantry against Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's French occupation troops and his appointment to the Spanish throne of his brother Joseph. Later King Joseph presented a draft constitution on July 6th, 1808 that for the first time in Spain's history called for an independent judiciary, a free press and the withdrawal of the feudal vestiges of aristocratic and religious power. In a situation akin to that which the Coalition finds itself in the Middle-East today, the traditional Spanish ruling classes threatened by the French's revolutionary concepts of liberty and freedom (of sorts, at least an

improvement on the previous structure) immediately launched a 'nationalist' and religiously inspired insurgency (Luttwack 2005).

The displaced Spanish overlords were extremely effective in painting Joseph's proposal as a heretical attempt by a foreign invader to destroy the Catholic Church in Spain. Seeing the Spanish peasantry obey their overlords once again and rising to fight the foreign 'infidels'. Since 'Le Grand Armee' was overstretched Joseph had not the troops to secure the country and his rule, preventing the implementation of his proposals. On the propaganda front, the Spanish were never permitted to realize, due to superior overlord propaganda, that the very first clause of Joseph's draft constitution decreed the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church was to be the *only* religion permitted in Spain. As a result the *guerrilleros* initiated an insurgency raging from 1808-1814 (Beckett 2001: 1-15).

An identical situation is playing itself out in the cognitive war in the Middle-East generally and Iraq specifically today in the War on Terror, attributable to similar aforementioned social, political, psychological and religious biases as those that existed two centuries ago in early 1800 Spain. Shiite and Sunni clerics and politicians of the region (and in the West) regularly lambast the 'Christian infidels' as invaders and thieves attempting to proselytize the region for Christianity, plunder its oil and protect 'the Jews'. Coalition high minded talk of democracy, liberty and human rights is relegated to hypocrisy and women's' rights a notion designed to compel Iraqi daughters and wives to 'dishonour' their family by copying the 'shameless disobedience' of Western women in a primitive but effectual effort to safe guard the structural integrity of a region designed by and for them:

> The vast majority of Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers and semi-literate at best, naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely incomprehensible; that foreigners have been unselfishly expending their own blood and treasure to help them. As opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, Americans and their allies are widely hated as the worst of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil, but also of their religion and family honour.

> The most direct and visible effects of these sentiments are the deadly attacks against the occupiers and their Iraqi auxiliaries, the aiding and abetting of such attacks and their gleeful celebration by impromptu crowds of spectators. When the victims are members of the Iraqi Police or National Guard, as is often the case these days, bystanders, family members and local clerics routinely accuse the Americans of being the attackers- usually by missile strikes that cleverly simulate car bombs. As to why the Americans would want to kill Iraqis whom they are themselves recruiting, training and paying, no explanation is offered, because no obligation is felt to unravel each and every subplot of the dark Christian conspiracy against Iraq, the Arab world and Islam (Luttwack 2005: 27-28).

The Coalition's Psychological and Information Warfare campaign has not merely been ineffectual, it has been almost non-existent given the low priority accorded to it in theory and practice. When combined with the general failure to Clear & Hold in order to allow reconstruction projects demonstrating tangible progress and good will on a sufficient scale in even a few exemplar cities, has meant that the persuasive war, by over-relying on the narrowly defined 'political track' (democracy promotion and 'political solutions'), has not met expectations.

Abu Ghraib: Perhaps the single most damaging incident in the Coalition's persuasive campaign thus far was *Abu Ghraib*. Time will tell if the *Haditha incident*, where US Marines stand accused of killing dozens of civilians deliberately in an act already described in the media as a mini My Lai (Donnelly 2006) and other smaller related incidents will be more damaging to the war effort. This event received more press and condemnation than anything Saddam or the Iraqi insurgents, terrorists or militias have done to date, by Iraqi and foreign presses alike. Abu Ghraib was bad no doubt, as are a few other less well known incidents like it. This does not alter the fact that these occurrences were outside nominal Coalition operating procedures. Nor does it alter the fact that these instances were hardly akin to the brutal terror and beheading campaigns perpetrated by Saddam or the insurgents, terrorists and militias of Iraq, as they were by Vietnamese Communists, *as a matter of doctrine*.

Nonetheless, akin it was portrayed in a case of My Lai revisited, as indicative of Coalition tactics, goals and prejudices. The minimal importance accorded Psychological and Information Warfare in neo counter-insurgency doctrine meant that like after My Lai the Coalition was seen as evil as the insurgents/terrorists and militias, if not more so, killing, torturing and maiming as a matter of doctrine. Perception came to overwhelm truth, ignoring the fact only a few detainees were harmed physically and these instances often involved superficial injuries (Taguba 2004). At Abu Ghraib prison foreign and Iraqi insurgents and terrorists captured on the battlefield were legitimate interrogation targets, for as has been seen throughout this thesis intelligence is indispensable in counter-insurgency warfare.

Regrettably, the way these interrogations were conducted assured this fiasco was a prototypical case study in how to lose hearts and minds. The resulting photos, containing gleeful Americans lording it over and humiliating their Iraqi and foreign detainees, turned an already suspicious Iraqi people farther away from the Coalition on a cognitive level. In the event the only damage

control conducted was the semi-classified conduct of trials for the perpetrating soldiers and rather half-hearted, intermittent and ineffective protestations that it was conducted by rogue elements contrary to Coalition directives. Giving rise to crippling popular images like this on Iraqi streets (Taguba 2004):

The Coalition has undoubtedly relearned the damage coercive cognitive operations like the Abu Ghraib interrogations can inflict at the campaign level when conducted in a vacuum with no thought for the persuasive war (Gebhardt 2005: 50), but not necessarily how to remedy the damage done. Counter-propaganda bulletins were not and are not undertaken within a daily, weekly or even monthly series of propaganda advertisements or 'infomercials' of sorts to update and inform target audiences of progress, failures, remedies and punishments in an honest and consistent manner regarding the war as a whole and not strictly delimited to high profile events. Vietnam brought forth that in counter-insurgency environments civilian audiences must be fully informed and insurgent and media bias countered constantly and effectively, lest the cognitive field be ceded to the insurgents- a field where half the battle lies. As seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan, such neglect eats away at the core of the campaign- legitimacy- and Iraq is no exception. One deleterious result of which in Iraq is espoused by Dawisha:

> It is unfortunate that many in the Arab and Western press have bestowed on the perpetrators of attacks against Coalition forces the grandiose label "the Iraqi resistance". Such a categorization, whether purposely or inadvertently, creates an impression of a universal phenomenon supported by most Iraqis. Nothing could be further from the truth (Dawisha 2004: 9).

In the Abu Ghraib and My Lai cases cognitive ground was surrendered to the insurgents and militias both by accident and neglect post event by not mounting an effective counter-propaganda and sincere apology campaign to offset the popular media sway (foreign and domestic), which was and is now somehow giving credence to anti-democratic terrorists (regularly described in the media not as murderers or terrorists but by the more neutral terms 'resistance fighters',

'extremists' or 'militants'). The 'Vietnam Syndrome' it must be concluded is alive and well post 9-11:

> Politically speaking it was dead and the fallout from the Vietnam war- namely the hostility to America and especially American military power- would follow it into the grave. As is evident from the coverage of Iraq in the mainstream media, such pronouncements were more than a little premature: the Vietnam Syndrome is still alive and well (Podhoretz 2006: 27).

Ironically propaganda was a central component of the conventional phase of the war- 31, 800, 000 leaflets were dropped on Iraq and interjected Coalition radio and television broadcasts were pervasive (Garden 2003: 713). The withering of propaganda operations is a by-product of the minimal import imbued upon psychological operations by the Model of Political Primacy. In neither Vietnam Afghanistan nor Iraq has propaganda been treated like election campaigns in the West are, with constant, total coverage that is an admixture of truth and ideologically derived analysis. This oversight has had hazardous results and relinquished valuable cognitive ground in Iraq.

The necessity of Psychological and Information Warfare has been left by the wayside for fear of being derisively labelled propaganda. That it most surely is, but propaganda does not have to be false. A true and constant account of aims, motivations and contributions to Iraq (and Afghanistan) made by insurgents, militias and counter-insurgents alike would suffice to contrast the warring factions in a more favourable counter-insurgency light. Added to this, what Psychological and Information Warfare operations are being conducted appear to be geared towards negatively influencing the insurgency, not towards positively influencing the Iraqi population, ignoring decades of counter-insurgency study and above all the Vietnam experience. It must likewise be remembered that these Psychological and Information Warfare efforts are designed to play a supporting role to the insurgency's physical liquidation (Emery, Werchan & Mowles 2005: 38).

The requirement for a continual, concerted and properly targeted counter-insurgency propaganda campaign becomes most apparent from Metz:

> After decades of totalitarianism, Iraqis are ill equipped to evaluate the credibility of information. As a result, wild, often surreal rumours spread rapidly and are widely believed. An exploding array of domestic Iraqi newspapers and electronic media, Iranian government sources, and other Arabic news media such as Al Jazeera bombard Iraqis with information, much of it unconstrained by objectivity or often truth. This manipulates existing prejudices, fears and beliefs (Metz 2003-04: 34).

Propaganda campaigns designed to influence mindsets in Iraq have been primarily confined to ad hoc, intermittent pamphlet drops and the odd paid newspaper article. Little has been done by way of an election type public relations offensive across the media spectrum. The most popular Iraqi TV show, the propaganda/documentary program *The Wolf Brigade, is* a program that follows Iraqi commandos in their daily fight against the insurgents, terrorists and militias, including violent footage and unapologetically propagandized interviews with obviously beaten insurgents (Vargas 2005). This program not only serves as a beacon but more generally is evidence of the enhanced sophistication of Iraqi propaganda campaigns compared to the Coalition's backward concept of operations, a concept costing the Coalition dearly in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

What the Psychological and Information Warfare deficiency has fostered is that the insurgents and militias, particularly the Sunni insurgents (despite being from a minority population and seeking to regain their former position as overlords via indiscriminate terrorism), have been able to paint themselves in the world's eyes as legitimate resistance and undercut indigenous Iraqi and domestic Coalition support for the war. Something which may well contribute to a precipitous Vietnam-era withdrawal.

Conclusion:

In spite of finding themselves counter-revolutionaries in revolutionary wars the insurgents of Afghanistan and Iraq have effectively operated on the physical and cognitive plains thanks to two factors. Firstly, due to an independently conducted coercive stratagem that has come to monopolize the Coalition's time and effort on the ground. Secondly, due to an over-reliance on 'political action' within the segregated persuasive matrix. Micro-level persuasive operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved insufficient in scope, allowing a persuasive void to develop which the respective insurgencies and militias are taking advantage of to feed their coercive wings.

To expand, democratic political evolution has proved unable to capture *and hold* the cognitive field for the Coalition. Democratic evolution and propaganda campaigns promote goodwill, reconstruction is the expression of that good will and coercive violence binds them together. When combined they enhance both the ability to attain coalescence and the critical intelligence gathering capability, in turn gestating a superior counter-insurgency program enabling the physical liquidation or incarceration of insurgents, terrorists and militias unable to be 'turned'. Neo counter-insurgency practice is a different matter.

The focus on democratic political evolution within the persuasive matrix, the increasing dependence upon intra-Iraqi political negotiations and the knock on neglect of development and propaganda have divorced persuasion from itself. In concert with this state of affairs, coercion (physical and psychological) aimed predominantly at the corporeal liquidation of the insurgency managed to regain pre-eminence in Coalition counter-insurgency practice (persuasion's early emphasis notwithstanding), divorcing coercion from persuasion and theory from practice as sincerely as they were in Vietnam.

