

An abstract painting featuring a central figure with a face, rendered in a style reminiscent of Expressionism or Cubism. The figure is composed of various shapes and colors, including white, grey, brown, and red. The background is filled with complex, overlapping patterns and textures, creating a sense of depth and movement. The overall composition is dense and layered, with a focus on form and color.

Richard Lansdown

THE AUTONOMY
OF LITERATURE

The Autonomy of Literature

Also by Richard Lunsdown

BYRON'S HISTORICAL DRAMAS

The Autonomy of Literature

Richard Lansdown

Lecturer in English
James Cook University
Cairns
Queensland
Australia





First published in Great Britain 2001 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 0-333-92134-8



First published in the United States of America 2001 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, LLC,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 0-333-92134-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lunsdown, Richard. 1961-

The autonomy of literature / Richard Lunsdown.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-333-92134-8

1. Criticism—History—20th century. 2. Criticism—United States—
History—20th century. 3. Criticism—Great Britain—History—20th
century. 4. Literature, Modern—20th century—History and criticism.
I. Title.

PN94 .L36 2000
801'.95—dc21

00-041517

© Richard Lunsdown 2001

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Clappenham, Wiltshire

for my mother and my father

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
Introduction	1
1 Institutionalism and Ideality	12
2 'A New Spin on the Old Words': Criticism and Philosophy	49
2.1 Richard Rorty	51
2.2 Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor	63
2.3 Martha Nussbaum	78
3 'These Shafts Can Conquer Troy, These Shafts Alone': Criticism and Psychoanalysis	95
3.1 Freud	98
3.2 Object relations	120
3.3 'The Secret Sharer'	128
4 'A Province of Truth': Criticism and History	145
4.1 R.G. Collingwood	146
4.2 New Historicism	150
4.3 Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur	176
5 Four Objections	201
5.1 'Approaching' literature	201
5.2 What institutionalists say and what they mean	211
5.3 Who, we? Effects on readers	218
5.4 Derrida again	222
<i>Notes</i>	239
<i>Index</i>	261

Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to thank the people who have given their time so generously and helped in the writing of this book: especially Jane Adamson, Bill Arfin, Rosemary Ashton, Simon Haines, Seumas Miller, the late Ralf Norrman, Peter Pierce, Stephen Torre, and Susan Triggell.

As the reader will discover, two individuals have had a particularly powerful influence over the argument presented here. Sam Goldberg saw only a fraction of the book before his death in 1991, but his work and example remained an inspiration long after, and remain so still. His friend Dan Jacobson, by contrast, saw the book coming and saw it through to the very end, reading, commenting, and corresponding indefatigably. He has been doing the same job for this particular writer now for twenty years.

Special acknowledgement must also be made to Nick Royle and Alex Segal, who responded to earlier versions of my discussion of Derrida in Chapter 1 with tact, with exemplary patience, and with invaluable suggestions for further reading. They are responsible for the argument presented there only in the sense that it would have been worse without their help.

A special thanks is also due to the staff and students of the School of English Philology at the University of Tampere, in which calm and conducive environment the groundwork for the study was laid, many years ago.

At Macmillan, and under Macmillan's auspices, two people expressed a faith in the project without which it might never have seen the light: Charmian Hearne and Professor John Sutherland.

My wife Angela has stood by, understood, and put up with these obsessions; without her it could not have been done. As for Sam and Holly: well, if the truth were told, you delayed this book – but in doing so, you made it better, too.

Trinity Beach, Queensland

Introduction

Any future historian of literary criticism and theory in the English-speaking world during the second half of the twentieth century will have a long and complex tale to tell, no doubt. But the basic lines of development will be clear enough. In Britain and its erstwhile colonies and in the United States two very different but generally dominant critical practices – the school of Leavis and the New Criticism – came increasingly under pressure from traditions of thought and analytic procedures essentially new to both of them, and derived from Continental philosophy and social science. In the years after the Second World War certain Continental intellectual traditions, of French origin particularly, re-invented and re-deployed themselves, with lasting effect on 'the languages of criticism and the sciences of man'.

