

though with a strength mediated by the knowledge of Mandarin phonotactic constraints. The results give support and add further constraints to the use of the sublexical route in L2 Mandarin word production.

Why do we believe people more when they repeat themselves?

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Sometimes, one eyewitness can be just as believable as three. This study addresses two possible explanations for why one eyewitness repeating themselves is just as believable as three eyewitnesses each making the same claim once. More specifically, we wanted to know whether one eyewitness repeating themselves became more credible because 1) people misinterpret the consistency of an eyewitness for the accuracy of that eyewitness, or 2) people fail to weigh the evidence based on the number of sources the evidence comes from—relying solely on the familiarity of the evidence. Our findings suggest that when judging evidence, people fail to account for how many sources it has come from.

Yours or mine: Ownership in the visuomotor system

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Individual possessions are an integral part of self identity (e.g. Belk, 1988 & Dittmar, 1992). However, the property of others is also important. The ability to track who owns what, for example, is critical to social cognition as indirectly evidenced by the early development of this ability in late infancy (Fasig, 2000). Recent research shows that social factors associated with an experimental task affect our hand-object interactions (Becchio, Satori, Bulgheroni & Castiello, 2008). Here I provide some of the first evidence that the social context of ownership is recognised and used by the visuomotor system when interacting with and responding to objects that differ in terms of ownership status, despite ownerships irrelevance to the experimental task. These results provide additional support for the idea of embodied cognition: higher level processes such as thought cannot be clearly disentangled from low level processes such as perception and action.

The hemispheric specialisation in the affective appraisal of music

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Humans are not symmetrical. Asymmetries are observed in differences in everything from the size of a person's feet through to hand preferences for motor tasks. There are also well known neurological asymmetries, for example language processing occurs predominantly in the left-hemisphere. This study investigated the influence of language and hemispheric asymmetries in appraising music. Monolingual English speakers ($N= 40$) were presented music clips, with native, foreign language or no lyrics, to the left or right ear and asked to indicate how pleasant they found the clip. Music was appraised as more unpleasant when presented to the left ear and instrumental music was more pleasant than music with lyrics. Response times were faster for music with native lyrics compared to instrumentals. These results indicate neurological asymmetries for affective appraisals and underscore the influence of language in these appraisals. The findings are interpreted as consistent with the Valence Model of emotional lateralisation.

Categorisation of facial affect: Assessing the evaluative context hypothesis

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It has been demonstrated that the categorisation of facial affect is moderated by cues of group membership and suggested that this is due to the differential evaluation of own and other group members (evaluative context hypothesis). To evaluate the accuracy of this explanation, participants categorised the emotional expressions of own and other race faces (Experiment 1) and own and other age faces (experiment 2) displaying happy, neutral and angry expressions. Implicit evaluations of own and other group members were also measured via affective priming. Categorisation of emotion was not influenced by cues of group membership in the direction predicted by the evaluative context hypothesis. There was also no relationship between differential evaluations of own and other group members and the predicted moderating effect of group membership on the categorisation of emotion. These results bring into question the accuracy and generalisability of the evaluative context hypothesis.