The 'surge' may or may not remedy this focus at the strategic level and switch practical emphasis from Search & Destroy to a Search & Destroy/Clear & Hold hybrid methodology (with the emphasis necessarily on Clear & Hold in neo counter-insurgency practice). Although it should be noted Search & Destroy appears to remain the Coalition's dominant operational method in Afghanistan, applicable to the fact that General David Petraeus' command and control authority extends to operations in Iraq.

The Coalition was originally welcomed in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this welcome has been worn thin by the failure to marry persuasion to coercion adequately. The Coalition has relied

predominantly on words within the persuasive matrix- 'political' words that is- for propaganda and tangible reconstruction have been conceptually overlooked and nigh on impossible to conduct in any event due to a parallel coercive strategy (attrition) that consistently failed to secure population areas for follow on persuasive operations. The routine failure to provide security has likewise damaged the cause immeasurably in and of itself.

True, the 'surge' and its renewed focus on Clear & Hold operations has increased security levels in Iraq, however its apparent military focus risks precluding follow on persuasive progress in the same vein as the 2004 Fallujah paradigm (only on a far larger scale). Moreover, time will tell if security levels are maintained post 'surge', taking into account the looming draw down of the operation and the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces. Time will similarly be required to tell whether or not the 'surge' will come to resemble the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and if the enhanced security levels gained under it are a case of too little too late.

The cornerstone lesson of Vietnam, of integrated coercive measures (expertise mainly found in the military) and persuasive measures (expertise mainly found in the civilian sector) in a paradigm that recognizes and utilizes the symbiotic relationship the two matrices sustain from day one has been accomplished in neither Afghanistan nor Iraq. Reflecting this concept and integrationist demands are Andrade & Willbanks:

> Key to the entire strategy is the integration of all efforts toward a single goal. This sounds obvious, but it rarely occurs. In most historical counter-insurgency efforts, military forces concentrated on war fighting objectives, leaving the job of building schools and clinics, establishing power grids and bolstering local government (popularly referred to today as nation building) to civilian agencies. The reality is that neither mission is more important than the other, and failure to recognize this can be fatal. Virtually all counter-insurgency plans claim they integrate the two. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq were attempts to combine and coordinate civilian and military agencies, although neither really accomplished its objective. In this respect, the development of the CORDS program during the Vietnam War offers a good example of how to establish a chain of command incorporating civilian and military agencies into a focussed effort (Andrade & Willbanks 2006: 11-12).

To sum, in both Afghanistan and Iraq attrition has dominated neo counter-insurgency practice and as such has all too often left a coercive void in both countries the insurgents and militias have maximized. On the persuasive side of the coin attrition has procured persuasive shortfalls in step, since it fails to enable and/or protect persuasive operations (like health care and education facilities, electricity, phone, oil infrastructure, sewerage grids, sanitation services and so on) or even governmental personnel (politicians, bureaucrats, lawyers, judges and so forth). In terms of

operational persuasive strategy, democratic political evolution and 'political solutions' have been prioritized within the persuasive matrix at the expense of most other persuasive operations, divorcing persuasion from itself and from coercion for good measure. In short, coercive and persuasive operations are being conducted unilaterally in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Concurrently, on the *indigenous institutional level* the Model of Political Primacy was followed for an inordinate length of time, confounding analysis. On this front political development (persuasion) was prioritized in both countries, meaning the development of indigenous security organs were of secondary importance for the longest time- in neither country were they prioritized from the outset. Presently in Iraq co-equal emphasis seems to have come to be placed on coercive institutional development, albeit belatedly. The same can not be said of Afghanistan today. Indigenous security forces are the key to Clear & Hold methodologies and thereby the key to tying coercion to persuasion. Due to the Model of Political Primacy however institutional progress on the coercive fronts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been excruciatingly slow, with the associated negative effects. Neo counter-insurgency it would seem is a mess, conceptually and practically.

Thesis Conclusion:

Different historical periods aside, the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are extremely alike in a counter-insurgency context. Vietnam was a war designed to roll back the spread of an antithetical ideology to the West, Communism. Afghanistan and Iraq are wars designed to similarly roll back the spread of another antithetical ideology, Islamo-Fascism (militant Islam). All interventions happened or are happening in countries deemed to be of crucial geo-political significance to their parent wars, be it the Cold War of the 20th century or the War on Terror of the 21st century. At their balance point also however, the campaigns were/are waged based on flawed principles and practices of counter-insurgency.

By comparing the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq to Vietnam it becomes apparent that strikingly similar coercive strategies have dominated neo counter-insurgency practice, breaking the bonds between coercion and persuasion while at the same time failing to make significant headway, despite allowing counter-insurgents to dominate the coercive matrix. It is seen as well that contrary to Vietnam, indigenous democratic evolution is favoured on the persuasive side, learning its importance from the failure to deliver democracy to the people of South-Vietnam.

Unfortunately macro-level democratic politics has been unable to win the persuasive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by itself, not to mention the wars proper (interestingly reminiscent of the failure cemented by the opposite focus on micro-level persuasive operations in Vietnam), contradicting the implicit prediction to this effect found in the Model of Political Primacy. Preliminary 'political action' may have caused the majority of ordinary Afghans and Iraqis to agree to work with the Coalition toward mutually beneficial goals (democratic governance), yet the effort has come to be a marriage of convenience as opposed to a true alliance.

A majority of Afghans and Iraqis support the concept of democracy and have tolerated Coalition occupation forces to this end. But the persuasive focus on the narrowly defined political track has failed to hold cognitive ground won by the political process, let alone translating into popular support. A situation that has caused indigenous popular support to free fall, given the failure to marry 'political action', 'military force' and 'psychological operations' in a symbiotic strategy on the ground- a failure drawn from the conceptual haze hanging over the field. The primacy of democratic evolution followed by the Coalition in practice on the *indigenous institutional* and *persuasive* sides of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq misses the mutual dependence of coercive and persuasive methodologies in counter-insurgency environs.

The Model of Political Primacy has played an enormous role in the stultification of Coalition counter-insurgency campaigns. One of the most egregious impacts it has inflicted has been on the evolution of Afghanistan's and Iraq's security forces. Indigenous security forces are the key to tying coercion to persuasion in the post ally world of 9-11 that the Coalition finds itself inhabiting, yet in both countries the evolution of said forces has been inhibited by the Model of Political Primacy and the concentration on the development of indigenous political organs over indigenous security organs for the first 12-18 months of each war.

At the operational level, neo counter-insurgency doctrine and practice has regularly fallen short. Counter-insurgency indicators in Afghanistan and Iraq have consistently gone the wrong way from day one of each war. Taken as a whole casualty and violence levels have constantly risen and popular support keeps falling. As covered, in both Afghanistan and Iraq 2006 was the worst year so far for all core conflict indicators. While the 'surge' has significantly arrested the insecurity in Iraq in the latter half of 2007 it does not mean Iraq is secure per se, or that this security will be maintained post 'surge'. The strategy is nascent and long term projections can not be made in any conflict based on strategies nine months old. Analysis must therefore be constrained to the overall picture heretofore.

The Coalition's sub-optimal performance has arisen in no small part from an incomplete analysis of the 'lessons' of Vietnam, something the study of Vietnam herein elucidated. Most notably regarding the few successful counter-insurgency programs of Vietnam that just so happened to marry coercive and persuasive practices intimately (the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups and the Combined Action Platoons).

In following a persuasive strategy inverse to the Allies' persuasive strategy enacted in Vietnam concurrently with disassociated Vietnam era coercive strategies to which persuasion came to be subordinated to *in practice* (no matter what the theory and doctrine said), Coalition strategy has repeatedly ignored the need for adequately married coercive and persuasive approaches within counter-insurgency environs. As predicted in the Refined Integrationist Model hypothesis, predominantly persuasive based initial strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq and later coercive based strategies have each fallen short.

Whilst the initial emphasis on democratic 'political action' was the conduit to gaining essential cognitive ground among a majority of Afghans and Iraqis, the focus on 'political action' (be it as

a whole or within the persuasive matrix at varying times) has lost sight of the necessity for sequential micro-level persuasive operations. Operations equally necessary to ingratiate target populations to the Coalition's cause. The stratified focus on the political sphere additionally meant that, because it is viewed as a stand alone field, coercive stratagems have been followed that are independent in the same nature. Indeed, stemming from the failure of 'political action' and democratic elections to garner victory in either Afghanistan or Iraq the Coalition turned tack 180 degrees and has again come to rely on coercion to attain victory.

The Vietnam legacy attrition strategies utilized to achieve this aim have flailed as eagerly as attrition did in Vietnam, directly because attrition fails to bridge coercion and persuasion. The 'surge' appears to be the exception that proves the rule in this regard. Its renewed emphasis on Clear & Hold/population security has been crucial to arresting the security situation in Iraq, but the 'surge' appears to address the military component of the war almost in isolation. Popular Iraqi support has not risen in line with rising security levels because of this factor it would seem. Afghanistan and Iraq sequentially highlight the perils of focussing on either persuasive or coercive modalities that inevitably neglect and separate the other side of the counter-insurgency coin. Massing to mean the insurgencies and militia movements of Afghanistan and Iraq have been nullified on neither the coercive nor persuasive plains, both necessary for a favourable counter-insurgency outcome as the study of Vietnam illustrated.

Vietnam demonstrated the perils of relying on coercive practices. Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the dangers of relying on either persuasive practices (as emphasized initially) or coercive practices (now dominating Coalition practice). While the Allies dominated the coercive matrix in Vietnam and the Coalition has at separate times dominated the persuasive and coercive spheres, never did any of them dominate both spheres *constantly* and *simultaneously*. What these case studies illustrate is that coercive and persuasive practices can not exist in isolation. If an insurgency is not effectively countered in any one matrix at any one time the insurgency will endure.

It has further been shown that 'political solutions/negotiations' in one form or another have failed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq to mitigate insurgent or militia activity (be they negotiations directly with the insurgency or militias or indirectly via the Iraqi democratic political process concerning power and wealth distribution at the political and ethnic level). To remind the reader, a 'political solution' cost the Allies the Vietnam War. Yes a 'political solution' was reached with

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but it is equally true that the deal was subsequently ignored by North-Vietnam who invaded and won the South via military force *post* Allied withdrawal. The worth of Taliban/Al-Qaeda signatures on "peace treaties" has also been reviewed, as has the desirability of *relying* on a by-proxy political solution in Iraq that has no guarantee of eventuating or ceasing insurgent and militia activity if reached.

The prevalent seeds of insurgencies during the Cold War were political, unsurprising in a global ideological struggle between communism and democracy/capitalism. The Cold War however is over and today the prevalent seeds of insurgency and terrorism are ethnicity and religion. Under these conditions the Model of Political Primacy becomes less relevant- one can negotiate or reach a political compromise with the violent, radical minority over one's ethnic identity no more than one should have to negotiate or compromise over one's religion.

It must likewise be restated that the stakes in the War on Terror fronts of Afghanistan and Iraq are higher for Coalition publics than the Vietnam War. Communist control of Vietnam did not result in the loss of life on American, Australian or British soil. The same can not be said by any stretch of the imagination of Afghanistan and Iraq should they revert to insurgent/terrorist control. Control of Afghanistan was a prime reason Al-Qaeda was able to conduct 9-11 it must never be forgotten. Neither has this thesis come across a single expert who has posited a realistic way to reconcile the field's and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5's predilection for 'political solutions' pertaining to counter-insurgency conflicts with Western governments' widely declared policy of 'no negotiations with terrorists'. Fundamentally the Model of Political Primacy is flawed and struggling to find relevance within the neo counter-insurgency conflicts of the War on Terror.