The words just quoted are taken from the title of a famous conference at Johns Hopkins University in 1966, where the structuralist revolution was formally introduced to American academia. Essential to Leavis himself and the New Critics had been the arriving at judgements of moral and aesthetic value by way of 'close reading' of literary texts. The structuralists, by contrast, had little patience with those concerns; they concentrated instead on trying to illustrate the general laws through which all systems of communication – languages, literatures, styles of clothing, indeed all modes of human expression – sought to order experience. Subsequently structuralism of this kind, associated with Lévi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson, and the 'early' Barthes, gave way to the post-structuralism that had been at work within and alongside it for many years and which, with its even more radical scepticism about any conceivable stability of meaning, selfhood, or 'closure', looked back to such thinkers as Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Indeed, Jacques Derrida himself had been one of the star performers at the 1966 conference mentioned above, and it was there that he gave a paper now regarded as a positive cornerstone of post-structuralism: 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'. Derrida was a crucial figure in the post-structuralist transformation, but he was not alone: Gilles Deleuze's *Nietzsche et la philosophie* had appeared as early as 1962; Foucault's even more epoch-marking *Folie et déraison* a year earlier still. In the mid- to late-sixties, and after the 1966 conference in Maryland, the movement massively extended and consolidated the territory it had apparently conquered: Foucault's *Les Mots et les Choses* appeared in 1966, Lacan's *Écrits* in the same year, and Derrida's *Le mot mirabilis* came in 1967, with *De la Grammatologie, Écriture et la différence*, and *La Voix et la phénomène*. Over the years immediately following, Foucault and Derrida produced further major works, as did Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Hélène Cixous. Finally, Jean-François Lyotard's *La Condition postmoderne*, published in 1979, gave the whole group a veritable kick into cyber-space.

Naturally there were delays in the spread of this revolution in the English-speaking world, indicated as often as not by the gaps intervening between the appearance of these books in their original language and in English translation. *Folie et déraison* was published in 1961, translated in 1967; *Les Mots et les Choses* waited from 1966 to 1970; *Écrits* from 1966 to 1977; *De la Grammatologie* from 1967 to 1976. (Deleuze's book on Nietzsche had to wait until 1983.) There was a perceptible time-lag, therefore; and it is probably true to say that it was not until the mid-seventies that the movement really began to come into its own in the English-speaking literary and philosophical worlds, to generate its English-speaking disciples, and to attract heavyweight English-speaking critical notice. Nor of course was it the case that Derrida single-handedly produced the Yale School of deconstruction simply by working there: individuals connected with Yale University such as Paul de Man and Geoffrey Hartman had been thinking along similar lines before his arrival, though clearly his presence served as an irreplaceable catalyst.

For various reasons the rate and extent of the uptake of this new thinking was markedly different in Britain and America. Many more Continental thinkers and academics went to America after the Second World War than went to Britain. (No one comparing England in 1946 with California at the same time would be surprised by that.) Those thinkers and academics, naturally enough, fostered and sustained links with colleagues in Europe who were then invited to the States for longer or shorter periods of time. Cultural conditions in America generally,

but especially in American academic and intellectual life, also strongly encouraged this development. Some of the fostering conditions were very broad indeed: they can perhaps best be indicated by the fact that the representative literary intellectual of nineteenth-century Britain was Matthew Arnold, whereas his American counterpart, one would have to say, was Ralph Waldo Emerson. The British, in other words, had a long tradition of empiricism; the Americans of idealism. Other conditions were more specific and historically quantifiable, however: the German university system, for example, had had a preponderant influence on the American one in the period of revolution and enlargement in the years following the Civil War.

In any event and for whatever reason the intellectual atmosphere in the two countries – or two centres of influence – has been very different, though a common language and a close social and political relationship perhaps combines to obscure the fact. If we take an intellectual discipline as far removed from literary criticism as possible, while still being one of the humanities – Anthropology, say – there were great differences of intellectual approach separating British social anthropologists inspired originally by Malinowski (himself an expatriate Pole) and their American counterparts inspired originally by Boas (himself an expatriate German). In psychoanalysis, there are similar differences between the Object Relations school associated with Melanie Klein and the ego-psychology practised by Hartmann, Erickson, and others. In literary-critical terms there grew up in America a *wissenschaftliche* interest in interpretation – increasingly embodied in the New Criticism as it evolved in the years leading up to the Second World War. In Britain this subject has never been so eagerly pursued.