Post Vietnam the 'political factor' cemented itself as the priority in Western counter-insurgency theory and doctrine because it was regarded as the main if not only neglected field of the Vietnam War. This regardless of its failure to achieve a lasting peace via the Paris Peace Accords in one of the bloodiest counter-insurgency battles in history. Eventually in Vietnam a quasi Refined Integrationist Model was enacted post Tet, belatedly and only through hard years of experience. Nevertheless, due to atrophy and ideologically driven analysis the Model of Political Primacy has reigned unchallenged since Vietnam until recently.

Put an alternative way, in lieu of such critical analysis it has remained assumed that the political sphere is *the* Achilles heel of counter-insurgency. A notion born from the field's own particular

misinterpretation of Clausewitz's ends and means and its determination to cling to Cold War era constructs of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare, namely in the form of the theoretical and at times practical reliance on not just political lodestars but political methods. An assumption entrenched by the field's analysis of the *goal* of most insurgents- political power. Giving rise to the creation of the field's current blueprint, broadly defined herein as the counter-insurgency Model of Political Primacy.

Contradictorily, the previous study highlighted the interlaced, symbiotic relationship coercion and persuasion sustain at the operational level time and again, repudiating the Model of Political Primacy (the attainment of specific political *goals* is the aim of any counter-insurgency campaign). This study has thereby extracted and validated, going back to the theorized counter-insurgency model, the Refined Integrationist Model.

The lack of a concrete understanding of the Refined Integrationist Model has meant the only lodestar Coalition militaries have had to guide operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the Model of Political Primacy. Though by tiering the aforementioned variables and imbuing them with value differentials (in theory or practice) each respective counter-insurgency component has been conducted largely in isolation. Perhaps the most detrimental effect for Coalition militaries has been the resulting disorientation, for by imposing a counter-insurgency model on Coalition militaries that tells them their mission is subordinate to extremely vague 'political considerations' the Coalition has been wandering rather aimlessly.

As seen, when asked what their job in Afghanistan or Iraq is nigh on every senior military officer will respond with the cliché that their job is to support the 'political process', whatever that may mean in terms of operational orientation. In practice it has been illustrated that this in no way has provided Coalition militaries with an adequate conceptual guiding light. It seems they, no more than anyone else, know exactly how to render military operations subordinate to 'political considerations'.

Rekindling the Vietnam experience the Coalition found itself subsequently resorting in Afghanistan and Iraq to what it does best as opposed to what was needed most. Lacking a reliable lodestar which provides them a crystal clear mission set in counter-insurgency contexts they have with few exceptions since 9-11 utilized their military might to hunt down and exterminate the enemy, ignoring the population and the relationship between coercion and persuasion in counter-

insurgency contexts along the way with alarming regularity. The 'surge' may be redressing the oversight of population security in Baghdad, central Iraq and Al Anbar, taking a critical amount of time to re-learn invaluable Vietnam lessons, but not the oversight of the symbiosis of the coercive and persuasive matrices it could be discerned.

As this thesis repeatedly drew out, Search & Destroy operations (by military units tasked to sweep through particular areas hunting down enemy combatants alone) are important but are only one part of the coercive matrix. To this, the study herein has demonstrated that the coercive matrix comprises both Search & Destroy and Clear & Hold modalities (as in an area is cleared of insurgent forces and held by residual military/police units). In coercive terms, Clear & Hold simultaneously draws insurgents to counter-insurgents and inserts the requisite coercive shield (since control of the population is what counter-insurgency is all about).

Clear & Hold operations are essential and must be aimed at *two* things, security for the populace *and* security for follow on persuasive operations, something attrition based coercive parameters and the 'surge' have fallen short of achieving for counter-insurgency forces in either Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq. Search & Destroy meanwhile addresses the insurgents' (and militias') physical dispositions, safe havens, training bases, intelligence networks, infrastructure, embedded or assisting hostile foreign agents (state or private) and so forth. Both are essential, as Vietnam illustrated by the eventual enactment of a dual track coercive strategy late in the war (although in counter-insurgency practice Clear & Hold requires emphasis given the population is the prize). This relationship can be conceptualized by the first of two forthcoming sub-unit models that visualize the core functions of counter-insurgency forces:

Coercive Matrix Sub-Unit Model:

Search & Destroy Insurgent Main-Force Units and Infrastructure

COERCIVE MATRIX CORE

Clear & Hold Population Centers

The harmful effects of the Model of Political Primacy have been demonstrated regarding persuasive warfare time and again in kind. Imposing upon the variables value differentials has garnered an over-reliance on 'political action' and the abject neglect of 'psychological operations' (including the disorientation of 'military force'). Accordingly this study has shown the core persuasive matrix functions of counter-insurgency forces to be at the macro-level democratic political evolution and at the micro-level Reconstruction & Development (including all economic and humanitarian aid programs) and Psychological Warfare Operations (focused primarily but not solely on positively influencing target and domestic populations):

Persuasive Matrix Sub-Unit Model:

Macro-Level:
Democratic
Political
Evolution

PERSUASIVE
MATRIX
CORE

Micro-Level:
Reconstruction & Development
+
Psychological Warfare
Operations

Knowing the Path, Walking the Path and the Differences Therein: Neo counter-insurgency doctrine recognises the destination of counter-insurgency campaigning is popular support. Unfortunately Cold War era precepts of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare (particularly as derived from Vietnam) and the confusion of Clausewitz's ends and means have meant that the map to popular support within counter-insurgency endeavours has been assumed to be via a primarily 'political' tract. The study herein has determined this not to be the case. There is a world of difference between knowing the path and walking the path in counter-insurgency warfare it can be assessed.

This thesis has argued that the Refined Integrationist Model provides a more optimal path to achieving the aims of neo counter-insurgency and the study herein suggests its hypothesis has been confirmed. Lamentably, the Refined Integrationist Model has never been implemented on a campaign wide basis, neither by the Allies in Vietnam nor by the Coalition in Afghanistan or Iraq. The intention at this point is not to belittle the importance of the political component in counter-insurgency warfare. It is to elucidate that to subordinate all counter-insurgency components to the political sphere (be it in theory or practice), especially the military component (by enacting military force to kill or capture those opposing the desired political process in isolation) is mistaken and retraces fallacious steps made during the Vietnam War.

Analysis suggests the political sphere is but one component of a counter-insurgency effort and to concentrate on it is to bypass other components of counter-insurgency practice, if not the crux of the matter. The argument here is that it is advisable to enact democratic 'political action' and if possible *attempt* 'political solutions/negotiations' as part of a grander scheme (realistically not possible for the Coalition regarding the jihadi and many Ba'athist terrorist elements), but unadvisable to *rely* on them. After all, how is the Coalition realistically to reach a sustained 'political solution' with the religiously fanatical terrorist groups of the War on Terror?

Perhaps a more reliable way of combating an insurgency, particularly in neo counter-insurgency conflicts fought in large part against Islamo-Fascist terrorists, is to divide the insurgency (and militias) from the population physically and cognitively. Once these elements are divided the Coalition is better able to extract intelligence on who and where the insurgents/terrorists and militia members are.

In the introductory chapter it was commented that the Refined Integrationist Model may seem overly simplified and the difference between political equality and political primacy at the operational level trivial. In contradiction the analysis contained within has illuminated a profound difference. KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) is a highly valued military principle, a principle that gathers merit exponentially in military endeavours with as many 'moving parts' so to speak as a counter-insurgency campaign. Why conceptual refinement, clarification and operational simplification are pre-requisites for counter-insurgency forces. Pre-requisites this thesis has hopefully identified and provided a way forward to address in its own small way.

The theoretical and doctrinal subordination of military force to the political sphere is directly responsible for the gestation in Afghanistan and Iraq of the subsequent inversion of doctrine/theory and the *practical* reliance on disassociated coercive methodologies. Because 'political action' and 'political solutions/negotiations' comprise surreal, intangible notions that exist in the mind for the most part, Coalition militaries have experienced difficulty interpreting military operations in a proper counter-insurgency context. On the ground independently conducted military operations have typically been designed to kill or capture enemy combatants opposing the Coalition's desired political process at a rate exceeding their replacement- for how else is military force subordinated to metaphysical 'political factors'?

The 'surge' might be an initial step to remedying this, but the reality appears to be the operation is orientated towards the persuasive matrix only in the broadest of senses. Whereby outside the immediate goal of enhancing population security the operation is hoped to secure Iraq sufficiently in order to create 'breathing space' for the Iraqi political process. Highlighting the ongoing difficulty the Coalition is experiencing in moving away from counter-insurgency paradigms that over-emphasize the political sphere. Remembering in addition it is often murky to what extent the political parties of the Iraqi parliament represent or control the warring insurgent and militia elements, or for that matter whether Iraqi politicians desire a political solution at all.

Relying on a war-fighting strategy that places a complex and slow moving political tract at its conceptual and/or practical peak to counter insurgents, terrorists and militias in a contingency as dynamic and fluid as counter-insurgency warfare is fraught with danger this study concludes. Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that 'politically' based approaches tend to lead to disjointed coercive parameters that miss the requirement to synchronize these operations with the persuasive matrix to acquire popular support- the crux of the matter. There is no harm seeding democratic political architectures and *attempting* 'political solutions/negotiations' if feasible. Though if they are *depended* upon, if they assume campaign primacy, with the remaining components of counter-insurgency subordinated to this sphere, disassociated coercive and persuasive practices tend to follow. Unilateral Vietnam-era attrition schemes and the nascent 'surge' are stark proof of this.

The political component is merely one section of a broader schematic drawn to attain coalescence not political support, because they are not automatically one in the same considering the Afghan and Iraq experiences to date. Popular support and the role of military force in counter-insurgency environs are not as crystal clear concepts as would appear at first glance, the optimal calibrating of which has been rendered harder by fuzzy grand theory precepts like the 'subordination' of military force to the 'political process'. After all, how can the political sphere be the *singularly* most important sphere when the case studies herein have detailed the Vietnamese, Afghan and Iraqi populations' desire for security first? From evidence presented it could be deduced that the achievement and sustainment of political goals are a derivative of popular support, not the other way around. Why coercive violence should ideally be calibrated to the broader persuasive matrix as opposed to the narrowly defined 'political sphere'.

Over the past six years coercive violence has overwhelmingly been aimed at negatively affecting the insurgents and militiamen of Afghanistan and Iraq in pursuit of political goals, not to the end of protecting the populace itself and *both* macro and micro-level persuasive operations-independently conducted coercive violence as a theoretical function of politics.

Even the battlefield successes and increased population security the switch from pure attrition to operations focussed more on local security under the 'surge' have procured in Baghdad, central Iraq and Al Anbar seem to have been misconstrued as campaign success. Unlike the Accelerated Pacification Campaign Reconstruction & Development and propaganda neither appear at this juncture to be adjunct operational arms of the 'surge'. Security may be an important persuasive operation but population security, in relative or absolute terms, does not equal victory. The villages of South-Vietnam attained their highest security ratings under the Hamlet Evaluation System in the last few years preceding the Allied withdrawal- shortly thereafter South-Vietnam fell. Today Saigon's official name is Ho Chi Minh City.

This thesis has discerned repeatedly that security is the necessary precursor for persuasive operations- it is not an end in itself. Vietnam drew out the dangers of equating dominance within the coercive matrix to dominance within the war. Military force should neither be a junior partner in theory and doctrine nor a senior partner in practice. It is no more and no less important than any other counter-insurgency variable. To lose sight of this at either the theoretical or practical level has had deleterious ramifications.

The Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq case studies have shown when the enemy and the narrowly defined political sphere compose the tactical and strategic lodestars of counter-insurgency campaigning respectively, military operations tend to stop at the point of battlefield victory. For operational counter-insurgency paradigms to encompass *all* relevant counter-insurgency variables the conflict requires at its focal point not the enemy and/or 'political factors' but the population. When such a focal point is instigated security operations are able to be viewed on a holistic counter-insurgency continuum. Once security is achieved the question becomes what next, what now can be done to further improve living standards? A lodestar this study has seen improves the chances of winning the ground that counts, popular opinion (indigenous and possibly domestic Coalition if headway can continue to be made in Iraq). Something the Refined Integrationist Model might be better suited to keep as both the cognitive and practical aim of neo counter-insurgency.

Grand theory constructs aside, within the three case studies canvassed herein indigenous populations have consistently discerned a fundamental purpose differential on the part of the counter-insurgents' military wings, stemming from its disorientation in relation to the persuasive matrix. They have seen that, no matter what the theory or doctrine states, the priority target of coercive counter-insurgent forces has often been the decimation of their enemy, not the well being and protection of themselves and their families. When this purpose differential is discerned by target populations and combines with the fact that the notion of popular support has been confused with and supplanted by the notion of political support, the core of the matter has been addressed in Afghanistan and Iraq no more than it was in Vietnam. The 'surge' appears to be the first attempt to focus Coalition military operations on population security, yet its temporary nature and military focus threatens to limit its strategic impact.

Such a purpose differential prevented the Allies reaching their geo-political end goal in Vietnam, an outcome more by the day looking to be repeated if not in Afghanistan then quite possibly in Iraq. In imitation of Vietnam popular support has not been maintained in Afghanistan or Iraq because it has not truly been sought at the operational level. Questions pertaining to the 'political process' and its ability to negate or mollify the insurgent/terrorist groups of the global jihad who increasingly opt to transcend the political dimension within the target country have neither been sufficiently canvassed. These segments of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq exist outside the indigenous political tract, opting to follow the *Military-Focus Strategy* and preferring to get their support and supplies from the 'strategic population'. Cold War era counter-revolutionary warfare notions focussing military force to support the political sphere have not and will not negate these elements. Besides, as Hoffman states:

> Victory against the fervent and fanatical individual who finds the notion of transcendence through death enticing rather than forbidding, will not be gained by out governing those that do not seek to govern. Nor will the solution to today's so-called "irregular" challenges be found by laminating yesterday's framework into current doctrine and strategy (Hoffman 2007: 84).

'Strategic population' or not however, these elements have to be physically present to combat Coalition forces and some Afghan or Iraqi somewhere has seen where these insurgents and terrorists reside and/or congregate, who they associate with, what vehicles they drive, what their names are and so on. Someone somewhere has seen something out of place but without protection or adequate persuasive operations to gestate *popular* support these people will not share intelligence with counter-insurgency forces. Intelligence that provides the only proven and dependable way to deal with the insurgents and terrorists opposing the Coalition's geo-political

end game within the wider Middle-East, not a few elements of which by definition will not be assimilated by the 'political process', and that is to kill or capture.

Intelligence of which is a derivative of popular support not political support this thesis concludes, a notion Coalition strategy to date has missed. Not to mention that popular support is the base line goal of the Afghan and Iraq wars and their 'over the horizon' intent, under the umbrella of the War on Terror, of altering mindsets and creating determined allied states and peoples within the Islamic world in order to tear down the principle pillar of Islamic terrorism, the geo-political architecture of the Middle-East.

Regarding the persuasive war in and of itself, the lessons of Vietnam run deeper than the need for qualitative violence and democratic evolution in the target country and definitely do not justify the primacy accorded to it. The lessons of Vietnam equally show the importance of mutually supportive coercive and persuasive practices, of propaganda and development, of making indigenous populations the principle target of the campaign and not the enemy (ironic considering the primacy of 'political factors' implies the primacy of winning the people) and how if corruption is not countered it can render moot the entire exercise almost single handed.

By merely taking in Vietnam's lessons of the need for democratic evolution and qualitative violence in counter-insurgency environs and missing a gamut of other lessons, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have been ineffective so far in their aim to defeat their respective insurgencies and militias. A shortfall the by-product of the fact that the coercive voids allowing insurgents, Warlords and militias to gestate and operate within Afghanistan and Iraq have fuelled persuasive counter-insurgency voids as a matter of course, and vice-versa.

Pertaining to counter-insurgency conflicts, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq sequentially highlight that counter-insurgency forces need not kill or capture every enemy combatant in the country. What they need do is utilize coercive practices to protect the populace and persuasive operations in order to win the battlefield that counts- the hearts and minds of the indigenous population. If this ground is gained and held counter-insurgency forces have won. For post withdrawal a population will exist that is determined to follow the path the counter-insurgents have set out for it and will continue to combat what insurgent, terrorist or militia elements remain (at this stage by definition an unsustainable minority), towards the counter-insurgents' and now their ends. But again, to take and hold this ground is equally dependent on both coercive and persuasive

practices- why they must be calibrated to ensure their continued mutual reinforcement. As Kilcullen comments, counter- insurgency is;

> not simply a matter of crushing the insurgents. As insurgency is a political, social and military problem, military measures alone cannot succeed in this aim. Rather, the role of military forces is to dominate the environment and reduce the energy in the insurgency, taking it 'off the boil' to allow other elements of national power to become effective. Thus military forces alone can only contain and disrupt insurgent systems- but this is an essential first step in allowing other non-military measures to succeed (Kilcullen 2004: 27).

To repeat, this is not something unilateral and/or segregated coercive parameters, be it in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq, have achieved. Time and again in this study the coercive matrix has proved unable to stand in isolation, because by utilizing coercive force overwhelmingly to liquidate the enemy it has not protected populations (until recently under the 'surge' in Iraq alone) or enabled micro-level persuasive operations to any significant degree. Theoretically subordinated to 'political action', practically the focus of counter-insurgency operations aimed at chasing down and nullifying insurgents, terrorists and militias for the most part, coercive violence has not lived up to its full potential. A situation causing the persuasive sphere to under-perform to the same degree.

So whilst some coercive lessons from Vietnam have been learned at the tactical level, like the need for collateral damage mitigation and the requirement to target both coercive and persuasive insurgent operators, a slew of other crucial coercive lessons of Vietnam have been missed by the Coalition. The Coalition's seeming determination to walk in their forefathers' footsteps and (re)fight a 'half war' inevitably raises the question of whether institutionally the Coalition has learnt the lessons of Vietnam in their entirety or has developed neo counter-insurgency strategies based on VIETNAM-101 'CliffsNotes'.

For in spite of allowing counter-insurgents to dominate the coercive matrix in all of the above conflicts, segregated coercive strategies as enacted (particularly attrition stratagems) have not enabled the counter-insurgents to prevail in any of the above conflicts either. Although the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are unfinished, the ominous Vietnam like retrogression of each of the campaigns via an inexorable downward spiral in popular support (indigenous and domestic) for the counter-insurgents from day one can nevertheless be perceived. Dominating one matrix is not good enough in counter-insurgency warfare it must be concluded. To revisit General Krulak's thoughts on the same subject in Vietnam: "You have to win totally or you are not winning at all" (Olson & Roberts 1991: 175).

The conduit to achieving current geo-political goals in hostile environments for the Coalition falls to counter-insurgency theory and practice. As such it is compulsory Coalition militaries understand it better, because the field's long standing conceptual fog has endangered national security imperatives. A fog that requires lifting if Coalition counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention concurrent counter-insurgency enterprises in Colombia and the Philippines, are to succeed. By elucidating the Refined Integrationist Model it is hoped this thesis will aid in this task for the field's model at present is seeing 'military force' conducted as a stand alone field (disjointed coercive methodologies are resurgent), Reconstruction & Development an unprotected, underutilized side show and almost completely omits Psychological/Information Warfare. Military force is an essential first responder, the provider of the shield behind which the other sphere, persuasion, can be undertaken- military force should not be conducted unilaterally in counter-insurgency practice.

Today the function of coercive violence has been misunderstood and divorced from the persuasive matrix, notably by Vietnam legacy modalities like sheer Search & Destroy tactics, the same injurious results of which are abundantly apparent in Afghanistan and Iraq. On their part micro-level persuasive operations are just as important, for while democratic 'political action' has proved able to *take* ground in the persuasive war it has proved unable to *hold* said ground when left to its own devices, bereft of sufficient military, police, developmental or propagandized support.

To go farther, the comparison of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq becomes more relevant when it is recognized that all highlight not merely the dangers inherent when persuasion and coercion are unlinked, but as importantly highlight the dangers inherent when the coercive and persuasive matrices are divorced from themselves. Over and over this thesis has seen the resultant shortfalls when one side of the coercive coin, Search & Destroy, is conducted without the other side, Clear & Hold and vice-versa. Both modalities are essential it has come to be realized. In the same vein the study has seen the costly impact when one side of the persuasive coin, be it micro-level operations in Vietnam or macro-level operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, are overemphasized at the expense and without adequate support from the other side of the persuasive coin.

A key conclusion of this thesis consequently is that not only can persuasion and coercion not be conducted unilaterally, but also that one side of either matrix can not be conducted unilaterally in counter-insurgency endeavours. As a matter of course isolated methodologies followed in

Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq have compromised the structural integrity of their respective counter-insurgency campaigns.

To answer the question then; is neo counter-insurgency a case of Vietnam redux? The answer is no in some respects and yes in others. Lamentably, as things stand the yes column outstrips by far the no column, rendering victory uncertain in both the Afghanistan and Iraq contingencies. It must subsequently be assessed that overall Afghanistan and Iraq are a case of Vietnam redux, an outcome stemming from the incomplete analysis of Vietnam, counter-insurgency field theory and the resulting Model of Political Primacy obtained from such partial, ideologically swayed analysis. Segregated and dominant coercive methodologies, inefficient and partial persuasive methodologies divorced from the coercive matrix in turn, have resulted in fence sitting writ large in Afghanistan and Iraq- exactly the situation that existed in Vietnam on the real battlefront, the battlefront for popular support, not political support.

The current theoretical and doctrinal misconception found in the field has had the most serious real world consequences and yet may, as in Vietnam, mean the difference between victory and defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. All because the composition, mutual dependence and practical utility of both the coercive and persuasive strands have been rendered opaque on account of the Model of Political Primacy.

Accordingly, coercion has come to dominate strategic neo counter-insurgency *practice* and has been divorced from persuasion as a result, whilst persuasion has been divided into two unsupportive sub-sets, i.e. into 'political action' and 'psychological operations' (micro-level persuasion), with 'political action' assuming primacy over 'psychological operations' conceptually and practically on the *persuasive* side. Under such circumstances it is no wonder the fields of 'politics', 'psychological operations' and 'military force' are withering independently. In short, what the Coalition has failed to come to grips with post Vietnam is the extent to which the coercive and persuasive matrices entwine within counter-insurgency contingencies. That rather than being *two distinct fields* they are in actuality *two wings* of the *one entity* that can not survive without *either wing.*

To conclude, this thesis focused on studying the relationship between persuasion and coercion in counter-insurgency contexts. In doing so it found the relationship is one of ineluctable symbiosis-each sphere is absolutely dependent on the other for survival. What happens in one matrix

invariably affects the other, for better or worse. It has been found that to focus on one over the other or conduct one without the other increases exponentially the chances of defeat for counter-insurgent forces. This is in opposition to the field's current theoretical blueprint which gives 'politics' conceptual supremacy and renders 'military force' theoretically subordinate to such 'political considerations', at the same time ignoring 'psychological operations' almost wholesale. To take issue with this assumption one last time, on the ground where it counts this thesis has consistently seen that to dismiss or omit either matrix, in part or whole, is unadvisable.