For these reasons (and there are of course many others) the new departures in Continental thought, and especially Francophone thought, had a deeper, broader, and more rapid impact in America than in Britain. But then, as has happened before in the history of American universities – we might think of Irving Babbitt and the neo-humanism he sought to deploy against the Germanic professionalization of university life mentioned above – a sudden change of emphasis made itself felt. The energy of the post-structuralist, deconstructionist movement began noticeably to run down, whereas the energy building up within its opponents suddenly flared into activity. Without doubt a decisive event here was the revelation in 1987 of Paul de Man's wartime activities on behalf of, or at the very least his intellectual collusion with, the pro-Nazi Belgian government. To the de Man scandal many other moral and ethical doubts about certain post-structuralists' personal and

professional lives attached themselves, however loosely and in how-ever anecdotal or gossipy a fashion: Lacan's professional idiosyncrasies; Foucault's Maoism and his apparent support for Pol Pot; even Althusser's having murdered his wife; and so on. But there were other concerns at issue, too, regarding the very basis of the post-structuralist, deconstructionist, post-modernist project. In particular exception was taken to its suppressing, ignoring, or debunking of the ethical dimension of human life – which then came back, after the de Man revelations, to haunt the project with a vengeance. Deconstruction was now seen to be insufficiently political, in the affirmative or practical sense, and also insufficiently focused on history.

In short, as some critics began to suggest, America had performed her old trick of seducing the European; and the New Criticism, by dragging the newcomer back into the constraints of 'close reading', had transformed deconstruction at least as much as it had itself been transformed. The response of the deconstructionist movement to these accusations – basically to assert that, contrary to appearances, it was *more* ethical, *more* political, and *more* historical than anybody or anything else – only seemed to underline its desperation. And soon the inevitable happened: books appeared (by writers generally sympathetic to deconstruction I hasten to add) with titles like *In the Wake of Theory* (Paul Bové, 1992), *Beyond Deconstruction* (Howard Felperin, 1985), *The Wake of Deconstruction* (Barbara Johnson, 1994), *After Derrida* (Nick Royle, 1995), etc. Then even they dried up.

What emerged in the wake of deconstruction – that is to say, the most radical wing of the post-structuralist movement – had been predicted by one of its American elder statesmen, J. Hillis Miller, in a Presidential Address (the very notion is inconceivable in Britain!) given to the Modern Language Association of America in 1986, the year before the de Man catastrophe. Miller could see the writing on the wall, and what the moving finger spelled out was that the highly refined, literary-philosophical episteme of Derrida and Yale was inexorably giving way to the socio-historical one of Foucault and California. The representative figures and tutelary spirits of American literary study were no longer Miller himself, Geoffrey Hartman, or Barbara Johnson, but Stephen Greenblatt and Edward Said. 'As everyone knows', Miller said,

literary study in the past few years has undergone a sudden, almost universal turn away from theory in the sense of an orientation toward language as such and has made a corresponding turn toward history, culture, society, politics, institutions, class and gender conditions,

the social context, the material base in the sense of institutionalization, conditions of production, technology, distribution, and consumption of 'cultural products,' among other products. This trend is so obvious everywhere as hardly to need description. How many symposia, conferences, scholarly convention sessions, courses, books, and new journals recently have had the word *history*, *politics*, *society*, or *culture* in their titles?¹

The velvet revolution described by Hillis Miller in 1986 has gone on unabated to this day; and what is more to the point perhaps is that this time the British have not lagged behind. If the Americans in the mid-eighties suddenly discovered (in Hillis Miller's words) 'the impatience to get on with it, that is, not to get lost in the indefinite delays of methodological debates but to make the study of literature count in our society' (my italics), the British had possessed just such a tradition of thought ever since the fifties. It may have been unglamorous and neglected by comparison with Sartre, Paris, and '68, but writers like Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and Stuart Hall had been steadily plugging away, finding aid and succour in historians like E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Christopher Hill, and ultimately establishing an institutional home for their own preoccupations in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham.