At the end of the day counter-insurgency consists of a multiplicity of variables bumbling around like the bright balls in children's lawn mowing toys, creating an innumerable, confounding number of permutations and to study this interaction can be overwhelming. This thesis hopes to alleviate the problem somewhat by breaking the frustrating number of counter-insurgency variables down to a duality- persuasion and coercion- whilst highlighting the interlaced relationship of the two.

Consequently this thesis concludes that its proposition has been affirmed, the principle inference of the thesis being thus: If the Coalition is to prevail in the counter-insurgency conflicts of today and tomorrow and avoid Vietnam redux it must redress the unbalanced, tiered doctrine currently employed and develop a counter-insurgency doctrine that better recognizes the binary, symbiotic nature of persuasion and coercion in counter-insurgency warfare. To effectively contest 'asymmetric warfare' in the conflicts of the 21st century a campaign of symmetry is demanded. As Soliven states (in Cold War parlance):

> In assessing a guerrilla war, particularly one in which the guerrilla loses out, it is impossible to divide political* and military^ tactics and events into neat and separate compartments, so as to determine which of these ingredients were essential to victory or defeat (Soliven 1966: 110).*Persuasive herein. ^Coercive herein.

End.

Bibliography:

1.   ABC News America, December 7th, 2006. *Public Optimism Fades in Afghanistan*, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2707304 - accessed 07/12/06.
2.   Abdullah, Thabit A.J. *A Short History of Iraq From 636 To The Present*, Pearson Longman, London, 2003.
3.   Abel, Elie and Kabel, Kalb. *Roots of Involvement, The U.S. in Asia 1784-1971,* W.W. Norton & Company Inc. New York, 1971.
4.   Addington, Larry H. *America's War in Vietnam. A Short Narrative History*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, USA, 2000.
5.   Ajami, Fouad. *Iraq and the Arab's Future*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, January-February 2003.
6.   Allan, Nigel J.R. *Rethinking Governance in Afghanistan*, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 2003.
7.   Allen, Richard. *Prospect and Retrospect, The impact and aftermath of colonial rule*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968.
8.   Andaya, Barbara Watson & Leonard Y. *A History of Malaysia, Second Edition,* Palgrave, Hampshire, UK, 2001.

9.   Anderson, David L. *The Vietnam War*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, U.K., 2005.

10.   Andrade, Dale. *Ashes to ashes: the Phoenix program and the Vietnam War*, Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1990.

11.   Andrade, Dale & Willbanks, Lt. Colonel James H. (US Army- retired). *CORDS/Phoenix. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future*, Military Review, March-April 2006.
12.   Andres, Richard B. Wills, Craig & Griffith, Thomas E. Jr. *Winning with Allies, The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model*, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3, Winter 2005-06.
13.   Armer M. *Methodological Problems and Possibilities in Comparative Research*, in Armer, M & Grimshaw, A. (Editors). *Comparative Social Research: Methodological Problems and Strategies*, John Wiley (Publisher), London, 1973.
14.   Arreguin, Ivan-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001.
15.   Australian Defence Force (ADF). *Global Operations (2007)*, http://www.defence.gov.au/globalops.cfm - accessed 29/09/07.
16.   Australian Government, *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/foreword.html - accessed 20/09/07.
17.   Aylwin-Foster, Brigadier General Nigel (UK Army). *Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations*, Military Review, November-December 2005.
18.   Baker, Aryn. *Deadly Notes in the Night*, Time Magazine, July 10th, 2006.
19.   Baker, Aryn. Habibi, Muhib & Morarjee, Rachel. *Afghanistan's Seasonal Disorder*, Time Magazine, May 29th, 2006.
20.   Baldwin, Gil. *Iraq- managing the peace*, Conflict, Security and Development, 3:3, December 2003.
21.   Barber, Noel. *The War of the Running Dogs, The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960,* Webright and Talley, New York, 1971.
22.   Barno, David W. *Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency*, Parameters, Summer 2006.
23.   Bastin, John & Smith T.E. *Malaysia*, Oxford University Press, Tokyo, Japan,

1966.

24.   Bastin, John & Winks*, Robin W. *Malaysia*, *Selected Historical Readings, 2ⁿᵈ edition,* KTO Press, 1979, Nendeln, Netherlands.

25.   BBC News, August 24ᵗʰ, 2006. *Row over Afghan clash casualties*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5280726.stm - accessed 24/08/06.

26.   BBC News, September 8ᵗʰ, 2006. *Afghan force 'needs more troops'*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5322698.stm - accessed 08/09/06.

27.   BBC News, October 17ᵗʰ, 2006. *Can change in Afghan tactics bring peace?* , http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6060384.stm - accessed 17/10/06.

28.   BBC News, December 21ˢᵗ, 2006. *Global security round-up in 2006*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6193663.stm - accessed 21/12/06.

29.   BBC News, March 23ʳᵈ, 2007. *US held talks with Iraq militants,* http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6494817.stm - accessed 23/03/07.

30.   BBC News, June 5ᵗʰ, 2007. *Most of Baghdad 'not controlled',* http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6721689.stm - accessed 05/06/07.

31.   BBC News, June 25ᵗʰ, 2007. *Iraqis 'unable to hold US gains'*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6236066.stm - accessed 25/06/07.

32.   BBC News, September 10ᵗʰ, 2007. *Iraq poll makes for grim reading*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6986993.stm - accessed 10/09/07.

33.   BBC News, September 14ᵗʰ, 2007. *Iraq violence: monitoring the surge*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6993516.stm - accessed 20/09/07.

34.   BBC News, September 28ᵗʰ, 2007. *UK's Afghan gains 'could be lost'*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7017450.stm - accessed 28/09/07.

35.   BBC News, October 8ᵗʰ, 2007. *UK Iraq troops to be cut to 2,500*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7034010.stm - accessed 08/10/07.

36.   Beckett, Ian F. W. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrillas and their opponents since 1750*, Routeledge, London, 2001.

37.   Begbie, P.J. *The Malayan Peninsula*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

38.   Bensahel, Nora. *Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction*. The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2006.

39.   Bicheno, Hugh. *Rebels and Redcoats, The American Revolutionary War*, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 2003.

40.   Biddle, Stephen. *Seeing* Bag*hdad, Thinking Saigon*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, March-April 2006.

41.   Bilton, Michael & Sim, Kevin. *Four Hours in My Lai, A War Crime and its Aftermath*, Penguin Group, London, England, 1992.

42.   Blair, Anne. *There to the bitter end, Ted Serong in Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001.

43.   Blaxland, Lt. Colonel John (Australian Army). *Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrist Response to the 'War on Terror' for the Australian Army*. Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australian Army), Working Paper No. 131, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006.

44.   Bohannan, Lt. Colonel Charles T. R. (Australia- retired) & Valeriano, Colonel Napoleon D. (Armed Forces of the Philippines- retired). *Counter-Guerrilla Operations, The Philippine Experience*. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

45.   Bond, Major F.R. *Vietnam- A Basis for a Right Opinion*, Acacia Press Pty, Ltd, Blackburn, Victoria, Australia.

46.   Bonnet, Colonel Gabriel. *Les Guerres insurrectionnelles et revolutionnaires*, Plon Publishers, Paris, 1958.

47.   Boot, Max. *Iraq and the consequences of failure*, Australian Army Journal, Volume IV, Number 2, Winter 2007.

48.		Bouscaren, Anthony T. *All Quiet on the Eastern Front: The Death of South-Vietnam*, The Devin-Adair Company, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, 1977.
49.		Bown, Colin & Mooney, Peter J. *Cold War to Détente*, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1976.
50.		Brewington, Major Brooks R. (USMC). *Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement*, Small Wars Center of Excellence, US Marine Corps, 1996,
http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Papers/brewington.pdf - accessed 30/09/07.
51.		Bristol, Nellie. *Military incursions into aid work anger humanitarian groups, (World Report),* The Lancet, Vol. 367, Issue 9508, February 4th, 2006.
52.		Brock, Timothy C. & Shavitt, Sharon. *Persuasion. Psychological Insights and Perspectives*, Allyn & Bacon, Boston, US, 1994.
53.		Brown, J.A.C. *Techniques of Persuasion. From Propaganda to Brainwashing*, Penguin Books, Middlesex, UK, 1963.
54.		Brown, T. Louise. *War and aftermath in Vietnam*, Routeledge, London, 1991.
55.		Burke, Jason. *Britain to cut troop levels in Iraq*, The Guardian, September 19th, 2004,	http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1307980,00.html	–	accessed 20/09/07.
56.		Burnam, P. Gilland, K. Grant, W. & Layton-Henry, Z. *Research Methods in Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
57.		Burns, John. *Struggle for Security*, The Newshour with Jim Leher, September 22nd, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec04/iraq_9-22.html - accessed 22/09/04.
58.		Burns, Robert. *Gates Prods NATO States on Deployments to Afghanistan*, Washington	Post,	October	23rd,	2007,	http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/22/AR2007102202371.html?nav=rss_world	–	accessed 23/10/07.
*59.		Busch, Peter. Killing the 'Vietcong': The British Advisory*
Mission and the Strategic Hamlet Programme, Journal of Strategic Studies, 25:1, 2002.
60.		Bush, US President George W. *President's Address to the Nation*, January 10th, 2007,	http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html	–	accessed 02/02/07.
61.		Butler, D & Stokes, D. *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice, 2nd edition,* London, Macmillan, 1974.
62.		Buttinger, Joseph. *Vietnam, The Unforgettable Tragedy*, Andre Deutesch Ltd, London, 1977.
63.		Byman, Daniel. *Constructing a Democratic Iraq. Challenges and Opportunities*, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003.
64.		Byman, Daniel. Scheuer, Michael. Lieven, Anatol & Lang, W. Patrick. *Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on "Terror"*, Middle-East Policy, Vol. XII, No.1, Spring 2005.
65.		Cable, Larry E. *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*, New York University Press, New York, 1986.
66.		Cairns, J.F. *The Eagle and the Lotus, Western Intervention in Vietnam 1847-1968*, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1969.
67.		Carruthers, S. *Winning Hearts and Minds. British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency 1944-1960*, Leicester University Press, London, 1995.
68.		Cassidy, Lt. Colonel Robert M. *British Army and Counter-Insurgency: The*

Salience of Military Culture, Military Review, May-June 2005.

69.   Cassidy, Robert M. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, Military Culture and Irregular War*, Praeger Security International, Westport, Connecticut, US, 2006.

70.   Cassidy, Robert M. *Feeding Bread to the Luddites: The Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2005.

71.   Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). *The World Fact Book, Afghanistan,* 2006, www.cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html - accessed 14/06/06.

72.   Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *The World Fact Book, Iraq,* 2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/iz.html - accessed 20/03/07.

73.   Chace, James & Fromkin, David. *What Are the Lessons of Vietnam?* In Capps, Walter (Editor). *The Vietnam Reader*, Routeledge, New York, 1991.

74.   Chandler, Robert W. *War of Ideas: The US Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981.

75.   Chanoff, David & Toai, Doan Van. *'Vietnam', A portrait of its People at War*, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 1996.

76.   Charters, David A. & Tugwell, Maurice (Editors). *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, A Comparative Analysis*, Brassey's Defence Publishers (a member of the Maxwell Pergamon Publishing Corporation), London, 1989.

77.   Clarke, Michael. *It Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time: Afghanistan needs help--but Europe's growing military role is poorly planned*, Time Magazine, International (Europe Edition) 167.6, February 6th, 2006.

78.   Cleaveland, Norman. *Bang! Bang! In Ampang, Dredging Tin During Malaya's 'Emergency',* Symcon Publishing Company, San Pedro, California, 1973.

79.   Clutterbuck, Richard. *The Long Long War, The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960*, Cassell, London, 1967.

80.   Coates, John. *Suppressing Insurgency, An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954,* Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1992.

81.   Cockburn, Patrick. *What has happened to Iraq's missing $1bn?* The Independent, September 19th, 2005, www.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article313538.ece - accessed 19/09/05.

82.   Cohen, Eliot. Crane, Lt. Colonel Conrad (retired). Horvath, Lt. Colonel Jan & Nagl, Lt. Colonel John. *Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency*, Military Review, March-April 2006.

83.   Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin-Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001,* The Penguin Press, New York, 2004.

84.   Comber, L.F. *Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: a survey of the Triad Society from 1800-1900*, Locust Valley, New York, 1959.

85.   Comte, Auguste. *A General View of Positivism, Official Centenary Edition of the International Auguste Comte Centenary Committee*, Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, New York, 1957.

86.   Conboy, Kenneth & Andrade, Dale. *Spies and Commandos, How America Lost the Secret War in North-Vietnam*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, US, 2000.

87.   Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Iraq war and Lessons for Counter-Insurgency*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,

Washington DC, March 16th, 2006,
http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2854 – accessed 04/04/06.

88.   Crane, Lt. Colonel. Conrad C. (retired). *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,* Military Review, May-June, 2005.

89.   Crockett, Anthony. *Green Beret, Red Star,* Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1954.

90.   Crow, Graham. *Comparative Sociology and Social Theory, Beyond Three Worlds*, Macmillan, London, 1997.

91.   Dalacoura, Katerina. *US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle-East since 11 September 2001: a critique*, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, 2005.

92.   Davidson, Lt. General. Phillip B. (US- retired). *Vietnam at War, The History: 1946-1975*, Sidwick & Jackson Limited, London, 1989.

93.   Davidson, Lt. General. Phillip B. (US- retired). *Secrets of the Vietnam War*, Presidio, Navato, California, 1990.

94.   Dareff, Hal. *From Vietnam to Cambodia, A Background Book about the Struggle in Southeast Asia*, Parent's Magazine (Publisher), New York, 1971.

95.   Dawisha, Adeed. *Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects*, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 1, January, 2004.

96.   Day, Graham. & Freeman, Christopher. *Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Post-War Iraq*. International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 2, 2003.

97.   DeGroot, Gerard J. *A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War*, Pearson Education Inc, New York, 2000.

98.   Dennis, Peter & Grey, Jeffrey. *Emergency and Confrontation, Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo, 1950-1966,* Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, St. Leonards, NSW, 1996.

99.   Diamond, Larry. Plattner, Marc F. & Brumberg, Daniel. *Islam and Democracy in the Middle-East*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, US, 2003.

100.   Diamond, Larry. *What Went Wrong in Iraq,* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, September-October 2004.

101.   Dobbins, James. *Iraq, Winning the Unwinnable War*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, January-February 2005.

102.   Dobbins, James. McGinn, John G. Crane, Keith. Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie. Rathmell, Andrew. Swanger, Rachel & Timilsina, Anga. *America's role in Nation-Building, From Germany to Iraq*, Rand, Santa Monica, 2003.

103.   Dolan, Chris J. *United States' Narco-Terrorism Policy: A Contingency Approach to the Convergence of the Wars on Drugs and Against Terrorism*, Review of Policy Research, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2005.

104.   Donnell, John C. & Hickey, Gerald C. *The Vietnamese "Strategic Hamlets": A Preliminary Report*, RM-3208-ARPA, US Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum, September 1962,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3208.pdf - accessed 20/09/07.

105.   Donnelly, Sally B. *Why Are U.S. Troops Snapping?*, Time Magazine, June 26th, 2006, www.time/nation/article/0,8599,1207035,00.htm - accessed 15/07/06.

106.   Donnelly, Thomas. *The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine*, American Enterprise Institute, February 1st, 2003,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp - accessed 05/07/07.

107.   Doyle, Edward [et al]. *The North*, Boston Publishers Co., Boston, Massachusetts, 1986.

108.   Doyle, Jeff & Grey, Jeffrey. *Vietnam: war, myth and memory. Comparative perspectives on Australia's war in Vietnam.* Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1992.

109.   Duffy, Michael. *What a Surge Really Means*, Time Magazine, January 15th, 2007.

110.   Duncanson, Dennis J. *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968.

111.   Dusevic, Tom. *Leader of the Pack, John Howard, the Making of a Populist*, Time Magazine, March 6th, 2006.

112.   Ecklund, Marshall V. *Task Force Ranger vs. Urban Somali Guerrillas in Mogadishu: An Analysis of Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Tactics and Techniques used during Operation Gothic Serpent*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 2004.

113.   Edelstein, David M. *Occupational Hazards. Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail*, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004.

114.   Egnell, Robert. *Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension.* The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 6, December 2006.

115.   Eland, Ivan. Newman, Robert. White, Jeffrey & Lang, Patrick. *Occupied Iraq: One Country, Many Wars*, Middle-East Policy, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 2005.

116.   Ellsberg, Daniel. *Secrets. A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers*, Viking Penguin, 2002.

117.   Emerson, Rupert. *Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumper, 1964.

118.   Emery, Major Norman. Werchan, Major Jason & Mowles, Major Donald G. Jr. *Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment*, Military Review, January-February 2005.

119.   Ewans, Martin. *Afghanistan, A New History*, RouteledgeCurzon, New York, 2002.

120.   Fall, Bernard. *Street Without Joy. Insurgency In IndoChina, 1946-63*, Third Revised Edition, Pall Mall Press, London, 1963.

121.   Fall, Bernard. *The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, Naval War College Press, 1965,

 http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/winter/art5-w98.htm - accessed 29/09/04.

122.   Fall, Bernard B. *The Two Viet-Nams, A Political and Military Analysis*, Second Revised Edition, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1967.

123.   Fearon, James D. & Laitin, David D. *Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War*, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003.

124.   Felter III, Joseph H. *Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: A Case for Empirical Study of Counterinsurgency*, ProQuest Information and Learning Company, MI, USA, 2005.

125.   Fischel, Wesley R. *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict*, F.E. Peacock Publishers, Itasca, Illinois, 1968.

126.   FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. *Counterinsurgency*, US Army Field Manual for Counter-Insurgency Operations, December 2006, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf - accessed 01/01/07.

127. FMI 3-07.22. *Counter-Insurgency Operations,* US Army Field Manual, www.us.army.mil, and www.fas.org/irp/dodir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf - accessed 30/06/05.

128. Ford, Ronnie. *Tet 1968. Understanding the Surprise*, Frank Cass, London, 1995.

129. Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and strategy in the Cold War*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, US, 2000.

130. Gannon, Kathy. *Afghanistan Unbound*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, May-June 2004.

131. Galula, David. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.

132. Garden, Timothy. *Iraq: the military campaign*, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4. 2003.

133. Gebhardt, Major James F. (retired). *The Road to Abu Ghraib. U.S. Army Detainee and Doctrine Experience*, Military Review, January-February 2005.

134. Gibbons, William Conrad. *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, PART III: January-July 1965*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989.

135. Gibson, James William. *The Perfect War. The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did*, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, New York, 1988.

136. Gilbert, Marc Jason. *Why the North Won the Vietnam War*, Palgrave, New York, 2002.

137. Ginsburg, Norton & Chester F. Roberts Jr. *Malaya*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1958.

138. Giustozzi, Antonio. *The Demodernisation of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992-2001*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 2004.

139. Global Security (2006). *'Appendix D', Mass-oriented Insurgency: How it organizes, How to counter it*, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020apd.htm - accessed 09/06/06.

140. Global Security (2007), *Operation Phantom Fury [Fallujah]*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-phantom-fury-fallujah.htm - accessed 01/01/07.

141. Goering, Curt. *Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan*, Minutemanmedia, February 8th 2006, http://www.minutemanmedia.org/GOERING%20020608.htm – accessed 08/02/06.

142. Gomm, Roger. Hammersley, Martyn and Foster, Peter. *Case Study Method*, Sage Publications, London, 2004.

143. Goodhand, Jonathon. *Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan*, Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2005.

144. Goodson, Larry P. *Afghanistan's Endless War, State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2001.

145. Gordon, Michael R., *Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency***.** New York Times Magazine, September 2nd, 2007.

146. Government Accountability Office (US). *Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues. Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade*, October 30th, 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08231t.pdf - accessed 02/11/07.

147. Graham, J.J. and Maude, F.N. *On War, Carl Von Clausewitz*, Wordsworth Editions Limited, Hertfordshire, UK, 1997.

148. Gravell, Senator Mike. *The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam, Volume II*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.

149. Greer, Colonel James K. *Operation Knockout: counter-insurgency in Iraq*,

Military Review, November-December 2005.

150.   Grenville, Kenneth. *The Saving of South-Vietnam*, Alpha Books, Sydney, 1972.

151.   Griffith, General Samuel B. II. In Greene, Lt. Colonel T.N. *The Guerrilla and How To Fight Him,* Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

152.   Grubbs, Major Lee K. & Forsyth, Major Michael J. *Is There A Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?* Military Review, July-August 2005.

153.   Gullick, J.M. *Malaysia,* Ernest Benn Ltd. London, 1969.

154.   Gullick, J.M. *Malaysia and its Neighbours,* Routeledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967.

155.   Hall, John A. *Coercion and Consent: Studies on the modern state*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1994.

156.   Hall, P & Soskice D. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2001.

157.   Hammer, Ellen. *Vietnam: yesterday and today*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966.

158.   Hammer, Ellen. *The struggle for Indochina: 1945-1955*, Stanford University Press, California, 1966.

159.   Hanna, Willard A. *The Formation of Malaysia, New Factor in World Politics*, American Universities Field Staff Inc. New York, 1964.

160.   Hanrahan, Gene Z. *The Communist Struggle in Malaya,* University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumper, 1971.

161.   Harmon, Christopher C. *Five Strategies of Terrorism*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 2001.

162.   Hashim, Ahmed S. *The Insurgency in Iraq*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 2003.

163.   Heilbrunn, Otto. *Partisan Warfare*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1962.

164.   Herring, George C. *America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, Third Edition, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1996.

165.   Herrington, Lt. Colonel Stuart A. *Peace With Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam, 1973-1975*, Presido, Novato, California, 1983.

166.   Hills, Alice. *Future War in Cities. Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma*, Frank-Cass, London, 2004.

167.   Hills, Alice. *Hearts and Minds or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians in Urban Operations*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2002.

168.   Hills, Alice. *Something old, something new: security governance in Iraq*, Conflict, Security and Development, 5:2, August 2005.

169.   Hoang, Van Chi. *From Colonialism To Communism, A Case History of North-Vietnam,* Popular Library Inc, New York, 1964.

170.   Hoffman, Bruce. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, Rand Occasional Paper, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, California, June 2004, www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf – accessed 01/05/05.

171.   Hoffman, Frank G. *Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?* Parameters, Summer, 2007.

172.   Hogan, Kevin. *The Psychology of Persuasion, How to Persuade Others to Your Way of Thinking*, Pelican Publishing Company, Gretna, Louisiana, US, 2005.

173.   Hollis, Rosemary. *Getting out of the Iraq trap*, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January 2003.

174.   Hooker, Virginia Matheson. *A short history of Malaysia: linking east and west*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2003.

175.   Hoopes, Townshend. *The Limits of Intervention*, David McKay Company Inc,

New York, 1970.

176.   Hughes-Wilson, Colonel John (UK Army- retired). *Military Intelligence Blunders*, Robinson Publishing, London, 1999.