Even here, though, there are important differences between Britain and America, which principally have their origin in the two countries' wholly different leftist traditions. New Historicism, for all the worthy aims Hillis Miller ascribed to it in 1986, seems almost irretrievably academic by comparison with Hoggart's surveys of working-class literacy. It is hard to see how a displaced bonnet once belonging to Cardinal Wolsey – the subject of an essay of Stephen Greenblatt's in *Learning to Curse* – is likely to make the study of literature count in our society. That much said, it is also true that the British socialist tradition has in recent years itself lost much of its own *élan*; and while there is Cultural Studies in Britain (and Australia) there are also plenty of writers – and a research industry more generally speaking – virtually indistinguishable from American New Historicism.

For the first time, then, a degree of consensus has arisen, right across the English-speaking academic literary world. The preoccupations which Hillis Miller anticipated have indeed come to dominate the field. It is not that theory has died; far from it – Miller's presidential address was called 'The Triumph of Theory' after all. But it has been shouldered aside by a cuckoo in the nest. Deconstruction goes on; radical

post-structuralism and psychoanalysis goes on: but the overwhelming bulk of literary work in the contemporary English-speaking university is oriented as Miller suggested. Around the amorphous body of historicism – which may not even call itself either historicism or cultural studies – hang all the other critical subcultures hoping, in some way or another, ‘to make the study of literature count in our society’: post-colonialism, gender studies, feminism, Marxism, ‘queer lit.’, and so on.

All this in fact marks the triumph of theory. When Hillis Miller lists the things newly on offer in 1986 – ‘history, culture, society, politics, institutions, class and gender conditions, the social context, the material base in the sense of institutionalization, conditions of production, technology, distribution, and consumption of “cultural products”’ – we know that it was the French who put them there, or put them there in that fashion. The great ziggurat of structuralist and post-structuralist thought, however – from Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, and Althusser, to Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida – has become not much more than a kind of scaffolding, ready to be kicked away. An interest in structures has given way to an interest in *institutions*, and the transition has thus been effected to the quasi-pluralist consensus we have today – namely, that literature is itself no more than one institution among many others and, like all other institutions, it is ultimately shaped as a cultural product by the socio-political and ideological forces to which it is subjected.

The existence of the consensus I have just tried to describe is nowhere made more clear than in its hostility to one intellectual tradition in particular. The various organs of an institutional persuasion may argue with each other, may compare and contrast their ‘approaches’ or ‘perspectives’ – the plenitude of their own, the limitations of others – but to one member of the family they never accord even this degree of civility. The house of theory has many mansions, with room for all the languages of criticism and the sciences of man: but no room can be made in it for the reprobate to which the derogatory term ‘liberal humanism’ has been assigned. He is the Joseph, stripped of his coat and thrown down the well.

These are the circumstances in which the present work seeks to establish its place. The decent and praiseworthy institutionalist objective of making the study of literature count almost invariably involves making it count *in a particular way* (in a queer way, in a feminist way, in a post-colonialist way, in a liberal Marxist-cum-leftist ‘committed’ sort of a way), and therein lies the rub. Even in hailing the new consensus in 1986 Hillis Miller was careful to place a thorn within the bouquet he was holding out to it. ‘I have great sympathy for this shift,’

he said: 'but not when it takes the form of an exhilarating experience of liberation from the obligation to read, carefully, patiently, with nothing taken for granted beforehand.' In other words, the compulsion to make literature count in one particular way can have the effect of reducing its ability to count at all.²

This book is written in the belief that literature has a life of its own, but one which is not in opposition to all other forms of life. On the contrary, the life that literature evinces comes from its ever-shifting modes of dealing with and transforming whatever lies outside it. Every individual work of literature seeks to address us in its own manner and for its own ends, of that we may be sure: with the artist breathing down both its neck and (often enough) our own. But there need be nothing either naïve or ideologically collusive in insisting, in response, on those features of the work which institutionalism cannot assimilate and digest, and which for want of better words we had better call its imaginative, formal, and moral elements. That is what this book wants to argue, at least: that the institutionalist consensus is inadequate and that something like the position outlined in the pages that follow is necessary, not to vanquish the modern consensus in one more bout of the theory wars, but to supplement it. But I should say here immediately that this study will not directly confront the great shift of literary-critical interest and focus described by Hillis Miller. Institutionalism has a long life and takes many forms, and the intention here, for the most part at least, is to consider its more sophisticated and intellectually ambitious variants in certain intellectual disciplines aside from criticism itself. The point of departure is Hillis Miller's recognition of how things stand in the study of English just recently and just now; but the intention of the study is something broader than polemic alone.

The first chapter of this study clears some room for the concept of autonomy advanced and illustrated in the book as a whole. In particular, it considers the view of literature advanced by those I have begun to characterize as 'institutionalists': those who see literature as the more or less passive recipient of institutional influence. (I mean by this influences derived most obviously from social institutions such as the media or the state; but I also use the term in a broader sense to refer to the historical context of a work, for example, or the individual writer's psychological disposition and settled philosophical preconceptions.) Jacques Derrida and Pierre Macherey are discussed in this connection.

At the same time the chapter follows the institutionalists in general and Derrida in particular in rejecting the notion that literature possesses 'ideality', some kind of essential philosophical, literary, or aesthetic quality which is its permanent guardian and guarantor. Thus the first chapter and the study as a whole defend a notion of autonomy similar to that which can be put forward with respect to human individuals: that a person is autonomous to the degree that what he or she thinks and does cannot be explained without reference to his or her own activity of mind.

This idea of literary activity – analogous but not identical to human mental activity – is distinguished from both mere chance and the myth of inspiration, and is seen instead in terms of dialogue and dialectic. There is the dialogue between the literary text and what lies outside it on the one hand, and there is the dialogue the text establishes with its author and its readers about itself: a dialogue in which sometimes the text and sometimes the author appears to have the upper hand. Finally, therefore (and to 'even the scores' if you like), the chapter comments on the theory of literary activity advanced by T.S. Eliot in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. If one of the effects of Derrida's thought has been for critics to overemphasize the weakness of the literary text in the face of the contaminatory, institutional influences which surround it, then Eliot tends to overemphasize its strength, *vis-à-vis* the virtually passive author. Somewhere between these two positions, this study argues, the truth about literature's autonomy lies.

There then follow three chapters which are in varying degrees both 'theoretical' (forensic and 'negative') and 'practical' (descriptive, and 'positive') in orientation. In each case the institutional claims made on literature by some practitioners within a particular intellectual discipline are analysed. Philosophy is the subject of Chapter 2, Psychoanalysis of Chapter 3, and History – or at least historical and narratological theories of literature – is the subject of Chapter 4. Such practitioners need not necessarily be institutionalists by conviction; but as often as not they are.

These three chapters are largely self-explanatory, but two important issues about their manner of proceeding should be raised in advance. First, The New Historicist critics and historical narratologists discussed in Chapter 4 are a fairly representative group. Similarly, Chapter 3 discusses Sigmund Freud as well as some important figures in the Object Relations school of psychoanalysis: so this chapter, too, covers some highly representative psychoanalytical writers. (The great exception here, needless to say, is the contribution of Jacques Lacan, which cannot be discussed in detail for lack of space.) But Chapter 2 really does

limit itself to a small – though at present highly significant – area of Philosophy's dealings with literature: a group of North American Aristotelians with avowed literary interests. None of these chapters is intended to be a complete discussion of criticism's institutional negotiations with the fields concerned – even if such a discussion could ever be achieved – but only a fair and reasonable picture of significant aspects of them.