177.   Hunt, Richard A. *'Pacification', The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA, 1995.

178.   Hyde, Douglas. *The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, a background book*, The Bodley Head, London, 1968.

179.   Ibrahim, Azeem. *Conceptualization of Guerrilla Warfare,* Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 2004.

180.   Indyk, Martin. *Back to the Bazaar*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1, January-February 2002.

181.   International Relations and Security Network. *UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's Parliamentary Statement on Iraq and the Middle East*, February 21st, 2007, se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=23&fileid=773666C1-8F83-8280-D086-EFADEEEA6F03&lng=en – accessed 20/09/07.

182.   Jackson, Paul. *Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2003.

183.   Joes, Anthony James. *Resisting Rebellion. The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*, The University Press of Kentucky, USA, 2006.

184.   Johnson, Chris & Leslie, Jolyon. *Afghanistan. The mirage of peace*, Zed Books, London, UK, 2005.

185.   Jones, General James L. (USMC- retired). *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq*, September 6th, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14232860 – accessed 03/10/07.

186.   Jones, Seth G. *Averting Failure in Afghanistan*, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006.

187.   Kann, Peter. *Obituary for South-Vietnam*, in Bouscaren, Anthony, T. (Editor). *All Quiet on the Eastern Front: The Death of South-Vietnam*, The Devin-Adair Company, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, 1977.

188.   Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam. A History*, Century Publishing, London, 1983.

189.   Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*, Pimlico, Random House, UK, 1994.

190.   Keesing's Research Report, *South-Vietnam- A Political History 1954-1970*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1970.

191.   Kelly, Colonel Francis J. *The Green Berets In Vietnam*, J. Flores Publications, Miami, Florida, USA, 1992.

192.   Kennedy, J. *A. History of Malaya, Second Edition*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1970.

193.   Kenny, Henry J. *Counterinsurgency and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam*, The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, California, 2001, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/35_Kenny.html - accessed 30/03/06.

194.   Khalilzad, Zalmay & Byman, Daniel. *Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State*, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000.

195.   Kilcullen, Lt. Colonel (Dr.) David. *Countering Global Insurgency. A Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Small Wars Journal, September-November 2004, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf - accessed 20/01/07.

196.   Kinross, Stuart. *Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict*, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2004.

197.   Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations. Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-*

Keeping, Faber & Faber, London, 1971.

198.   Knickmeyer, Ellen & Finer, Jonathan. *British Smash Into Iraqi Jail To Free 2 Detained Soldiers*, The Washington Post, September 20th, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/19/AR2005091900572.html?nav=rss_world – accessed 20/09/05.

199.   Kolko, Gabriel. *Vietnam, Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1986.

200.   Komer, Robert. *Bureaucracy at war: U.S. performance in the Vietnam conflict,* Boulder Publishers, Colorado, 1972.

201.   Kramer, Mark. *The Perils of Counterinsurgency, Russia's War in Chechnya*, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004-05.

202.   Krepenivich, Andrew F. Jr. *How to Win in Iraq*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September-October 2005.

203.   Kuster, Thomas A. Jnr. *Dealing with the insurgency spectre*, Military Review, February 1987.

204.   Laird, Melvin R. *Iraq, Learning the Lessons of Vietnam*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84. No. 6, November-December 2005.

205.   Lanning, Michael Lee & Cragg, Dan. *Inside the VC and NVA. The real Story of North-Vietnam's Armed Forces*, Fawcett Columbine, New York, 1992.

206.   Laqueur, Walter. *The Guerrilla Reader, a Historical Anthology*, Wildwood House, London, 1978.

207.   Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1999.

208.   Larson, Charles U. *Persuasion. Reception and Responsibility. Tenth Edition*, Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, California, USA, 2004.

209.   Lee, Kam Hing & Tan, Chee-Beng. *The Chinese in Malaysia*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2000.

210.   Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978.

211.   Lieven, Anatol. *The Pressures on Pakistan*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1, January-February 2002.

212.   Lockhart, Greg. *Nation in Arms, The Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Australia, 1989.

213.   Loyn, Bruce. *Travelling with the Taleban*, BBC News, October 24th, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6081594.stm - accessed 24/10/06.

214.   Luce, Don & Sommer, John. *Viet Nam- The Unheard Voices*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1969.

215.   Luttwack, Edward N. *Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, January-February 2005.

216.   Lynn, John A. *Patterns of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, Military Review, July-August, 2005.

217.   Maclear, Michael. *Vietnam: the ten thousand day war,* Thames Methuen, London, 1981.

218.   Maley, William. *The Afghanistan Wars*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002.

219.   March J.G & Olsen J.P. *The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life*, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, 1984.

220.   Marks, Thomas A. *Urban Insurgency*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 2003.

221.   Marsden, Peter. *Afghanistan: the reconstruction process*, International Affairs,

Vol. 79, No. 1, January 2003.

222.   McAllister, James. *The Lost Revolution: Edward Lansdale and the American Defeat in Vietnam 1964-1968*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.14, No.2, Summer 2003.

223.   McAllister, J.F.O. *Remember This War?* Time Magazine, September 4th, 2006.

224.   McCarthy, Mary. *The Seventeenth Degree,* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, New York, 1974.

225.   McCauley, Martin. *Afghanistan and Central Asia- A Modern History*, Pearson Education, London, 2002.

216.   McFate, Montgomery J.D. (Ph.D). *Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship*, Military Review, March-April 2005.

226.   McGirk, Tim. *War in the shadows*, Time Magazine, October 10th, 2005.

227.   McGirk, Tim & Ware, Michael. *Remember Afghanistan?* Time Magazine, March 8th, 2004.

228.   McMaster, Colonel Herbert (US Army), 2007. The "large gains" comment concerning Coalition progress among the Sunni Tribes in Al Anbar province was made by Colonel McMaster in email discussions with the candidate.

229.   McWilliams, Wayne C. & Piotrowski, Harry. *The World Since 1945*, Fifth Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001.

230.   Metz, Steven. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04.

231.   Metz, Steven & Millen, Lt. Colonel Raymond. *Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity*, Strategic Studies Institute, Project NIC 2020, 2004, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/insurgency.pdf - accessed 11/01/06.

232.   Metz, Steven. *Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB752.pdf -accessed 19/10/07

233.   Michael, George & Scolnick, Joseph. *The Strategic Limits of Suicide Terrorism in Iraq*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2006.

234.   Middleton, Drew. *How Not to Win a War*, in Bouscaren, Anthony, T. (Editor). *All Quiet on the Eastern Front: The Death of South-Vietnam*, The Devin-Adair Company, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, 1977.

235.   Millen, Raymond A. *Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State*, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, www.strategistudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB600.pdf - accessed 18/11/2005.

236.   Miller, Harry. *Jungle War in Malaya, The Campaign against Communism 1948-60*, Arthur Barker Ltd. Bristol, UK, 1972.

237.   Miller, Harry. *The Communist Menace in Malaya*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1954.

238.   Miller, Harry. *The Story of Malaysia*, Faber and Faber, London, 1965.

239.   Miska, Major Steven M. *Growing the Iraqi Security Forces*, Military Review, July-August 2005.

240.   Molloy, Morris H. in Carr, Barry & McKay, Elaine (Editors). *Low Intensity Conflict: Theory and Practice in Central America and South-East Asia*, La Trobe University Institute of Latin American Studies & Monash University Centre of Southeast-Asian Studies, Australia, 1989.

241.   Monten, Jonathan. *The Roots of the Bush Doctrine, Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy*, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2005.

242.   Moore, Robin. *Task force Dagger, The Hunt for bin-Laden. The Inside Story of Special Operations Forces in the War On Terror*, Macmillan, London, 2003.

243.   Moorehead, F.J. *A History of Malaya, Volume One,* Longmans of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1963.

244.   Moss, George Donelson. *An American Ordeal*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, USA, 1990.

245.   MSNBC News, December 1st, 2006. *Growing doubts in US about military strategy*, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14618513/ - accessed 10/12/06.

246.   MSNBC News, February 22nd, 2007. *Chlorine: Old chemical scourge raises new fears*, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17280358/ - *accessed* 21/07/07.

247.   MSNBC News, August 2nd, 2007. *Iraq political developments 'discouraging',* http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20092536/ - accessed 02/08/07.

248.   MSNBC News, October 26th, 2007. *Suicide bomb targets Sunni insurgents in Iraq,* http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21493781/ - accessed 26/10/07.

249.   Nalty, Bernard (Editor). *The Vietnam war: the history of America's conflict in Southeast Asia,* Salamander Books, London, 1996.

250.   National Security Council (NSC-US), *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,* US Government, November 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html - accessed 20/12/05.

251.   Naumes, William & Naumes, Margaret. *The Art and Craft of Case Writing, Second Edition*, M.E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 2006.

252.   Newshour with Jim Leher. *Iraq in Transition,* 2006 (ongoing coverage), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/iraq/ - accessed 14/06/06.

253.   Newshour with Jim Leher, August 22nd, 2007. *President Bush Reaffirms Support for Iraqi Prime Minister*, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec07/almaliki_08-22.html - accessed 23/08/07.

254.   Newshour with Jim Leher, September 12th, 2007. *Petraeus, Crocker Discuss Iraq Assessment*, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec07/petraeus_09-12.html - accessed 13/09/07.

255.   New York Times, September 30th, 2007. *Taliban Rebuffs Karzai's Offer*, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Afghanistan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin – accessed 30/09/07.

256.   O'Balance, Edgar. *The Wars in Vietnam, 1954-1973*. Ian Allan Ltd, London, 1975.

257.   O'Hanlon, Michael E. & Albuquerque, Adriana Lins de. *Afghanistan Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution, Washington, September 2005, www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex - accessed 30/02/06.

258.   O'Hanlon, Michael E. & Campbell, Jason H. *Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Brookings Institution, Washington, January 2007, www.brookings.edu/iraqindex - accessed 09/01/07.

259.   O'Hanlon, Michael E. & Kamp, Nina. *Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Brookings Institution, Washington, April 2006, www.brookings.edu/iraqindex - accessed 30/02/06.

260.   Olson, James S. (Editor). *Dictionary of the Vietnam War*, Greenwood Press, London, 1988.

261.   Olson, James S. & Roberts, Randy. *Where the Domino Fell*, *America and Vietnam 1945-1990*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.

262.   O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism. Inside Modern Revolutionary*

Warfare, Brassey's (US) Inc., 1990.

263.   Ongkili, James P. *Nation Building in Malaysia 1946-1974,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.

264.   Open Society Institute (OSI) & the United Nations Foundation (UNF). *Iraq in Transition, Post-conflict challenges and opportunities*, http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/iraq_2004 1112/iraq_Transition.pdf - accessed 12/01/06.

265.   Oyen, Else. *Comparative Methodology, Theory and Practice in International Social Research*, Sage Publications, London, 1992.

266.   Page, Caroline. *U.S. Official Propaganda During the Vietnam War, 1965-1973, The Limits of Persuasion*, Leicester University Press, London, 1996.

267.   Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1967.

268.   Palmer, General Bruce. *The 25-Year War. America's Military Role in Vietnam*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, USA, 1984.

269.   Paul, Major Roy D. *The Use of Force in the 21st Century,* The United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, April, 2001, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401165&Location=U2&doc=G etTRDoc.pdf – accessed 20/09/07.

270.   Peake, Gordon. *From Warlords to Peacelords?* Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2003.

271.   Peers Commission Report (1970). University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTRIALS/mylai/summary_rpt.html - accessed 05/04/07.

272.   Pemberton, Gregory (Editor). *Vietnam Remembered*, Weldon Publishing, Sydney, 1990.

273.   Perloff, Richard M. *The dynamics of persuasion: communication and attitudes in the 21st century***,** Mahwah Publishers, New Jersey, 2003.

274.   Pike, Douglas. *History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978.

275.   Podhoretz, Norman. *The Panic Over Iraq*, Commentary, Vol. 121, No. 1, January 2006.

276.   Podhoretz, Norman. *Why We Were In Vietnam*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1982.

277.   Porter, Gareth. *A Peace Denied. The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Peace Agreement*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & London, 1975.

278.   Poulton, Robin Edward. *Honour, guns and Jihad-improving childhood and communications in Afghanistan would promote peace*, Conflict, Security & Development 3:3, December 2003.

279.   Prados, John. *The hidden history of the Vietnam War*, I.R Dee (Publisher), Chicago, 1995.

280.   Purcell, Victor. *Malaysia*, Walker and Company, New York, 1967.

281.   Pye, Lucian W. *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya,* Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1956.

282.   Raskin, Marcus G. & Fall, Bernard B. *The Vietnam Reader, Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis*, Vintage Books, New York, 1967.

283.   Rathmell, Andrew. *Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we*

learn? International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, October 2005.

284.   Reardon, Kathleen Kelly. *Persuasion in Practice*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, London, 1991.

285.   Record, Jeffrey. *The wrong war: why we lost in Vietnam,* Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 1998.

286.   Regehr, Ernie. *Afghanistan: Toward counter-insurgency by other means*, Project Ploughshares, Ontario, Canada, 2006, *www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf061.pdf* - accessed 30/01/06.

287.   Rohde, David. *Afghan Police Suffer Setbacks as Taliban Adapt*, New York Times, September 2nd, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/world/asia/02taliban.html?_r=1&oref=slogin – accessed 02/09/07.

254.   Rhodes, Michael R. *Coercion. A Nonevaluative Approach,* Rodopi, Atlanta, 2000.

255.   Ricks, Tom. *Journalist details Iraq 'fiasco'*, Lateline, ABC network, August 24th, 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1723569.htm - accessed 25/08/2006.

256.   Ridderhof, Phillip J. *Combine Action and US Marine Experiences in Vietnam, 1965-71*, Small Wars Journal, June 2005, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ridderhof.htm - accessed 15/03/07.

257.   Roe, Major Andrew M. *To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Good Governance and a Splash of History*, Military Review, November-December 2005.

258.   Rogers, Lieutenant-General Bernard William. *Vietnam Studies. Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point*, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1989, http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/90-7/cont.htm - accessed 04/07/07.

259.   Ross, Brian. *Australia's Military Involvement in the Vietnam War*, © Brian Ross, 1995, http://www.vvaa.org.au/bross-1.pdf - accessed 20/09/07.

260.   Roy, Olivier. *Development and political legitimacy: the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan*, Conflict, Security & Development, 4:2, August 2004.

261.   Rubin, Barnett R. *Saving Afghanistan*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1, January-February 2007.

262.   Rubin, Barry & Rubin, Judith Colp (Editors). *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle-East*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

263.   Rubin, Barry. *The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, November-December 2002.

264.   Rubin, Barry. *The Tragedy of the Middle-East.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2002.

265.   Rushkoff, Douglas. *Coercion, Why We Listen to What "They" Say*, Riverhead Books, New York, 1999.

266.   Ryan, N.J. *A History of Malaysia and Singapore*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976.

267.   Ryan, N.J. *The Making of Modern Malaysia, A History from the earliest times to 1966*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

268.   Saikal, Amin. *Securing Afghanistan's Border*, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006.

269.   Sakr, Naomi. *UN Analysis of Aggregate Arab 'Knowledge Deficit'*, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2, April 2004.

270.   Santoli, Al. *To Bear Any Burden*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999.

271.   Schaffner, Paul E. & Stone, William F. *The Psychology of Politics*, *Second Edition*, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1988.

272.   Scholl-Latour, Peter (translated by Faye Carney), *Death In the Ricefields, Thirty Years of War in Indochina*, Orbis Publishing, London, 1979.

273.   Semple, Kirk. *Basra Raid Finds Dozens Detained by Iraq Spy Unit*, New York Times, March 5th, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html?ex=1330750800&en=4ef0154f8103aad8&ei=5090 - accessed 5/03/07.

274.   Sengupta, Kim & Rahim, Ahmed. *Afghanistan - The dead zone*, The Independent, September 24th, 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article1726097.ece - accessed 24/09/06.

275.   Sepp, Kalev I. *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,* Military Review, May-June 2005.

276.   Serchuk, Vance. *Post-Election Strategy in Afghanistan*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), Washington DC, October 2005, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23360/pub_detail.asp - accessed 14/12/05.

277.   Shanahan, Dennis. *Surge working: top US general*, The Australian, August 31st, 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22337285-31477,00.html - accessed 31/08/07.

278.   Shaw, Geoffrey D.T. *Laotian 'Neutrality': A Key Vietnam War Blunder*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2002.

279.   Shaw, Geoffrey D.T. *Policemen versus Soldiers, the Debate Leading to MAAG Objections and Washington Rejections of the Core of the British Counter- Insurgency Advice*, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 2001.

280.   Short, Anthony. *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960,* Frederick Muller Limited, London, 1975.

281.   Sidman, Murray. *Coercion and its fallout*, Authors Cooperative Inc. Publishers, Boston, 1989.

282.   Singer, P.W. *Outsourcing War (private military firms)*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84. No. 2, March-April 2005.

283.   Smith, E.D. *Counter-Insurgency Operations: 1. Malaya and Borneo*, Ian Allan Ltd., Surrey, UK, 1985.

284.   Smith, R.B. *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III, The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, London, 1991.

285.   Snepp, Frank. *Decent Interval, An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam*, Random House, New York, 1977.

286.   Sobchak, Major Frank. *Clausewitz: "On Afghanistan"*, Military Review, July-August, 2005.

287.   Soliven, Maximo V. in Ray, Sibnarayan (Editor). *Vietnam seen from East and West- An International Symposium*, Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd. Melbourne, 1966.

288.   Stewart, Richard W (Editor). *The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003*, Army Historical Series, American Military History, Volume II, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2005, http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/index.htm - accessed 17/10/06.

289.   Stone, Deborah. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making Revised Edition*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2002.

290.   Stone, Gerald L. *War Without Honour*, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1966.

291.	Stubbs, R. *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare*, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 1989.

292.	Summers, Harry G. Jnr. *Vietnam War Almanac*, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1985.

293.	Sweetenham, Sir Frank. *British Malaya, An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya*, The Bodley Company, New York, 1907.

294.	Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), *Howard's speech on Iraq*, May 20th, 2004, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/19/1084917646034.html - accessed 20/09/07.

295.	Taber, Robert. *The War of the Flea. A Study of Guerrilla Warfare, Theory and Practice,* Paladin, UK, 1977.

296.	Taguba, Major General Antonio (US). *Taguba Report*, 2004, FindLaw, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html- accessed 24/08/07.

297.	Tanham, George. *Communist Revolutionary Warfare*, Metheuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1962.

*298.	Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan. A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Taliban*, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2002.

*299.	Thayer, Carlyle. War by other means, National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, 1954-60*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989.

300.	The World Today, April 10th, 2007. *Australian Troops to target Taliban leadership: Nelson*, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2007/s1893390.htm - accessed 11/04/07.

301.	Thies, Wallace J. *When Governments Collide, Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1980.

302.	Thomas, Evan & Nordland, Rod. *Death of a Terrorist*, Newsweek, June 19th, 2006.

*303.	Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency, Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1966.

304.	Tomes, Robert R. *Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Parameters, Spring 2004.

305.	Topmiller, Robert J. *The Lotus Unleashed, The Buddhist Peace Movement in South-Vietnam, 1964-1966*, The University of Kentucky Press, 2002.

306.	Townshend, Charles. *The Oxford History of Modern War*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

307.	Tregonning, K.G. *A History of Malaya*, Eastern University Press Ltd, London, 1964.

308.	Trullinger, James Walker Jr. *Village at War, An Account of Revolution in Vietnam*, Longman Inc., New York, 1980.

309.	Tucker, Spencer C. (Editor). *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, A Political, Social and Military History*, Abc-Clio, Santa Barbara, California, 1998.

310.	Tucker, Spencer C. *Vietnam*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, USA, 1999.

311.	Turley, William S. *The Second Indochina War, A Short Political and Military History, 1945-1975*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1986.

312.	US Marines Training Command. *Theory of Unconventional Warfare- Lesson Three*, http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/cce/students/pme/csc/8809/w8809L3.pdf - accessed 17/09/04.

313.	Valentine, Douglas. *The Phoenix program*, Morrow Publishers, New York, 1990.

314.	Van Canh, Nguyen with Cooper, Earle. *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982*. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1983.

315.	VanDeMark, Brian. *Into the Quagmire, Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of*

the Vietnam War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.

316.   Vandiver, Frank E. *Shadows of Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson's Wars*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1997.

317.   Vargas, Elizabeth. *Wolf Brigade Said to Be Effective, at Times Brutal Unit Known for Aggressiveness Training to Replace U.S. Troops*, ABC America News, December 13th, 2005,

http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/IraqWhereThingsStand/story?id=1403032 - accessed 26/06/06.

318.   Vickers, George R. *U.S. Military Strategy and the Vietnam War*, in Werner, Jayne S. & Huynh, Luu Doan. *The Vietnam War, Vietnamese and American Perspectives*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1993.

319.   Von Hippel, Karin. *Back-pedalling in Iraq: lessons unlearned*, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004.

320.   Wang, Gungwu (Editor). *Malaysia- A Survey*, F.W. Cheshire, Sydney, Australia, 1964.

321.   Ware, Michael. *The Most Dangerous Place*, Time Magazine, May 29th, 2006.

322.   Warner, Denis. *Not With Guns Alone*, Hutchinson of Australia, Melbourne, 1977.

323.   Watt, Allan. *Vietnam, An Australian Analysis*, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968.

324.   Waxman, Congressman Henry A. *Letter to Parsons Corporate Headquarters*, November 6th, 2007, http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071106151246.pdf - accessed 07/11/07.

325.   Wertheimer, Alan. *Coercion*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987.

326.   Westmoreland, General William C. *"The Year of Decision-1968"*, in Gettleman, Marvin E. Franklin, Jane. Young, Marilyn & Franklin, H. Bruce. *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, Grove Press Inc., New York, 1985.

327.   Whitehouse Press Release, July 10th, 2007. *Iraq Fact Check: Responding to Key Myths* http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070710-3.html - accessed 20/07/07.

328.   Whittaker, David J. *Terrorism, Understanding the Global Threat*, Longman, London, 2002.

329.   Whitaker, Raymond & Cornwell, Rupert. *Is surge working? US commanders hail fall in Baghdad killings*, The Independent, April 1st, 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2411393.ece - accessed 01/04/07.

330.   Wilkinson, R.J. (C.M.G.). *A History of the Peninsular Malays with Chapters on Parak and Selangor, 3rd edition,* Kelly and Walsh Limited, Singapore, 1923.

331.   Wintle, Justin. *The Viet Nam wars*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson (Academic), London, 1991.

332.   Woodruff, Mark W. *Unheralded Victory, Who Won the Vietnam War?* Harper Collins Publishers, London, 2000.

333.   Woodside, A.B. *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam*, Houghton & Mifflin, Boston, 1976.

334.   Young, Marilyn B. *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990*, HarperPerennial, New York, 1991.

335.   Zakaria, Fareed, Newsweek, March 5th, 2007. *The Surge That Might Work,* http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17316434/site/newsweek/ - accessed 06/03/07.