The second issue is this: each of these chapters, as I have said, tends to adopt a forensic and on occasion a frankly polemical attitude. But as I say repeatedly in what follows, the intention is by no means to forbid philosophers, psychoanalysts, and history theorists from reading literature, or to cultivate a 'hands-off literature' attitude, or to use some notional authority vested in the literary critic to banish illegal immigrants. I end up disagreeing with all my invited guests; but I do not disagree *entirely* with any of them, and credit is given wholeheartedly where it is due. 'Those who wish to turn the page on philosophy', Derrida has suggested (see p. 243, footnote 49), 'only end up doing philosophy badly.' I do not think literary criticism need or should be nearly so sanctimonious about its nature and activities. The study acknowledges the vital and irreplaceable contributions made to literary study – again and again, and for all time – by 'outsiders'. There are occasions when I think Freud, or Richard Rorty, or Hayden White are plain wrong; but overall and in the end the differences are mostly ones of emphasis (however crucial emphasis can be): cases where, in my view, partial accounts of literature are presented as complete ones, or certain factors – historical or psychological causation, for example – are dogmatically and reductively presented as being of primary importance.

So much for the theoretical, forensic, and negative side of these three central chapters. In each case, however, as and when space and opportunity permit, the pendulum swings to other but intimately related concerns, or the argument sees the same concerns from other points of view. First and foremost, negative or polemical theoretical discussion in almost every case is accompanied by the introduction and furthering of a positive theory of literature, and this is where my debt to the authorities I have criticized becomes particularly clear: for I could not have gone on to improve (if I may say so) Richard Rorty's or Martha Nussbaum's or Sigmund Freud's or Stephen Greenblatt's accounts of literature if those accounts had not been available in the first place. So it is that the theoretical problems I see in other writers encourage me gradually and intermittently to spell out a positive theory of literature of my own: that literature is more morally problematic and unpredictable

than the American Aristotelians allow, for example; or that the artist's practice in at once exercising and foregoing creative control over the work is a more important critical principle than wish-fulfilment and the return of the repressed dwelt upon by Freud and others; or that the distinction between history and literature on the grounds of truth is in certain key respects unreliable (for they are evidently both true, only in different ways); and so on.

On each occasion, moreover, the attempt is made – again, subject to space and opportunity – to see the issues raised from literature's point of view, as it were. The three central chapters contain a variety of literary examples – albeit mostly, necessarily, brief ones. Sometimes I use these in order to make a forensic or polemical point, to be sure; but I also use my literary examples to further positive discussion. Thus *Lolita*, *Middlemarch*, *Wuthering Heights*, Henry James, and Daniel Defoe come to my aid in Chapter 2; Dickens, Jane Austen, and Charlotte Brontë – but above all Joseph Conrad and William Wordsworth – are volunteered in Chapter 3; and Emily Dickinson, *King Lear*, and *Northanger Abbey* perform similar services in Chapter 4. The reader will recognize these discussions as being broadly 'traditional', in literary-critical terms: tending unquestionably, in some respects at least, towards the moral, the formalist, and the liberal-humane end of the spectrum.

But – as I began to suggest at the end of the first section of this Introduction – the study is also quite clearly not altogether happy with that particular concatenation of attitudes, long-lived as it certainly has been in the English critical tradition. The literature I have worked with encourages me to reconsider moralism, formalism, and liberal humanism (above all and in particular) often quite radically. In fact it demands that I do so. It may well be, for example, that the critical writers examined in the theoretical discussions would not in fact disagree with the practical analyses presented alongside them. But that is not as important as it sounds: the important issue is that my intention is to present textual analyses which my chosen theoreticians could not themselves have provided, their foci of interest being what they are. The aim in this respect is twofold: to suggest in practical terms the many forms literature's autonomy can take; and to justify a mode of criticism that responds accordingly.

There remain four issues that are central to the case I seek to present, but which do not fit neatly into the chapters outlined above. In order to engage the reader and to outline these issues directly and economically, I have written of them in an adversarial mode as 'Four Objections': but the chapter makes it quite clear that there is no attempt on my part

to forestall or disarm every criticism which such a study will attract. The four objections raised are those which, being answered, might most successfully advance the argument as a whole. The aim is to draw together the various strands of the book and attempt to provide a more comprehensive account of the relations between reader, writer and the world at large than those described and criticized in previous pages.